Case Summary: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala

Case Title: Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr.

Citation: AIR 1973 SC 1461 (1973) 4 SCC 225

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: S.M. Sikri (CJI), J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud, K.K. Mathew, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.K. Palekar, and M.H. Beg, JJ. (A 13-judge bench, the largest ever in the Supreme Court of India’s history)

Date of Judgment: April 24, 1973

Relevant Statutes/Key Provisions: The Constitution of India, 1950:

Article 13 (Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights)

Article 368 (Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor)

Articles 19, 25, 26, 31 (Fundamental Rights, particularly Right to Property, which was central to the land reform acts challenged)

Article 31A, 31B (Savings of laws providing for acquisition of estates, Validation of certain Acts and Regulations)

The Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971

The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971

The Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1972

Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963

Brief Facts:

The genesis of this landmark case lies in the challenge to the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, enacted by the Kerala State Government. Swami Kesavananda Bharati, the head of Edneer Mutt, a religious institution in Kerala, challenged the state’s efforts to acquire his property under the provisions of the said Act. He contended that this legislation violated his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 26 (Freedom to manage religious affairs), Article 19(1)(f) (Right to acquire, hold and dispose of property, now repealed), and Article 31 (Compulsory acquisition of property, now a legal right) of the Constitution of India.

The challenge to the Kerala Land Reforms Act was not an isolated event. It came in the backdrop of a series of parliamentary amendments aimed at overcoming judicial pronouncements that had limited the Parliament’s power to amend fundamental rights. Specifically, the Supreme Court’s decision in I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643, had held that Parliament could not amend fundamental rights. To nullify this judgment and reassert its supremacy, Parliament enacted the 24th, 25th, and 29th Constitutional Amendment Acts.

The Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, explicitly modified Article 368, asserting Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights, and made it mandatory for the President to assent to a Constitution Amendment Bill. The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, curtailed the right to property and allowed the Parliament to acquire private property for public use by paying an ‘amount’, not necessarily market value, and further stipulated that no law giving effect to Article 39(b) or (c) (Directive Principles of State Policy) could be challenged on the grounds of violating Articles 14, 19, or 31. The Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1972, placed the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, and its amending Act of 1969 in the Ninth Schedule, thus immunizing them from judicial review under Article 31B.

Kesavananda Bharati, therefore, not only challenged the Kerala Land Reforms Act but also the constitutional validity of the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments. This broader challenge brought into sharp focus the fundamental question: What is the extent of Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution? Could Parliament, through its amending power, alter or destroy the very basic features or fundamental structure of the Constitution? This question led to the formation of the largest-ever bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising 13 judges.

Issues Involved:

The primary legal issues that the 13-judge bench of the Supreme Court had to decide were:

-Does Parliament have an unlimited power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, extending to the abrogation or alteration of fundamental rights? This was a direct re-examination of the Golaknath judgment.

-Are the Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971, the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, and the Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1972, valid? Specifically, did they exceed the amending power of Parliament?

-To what extent can fundamental rights be abridged or taken away by constitutional amendments?

-Is there an implied limitation on the amending power of Parliament, meaning certain features of the Constitution are beyond the reach of amendment? This issue led to the conceptualization of the “Basic Structure Doctrine.”

Arguments:

Petitioner’s Arguments (Kesavananda Bharati & Ors.)

The petitioners, primarily represented by N.A. Palkhivala, presented a robust argument emphasizing the limitations on Parliament’s amending power:

Implied Limitations: It was argued that the power to amend under Article 368 is not absolute and unlimited. The term “amend” implies a power to improve or make changes within the existing framework, not to abrogate or destroy the very identity of the Constitution. If Parliament had unlimited power, it could transform the democratic republic into a totalitarian regime, which was never the intention of the framers.

Fundamental Rights are Inalienable: The fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are essential, inalienable, and transcendental. They form the core of the democratic and liberal character of the Indian state. Parliament cannot, under the guise of amendment, take away or abridge these basic rights.

Sovereignty of the People: The Constitution derives its authority from the people, and Parliament is a creature of the Constitution. Therefore, Parliament cannot act as a constituent assembly and rewrite the entire Constitution. The power to amend is delegated power, and delegated power cannot be used to destroy the delegating authority.

Basic Features: The petitioners contended that the Constitution has certain “basic features” or a “basic structure” (such as democracy, republican form of government, secularism, federalism, judicial review, fundamental rights, etc.) that are foundational to its existence. These features are unalterable even by a constitutional amendment. They argued that if these features are destroyed, the Constitution ceases to be the same document.

Judicial Review: It was asserted that judicial review is an integral part of the basic structure, and any amendment seeking to remove or curtail it would be unconstitutional, as it would dilute the checks and balances essential for a democratic system.

Respondent’s Arguments (Union of India & State of Kerala)

The respondents, representing the Union and State governments, argued for the supremacy and unlimited nature of Parliament’s amending power:

Sovereignty of Parliament: They contended that Parliament, representing the will of the people, is supreme. In a democratic system, if the people, through their elected representatives, wish to amend the Constitution, there should be no limitation on this power, except for the procedure laid down in Article 368.

No Implied Limitations: It was argued that Article 368 explicitly grants the power to amend, and there are no express limitations mentioned in the article itself. Implied limitations would amount to judicial overreach and an encroachment on the legislative domain.

Flexibility of the Constitution: A Constitution must be dynamic and capable of adapting to changing social, economic, and political realities. An unlimited amending power ensures this flexibility and prevents the Constitution from becoming a static document. The framers intentionally made the amendment procedure neither too rigid nor too flexible.

