Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

Citation:: AIR 2015 SC 1523; (2015) 5 SCC 1

Court: Supreme Court of India

Bench: Chelameswar and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Date of Judgment: March 24, 2015

Relevant Statutes/Key Provisions:

Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India;
Section 66A, Section 69A, and Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000

Brief Facts:

The case arose after two girls were arrested in Maharashtra for posting and liking a Facebook status questioning the bandh observed after the death of a political leader. This triggered a national debate on the misuse of Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalised sending ‘offensive’ messages through communication services. Shreya Singhal, a law student, filed a petition under Article 32 challenging the constitutional validity of Section 66A, along with challenges to Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act.

Issues Involved:

1. Whether Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?
2. Whether Section 66A is saved by the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2)?
3. Whether Sections 69A and 79 of the IT Act are constitutionally valid?

Arguments:

Petitioner’s Arguments:
– Section 66A is vague and overbroad, leading to arbitrary interpretation and enforcement.
– Terms like ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘menacing character’ are undefined and subjective.
– The provision chills free speech and allows for disproportionate state control over expression.

Respondent’s Arguments (Union of India):
– The provision is necessary for maintaining public order and preventing misuse of online platforms.
– Section 66A falls within the reasonable restrictions permitted under Article 19(2), such as defamation, incitement to an offence, etc.
– The judiciary can read down the section to prevent misuse.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act as unconstitutional,The Supreme Court, in a unanimous verdict delivered by Justices J. Chelameswar and Rohinton F. Nariman, declared Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as unconstitutional and void ab initio, for being violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and not saved by any of the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).

The Court held that the expressions used in Section 66A—such as “grossly offensive,” “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” “danger,” “insult,” and “ill-will”—were vague, undefined, and entirely subjective, giving unfettered discretion to law enforcement and leading to arbitrary application. This vagueness, the Court reasoned, rendered the provision unconstitutionally overbroad and incapable of withstanding the test of constitutionality laid down for statutes that restrict fundamental rights.

Further, the Court held that Section 66A did not bear proximate connection with any of the grounds mentioned in Article 19(2), such as public order, decency, morality, defamation, or incitement to an offence. The provision criminalised speech that may be offensive or annoying but not necessarily inciting or harmful, thereby chilling free expression and deterring individuals from speaking freely on digital platforms.

In contrast, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 69A of the IT Act, which provides for the blocking of websites in the interest of sovereignty, integrity, and public order, among other grounds. The Court noted that Section 69A and its accompanying rules included adequate procedural safeguards, such as the requirement for a reasoned order and a pre-decisional hearing. These safeguards, the Court held, aligned the provision with the principles of natural justice and procedural due process.

Regarding Section 79, which deals with intermediary liability, the Court read it down to clarify that an intermediary (such as a social media platform or internet service provider) can only be compelled to take down content upon receiving a court order or valid government notification under the IT Act and its rules. This interpretation ensured that intermediaries are not held vicariously liable for all third-party content and are protected under a regime that balances responsibility and free speech.

The Court rejected the argument advanced by the government that the provision could be “read down” to make it constitutionally compliant. It held that reading down cannot cure a fundamentally vague and overbroad law. Where a provision suffers from incurable vagueness and unrestricted delegation of powers, the only remedy is to strike it down entirely.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared Section 66A unconstitutional in its entirety and struck it down, thereby reinforcing the primacy of free speech and the need for clear and narrowly tailored legislation when fundamental rights are at stake.

Ratio Decidendi:

A law that curtails freedom of speech must be clear, narrowly defined, and must fall strictly within the grounds of reasonable restriction under Article 19(2). Section 66A did not meet this standard and was therefore unconstitutional.

Obiter Dicta (if any):

The Court remarked that mere annoyance or inconvenience cannot be grounds for curbing free speech and that discussion or advocacy, however unpopular, is protected under Article 19(1)(a).

Final Decision:

– Section 66A was struck down as unconstitutional.
– Section 69A was upheld, subject to procedural safeguards.
– Section 79 was upheld, with the interpretation that intermediaries are obligated to act only upon court orders or government notifications in accordance with the rules.

