Published on: 25th December 2025
Authored by: Yash Mishra
MIT World Peace University
Abstract:
The 21st-century “commercial space race” has transformed outer space from an arena of state rivalry into one dominated by private actors. Companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, Rocket Lab and others now launch rockets, satellites, and even crewed vehicles at a pace unimagined when the first space treaties were written. Today over 11,000 satellites orbit Earth[1] (SpaceX’s Starlink alone accounts for ~7,500)[2], and nations from the U.S. to India are inviting industry into space. This boom raises urgent questions about governance: who rules space when rockets are privately owned? Existing international space law – a web of treaties from the Cold War era – was designed for two superpowers, not Silicon Valley. This article examines how international law currently constrains private space enterprises, highlights the gaps in that framework, and considers proposals (including a possible UN regulatory agency) to ensure that private rockets operate under meaningful global accountability.
International Legal Framework:
The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 (UNOOSA, Jan. 27, 1967) remains the cornerstone of space law. Its Articles establish key principles: outer space is the common province of mankind; no nation may claim sovereignty over the Moon or planets; and space must be used for peaceful purposes[3][4]. Crucially for private companies, Article VI provides that “States Parties…shall
bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space…whether such activities are carried on by governmental or non-governmental entities,” and requires that all non governmental space activities be authorized and supervised by the state[5]. In short, the OST makes governments responsible for anything their nationals (including companies) do in space. Complementary treaties add detail: the Liability Convention (1972) holds launching States strictly liable for any damage their space objects cause on Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage in space if due to fault[6]. The Registration Convention (1975) mandates that
launching States register every space object they send up and furnish basic data (launch date, orbital parameters, purpose, etc.) to the UN registry[7].
In practice, these treaties impose obligations only on States, not directly on companies. For example, if SpaceX’s Starlink satellites collide with another country’s spacecraft, the U.S. (as launching State) is liable under the Liability Convention, even though the operator is a private firm. If a New Space startup launches a probe to an asteroid, the launching State must add it to its space object registry. OST Article VIII likewise says the State on whose registry a satellite is carried retains jurisdiction over it. Thus, international law currently “contains no direct regime for private actors,” but operates indirectly: it requires that each nation regulates and supervises its own companies[5][8]. The U.S. – echoing the OST – emphasizes that it authorizes and oversees all private spaceflight: for instance, the FAA licenses every U.S. launch and reentry operation[9], NOAA licenses remote-sensing satellites, and the FCC licenses satellite communications.
Gaps in Governing Private Space Actors:
Despite these treaties, serious governance gaps remain. The original space law framework was built for state space programs, not for today’s thousands of commercial launches. Scholars note that the OST and related treaties “did not anticipate private space activity,” leaving them ill suited to allocate responsibility and manage new risks[10][11]. In particular, Article VI’s requirement that states “authorize and continually supervise” private activities is vague: no one monitors whether companies actually comply with environmental or safety norms in orbit. States differ wildly in how strictly they police their firms, and international law provides little enforcement mechanism. As one analysis observes, ambiguities in treaty language and lack of enforcement mean private firms often operate “with minimal oversight”[12]. For example, in 2020 a SpaceX Starlink satellite nearly collided with an ESA satellite; SpaceX casually called the event a mere “bug” and simply promised to be more careful[12]. Under current law, only affected States can lodge a claim (likely via diplomatic channels) – there is no global police for space operations.
Moreover, emerging activities raise novel challenges. The Artemis Accords (a 2020 U.S.-led set of principles on lunar exploration) and some national laws allow private companies to extract
asteroid or lunar resources, a practice whose compatibility with Article II of the OST (no national appropriation) is hotly debated[13][14]. States like the U.S. and Luxembourg have concluded that use of resources is permitted so long as no one severs part of space for national territory[15][13], but critics argue this circumvents OST Article II. Meanwhile, proliferation of satellites is causing space traffic and debris issues. Collision risks from “mega-constellations” are rising (over 60% of active satellites are in one company’s constellation[2]), yet there is no binding international “space traffic management” regime. Current COPUOS guidelines on debris are voluntary and non-binding.
In sum, the governance gap is that international law demands that States supervise their nationals, but says little about how. It also lacks clear universal rules for new scenarios (resource mining, orbital congestion, on-orbit servicing, etc.). As one expert aptly puts it, the existing regime is “increasingly outdated in the context of modern exploration”[16]. Without reform, the rapid rise of private space actors could lead to conflicts or accidents that the old, state-centric framework cannot readily resolve.
