Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

Decided on: 24.03.2015

JUDGES: Jasti Chelameswar and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

INTRODUCTION

The right to freedom of speech and expression, enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, stands as a cornerstone of democratic governance and individual liberty. This fundamental right empowers citizens to articulate their thoughts, opinions, and beliefs without fear of retribution or censorship. It is an essential mechanism for fostering public discourse, facilitating societal progress, and ensuring government accountability. However, the complexity surrounding this right arises from the fact that it is not absolute; rather, it exists within a framework that allows for reasonable restrictions as delineated in Article 19(2)^[1]. This nuanced balance between freedom and restriction merits critical examination. Article 19(2) stipulates specific grounds upon which the government can impose limitations on free speech: sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with other countries, public order, decency and morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offense. Each of these categories serves a vital purpose in maintaining social harmony and national stability. A careful interpretation of Article 19(2) clearly shows that if a law places reasonable restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression for reasons such as protecting India’s sovereignty, integrity, security, foreign relations, public order, decency, morality, preventing contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offense, then such a law cannot be considered unconstitutional for violating Article 19(1)(a).

The case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India is a landmark judgment that protected people’s Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression^[2]. The Supreme Court struck down unfair powers given to the government under the Information Technology Act, which could have been used to silence free speech. This case also shows that in India, court decisions are not always properly followed, and real change happens when the legislature takes active steps to make better and fairer laws.

FACTS OF THE CASE

In 2012, Mumbai police arrested two girls, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, for posting comments on Facebook criticizing the bandh that followed the death of Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray. Although they were soon released and the charges were dropped, the arrests sparked nationwide outrage. It was alleged that the police misused their power by wrongly applying Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, violating the girls’ fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression^[3].

Since offences under Section 66A were cognizable, police could arrest or investigate without a warrant, leading to several arrests across India for sharing opinions online. Many of these posts were merely political dissent, labelled by authorities as “objectionable content.” In response, the Central Government issued an advisory in January 2013 stating that no person should be arrested under Section 66A without prior approval from a senior police officer, such as the Inspector General.

Following this, a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed challenging Section 66A of the IT Act as unconstitutional and violative of Article 19(1)(a). The petition aimed to stop the misuse of the provision, especially after the Mumbai arrests. Section 66A, introduced later through an amendment to the IT Act, 2000^[4], was intended to address cybercrimes such as publishing obscene content, identity theft, phishing, and spreading offensive or misleading messages online. It penalized:

1. Information that is grossly offensive or threatening;
2. False information sent repeatedly to cause annoyance, insult, or hatred; and
3. Electronic messages intended to mislead or inconvenience others.

ISSUES RAISED

The main issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 violates the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as the restrictions it imposes do not fall within the ambit of “reasonable restrictions” mentioned in Article 19(2).

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS

1. Section 66A^[5] curtails the fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) and cannot be justified under any clause of Article 19(2).
2. Expressions like “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” and similar terms are ambiguous and lack precise meaning, giving excessive discretionary power to authorities and leading to arbitrary enforcement.
3. The section is inherently vague as it fails to clearly define the offences, leaving citizens uncertain about what conduct is punishable.
4. It also contravenes Article 14^[6] since it discriminates without reasonable classification, targeting only online communication while excluding other mediums.

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS

1. The legislature is the appropriate body to assess public needs, and every law is presumed to be constitutional unless proven otherwise.
2. The judiciary should interpret laws in a manner that upholds their validity, even if it requires reading down certain provisions.
3. The mere possibility of misuse does not render a statutory provision invalid.
4. The broad and flexible wording of Section 66A^[7] is intended to safeguard the public from misuse of digital communication platforms.
5. A statute cannot be struck down solely for being vague if it is otherwise fair, reasonable, and non-arbitrary in its application.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

After hearing arguments from both the Petitioners and the Respondents, the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered a unanimous judgment declaring Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 unconstitutional. The Court held that the provision violated the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) and was not saved by any of the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).

The Court further held that:

Section 66A is struck down in its entirety as unconstitutional.

Section 69A and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 are constitutionally valid.

Section 79 of the I.T. Act is upheld, subject to the reading down of Section 79(3)(b).

Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act is struck down as unconstitutional.

ANALYSIS

1. Section 66A of IT Act 2000 and Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Expression

The Supreme Court clarified that the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)^[8] includes three dimensions discussion, advocacy, and incitement. As long as an expression remains within discussion or advocacy, it is constitutionally protected. However, when it turns into incitement to cause harm, only then can restrictions be imposed under Article 19(2)^[9]. The language used in Section 66A^[10] is unclear and overly broad. Words like “offensive,” “menacing,” or “annoying” lack precise meaning and give uncontrolled discretion to authorities. Such ambiguity violates the basic principle of legal certainty and enables arbitrary enforcement. The wide and uncertain wording of Section 66A^[11] discourages individuals from expressing legitimate opinions for fear of punishment. This suppresses open discussion and leads to a chilling effect on free speech, which is contrary to constitutional values

2. Meaning of “Information” under Section 2(v) of the IT Act

The definition of “information” under the IT Act is wide and neutral, referring to the means of communication, not its content. It encompasses all types of expressions political, artistic, literary, or scientific. Section 66A fails to differentiate between harmless opinions and actual incitement, thereby infringing on the public’s right to receive and share information.

