Published on: 24th November 2025
Authored by: Komal Soni
Balaji Law College
Citation: (2000) 10 SCC 664
Decided on: 18 October 2000
Bench: Justice B.N. Kirpal, Justice G.B. Pattanaik (majority), Justice S.P. Bharucha (dissenting)
Introduction
The case of Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India stands as one of the most significant decisions in Indian legal history concerning environmental justice, the rights of displaced communities, and the doctrine of sustainable development. The case emerged in the backdrop of the Sardar Sarovar Dam Project (SSDP), a large-scale multipurpose river valley development scheme on the Narmada River aimed at addressing the pressing needs of water scarcity, electricity generation, and irrigation in western India.
However, the scale of displacement caused by the dam triggered a nationwide debate led by the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) — a people’s movement championing the cause of the displaced and affected populations. The case epitomizes the delicate balance between economic development and environmental sustainability while exploring the extent to which courts can intervene in policy-driven infrastructure projects.
Factual Background
The Sardar Sarovar Dam is part of the Narmada Valley Development Project, one of the largest river development projects undertaken in India, which includes the construction of dams, canals, and powerhouses on the Narmada River and its tributaries.
The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) was constituted in 1969 to resolve disputes among Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan regarding water sharing. It gave its final award in 1979, which included terms for dam height and guidelines for resettlement and rehabilitation.
Following this, the project moved into construction in the mid-1980s. However, due to concerns over large-scale displacement (over 200,000 people), loss of forest land, tribal rights, environmental degradation, and alleged inadequate rehabilitation and environmental safeguards, the Narmada Bachao Andolan filed a writ petition under Article 32 before the Supreme Court in 1994.
The petition raised fundamental questions of right to life, right to environment, and the legality of environmental clearances granted to the dam project.
Key Legal Issues
- Whether the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam violates the fundamental rights of the displaced persons under Article 21 of the Constitution.
- Whether the environmental clearance granted in 1987 was valid and whether environmental safeguards were adequately enforced.
- Whether there was a failure to comply with the rehabilitation and resettlement provisions mandated by the NWDT Award.
- To what extent can the judiciary intervene in development policy, especially concerning mega-infrastructure projects.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (Narmada Bachao Andolan):
- Argued that over two lakh people, mostly tribal and marginalized communities, were being displaced without adequate rehabilitation.
- Emphasized that the environmental clearance granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) in 1987 was conditional and had not been complied with.
- Asserted that the project would lead to irreversible ecological damage, submergence of forests and fertile lands, and violation of the right to life and livelihood under Article 21.
- Demanded the suspension of dam construction until proper environmental impact assessments and rehabilitation were carried out.
Respondents (Union of India & States):
- Argued that the project was essential for the development of drought-prone and economically backward regions of Gujarat and Rajasthan.
- Asserted that the project would benefit millions by providing irrigation, drinking water, and electricity.
- Claimed that rehabilitation policies were in place, and most of the affected families had been or were being resettled.
- Defended that environmental clearance was valid, and regular monitoring by expert committees was underway.
The Judgment
The Supreme Court, in a 2:1 majority, allowed the construction of the dam to proceed, subject to conditions ensuring compliance with rehabilitation and environmental safeguards.
Majority Opinion (Justices B.N. Kirpal and G.B. Pattanaik):
- The Court held that development and environment must go hand in hand, and a balance must be struck between the two.
- Emphasized that the precautionary principle cannot be applied in every case to halt developmental activities.
- Recognized that right to development is part of Article 21, and halting the project would affect millions who stand to benefit.
- Held that rehabilitation efforts were being carried out satisfactorily and that displacement alone cannot be a reason to stop construction if proper resettlement is ensured.
- Directed that further construction should proceed only when rehabilitation of the affected families is complete up to the corresponding height of the dam.
- Found that environmental clearance given in 1987 was valid and did not suffer from illegality.
Key Observations:
“The displacement of the tribals and other persons would not per se violate their fundamental or other rights… If proper rehabilitation is done… the people affected can have a better standard of life than what they enjoyed before.”
Dissenting Opinion (Justice S.P. Bharucha):
Justice S.P. Bharucha offered a well-reasoned and empathetic dissent that sharply contrasted with the majority’s developmentalist approach. His opinion underscores constitutional morality, human dignity, and environmental accountability over mere economic gains.
- Inadequate Environmental Compliance
Justice Bharucha raised serious doubts about whether the environmental clearance granted in 1987 was legally valid. He pointed out that:
- The clearance was conditional, requiring further studies on environmental impacts, including catchment area treatment, command area development, seismic safety, flora and fauna studies, etc.
- These studies were either not conducted or not completed before construction started, violating the spirit of informed decision-making in environmental matters.