Socio-economic Reforms: The government’s primary objective behind the land reform acts and the constitutional amendments was to usher in socio-economic justice and implement Directive Principles of State Policy. They argued that if fundamental rights were considered absolute and unamendable, it would hinder the state’s ability to bring about necessary social and economic changes for the welfare of the masses.

Golaknath Overruled: They sought to overturn the Golaknath judgment, arguing that it had created an artificial distinction between fundamental rights and other parts of the Constitution, thereby impeding progressive legislation.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court delivered a highly complex judgment on April 24, 1973, with a narrow 7:6 majority. While there were 11 separate judgments, Justice H.R. Khanna’s opinion largely determined the outcome and became the cornerstone of the “Basic Structure Doctrine.”

The majority held that: Parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights. This effectively overruled the Golaknath judgment, reaffirming Parliament’s authority to amend Part III.

However, Parliament’s amending power under Article 368 is not unlimited. It cannot be used to alter, abrogate, or destroy the “basic structure” or “framework” of the Constitution.

The “Basic Structure Doctrine” was thus propounded, introducing an inherent limitation on the Parliament’s constituent power. While the Court did not provide an exhaustive list of what constitutes the “basic structure,” it indicated several features that could be considered part of it. These include:

Supremacy of the Constitution

Republican and Democratic form of Government

Secular character of the Constitution

Separation of powers between the legislature, executive, and judiciary

Federal character of the Constitution

The dignity of the individual secured by the various freedoms and rights in Part III and the mandate to build a welfare state contained in Part IV.

The unity and integrity of the nation.

Judicial Review.

The Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 was held to be valid, affirming Parliament’s power to amend any part of the Constitution, but subject to the basic structure limitation.

The Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 was partially upheld. The first part, which curtailed the right to property, was held valid. However, the second part, which stated that no law giving effect to Directive Principles under Article 39(b) or (c) could be challenged in any court, was struck down as unconstitutional because it removed judicial review, which was deemed a basic feature.

The Constitution (Twenty-Ninth Amendment) Act, 1972, which placed the Kerala Land Reforms Act in the Ninth Schedule, was upheld, but with a caveat. The Court clarified that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973 (the date of the judgment), could be subject to judicial review if they violated the basic structure.

Ratio Decidendi

The core legal principle (ratio decidendi) that emerged from Kesavananda Bharati is:

Parliament possesses the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, but this power is not absolute and is subject to an implied limitation: Parliament cannot alter, abrogate, or destroy the ‘basic structure’ or ‘essential features’ of the Constitution

This doctrine establishes that while Parliament has extensive power to amend the Constitution to adapt it to changing needs, it cannot use this power to change the fundamental identity of the Constitution or its core values. The basic structure forms an inviolable foundation upon which the entire constitutional edifice rests.

Obiter Dicta (if any)

While the primary focus was on the basic structure doctrine, several judges made observations (obiter dicta) that, while not strictly binding, hold significant persuasive value:

Importance of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles: The judgment highlighted the harmonious relationship between Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV), emphasizing that neither should be subservient to the other. They are complementary instruments for achieving social justice.

Role of Judiciary: The Court implicitly reaffirmed its role as the ultimate interpreter and guardian of the Constitution, with the power of judicial review being crucial to upholding the constitutional scheme.

Constituent Power vs. Legislative Power: The judgment distinguished between constituent power (the power to frame or amend the Constitution) and ordinary legislative power (the power to make laws), asserting that even constituent power has limitations when it comes to the basic structure.

Final Decision: By a 7:6 majority, the Supreme Court:

Upheld the validity of the 24th Amendment but subjected Parliament’s amending power to the “Basic Structure Doctrine.”

Partially upheld the 25th Amendment, striking down the provision that barred judicial review of laws implementing Directive Principles.

Upheld the 29th Amendment but implied that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after the judgment date would be subject to basic structure review.

Dismissed the writ petition filed by Kesavananda Bharati, meaning the Kerala Land Reforms Act was upheld. However, the victory was for the constitutional principles articulated, which significantly curtailed parliamentary power.

Impact of the Case

The Kesavananda Bharati judgment is a watershed moment in Indian constitutional law. Its impact is profound and multi-faceted:

Constitutional Supremacy: It firmly established the supremacy of the Constitution over Parliament. While Parliament can amend, it cannot destroy the fundamental framework of the Constitution.

Judicial Review Strengthened: It reinforced the power of judicial review, enabling the judiciary to strike down constitutional amendments that violate the basic structure. This acts as a crucial check on legislative power.

Protection of Fundamental Rights: Although the judgment affirmed Parliament’s power to amend fundamental rights, it simultaneously ensured that the core essence and spirit of these rights, as part of the basic structure, could not be abrogated.

Balance of Power: The doctrine created a delicate balance between parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional supremacy, preventing any single organ of the state from becoming absolute.

Evolution of Basic Structure: Subsequent judgments have further elaborated on and added to the list of basic features, making the doctrine a living and evolving concept in Indian jurisprudence. Examples include free and fair elections, rule of law, and independence of the judiciary.

Preventing Authoritarianism: The doctrine serves as a bulwark against potential authoritarian tendencies, ensuring that democratic and fundamental values remain protected even in the face of overwhelming parliamentary majorities.

International Recognition: The Basic Structure Doctrine has gained international recognition as a unique contribution of Indian jurisprudence to constitutional theory.

In conclusion, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala remains a cornerstone of Indian constitutional law, safeguarding the foundational principles and values upon which the nation is built. It is a testament to the judiciary’s role in upholding the sanctity of the Constitution and balancing the powers of different state organs.