3. Reasonable Restriction and Public Order

As interpreted in Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh^[12], any restriction on rights must be fair, balanced, and not arbitrary. Section 66A fails this test because it punishes even those communications that cause trivial annoyance or discomfort without affecting public order or security. There is no logical link between the prohibited acts and potential disorder.

4. Defamation and Incitement to Crime

Defamation implies harm to reputation, which Section 66A does not specifically address. Similarly, mere annoyance or inconvenience cannot be considered as incitement to commit an offence. Hence, the provision does not fall within any legitimate restriction permitted by Article 19(2). The provision does not meet the “clear and present danger” or “tendency to cause public disorder” standards. There is no direct or imminent risk of violence or disruption caused by the expressions covered under Section 66A.

5. Decency and Morality

Section 66A has no reference to obscenity and therefore cannot be justified on grounds of decency or morality. The terms “grossly offensive” or “annoying” are subjective and differ from person to person, leading to inconsistent application of the law. A law cannot be justified merely because authorities promise to use it fairly. Since the possibility of misuse exists inherently in vague laws, the provision must be evaluated independently of administrative assurances. Section 66A, by nature, invites misuse. Because none of the parts of Section 66A can be separated or saved without violating Article 19(1)(a), the Court declared the entire section unconstitutional.

6. Article 14 – Equality Before Law

Though Section 66A was struck down for violating free speech, it did not infringe Article 14. The Court acknowledged that online communication is distinct from print or broadcast media due to its instant reach and low cost, thus allowing the legislature to treat it differently.

OTHER LEGISLATIONS:

• Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act

Section 118(d) was also invalidated for being unclear and excessive, as it penalized vague actions and unnecessarily restricted free expression, similar to Section 66A^[13].

• Section 69A and the Blocking Rules, 2009

Section 69A was upheld as constitutionally valid since it is narrowly framed and includes procedural safeguards such as prior approval, recorded reasons, and a review process. These mechanisms ensure accountability and prevent arbitrary censorship.

• Section 79 and the Intermediary Guidelines, 2011

Section 79, providing immunity to intermediaries like online platforms, was upheld with interpretation. The Court clarified that intermediaries are required to act only upon receiving a court order or a lawful government direction that complies with Article 19(2). The related Rules were also validated with this reading.

CONCLUSION

The Shreya Singhal v. Union of India judgment is a game-changer in the world of digital rights and freedom of expression. Imagine waking up one day to find that your ability to express yourself online has been severely restricted by vague laws. That’s exactly what Section 66A of the Information Technology Act did until the Supreme Court stepped in. By striking down this section, the Court reaffirmed our fundamental right to free speech under Article 19(1)(A). This decision is not just a legal victory; it’s a win for every citizen who values their voice in today’s digital age.

But why was this ruling so important? Well, think about it: laws that are vague and arbitrary can easily be misused to silence dissent or stifle creativity. By emphasizing that such laws cannot be allowed to restrict our freedoms, the Supreme Court reminded us that we need clear guidelines to protect our rights. This judgment highlights how essential it is for our judiciary to act as a guardian of the Constitution, ensuring that no one be it an individual or government oversteps their bounds.

Unfortunately, even after this landmark decision, there have been reports of continued misuse of Section 66A. It’s disheartening to see that despite its invalidation, some people still use outdated practices against others online. This shows us that simply having strong judicial decisions isn’t enough; we also need effective enforcement and accountability at all levels. How can we expect real change if there’s a disconnect between what judges decide and what happens on the ground? It’s crucial for lawmakers and citizens alike to stay informed about these issues so we can hold each other accountable.

^[1] Constitution of India 1950, art 19(1)(a), art 19(2)

^[2] Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015< https://indiankanoon.org/doc/110813550/>

^[3] Constitution of India 1950, art 19(1)(a)

^[4] Information Technology Act, 2000

^[5] Information Technology Act, 2000

^[6] Constitution of India1950, art 14

^[7] Information Technology Act, 2000

^[8] Constitution of India 1950, art 19(1)(a)

^[9] Constitution of India 1950, art 19(2)

^[10] Information Technology Act, 2000

^[11]  Information Technology Act, 2000

^[12] Chintaman Rao vs The State Of Madhya Pradeshram 1951< https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1256541/ >

^[13]  Information Technology Act, 2000