Published on: 07th October 2025
Authored by: Anisha Raghav
G. D. Goenka University
Citation: Civil Appeal No. 3100 of 2020, Supreme Court of India, decided on 15 December 2020.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Justice R.F. Nariman, Justice K.M. Joseph
Date of Judgment: 15 December 2020
Relevant Provisions
- Section 19(1)(a), Competition Act, 2002 (information to CCI)
- Section 3, Competition Act, 2002 (anti-competitive agreements)
- Section 53B, Competition Act, 2002 (appeal)
- Section 45, Competition Act, 2002 (penalty for false information)
Brief Facts
In August 2018, an independent legal practitioner, Samir Agrawal, filed information under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002[1] before the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Agrawal alleged that the two leading cab aggregators, ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (operating as Ola) and Uber India along with its parent entities, were conducting their acts through models of algorithmic pricing, amounting to price-fixing and anti-competitive practices. Agrawal argued that Ola and Uber used a dynamic pricing algorithm to set fares for rides, essentially eradicating any room for negotiation between drivers and riders. In his view, the single unified algorithmic process forced all drivers associated with each platform to charge the exact or almost identical fares and refrained them from independently setting a price. These platforms, in his contention, created an “artificial collusion” among the drivers who, though legally independent contractors, became parties to a hub-and-spoke cartel through these centralised algorithms of the cab companies. Specifically, he submitted this conduct amounted to: Price-fixing [Section 3(1) read with Section 3(3)(a)], Resale price maintenance (Section 3(4)(e)), and Hub-and-spoke cartelization, with cab aggregators acting as “hubs” and drivers as “spokes”[2].
Based on the above allegations, the CCI commenced a preliminary inquiry. After considering the submissions, by order dated 6 November 2018, the CCI dismissed the information. The CCI stated that the allegations were in respect of the pricing mechanism of the various platforms–Ola and Uber–and not about a collusion between the companies. In the case of a hub-and-spoke cartel, there is an exchange of highly confidential and sensitive pricing information amongst competitors through a common hub. There is no evidence that individual drivers, who are regarded as competitors, had any conversation among themselves for price-fixing or used the algorithm for such communication; they merely accepted the prices given to them by the platform. The dynamic pricing algorithm factors in time, locality, demand, and traffic, among others; it does not disclose any collusion or any kind of “agreement” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Competition Act.
The drivers were not “resellers” for the purposes of Section 3(4)(e), and since there is no concept of fixed “resale price,” claims of resale price maintenance could not be established. The complaint of “price discrimination” whereby different fares are charged to different riders was found to be irrelevant as the informant had not alleged dominance, being an essential element under Section 4 which was not even invoked. Agrawal had challenged the CCI order of termination before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT).
On May 29, 2020, the NCLAT upheld the dismissal of the complaint, firstly on the basis that there was no merit found in the complaint, and secondly, and most importantly, on the ground that Agrawal did not have locus standi (“standing”). The tribunal considered that only “aggrieved persons,” i.e., those suffering a legal wrong or loss, may file complaints or appeal, and since Agrawal was neither a cab customer nor a driver, he could not be considered an “aggrieved” party.
In a broader question challenging the locus standi as per the order issued by the NCLAT, Agrawal moved the Supreme Court, claiming merit in his complaint and placing in the center-stage the untenable restrictive interpretation of locus standi by the appellate tribunal vis-a-vis the purpose of the Competition Act and the 2007 amendment which replaced “complaint” with “information” as a means of widening access to CCI.
Issues
- Does any person, for that matter, have the locus to submit the information to the CCI, or must he be aggrieved directly?
- Is pricing by algorithm by cab aggregators—Ola and Uber—an agreement or cartelization of the anti-competitive kind under Section 3?
- Whether the informant can challenge an order of the CCI which closes the case?
Arguments
- Petitioner’s Arguments (Samir Agrawal)
Locus Standi & Right to Inform:
The learned counsel, Agrawal, submitted that Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 states that “any person” can give information to the CCI about suspected anti-competitive behavior and that it is not limited to only those who are prima faci aggrieved by such conduct. Moreover, he pointed out that the 2007 amendment, which substituted the word “information” for “complaint,” enlarged the class of public-spirited persons who could approach the Commission. There is also an extended interpretation for the term “person” as defined under Section 2(l) to include all natural and juridical persons.
Price Fixing by Algorithms: He contended that the dynamic pricing algorithms used by Ola and Uber constitute the fixing of fares-however, the drivers themselves are “forced” into collective pricing through platform-determined algorithms, thus amounting to a concerted practice or a “hub-and-spoke” cartel. The drivers can neither set prices on their own nor enter into negotiations with any of the riders; hence, they become innocent parties to the price-fixing in contravention of Section 3(1), 3(3)(a), and 3(4)(e) of the Act (anti-competitive agreements and resale price maintenance).
Right to Appeal: Agrawal contended that aggrieved persons providing information later rejected should be entitled to appeal to the NCLAT and then to the Supreme Court, inasmuch as the law is supposed to operate for public interest and to prevent anti-competitive practices from affecting the entire market[3].
