The Balance of Justice: A Collision of Power and Principle

Published On: August 14th 2025

Authored By: Ekene Evans Ahmed
Authored By: Ekene Evans Ahmed

Abstract

This article surveys the perception of fairness and political selectivity that has come to define the International Criminal Court (ICC). Beginning with its historical origins—from the post-colonial context of Nuremberg and Tokyo to the ICC’s early Africa-centric referrals—it traces how geopolitical power imbalances and opaque decision-making have undermined the Court’s legitimacy. By comparative analysis with tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, ICJ, and ECHR, it exposes both best practices, as well as enduring gaps, in procedural transparency, diversity of leadership, and civil-society engagement. Attention is paid to the “neo-colonial” critique, the dynamics of “victor’s justice,” and the role of media framing and public opinion in shaping trust. Drawing on authoritative sources—from the Rome Statute and ICC Strategic Plan to leading scholarship and fact-checked case studies—it offers practicable reforms: publishing redacted prosecutorial memoranda; widening geographical outreach; instituting regional rotations and formal amicus roles; and forging binding enforcement pacts. These measures, grounded in binding instruments and proven precedents, chart a path toward a truly universal, impartial, and effective system of international criminal justice.

Keywords: ICC; fairness; political selectivity; legitimacy; transparency; procedural justice; geopolitical bias

Introduction

intended to serve, highlighting the disparities that can exist in public perceptions of fairness[6]. Furthermore, search for substantive and procedural justice in international arbitration clearly shows the need for perception of fairness, at a global scale, that meets the expectations of diverse stakeholders.

The dynamics of trust and distrust among  nations also influence their willingness to engage in international agreements; attitudes of distrust can obstruct cooperation, but understanding the factors that drive these attitudes can help mitigate obstacles to reaching consensus. Thus, the ways we perceive fairness in international courts is crucial for fostering global trust, and also in promoting effective international legal frameworks.

The International Courts

Perceptions of Legitimacy

Perceptions of Legitimacy, regarding international courts, are influenced by various cultural, social, and political factors. One may notice that defiance of international law by state leaders dares often to threaten the rules-based international order and risks marginalizing international institutions, leading to varying degrees of trust across different regions.

Take for instance, in Southern Europe, there has been a noticeable trend of mistrust toward ordinary courts, which has the potential to spill over into perceptions of international courts. It is not excessive to state that ethnic and racial minorities, migrants, and indigenous peoples frequently encounter additional obstacles when claiming and enforcing their rights. It all contributes to their scepticism regarding the legitimacy of these institutions.

It can be observed that litigating parties may change their perceptions based on the outcomes and processes they experience. It basically highlights the dynamic nature of legitimacy. Key aspects of court legitimacy tend to mirror those of police legitimacy. These factors remain quite consistent across different racial and ethnic groups. When there is a lack of consistency and coherence in key decisions, public confidence in courts can significantly diminish. This is as seen with the International Criminal Court, which has faced criticisms that have undermined its legitimacy.

Research indicates that higher levels of perceived procedural fairness correspond to a greater likelihood of acceptance of court decisions. This emphasizes the crucial aspects of procedural fairness. Not to mention, public demonstrations of fairness and impartiality are particularly important for international courts.

This is potentially more so than for domestic courts. Practically speaking, compliance rates with court judgments can depend on both the nature of the remedies issued, and the perceived quality of the court’s processes. [1]Acknowledged, is that low levels of trust may lead to lower compliance rates. But most importantly, this has the consequence of negatively affecting the overall effectiveness of international rulings.

It is clear that societal factors, including local cultures and social beliefs, significantly shape attitudes toward international courts, as well as the concept of justice itself. Furthermore, barriers like poverty can basically exacerbate challenges to access justice, further entrenching perceptions of inequality and mistrust. However, perceptions of their prior experiences with discrimination (marginalized groups) may improve with advancements in fairness that benefit their members. It suggests a potential pathway to enhancing trust in international judicial mechanisms.[2]

Geographical concentration & Impact of Marginalized Communities

Marginalized communities tend to face significant challenges in accessing and utilizing international courts. This in turn shapes their perceptions of fairness regarding these institutions. Ethnic and racial minorities, migrants, and indigenous peoples encounter additional obstacles that hinder their ability to claim and enforce their rights. It contributes to a pervasive mistrust of international judicial systems.[3] When effective representation fails, it diminishes the opportunities for disadvantaged groups to influence societal rules and norms. This can exacerbate feelings of disenfranchisement and scepticism towards these institutions.

