Case Summary: Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

Published On: December 1st 2025

Authored By: Dheepshika M
Chennai Dr Ambedkar Government law college pudupakkam
  • Case title : Shreya Singhal v. Union of India 
  • Court : Supreme Court of India 
  • Citation: AIR 2015 SUPREME COURT 1523
  • Bench composition: R.F. Nariman, J. Chelameswar.
  • Date of Judgement: 24 March 2015

Procedural History: 

The Supreme Court of India was petitioned directly, challenging the constitutionality of Section 66A of the IT Act. The case bypassed lower courts due to the fundamental rights issue at stake.

Fact of the case: 

The case was a direct consequence of the misuse of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The provision criminalized the sending of “grossly offensive” or “menacing” electronic messages, or information that a person knew to be false but was intended to cause “annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will.

The immediate trigger for the public interest litigation was the arrest of two women in Maharashtra for a Facebook post criticizing the shutdown of Mumbai following the death of a political leader. This incident, along with other similar arrests across the country, highlighted the arbitrary and subjective nature of the law, which was seen as a tool to silence dissent and free speech online.  

Issues framed:

 The primary issues before the Supreme Court were:

  1. Whether Section 66A of the IT Act was a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution?
  2. Whether the provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad?

Arguments of both parties:

Petitioners’ Arguments

  1. Violated Article 19(1)(a): Section 66A was an unconstitutional restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. The petitioners argued that the law was not saved by the reasonable restrictions listed in Article 19(2) of the Constitution.
  2. Vague and Overbroad: The terms used, such as “grossly offensive” and “menacing,” were not defined, making the law susceptible to arbitrary and subjective interpretation by law enforcement.
  3. “Chilling Effect”: The provision had a “chilling effect” on free speech, as individuals would fear prosecution for sharing legitimate opinions or ideas online, thereby stifling public discourse.

Respondent (Union of India)’s Arguments

  1. Presumption of Constitutionality: Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid unless clearly proven otherwise. The government argued the law was necessary to address new forms of online crimes.
  2. Flexible Language: The use of broad, flexible language was necessary to address the ever-evolving nature of online threats and to protect citizens from harm, harassment, and defamation.
  3. Possibility of Misuse: The mere possibility of a law’s misuse is not a valid ground for striking it down. The government contended that abuse could be addressed through administrative remedies rather than by invalidating the entire provision.

Legal framework/provisions:

  1. Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression.
  2. Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows the government to impose “reasonable restrictions” on free speech in the interest of specific public concerns, such as public order, decency, or defamation.
  3. Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which was the main provision challenged for criminalizing “offensive” online content.
  4. Section 79 of the IT Act, which deals with the liability of internet intermediaries (like social media companies) for user-generated content.

Application of law to facts:

Law Applied: The court examined this under Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech) and Article 19(2) (reasonable restrictions).

Application: The court determined that the law’s vague wording, such as “offensive” or “annoyance,” did not constitute a “reasonable restriction.” This was because it failed to distinguish between legitimate advocacy and actual incitement to violence or public disorder. Consequently, the court held that the law’s application to the petitioners’ actions was unconstitutional and it was struck down.

Ratio Decidendi: 

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, is unconstitutional as it violates the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

The court’s reasoning for this includes:

  • The terms in Section 66A (“grossly offensive,” “menacing,” etc.) are excessively vague and overbroad, making the law open to arbitrary application.
  • The provision fails to fall within the ambit of “reasonable restrictions” permitted by Article 19(2) because it does not have a direct and proximate relationship with public order. It punished mere “advocacy” or “discussion” rather than “incitement” of an offense.
  • The law had a chilling effect on free speech, as individuals would be hesitant to express views for fear of criminal prosecution.

Obiter Dicta: 

In this case, the significant obiter dicta relate to the court’s commentary on the legal status of other provisions:

  • Section 79 of the IT Act (Intermediary Liability): The court interpreted this section to mean that internet intermediaries (like social media platforms) are only required to remove content upon receiving a specific court order or a government direction. This provided a crucial shield for platforms against arbitrary demands for content takedown by private parties, though this reading down has been debated.
  • Section 69A of the IT Act (Blocking of Websites): The court found this provision to be constitutionally valid. It reasoned that Section 69A, unlike 66A, had sufficient procedural safeguards and a narrow focus on blocking content for specific reasons like national security and public order, making it a “reasonable restriction.”

Judgement:

The Supreme Court of India declared Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, unconstitutional in its entirety. It held that the provision was violative of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of speech and expression.

The Court also gave directions on other provisions:

It read down Section 79 of the IT Act, clarifying that internet intermediaries are only liable for content upon receiving a court order or a government notification, not on their own knowledge.

It upheld the constitutional validity of Section 69A of the IT Act, which allows the government to block websites.

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