National Space Laws: Divergent Approaches:
Because international law looks to States to implement it, many countries have adopted national space legislation to authorize, supervise, and control private launches. These laws vary widely. In the United States, the Commercial Space Launch Act (1984, amended continuously) directs the Federal Aviation Administration to license all U.S. launches and reentries[9]. The U.S. also has specialized laws: for example, the 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act explicitly grants U.S. citizens rights to own resources they extract from asteroids or the Moon. In practice, any American company (SpaceX, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, etc.) must obtain FAA authorization before a flight, as well as FCC/NOAA licenses for communications or remote sensing.
Luxembourg pioneered a resource-specific law in 2017. Its Space Resources Law begins by proclaiming that “Space resources are capable of being owned,” and requires any company to obtain a national mission authorization before exploiting asteroid or lunar material[17]. (In effect, Luxembourg grants domestic firms property rights over resources they gather, subject to the OST proviso of free use.) The law also imposes corporate and technical requirements on
licensees, ensuring the State can supervise private missions. The European Union is moving in a similar direction: a proposed EU Space Act (2025 draft) would harmonize licensing rules across member states for launch, satellite operation, and space debris mitigation, though notably it omits any framework for resource extraction[18].
The United Arab Emirates recently overhauled its space sector regulation. In 2019 it passed Federal Law No. 12/2019 on the “Regulation of the Space Sector,” and in 2023 Federal Decree Law No. 46/2023 on its organization[19]. These laws establish a national space agency (UAESA) with authority over commercial space activities, and even set up a compensation fund under a Cabinet resolution for damage caused by UAE space objects. In short, the UAE now has a comprehensive legal regime covering licensing, export controls, and liability in line with the OST and Liability Convention[19].
India, historically a state-dominated space program, is also opening up. The 2023 Indian Space Policy created IN-SPACe (Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre) as a single-window regulator for all space activities by government and private entities. IN-SPACe will issue licenses for launches, satellite operations, ground stations, remote sensing and more[20][21]. The Policy encourages a “NewSpace” ecosystem: private Indian companies may now build and launch satellites, provide satellite services, and even undertake remote sensing, provided they have IN-SPACe authorization. This mirrors global practice that any non government actor must be licensed by its home nation.
Other major spacefaring countries have analogous regimes. The United Kingdom’s Outer Space Act (1986, updated 2018) requires UK-based launches to obtain government licenses; Japan’s Space Basic Act (2008) similarly mandates state permission. China’s new Space Law (2021) requires state approval for civilian missions. In sum, while details differ, most nations are building (or already have) domestic space laws that empower them to oversee their corporations.
However, this mosaic of national laws means regulation depends on the company’s nationality. SpaceX and Blue Origin (U.S. entities) adhere to FAA/NOAA/FCC rules. A Luxembourg registered asteroid miner would follow Luxembourg’s resource law[17]. An Indian satellite startup must clear IN-SPACe. There is no global “one-stop” license: any company operating internationally must juggle multiple approvals or face prohibition (for example, U.S. companies
cannot launch with Russian rockets without U.S. permission, and vice versa). These patchwork rules can cause conflicts. The EU Space Act draft suggests that some activities (e.g. asteroid mining) might still be left to member states, potentially leading to divergent interpretations of the OST’s non-appropriation clause[18].
Toward a Global Regulatory Framework:
Given these gaps, many observers argue that new international mechanisms are needed to govern private space activity. One path is to strengthen existing treaties. For instance, nations could amend the Outer Space Treaty to clarify states’ duties. A recent analysis recommends explicitly incorporating private entities into OST obligations by defining “non-governmental entity” and spelling out state enforcement measures[22]. This might involve, for example, requiring each State Party to establish licensing regimes meeting common standards, or to penalize their nationals for debris generation. A treaty amendment or new concordat could also set minimum safety, environmental, and liability requirements for all spacefaring.
Yet treaty amendment is notoriously difficult (the OST has never been amended in over 50 years). Another proposal is a new global treaty focused on commercial activities – perhaps even an analogue to the Law of the Sea’s regime for seabed mining. The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group (an NGO consortium) has drafted sample “model provisions” for space mining, including an international registry of mining rights[23]. Any such treaty would need broad support (including from China, Russia, the EU, and others) and would likely be decades in the making.