The legitimacy of international courts is further undermined by inconsistencies in their rulings and a perceived lack of impartiality. Legal realists argue that judges may decide cases influenced by pre-existing social and political commitments, raising concerns about the impartiality of international judicial bodies. This perception is compounded by the lack of procedural fairness; higher degrees of perceived fairness correlate with a greater likelihood that decisions will be accepted and complied with. Conversely, low levels of trust often yield lower compliance rates, which negatively impacts the effectiveness of international rulings.

Additionally, the overall credibility of institutions like the International Criminal Court can be compromised by key decisions that appear inconsistent, thus diminishing their legitimacy in the eyes of marginalized groups.[4] Furthermore, societal factors, such as local cultures and beliefs, can shape attitudes towards justice and peace, influencing how these communities view international courts. The availability of information regarding a court’s operations also plays a crucial role in building trust; a lack of transparency can lead to increased suspicion and scepticism.[5]

Imbalance and Influence: The International Criminal Court and Political Structure

Many critics have contended that the structure of the International Criminal Court (ICC) disproportionately concentrates influence in ways that undermine judicial integrity.[6] That is, although judges and prosecutors are elected by member states, voting power is allocated based on United Nations regional groupings.

This arrangement allows countries with a weak rule-of-law framework to wield the same voting weight as those that are with well-established legal systems. As Australia has observed, this parity enables states with really questionable judicial standards, to exert equal influence over appointments and decision-making processes (The Australian, “ICC a political body that exceeds its jurisdiction.” In turn, raising concerns about the Court’s legitimacy and effectiveness.

Geographical Concentration and the “Neo-Colonial” Label

Between 2002 and the mid-2010s, every case that was tackled by the International Criminal Court (ICC) involved African states.[7] This sustained focus on a single region incensed a widespread perception of selective enforcement, not to mention unequal treatment, under international law.

Such criticisms ere the basis of concerns that the ICC was reinforcing global power imbalances under the guise of legal accountability. This perception significantly strained the Court’s credibility in certain parts of the Global South. It continues to shape debates about its legitimacy and impartiality.

Choice of Engagement

As observed, international criminal tribunals have frequently faced criticism for exhibiting bias in their prosecutorial choices. This is particularly so for how they seem to focus on the defeated parties in a conflict while overlooking the alleged crimes committed by the victors. It’s a pattern that has led to accusations involving “victor’s justice”. That is, where legal accountability is selectively applied.[8]

Take, for example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The tribunal did not investigate or prosecute the members of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). This happened despite credible allegations of retaliatory violence. Then similarly, in the case of Myanmar, where certain international mechanisms have been criticized for their limited scope as well as their inaction regarding serious allegations. The tribunals for the former Yugoslavia also drew scrutiny for some perceived inconsistencies in how the different sides were handled.

Public Opinion and Media Framing

It is settled that public perception plays a critical role in shaping the legitimacy of international criminal institutions.

Standing on Reformation

Reforming ICC Nomination and Election Processes

It is stated that reforming the International Criminal Court’s regional nomination and election systems is essential to reducing politicization, as well as strengthening judicial integrity.

This procedure has come under fire because of its facilitation of political negotiating, and jeopardising merit-based selections.

Inconsistent screening, a lack of accountability, and heightened vulnerability to local power dynamics have resulted from these inconsistent standards. To make sure that judicial appointments represent independence and competence rather than political expediency, then reform initiatives should concentrate on establishing transparent, open, and merit-based nomination procedures in each of the member states.

Civil Society’s Contribution to Improving ICC Accountability

The International Criminal Court’s accountability and transparency are greatly enhanced by the active supervision of public watchdogs, investigative journalists, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). As impartial observers of ICC operations, these outside parties support victims’ rights, draw attention to irregularities, and expose procedural shortcomings.