Key Takeaways:

– The judgment was a milestone in safeguarding digital free speech in India.
– It reinforced the principle that vague laws cannot form the basis for restrictions on constitutional freedoms.
– It introduced a standard for constitutional scrutiny of laws affecting online expression.

The Supreme Court’s judgment was not merely declaratory in nature; it laid down a robust doctrinal framework for testing the constitutionality of laws affecting free speech. The Court employed the doctrine of proportionality to evaluate whether the restriction imposed by Section 66A was justified. It held that the restriction was not only disproportionate but also lacked sufficient nexus with the objectives laid out under Article 19(2). By invalidating the provision, the Court sent a strong message that freedom of speech cannot be compromised under the garb of vague and overbroad legal provisions. This judgment has since become a cornerstone in Indian constitutional jurisprudence concerning digital rights.

The background of this case lies in the growing concern over the unregulated and ambiguous legal framework governing online speech in India. In the aftermath of the arrest of two young women in Maharashtra for a seemingly innocuous Facebook post criticizing the city-wide bandh following the death of a political leader, the public outcry sparked significant media attention. Legal experts and civil society alike began questioning the constitutional legitimacy of laws like Section 66A of the IT Act. The petitioner, Shreya Singhal, a concerned law student, initiated this Public Interest Litigation (PIL) to safeguard democratic rights enshrined in the Constitution. Her challenge focused on ensuring that vague and arbitrary provisions do not curtail fundamental freedoms, particularly in an era where digital expression has become integral to public discourse.

The petitioner emphasized that the sweeping language of Section 66A could criminalize any form of dissent or unpopular opinion expressed online, making it incompatible with democratic values. She pointed out that the terms used were so vague that enforcement agencies had the liberty to arrest individuals based on subjective interpretations. This vagueness, she argued, led to a chilling effect on freedom of speech, where individuals would avoid expressing themselves altogether for fear of prosecution. On the other hand, the Union of India maintained that the provision served a necessary function in curbing misuse of technology, especially in the context of hate speech, communal disharmony, and online defamation. However, the state failed to provide convincing evidence that the section’s language was narrowly tailored to serve the interests outlined in Article 19(2).

The petitioner emphasized that the sweeping language of Section 66A could criminalize any form of dissent or unpopular opinion expressed online, making it incompatible with democratic values. She pointed out that the terms used were so vague that enforcement agencies had the liberty to arrest individuals based on subjective interpretations. This vagueness, she argued, led to a chilling effect on freedom of speech, where individuals would avoid expressing themselves altogether for fear of prosecution. On the other hand, the Union of India maintained that the provision served a necessary function in curbing misuse of technology, especially in the context of hate speech, communal disharmony, and online defamation. However, the state failed to provide convincing evidence that the section’s language was narrowly tailored to serve the interests outlined in Article 19(2).

The Supreme Court’s judgment was not merely declaratory in nature; it laid down a robust doctrinal framework for testing the constitutionality of laws affecting free speech. The Court employed the doctrine of proportionality to evaluate whether the restriction imposed by Section 66A was justified. It held that the restriction was not only disproportionate but also lacked sufficient nexus with the objectives laid out under Article 19(2). By invalidating the provision, the Court sent a strong message that freedom of speech cannot be compromised under the garb of vague and overbroad legal provisions. This judgment has since become a cornerstone in Indian constitutional jurisprudence concerning digital rights.

At the heart of the judgment lies the affirmation of the principle that laws restricting speech must be precise and predictable. The Court categorically stated that the absence of clear standards in Section 66A made it inherently unconstitutional. A law that allows the state to arbitrarily penalize speech is antithetical to the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). This ratio has since been relied upon in several subsequent rulings related to digital expression, intermediary liability, and governmental overreach.

By declaring Section 66A unconstitutional, the Court restored a crucial layer of protection to internet users in India. It not only struck down a law but also highlighted the responsibility of the legislature to ensure clarity and constitutionality in drafting laws that affect fundamental rights. The upholding of Section 69A and the reading down of Section 79 demonstrate the Court’s nuanced approach—balancing state interests with civil liberties. The decision was hailed internationally as a progressive step in upholding digital freedoms in the world’s largest democracy.