Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): A Landmark Constitutional Jurisprudence

Introduction

The case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala is a constitutional landmark that established the Basic Structure Doctrine, fundamentally redefining the limits of Parliament’s amending powers under Article 368 of the Indian Constitution. Decided by a historic 13 judge bench, the judgment struck a balance between constitutional supremacy and parliamentary sovereignty, asserting that while Parliament could amend any provision of the Constitution, such amendments must not alter its “basic structure.” The case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala was heard for 68 days and continues to hold the top spot for the longest proceedings ever to have taken place in the top court. The Kesavananda Bharati case is significant for its ruling that the Constitution can be amended but not the basic structure.

This decision shaped the contours of constitutional law and has been extensively cited in subsequent landmark cases to reinforce the doctrine of limited government.

Facts and Background

Swami Kesavananda Bharati, the head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala, filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, which sought to impose restrictions on the management of the Mutt’s property. The petitioner argued that the legislation violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 25, 26, 14, 19(1)(f), and 31.

Meanwhile, the Indian Parliament, asserting its power to override judicial interpretations, passed the 24th, 25th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments, which curtailed judicial review and gave Parliament unrestrained authority to amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights.

The Court clubbed the challenge to land reform laws with the broader constitutional question: Does Parliament have unlimited power to amend the Constitution under Article 368?

Legal Questions Raised

 1.Does Parliament have unlimited power to amend the Constitution under Article 368?

2.Can Parliament amend or abrogate Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution?

3.Can the power to amend the Constitution include the power to destroy or alter the basic features of the Constitution?

4.Are the 24th, 25th, and 29th Constitutional Amendment Acts valid and constitutional?

5.Can laws place in the Ninth Schedule be challenged on the ground that they violate Fundamental Rights or the Basic Structure?

6.Whether the directive principles of state policy can override the Fundamental Rights.

7.Is judicial review excluded for laws implementing Article 39(b) and (c) as per the 25th Amendment?

Constitutional Amendments in Question

1. 24th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971

Key Provisions:

• Amended Article 13 to state that “nothing in this Article shall apply to any amendment of this Constitution made under Article 368.”
• Amended Article 368 to affirm Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights.
• Made it mandatory for the President to give assent to Constitutional Amendment Bills.
• Purpose: To override the Supreme Court’s ruling in Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), which held that Fundamental Rights cannot be amended.

2. 25th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1971

Key Provisions:

• Amended Article 31C, which was introduced to give primacy to Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 19, and 31.
• It stated that any law enacted to implement Directive Principles under Article 39(b) or (c) shall not be void even if it contravenes Articles 14, 19, or 31.
• It also excluded judicial review for such laws.

3. 29th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1972

Key Provisions:

• Added Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and its further amendment to the Ninth Schedule.
• Laws in the Ninth Schedule were protected from judicial review under Article 31B.
• The petitioner, Swami Kesavananda Bharati, challenged the constitutional validity of these amendments, especially their effect on Fundamental Rights and the extent of Parliament’s amending power.

Parties Contentions

1. Petitioner (Kesavananda Bharati)

• Article 13 prohibits the State from enacting laws that contravene Fundamental Rights. “Law” must include constitutional amendments.
• The power to “amend” does not include the power to destroy or abrogate core constitutional values.
• Basic features such as democracy, fundamental rights, secularism, and rule of law must remain inviolable.

1. Respondents (State & Union)

• Article 368 is a complete code for constitutional amendment and not subject to Article 13.
• Parliament, being sovereign in its constituent capacity, can alter any part of the Constitution.
• Fundamental Rights are not sacrosanct and can be abridged to implement socio-economic reforms.

The Verdict

• Parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Fundamental Rights (24th Amendment upheld).
• Parliament’s power under Article 368 is not unlimited it cannot alter or destroy the Basic Structure of the Constitution.

25th Amendment partially upheld:

• The provision giving primacy to Directive Principles over Fundamental Rights was valid.
• The clause excluding judicial review was invalid.
• 29th Amendment upheld, but laws in the Ninth Schedule are subject to the Basic Structure test.
• The doctrine of Basic Structure was established, limiting Parliament’s amending power.