Human Rights Watch and ICC-CPI assert that civil society participation is essential to holding the Court and its member nations to international legal standards.[9] Their supervision guarantees that the pursuit of justice continues to be open to independent examination, builds public trust, and puts pressure on institutions to maintain impartial standards.

Importance of Deepening Knowledge and Outlining Reform Suggestions

A better, more thorough analysis of the historical background, institutional transparency, and structural reform are necessary to allay complaints of selective justice and strengthen the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The following areas of focus are essential for recognising flaws and developing significant fixes: Claims of Selective Justice’s Historical Roots Post-colonial dynamics and the early focus of international tribunals are major factors in the perception of “selective justice.”

International criminal law seemed to disproportionately target actors from the Global South, starting with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which notably only prosecuted the defeated Axis powers, and continuing through the ICC’s early focus on African states. Claims of neo-colonial bias are fuelled by this legacy, which also continues to influence scepticism about impartiality.

Decision-Making Transparency and Best Practices from ICTY & SCSL

Transparency in Decision-Making and ICTY & SCSL Best Practices The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) are two examples of past tribunals that provide valuable lessons for enhancing transparency. Both courts published thorough legal justifications, established more organised reporting procedures, and permitted closer examination of prosecutorial discretion. In order to reduce perceptions of bias, these best practices highlight the significance of transparent deliberative procedures, unambiguous indictment standards, and independent oversight.

Diversifying Advisory and Leadership Groups Reducing politicisation and regional

imbalances requires ICC leadership, including judges, prosecutors, and advisory committees, to be more diverse in terms of both demographics and professions. Prioritising inclusive representation across legal traditions, geographical areas, and gender should be a top priority for structural reforms. This would guarantee that diverse legal cultures and viewpoints inform the Court’s jurisprudence while also enhancing its global character. The ICC can start to overcome legacy biases by tackling these three areas, which are based on historical critique, procedural integrity, and structural inclusion.

Rebuilding international trust, bolstering legitimacy, and making sure the Court functions as a truly universal institution of justice all depend on these changes. An essential organisation in the fight for world justice is the International Criminal Court (ICC), which is charged with.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an organisation which its necessity cannot be overemphasized in the fight for world justice. However, complaints of bias, political meddling, and enforcement flaws have compromised its efficacy and integrity.
To address these challenges, three select recommendations are proposed.

Below, each is expanded upon with cogent and informative discussions, grounded in binding authorities such as the Rome Statute, and supported by legal arguments that form a reasoned opinion on how the ICC can enhance its credibility and fulfil its mandate.

Recommendations For Strengthening Efficiency and ICC Integrity

Creating a Transparent Selection and Referral Criteria

Transparency – An Institutional Bedrock

Trust in international justice relies on transparency. The International Criminal Court (ICC) must first demonstrate that legal rigor, and not political calculation, to be able to uphold its legitimacy. It is what guides its operations. To strengthen transparency in selection and referral processes is therefore both a moral and operational imperative.

The ICC has to routinely publish redacted versions of prosecutorial memoranda and referral protocols, to illuminate how cases move from preliminary examination into formal investigation. Such disclosures would serve to clarify prosecutorial reasoning and help dispel persistent claims of hidden agendas or selective justice.

The Imperative of Openness

The Rome Statute, most particularly Article 53, directs the Prosecutor to assess the gravity of crimes, the available evidence, and also the interests of justice in determining whether or not to proceed with investigations.[10] Yet, these deliberations usually occur behind closed doors, thus limiting public insight into the Court’s rationale. This, in consequence, fuels suspicion of external influence.

The extended preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan, which lasted more than a decade, invited criticism due to its lack of clarity, and delay. If assessments had been published throughout the process, then the ICC could have countered narratives of politicized inaction.

This would have shown its legal reasoning in real time. By embracing selective disclosure, the Court would not only uphold the spirit of Article 53 but also emphasize its willingness to be scrutinized on legal, and not political, grounds.

