Human Rights in Armed Conflicts: The role of the International Criminal Court

Introduction

Armed conflicts have always left deep scars on humanity, not only because of the destruction they cause but also because of the systematic violation of basic human rights. Civilians, who are often the most vulnerable, face displacement, torture, killings, sexual violence, and loss of livelihood during wars. While international humanitarian law and international human rights law provide a framework to safeguard dignity and life in such times, these laws alone are not sufficient when it comes to ensuring accountability. Violators often escape justice, leaving victims without remedy and communities without closure.

This gap gave rise to the International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent judicial institution established to prosecute the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Unlike earlier ad-hoc tribunals created for Rwanda or Yugoslavia, the ICC is designed to be a standing court with global jurisdiction over states that have ratified the Rome Statute[1]

The role of the ICC in protecting human rights during armed conflicts is both significant and controversial. While it has provided justice in landmark cases and given victims a platform, it also faces political pressures, limited cooperation from states, and accusations of selective justice. This article explores the intersection of human rights and armed conflict, examines the ICC’s role, and evaluates its challenges and future prospects.

Human Rights in Armed Conflicts

Human rights are often described as the basic and inalienable rights that belong to every individual. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR)[2], in its preamble, declares that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” Yet, armed conflicts represent the very breakdown of this promise, where civilians face the harshest realities of violence, displacement, and insecurity.

During armed conflicts, two parallel bodies of law apply—International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)[3]. While IHRL guarantees fundamental rights at all times, IHL, primarily codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, regulates the conduct of hostilities and protects those not directly participating in the conflict, such as civilians, prisoners of war, and the wounded. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996) affirmed that “the protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war.”[4] This highlights the simultaneous application of both regimes.

The consequences of conflict on human rights are stark. The Rwandan genocide (1994) saw mass killings, sexual violence, and displacements on a scale that shocked global conscience. Similarly, the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s revealed the systematic use of ethnic cleansing and mass executions, later addressed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)[5]. These tragedies underlined the urgency of establishing a permanent body like the ICC.

Even in contemporary contexts, the violations are visible. For instance, in the ongoing conflict in Syria, reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have documented indiscriminate bombings, starvation sieges, and torture in detention facilities[6]. Such acts directly violate the right to life (Article 6, ICCPR), the prohibition of torture (Article 7, ICCPR), and the protections afforded under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions[7].

Thus, human rights in armed conflicts are not theoretical guarantees but urgent, practical necessities. The ICC emerges in this environment as a mechanism to ensure that accountability for such grave breaches is not lost in the fog of war

The ICC: Origin, Mandate, and Jurisdiction

The conception of the International Criminal Court was the culmination of decades of attempts to establish a permanent judicial mechanism to address atrocities that shock the conscience of humanity. The post–Second World War tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo laid the initial groundwork by affirming that individuals, including state leaders, could be held personally accountable for crimes under international law[8]. However, these tribunals were exceptional and ad-hoc, limited in both temporal and territorial scope. Later, the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994 reflected a renewed determination to end impunity for gross violations of human rights. While both tribunals contributed significantly to the development of international criminal jurisprudence, they also revealed serious limitations—most notably their reactive nature, restricted mandates, exorbitant costs, and protracted proceedings.

Against this backdrop, the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998, which entered into force on 1 July 2002, marked a historic turning point. The Statute established the International Criminal Court as a permanent institution with jurisdiction over what it describes in Article 5 as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. Beyond merely retributive justice, the ICC embodies a preventive rationale, seeking to deter future atrocities through the prospect of individual accountability.

The ICC’s operation is guided by the principle of complementarity, a cornerstone of the Rome Statute, which ensures that the Court intervenes only when national jurisdictions are either unwilling or genuinely unable to prosecute. This delicate balance preserves state sovereignty while addressing the pervasive culture of impunity that often characterises armed conflicts. The Court’s jurisdiction, however, is not absolute. It is confined to crimes committed on the territory of, or by nationals of, States Parties, unless a situation is referred by the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter[9].

