Joseph Shine v. Union of India

Case Name: Joseph Shine v. Union of India

Citation: 2019 (3) SCC 39

Petitioner: Joseph Shine

Respondents: Union of India

CASE BRIEF:

In the landmark judgment of Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018), the Supreme Court of India declared Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, unconstitutional, thereby decriminalising adultery. This provision, introduced in 1860 during British colonial rule, criminalised adultery when a married woman engaged in sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband, provided it occurred without the consent or connivance of her husband. However, under this statute, only the man could be prosecuted and penalised, while the woman involved was exempt from punishment. The punishment could extend up to five years of imprisonment, a fine, or both. The provision treated women as property of their husbands, ignoring their autonomy and capacity for individual decision-making.

The Supreme Court invalidated Section 497 of the IPC on the grounds that it violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. A five-judge constitutional bench, through four concurring judgments, unanimously held that the provision was discriminatory, archaic, and violated the principles of dignity, privacy, and equality. In conjunction, Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), which limited the right to initiate proceedings under Section 497 to the husband of the woman, was also struck down. This decision reversed earlier rulings in Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay (1954 SCR 930), Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India ((1985) Supp SCC 137), and Vishnu Revathi v. Union of India ((1988) 2 SCC 72).

FACTS:

Joseph Shine, an Indian citizen from Kerala, filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 497 IPC. It is widely reported that Shine was motivated by a personal tragedy involving a close friend’s suicide, which was allegedly linked to the criminal implications and social stigma associated with adultery accusations.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 497 of the IPC, read in conjunction with Section 198(2) of the CrPC, violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution of India.

LAWS:

• Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 321

• Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985) Supp SCC 137

• Vishnu Revathi v. Union of India (1988) 2 SCC 72

Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Adultery Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is, and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be, the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. In such case, the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.

Article 14 – Right to Equality The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

Article 15 – Prohibition of Discrimination (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

Article 21 – Right to Life and Personal Liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Section 198(2) CrPC (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence punishable under section 497 or section 498 of the said Code: Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner’s Argument:

• The petitioner’s counsel contended that several aspects of Section 497 infringed upon the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.

• They argued that the law, formulated during colonial times, was outdated and lacked relevance in modern society.

• Section 497, along with Section 198(2) CrPC, was said to violate Article 14 by creating a gender-based classification without any rational justification. The law criminalised adultery based solely on the gender of the offender, disregarding the consent of the woman involved.

• The petitioner argued that the provision reflected patriarchal assumptions, treating women as the property of their husbands. It was pointed out that if the husband consented to the extramarital relationship, the act would not constitute adultery.

• The law was discriminatory as it only allowed men to prosecute adulterous relationships, which was a clear violation of Article 15.

• It was argued that the statute denied women their right to seek legal recourse if their husbands committed adultery, thereby entrenching gender inequality.

• The counsel emphasized that the provision infringed upon a woman’s right to dignity, autonomy, and sexual agency, thus breaching Article 21. The act of consensual sexual relations between adults, they asserted, falls within the ambit of the Right to Privacy.

• Women were objectified under this law, with their rights subordinated to the husband’s consent or disapproval.

• The provision, according to the petitioner, was paternalistic and arbitrary, failing to meet the standards of modern constitutional jurisprudence.

• Furthermore, it was argued that if sexual relations were consensual, both parties should be equally liable, highlighting the discriminatory nature of punishing only the male partner.

• The petitioner also advocated for the view that adults, irrespective of marital status or gender, should have the freedom to engage in consensual relationships without the threat of criminal prosecution.

Respondent’s Argument:

• The respondents argued that adultery, as a societal wrong, disrupted the sanctity of the marital institution and therefore deserved criminal sanction.

• They emphasized that adultery inflicted emotional harm on the spouse, children, and the broader social fabric.

• The act was viewed as morally reprehensible, and the legal consequences served as a deterrent against such immoral conduct.

• The State defended the provision under Article 15(3), asserting that it allowed for positive discrimination to protect women from criminal liability.

• It was argued that societal morality and the stability of family structures justified retaining adultery as a criminal offence.

• The respondents contended that the Right to Privacy under Article 21 was not absolute and could be restricted when public interest was involved.

• They maintained that engaging in extramarital affairs with married individuals fell outside the protective scope of the Right to Privacy.

• Section 497 was portrayed as a safeguard preserving the institution of marriage and deterring behaviour that could harm familial cohesion.

• Finally, the respondent’s counsel urged the Court to retain the provision by striking down only the offending portions, thereby preserving the essence of the statute.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court, in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, unanimously held Section 497 of the IPC unconstitutional for infringing upon Articles 14, 15, and 21. The key takeaways from the judgment include:

• Adultery is no longer a criminal offence in India, although it remains a valid ground for divorce under civil law.

• The provision was grounded in patriarchal notions that considered women to be the property of their husbands and denied them agency.

• The Court observed that marriage is a partnership between equals and that criminal law should not intrude into private relationships between consenting adults unless public interest is at stake.

• The judgment underlined the importance of individual dignity, privacy, and equality in a progressive constitutional democracy.

The ruling reaffirmed that personal choices and intimate relationships fall within the domain of individual liberty. Criminalising such private behaviour would amount to a violation of fundamental rights. The judgment marked a significant step towards gender justice and aligned Indian jurisprudence with global democratic values.

MY PERSPECTIVE:

In the Joseph Shine v. Union of India case, I believe the Supreme Court’s decision to decriminalise adultery was not entirely appropriate. While the ruling rightly aimed to protect individual liberty and uphold gender equality, it failed to consider the vital role of marriage as a foundational social institution in Indian society. Adultery affects not only the individuals involved but also impacts spouses, families, and children, often causing deep emotional distress and social instability. Rather than being struck down entirely, Section 497 could have been restructured to be gender-neutral and to address the harm caused to all parties involved. By removing legal deterrence altogether, the judgment risks eroding trust and accountability within marriages. Although personal liberty is a cornerstone of constitutional rights, certain legal safeguards are necessary to preserve the sanctity and stability of marriage within the societal framework.