- Respondents’ Arguments (Ola, Uber, and CCI)
The respondents objected that those aggrieved should be deemed persons born out of legal injury, whether consumers, competitors, or participants in the market; hence, only those persons should have the standing to file or appeal under the Act. They argued that acceptance of non-injured parties or mere bystanders to initiate or contest competition inquiries might open the doors to frivolous or vexatious litigations, thus weakening effective enforcement. No Anti-Competitive Agreement or Collusion: Ola and Uber further contended that both of them serve as intermediaries/platforms between drivers and riders and not cartels. Drivers and the platform operate at different levels in the supply chain and do not “agree” on price. Dynamic pricing is triggered by supply and demand, time, location, distance, weather, and local market factors. No competitor decides to fix a price…The algorithms simply automate what a traditional driver might manually negotiate based on demand, not a tool for anti-competitive conduct.
It was brought up by the respondents that drivers still operate as independent contractors: drivers may refuse a particular ride, leave the platform, or even multi-home on more than one platform simultaneously. As such, drivers cannot be “resellers” of services, and hence, claims for resale price maintenance cannot emerge. ID must provide evidence of communication or a “meeting of minds” between drivers to uphold collusion. Discrimination in
Prices-Argument: The defense further averred that the petitioner ignores the lack of a dominance allegation, which is required for a viable case under Section 4 of the Act, in arguing price discrimination (charging different fares to different customers on account of demand-based pricing).
International Precedents: The respondents contended with the efforts to import US-style class-action antitrust logic by arguing that there is a different regulatory and statutory construction regime in India. To summarize, the petitioner attempted to argue matters of public interest and technological cartelization, whereas the respondents, within the framework of the Indian Competition Act, attempted to defend the algorithmic model, the drivers’ choice, and standing as per Indian law.
Judgment
Primarily, the Supreme Court was confronted with two crucial issues, namely, an aggrieved informant’s locus standi before the Commission for Competition (CCI) and merits of alleged anti-competitive conduct by Ola and Uber induced by their pricing algorithms.
The Court rejected an extremely narrow interpretation adopted by the NCLAT that restricted the filing of information and appeals to ‘persons aggrieved’ in the conventional sense-that is, persons who have suffered legal injury or losses directly. The Court stated that the Competition Act, especially after the 2007 amendments, uses the term ‘information’ rather than ‘complaint,’ thus opening the doors for a wider pool of persons who may approach the Commission. Section 19(1)(a), by stating that ‘any person’ may submit information, clearly reveals that the intent of the Act was to promote public interest and in rem nature and not merely to provide a remedy for personal grievances[4].
It was observed that a person is not required to show any personal injury or aggrieved status for filing information or to appeal and adverse order from the CCI. Such wide standing keeps away bottlenecks and promotes vigilant competition law enforcement. The Court, to avoid its misuse, pointed out Section 45 of the Competition Act, which punishes a person furnishing false information or mala fide information balancing openness with rigour.
Merits on Algorithmic Pricing and Cartelisation:
On the substance of Agrawal’s allegations, the Court upheld the decisions of the CCI and NCLAT that Ola’s and Uber’s algorithm-based dynamic pricing does not amount to an anti-competitive agreement or cartelization under Section 3 of the Competition Act. The Court was clear that there was no “meeting of minds” or concerted practice between drivers or between drivers and the platforms. The drivers would not negotiate prices among themselves, as they are independent; the platforms act as principals rather than as passive bystanders in a hub-and-spoke cartel. The Court recognized dynamic pricing through an algorithm as a legitimate business practice that takes into account demand, supply, traffic, and a variety of other external factors; it is not a method of collusion or price-fixing. Allegations relating to resale price maintenance failed because the drivers were not resellers but independent providers and no fixed resale price was ever imposed. Price discrimination claims were held to be irrelevant without allegations of dominance under Section 4 of the Act, which were not alleged in this case.
Ratio Decidendi
The Competition Act is a public interest legislation; locus standi to inform and appeal is broadly construed. Algorithmic pricing by cab aggregators does not, by itself, constitute cartelization under Section 3 unless accompanied by evidence of concerted practice between parties.
Decisions under Section 26(2) (rejection/closure of information) are appealable by informants.
Obiter Dicta
Section 45 safeguards against frivolous and mala fide information by penalizing false complaints, discouraging abuse of the “any person” clause. Competition law proceedings are geared toward protecting public interest, not just individual grievances.
Final Decision
Considering the Supreme Court, it allowed the appeal filed by Samir Agrawal on the issue of locus standi, holding that the doors of the Competition Commission and appellate tribunals must remain wide open in the public interest. Anybody, whether aggrieved or not, can give information and can also appear against an adverse order. However, the Court dismissed the appeal at the merits and affirmed the findings of the CCI and NCLAT that Ola and Uber did not violate provisions of the Competition Act relating to cartelization or anti-competitive agreements. The judgment clarified the stand vis-à-vis technology-driven markets and algorithmic pricing under Indian competition law and strengthened the wide and public interest enforcement nature of competition. This landmark decision opens up the arena of competition law to enhanced public participation while fiercely limiting the interpretation of anti-competitive conduct with respect to digital business models.
[1] Competition Act, 2002, § 19(1)(a) (India)
[2] Case Summary, Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India (2020), Legal Bites, https://www.legalbites.in/landmark-judgements/case-summary-samir-agrawal-v-competition-commission-of-india-2020-anti-competitive-agreements-1134593
[3] Supreme Court Affirms Expansive Locus Standi Under Competition Law, India Corp Law, https://indiacorplaw.in/2020/12/26/supreme-court-affirms-expansive-locus-standi-under-competition-law/
[4] Case Summary, Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India (2020), Legal60, https://legal60.com/case-summary-samir-agrawal-v-competition-commission-of-india-2020-anti-competitive-agreements/