Since its establishment, the Court has initiated proceedings in a range of situations, from Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo to Darfur, Libya, and, most recently, Ukraine[10]. Despite the refusal of several major powers—including the United States, China, and Russia—to ratify the. Statute, the ICC stands as the most ambitious institutional expression of the international community’s commitment to enforce accountability during armed conflicts.

The Role of the ICC in Protecting Human Rights During Armed Conflicts

The establishment of the ICC was driven by the recognition that grave violations of human rights often occur during armed conflicts, and that domestic legal systems are frequently unwilling or unable to prosecute those responsible. In this regard, the ICC plays a pivotal role in bridging the accountability gap by ensuring that individuals who commit atrocities are not shielded by political or military power. Its contribution lies not only in securing convictions but also in reinforcing the principle that certain crimes offend the conscience of humanity and will not go unpunished.

The Court’s jurisprudence reflects this role. In Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (2012), the ICC delivered its first conviction, finding Lubanga guilty of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 into armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo[11]. This landmark decision affirmed that the use of child soldiers constitutes a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute, thereby reinforcing the protection of children’s rights in conflict situations. Similarly, in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (2016), the Court recognized sexual violence as a weapon of war, holding Bemba responsible for crimes committed by troops under his effective command in the Central African Republic[12]. Although the conviction was later overturned on appeal, the case remains significant for underscoring the responsibility of commanders to prevent and punish crimes committed by their subordinates.

The ICC has also sought to hold senior political leaders accountable. The most notable example is the indictment of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in Darfur. Although al-Bashir has yet to be surrendered to The Hague, the issuance of arrest warrants against a sitting head of state has been described as a “milestone in international criminal justice,” demonstrating that no office confers immunity for the gravest crimes[13].

Beyond prosecutions, the ICC’s role extends to victim participation and reparations. The Rome Statute provides for the right of victims to present their views and concerns before the Court, a feature absent in earlier international tribunals. The Trust Fund for Victims, established under Article 79 of the Statute, enables reparations that go beyond symbolic justice and contribute to rebuilding war-torn communities.

Through these mechanisms, the ICC operates not merely as a court of law but as an institution that affirms the universality of human rights, even in the darkest moments of armed conflict. By prosecuting perpetrators and acknowledging victims, it transforms abstract legal principles into concrete protections for human dignity[14].

Challenges Faced by the ICC

While the International Criminal Court represents a significant advancement in the global fight against impunity, its effectiveness in protecting human rights during armed conflicts is constrained by a series of legal, political, and practical challenges. The most fundamental limitation stems from the Court’s lack of universal jurisdiction. Membership of the ICC is restricted to States Parties to the Rome Statute, and several powerful states—including the United States, China, Russia, and India—remain outside its framework. As a result, many conflicts involving grave human rights violations fall beyond the Court’s direct jurisdiction unless referred by the United Nations Security Council under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute[15]. This selective reach undermines the Court’s universality and weakens its deterrent effect.

A second challenge relates to enforcement. The ICC does not possess its own police force or enforcement mechanism and is entirely dependent on the cooperation of states to execute arrest warrants and gather evidence. This dependency has often left the Court powerless when confronted with non-cooperation. The case of Omar al-Bashir illustrates this problem vividly. Despite the issuance of arrest warrants, al-Bashir travelled freely to several countries, including States Parties to the Rome Statute, without being apprehended. Such incidents expose the gap between the Court’s judicial pronouncements and the political realities of international relations.

The Court has also faced criticism of selectivity and bias. A disproportionate number of its investigations have concerned African states, prompting accusations of “neo-colonial justice.”[16] Although many of these cases were self-referred by African governments, the perception of regional imbalance has damaged the Court’s legitimacy in the eyes of some states, leading to withdrawals or threats of withdrawal, as seen in Burundi and the Philippines

Procedural and institutional issues further complicate the Court’s work. Lengthy trials, resource constraints, and high evidentiary standards often result in protracted proceedings with relatively few convictions[17]. For example, the acquittal of Jean-Pierre Bemba on appeal highlighted both the difficulties of proving command responsibility and the fragility of the Court’s jurisprudence. Such setbacks risk diminishing the ICC’s credibility as an effective instrument of justice.

Finally, the Court operates in a deeply political environment, where cooperation is contingent upon states’ strategic interests. The Security Council’s ability to refer situations, while important, has also exposed the ICC to accusations of politicization, given the veto powers of its permanent members.