To Build Confidence Through Accountability

First of all, transparency is not an abstract virtue but a functional necessity. The Court depends heavily on the cooperation of states and civil society actors, as mandated by Article 86 of the Rome Statute. [11]These stakeholders are more likely to engage meaningfully when they are assured that the ICC’s decision-making is founded in consistent legal principles.

While the Office of the Prosecutor has made commendable progress through policy papers, outlining case selection criteria, these general frameworks still fall short of case-specific clarity. Publishing redacted internal documents would really bridge this gap, offering a meaningful glimpse into the Court’s evaluative processes while protecting sensitive information, as well as witnesses.

By institutionalizing this level of openness, the ICC would certainly fortify its credibility, foster cooperative relationships, and better fulfil its mission as an impartial arbiter of international justice.

Widening Geographical Outreach and Engagement

Correcting Regional Imbalances to Uphold Universality

The strange focus of the ICC on African situations has long attracted criticism, with many perceiving it as indicative of selective enforcement or regional bias. This perception doesn’t help the Court’s legitimacy, and also contradicts its intended universality.

To correct this imbalance, the ICC has to increase  its efforts in engaging underrepresented regions. This can be achieved by actively soliciting and supporting referrals from non-African states.

More specifically, through structured outreach initiatives. Such as regional workshops, bilateral consultations, and also the dissemination of public guidance materials. The Court can clarify referral procedures, demystify certain evidentiary standards, and also promote equitable access to justice.

A Global Mandate Demands Global Reach

By Article 13 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is empowered to investigate crimes committed anywhere within its jurisdiction. But its caseload since inception has been overwhelmingly centered on Africa. While this occurrence is partly attributable to the voluntary referrals by African governments, the continued regional concentration poses the danger of reinforcing perceptions of targeted justice.

The Court’s own Strategic Plan 2019–2021 acknowledges this exact concern.[12]

Outreach as a Mechanism for Access and Fairness

Expanding outreach is not only a reputational strategy; it is some essential for fulfilling the legal obligations of the court. In Article 54 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor is mandated to investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances.

Diversify Leadership through Regional Rotations and Civil Society Empowerment

Rotations and Civil Society Empowerment

Diverse leadership and external oversight are important in depoliticizing the ICC. These reforms would serve to broaden its legitimacy, and sharpen its focus on justice.

Ensuring an Inclusive Governance and Strengthening Oversight

To uphold legitimacy and fairness, the ICC’s leadership structures must accurately reflect the geographic and legal diversity of its 123 member states. The institutionalisation of regional rotation for high-level positions, especially within the Presidency and the Office of the Prosecutor, would help counterbalance informal hierarchies and mitigate perceptions of regional dominance.

A Commitment to Equitable Representation

The Rome Statute explicitly recognizes the importance of diverse representation. By the provisions of Article 36(8)(a), a judge is required to represent the world’s principal legal systems and equitable geographical distribution.[13] This principle should extend beyond the bench to the broader leadership of the Court.

However, historical trends reveal an imbalance: certain regions have disproportionately occupied key offices, undermining perceptions of fairness. The  ICC could possibly adopt a formalized system of regional rotation, similar to practices at the International Court of Justice, in order to help solve this

For instance, periodically rotating the Office of the Prosecutor among different continents would not only promote equity but also introduce a broader range of legal cultures and prosecutorial priorities, enriching the Court’s jurisprudence.

Institutionalisation Civil Society Participation

Both the Rome Statute and the Court’s procedural framework already acknowledge the importance of external engagement. Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence permits submissions from amicus curiae, and Article 15 enables the Prosecutor to receive information from individuals, organizations, and states.[14]

Flowing from this, on this foundation, the ICC should formalize liaison roles for civil society coalitions, legal experts, and journalists. These designated roles would help to facilitate structured interaction with Court mechanisms, allowing for consistent observation, public reporting, and constructive feedback. The long time involvement of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC) illustrates how civil society contributes to transparency and public accountability.

The Court can institutionalise civil society’s watchdog role, balancing state influence, elevating underrepresented voices, and reinforcing its commitment to open justice, by expanding this model.