Key Judicial Opinions

• Chief Justice S.M. Sikri (Majority) introduced the Basic Structure Doctrine, stating that certain principles lie beyond the reach of Parliament’s amending power.
• Justice H.R. Khanna, the swing vote, observed that while Parliament could amend any part, it could not alter the identity of the Constitution.
• Justice J.M. Shelat and Justice A.N. Grover laid emphasis on the sanctity of Fundamental Rights and democratic structure.
• Dissenting Opinion (Justice A.N. Ray et al.): Advocated unlimited amending power and disagreed with the concept of implied limitations on Article 368.

Components of the Basic Structure Doctrine

1. Supremacy of the Constitution
2. Republican and Democratic form of Government
3. Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, and Democratic character of the State
4. Separation of Powers between Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary
5. Federal Character of the Constitution
6. Unity and Integrity of the Nation
7. Rule of Law
8. Judicial Review
9. Free and Fair Elections
10. Independence of the Judiciary
11. Fundamental Rights
12. Harmony and Balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles
13. Parliamentary system of governance
14. Principle of Equality
15. Freedom and dignity of the individual
16. Secularism
17. Welfare State (socio-economic justice)
18. Limited power of amendment under Article 368

Subsequent Developments and Affirmation

1. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975)

Held: Clause 4 of the 39th Amendment Act, which barred judicial review of the election of the Prime Minister, was unconstitutional.

Importance: Reinforced that free and fair elections are part of the basic structure.

2. Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980)

• Struck down parts of the 42nd Amendment that gave unlimited amending power to Parliament.
• Held: Limited amending power is itself part of the basic structure.
• Also clarified the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles as essential to basic structure.

3. Waman Rao v. Union of India (1981)

• Clarified that constitutional amendments placed in the Ninth Schedule before Kesavananda (i.e., before 24 April 1973) were valid.
• Amendments after Kesavananda would be subject to the basic structure test.

4. S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)

Held: Secularism is a part of the basic structure.

The misuse of President’s Rule (Article 356) was brought under judicial review.

5. I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007)

Held: Even laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 are subject to judicial review if they damage the basic structure.

It also strengthened the doctrine of judicial review.

6. Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018)

Reaffirmed: Federalism, democracy, rule of law, and accountability are part of the basic structure.

 Recent Developments:

In 2023, during the Constitution’s 50th Anniversary of Kesavananda, the Basic Structure Doctrine was praised as a bulwark against authoritarianism.

In 2023–2024, debates arose over judicial overreach, but the doctrine remains intact and widely respected.

Significance and Legacy

The Kesavananda Bharati judgment is the cornerstone of constitutionalism in India. It balances change with continuity, ensuring that while the Constitution may evolve, its core values remain untouched.

Strengths:

• Preserves the spirit and purpose of the Constitution.
• Shields fundamental rights from political whims.
• Establishes judicial oversight over constitutional amendments.
• Encourages dialogue between the legislature and judiciary.

Criticism:

• The doctrine is vague and subjective; courts never fully define what constitutes the “basic structure.”
• Critics argue it results in judicial overreach by unelected judges.
• Politically sensitive—Justice Sikri and others were superseded in judicial appointments after this judgment, raising concerns about executive interference.

Conclusion

The decision in Kesavananda Bharati stands as a seminal safeguard for Indian democracy. It introduced the Basic Structure Doctrine—a unique judicial innovation that redefined constitutional amendment powers. By setting substantive limits on the Parliament’s authority, the Court ensured that India’s founding principles would remain intact across changing political landscapes.

Even after 50 years, Kesavananda Bharati is invoked in almost every constitutional litigation, a testament to its enduring relevance. It affirms that the Constitution is a living document, dynamic in form but eternally rooted in its foundational ideals.

 

References

1. Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461
2. Minerva Mills Ltd. v Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789
3. Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299
4. I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu (2007) 2 SCC 1
5. Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution (OUP 1999)
6. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (LexisNexis, 8th edn, 2021)
7. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India (EBC, 13th edn, 2020)
8. Sudhir Krishnaswamy, Democracy and Constitutionalism in India (OUP 2009)