These challenges demonstrate that while the ICC embodies the international community’s aspiration to enforce accountability, its authority is constantly tested by political resistance, structural limitations, and the uneven realities of global power.

The Future of the ICC and Its Impact on Human Rights in Armed Conflicts

Despite the structural and political limitations it currently faces, the International Criminal Court remains an indispensable component of the international legal order, and its future trajectory will largely determine the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms in armed conflicts. Strengthening the ICC requires not only institutional reforms but also greater international commitment to its mandate. Expanding the membership of the Rome Statute remains critical. The refusal of major powers to ratify the Statute continues to undermine the Court’s universality; yet, gradual accession by additional states can incrementally widen its reach and legitimacy.

Equally important is enhancing cooperation between the ICC, states, and regional organizations[18]. Without reliable state compliance, the Court’s authority risks remaining largely symbolic. Measures such as stronger enforcement frameworks, improved witness protection mechanisms, and increased funding can bolster its operational capacity. The role of the United Nations Security Council will also remain decisive; referrals should be exercised more consistently and free from the paralysis of political vetoes if the Court is to address crises effectively.

Furthermore, the ICC has the potential to shape the normative development of international law[19]. By recognizing crimes such as sexual violence, the recruitment of child soldiers, and the destruction of cultural heritage as serious violations, the Court has already broadened the understanding of what constitutes a breach of human rights in armed conflict. In the future, greater emphasis on victim participation and reparations can ensure that justice is not merely punitive but also restorative.

Ultimately, the ICC’s endurance will depend on whether it can navigate the tension between legal ideals and political realities. While its imperfections are evident, its continued evolution offers the possibility of embedding accountability more deeply into the fabric of international relations, thereby reaffirming the universality of human rights even amidst war.

Conclusion

The experience of the past two decades demonstrates that the International Criminal Court occupies a unique, though contested, position in the international legal order. Armed conflicts continue to expose civilians to systematic violations of fundamental human rights, ranging from mass killings and forced displacement to sexual violence and the destruction of cultural identity. In this bleak context, the ICC symbolizes a measure of hope: a permanent judicial body committed to ensuring that perpetrators of the gravest crimes are brought before the law, regardless of rank or office.

Yet, as the preceding analysis illustrates, the Court’s contribution is tempered by its limitations. Jurisdictional restrictions, state non-cooperation, and the political dynamics of the international system frequently hinder the Court from fulfilling its mandate in a consistent and universal manner. These challenges should not, however, obscure its achievements. Through landmark judgments, victim participation schemes, and the progressive development of international criminal law, the ICC has reaffirmed the principle that accountability is integral to human rights protection in times of armed conflict.

The future of the ICC will depend upon sustained international support and its ability to adapt to evolving forms of warfare. While imperfect, it remains the most ambitious attempt by the global community to translate the ideal of “never again” into enforceable legal reality.

References

[1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3 (Rome Statute)

[2] Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III)).

[3] Cordula Droege (2007) 40(2) Israel Law Review 310.

[4] Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 241.

[5] Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (adopted by UNSC Res 827, 25 May 1993).

[6] Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Report on Syria’ (OHCHR, 2023) https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/mena/syria accessed 12 September 2025.

[7] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 6, 7; Geneva Conventions (n 1) Common Article 3.

[8] Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No 10 (US Gov’t Printing Office 1949–53); Y Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Harvard UP 2008).

[9] N Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, ch VII.

[10] International Criminal Court, ‘Situations and Cases’ https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations accessed 12 September 2025.

[11] Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012).

[12] Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Trial Judgment) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 March 2016).

[13] International Criminal Court, ‘Arrest Warrant for Omar Al-Bashir’ (ICC, 4 March 2009) https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir accessed 12 September 2025; William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (6th edn, CUP 2020) 112.

[14] Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 15–16.

[15] Ibid art 13(b); UN Charter (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, ch VII.

[16] Sarah Nouwen, ‘Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 279.

[17] William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (6th edn, CUP 2020) 60–65.

[18] Ibid 75–76.

[19] Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2nd edn, OUP 2008) 3–5.