Closing the Gap

Enforcement is the ICC’s Achilles’ heel. Multilateral agreements would transform it into a strength, ensuring accountability is not an empty promise. By the provisions of Article 93 of the Rome Statute, there are outlined various forms of legal assistance, including the identification and freezing of assets, the protection of witnesses, and the collection of evidence. Even though binding implementation mechanisms are absent, these provisions often remain aspirational.[15]

A practical model exists in the European Arrest Warrant system, which truly facilitates automatic and expedited surrender procedures across jurisdictions. Replicating this structure within a global or regional ICC enforcement framework would serve to provide a legal and procedural foundation for more reliable compliance. Such treaties would not only streamline coordination, but they would also signal a collective commitment to upholding the Court’s authority.

By putting enforcement obligations in binding instruments, the ICC can overcome one of its most persistent weaknesses, which is its dependence on politically contingent state cooperation, and advance toward a very effective system of international criminal justice.

Conclusion

It is submitted that the international courts are custodians of our collective commitment to justice, as well as the crucible in which the legitimacy of that commitment is very much tested. It demands that they embody the transparency, diversity, and impartiality that they require of others. Rather than merely adjudicating with rigor.

The mission of the ICC demands unwavering integrity and effectiveness. This is necessary if it really wishes to end impunity for the world’s gravest crimes. Transparent criteria, broader outreach, diverse leadership, limited political interference, and extremely robust enforcement offer a roadmap to achieve this. Grounded in the Rome Statute and proven practices, these reforms would elevate the ICC from a beleaguered institution to a beacon of global justice, capable of withstanding scrutiny and delivering on its promise to humanity.

References

[1] Emily J Harrison, ‘Cross-Culture Perceptions of Justice: A Comparative Study of Ethical Principles’ (2025) 22(3) Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology 183.

[2] Chae M Jaynes, Jacqueline G Lee and Richard K Moule Jr, ‘Testing Racial and Ethnic Differences in the Correlates of Court Legitimacy’ (2024) 94 Journal of Criminal Justice 102252 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcrimjus.2024.102252> accessed 7 July 2025.

[3] Flaviana Palmisano and Agnese Sacchi, ‘Trust in Public Institutions, Inequality, and Digital Interaction: Empirical Evidence from European Union Countries’ (2024) 79 Journal of Macroeconomics 103582 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2023.103582> accessed 7 July 2025.

[4] Chuka Arinze-Onyia, ‘Race, Nationality and the True Color of International Criminal Justice’ (Opinio Juris, 9 May 2024) <https://opiniojuris.org/2024/05/09/race-nationality-and-the-true-color-of-international-criminal-justice/> accessed 7 July 2025.

[5] Neus Torbisco-Casals, ‘The Legitimacy of International Courts: The Challenge of Diversity’ (2022) 52(4) Journal of Social Philosophy 491 <https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12452> accessed 7 July 2025.

[6] Sébastien Chartrand and John Philpot (eds), Justice Belied: The Unbalanced Scales of International Criminal Justice (2014)

[7] Callum Ross, ‘Selective Justice and Persecution? The African View of the ICC‑UNSC Relationship’ (E‑International Relations, 16 September 2018) <https://www.e-ir.info/2018/09/16/selective-justice-and-persecution-the-african-view-of-the-icc-unsc-relationship/> accessed 7 July 2025

[8] Sébastien Chartrand and John Philpot (eds), Justice Belied: The Unbalanced Scales of International Criminal Justice (2014)

[9] Human Rights Watch, World Report 2020: Côte d’Ivoire (2020) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cote-divoire> accessed 7 July 2025.

[10] International Criminal Court, Policy for the Interests of Justice (OTP, March 2023) <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf> accessed 18 July 2025.

[11] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 86.

[12] International Criminal Court, Strategic Plan 2019–2021 (2019) <https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7ncqt3/pdf/> accessed 7 July 2025.

[13] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, art 36.

[14] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 15, 36; International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (adopted 9 September 2002) ICC-ASP/1/3, rule 103.

[15] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 86, 89, 93.

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