- The Environment Sub-group, formed to monitor compliance, was not functioning with required independence or transparency.
“It is not open to the Government to treat such conditions as mere formalities. Environmental protection is not a one-time formality but a continuous obligation.”
- Flawed Rehabilitation and Resettlement Mechanism
Justice Bharucha strongly criticized the ineffective implementation of rehabilitation policies:
- Large numbers of oustees, especially in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, were still not adequately identified, much less resettled.
- He emphasized that the NWDT Award and the Constitution require prior rehabilitation, meaning people must be resettled before their homes are submerged.
- In tribal areas, mere land-for-land compensation was inadequate due to the disruption of community life, loss of forests, and cultural disintegration.
“The displacement of people, particularly the tribals, is a serious violation of their fundamental rights if they are not adequately rehabilitated.”
- Development at the Cost of the Marginalized
Justice Bharucha was deeply concerned about the social cost of the project:
- He warned that large infrastructure projects tend to externalize their costs by pushing burdens on vulnerable populations.
- The petitioners were not anti-development, but were calling for humane, lawful, and inclusive development.
- He suggested that the project could continue only after demonstrating, through verifiable data, that every affected family had been rehabilitated in accordance with the rehabilitation policies and NWDT Award.
“The poor and the underprivileged cannot be made to pay the price for development while the benefits accrue to others.”
- Call for a Moratorium
In his conclusion, Justice Bharucha did not outright oppose the dam but called for a moratorium on further construction until:
- Environmental impact assessments were properly conducted;
- Monitoring mechanisms were made accountable;
- All affected persons were resettled with adequate facilities;
- Reports were made publicly available for judicial and public scrutiny.
His approach was essentially precautionary, rooted in the belief that irreversible harm to people or the environment cannot be undone, whereas economic benefits can be achieved through alternative, lawful, and participatory means.
Legacy of the Dissent
Though it did not carry the majority, Justice Bharucha’s dissent:
- Became a foundational reference for later environmental and displacement-related PILs;
- Influenced reforms in rehabilitation and environmental assessment policies;
- Highlighted the judiciary’s moral responsibility to protect the rights of the marginalized even when national development is at stake.
His dissent is often quoted in legal and academic circles as a model of rights-based judicial reasoning, placing constitutional compassion and justice above administrative convenience.
- Key Doctrines and Principles Applied
- Sustainable Development – The Court recognized this as a fundamental principle guiding state policy and judicial reasoning, requiring balancing development with environmental protection.
- Precautionary Principle – The Court ruled that it should not be used to halt every project unless there is strong evidence of environmental harm.
- Doctrine of Proportionality – The Court weighed the benefits to millions against the harm to a smaller but vulnerable population and ruled in favor of proportional public interest.
Impact and Significance of the Judgment
- Environmental Jurisprudence:
- The case further developed the Indian environmental jurisprudence by redefining sustainable development in practical terms.
- The judgment indicated that economic development cannot be sacrificed in the name of environmental concerns unless proven to be hazardous.
- Rehabilitation Policy:
- One major contribution was the judicial recognition of the need for proper rehabilitation, making it a pre-condition for displacement in any public project.
- It brought tribal rights and displacement compensation into mainstream legal discussion.
- Public Interest Litigation (PIL):
- The case reaffirmed the power of PIL in highlighting environmental and human rights issues, but also showed the judiciary’s restraint in interfering with executive decisions related to development.
- International Attention:
- The case gained international recognition, drawing attention to India’s development policies, human rights record, and the dilemma of large-scale infrastructure projects in the Global South.
- Strengthened Institutional Mechanisms:
- After this decision, the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) frameworks for rehabilitation were expanded.
- Inspired subsequent rulings like Almitra Patel v. Union of India and others involving displacement and urban housing.
Critical Analysis
While the majority judgment reflects a pragmatic approach, emphasizing economic necessities and long-term development, critics argue it compromised environmental due diligence and tribal rights. The reliance on state assurances regarding rehabilitation was seen as misplaced, considering the implementation failures later reported by independent watchdogs.
Justice Bharucha’s dissent is often viewed as a moral compass, reminding the judiciary of its role in upholding the rights of the marginalized. His opinion laid the foundation for more stringent environmental governance and participatory project planning in subsequent years.
Conclusion
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India serves as a seminal case reflecting the complex interplay between law, development, human rights, and environmental protection. It pushed Indian jurisprudence to engage with difficult questions: Who pays the price of development? Can the state balance competing rights? And to what extent should courts defer to state policy in infrastructure matters?
While the Sardar Sarovar Dam now stands completed, the legacy of the case continues to influence environmental impact assessment policies, displacement law, and the growing jurisprudence around sustainable development and climate justice in India.
Proper Citation (Bluebook 20th Edition)
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664.