Alternatively, some advocate creating a new international organization or agency with authority over space commerce. For example, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) might be given a stronger charter, or a special sub-agency (under UNOOSA) could be established for licensing and enforcement. A 2024 proposal to COPUOS envisions a Study Group on space traffic management to begin drafting potential legal measures[24]. Beyond COPUOS, ideas range from a “Global Space Traffic Coordination Authority” to a UN run permit system for satellites. These models suggest a centralized registry of launches (expanding the UN Register), mandatory data-sharing on trajectories, and an international “blacklist” for violators.
Any new authority would need real enforcement power. One idea is an international compliance body that would monitor private activities and investigate infractions[25]. For example, just as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regulates airspace safety, an “International Space Traffic Management Office” could be created. Such an office might not launch law itself, but could certify national regulators and publish “name-and-shame” violation reports. Enforcing penalties (sanctions, fines, suspension of launch privileges) would ultimately still fall to states, but a central body could coordinate investigations of cross-border incidents.
There are precedents for involving industry in norm-setting. The Internet’s governance offers an analogy: a non-profit (ICANN) administers key addressing systems with significant regulatory influence, despite not being a government. A space equivalent might be imagined, though any model will have to balance state sovereignty with multi-stakeholder input. At a minimum, COPUOS and the UN could develop clearer non-binding guidelines or codes of conduct (as have been done for debris mitigation and best practices) to build norms. The Artemis Accords, though not universally accepted, show how a leading space power can convene like-minded states and companies around shared principles (e.g. transparency, “safety zones” around operations).
Finally, informal measures could help bridge the gap while formal law catches up. Industry coalitions or public–private forums (much as the Hague Working Group on mining) could agree on voluntary standards for collision avoidance, debris mitigation, and resource use. International insurers and investors are increasingly demanding proof of compliance with space law as a commercial condition. Thus, even without a global regulator, market pressures might compel companies to follow stricter safety norms.
Conclusion:
The surge of private spaceflight means that “rockets” are no longer just state-run. Yet our legal framework remains unbalanced: it treats outer space as a shared realm but lacks shared institutions strong enough to govern non-state actors. As SpaceX and Blue Origin launch next generation rockets, and countries like India and UAE vigorously license new entrants, the risk is that conflicting national rules and weak enforcement will produce accidents or contested claims. Filling this governance gap is not easy – it may require updating the Outer Space Treaty, crafting new international instruments, or even creating a UN-backed regulatory body. What is certain is
that without fresh global cooperation, the spirit of the OST (peaceful, equitable space use) could be undermined by 21st-century NewSpace. The stakes are high: outer space is a global common, and its security and sustainability now depend on how well law and policy adapt to the age of private rockets.
References: Primary space treaties and UNOOSA materials[5][6][7]; recent analyses and news on commercial space law[8][12][26][17][19][27][1].
[1] [2] How many satellites could fit in Earth orbit? And how many do we really need? | Live Science
https://www.livescience.com/space/space-exploration/how-many-satellites-could-fit-in-earth orbit-and-how-many-do-we-really-need
[3] The Outer Space Treaty
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html
[4] [8] [10] [11] [12] [16] [22] [25] Houston, We Have a Problem: International Law’s Inability to Regulate Space Exploration – NYU JILP
https://nyujilp.org/houston-we-have-a-problem-international-laws-inability-to-regulate-space exploration/
[5] Outer Space Treaty
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html [6] Liability Convention
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introliability-convention.html [7] Registration Convention
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registration-convention.html [9] Navigating U.S. Commercial Space Regulations – Office of Space Commerce
https://space.commerce.gov/links/resources-for-space-entrepreneurs/navigating-u-s-commercial space-regulations/
[13] [14] [15] [18] [23] [26] Space mining: breach of international law in space? https://cms-lawnow.com/en/ealerts/2025/07/space-mining-breach-of-international-law-in-space
[17] Law of July 20th 2017 on the exploration and use of space resources – The agency – Luxembourg Space Agency
https://space-agency.public.lu/en/agency/legal
framework/law_space_resources_english_translation.html
[19] Space Law and Arbitration: An introduction to Space Law in the UAE : Clyde & Co https://www.clydeco.com/en/insights/2024/04/space-law-and-arbitration-an-introduction-to-s-1 [20] [21] [27] isro.gov.in
https://www.isro.gov.in/media_isro/pdf/IndianSpacePolicy2023.pdf
[24] unoosa.org
https://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/documents/2024/aac_1052024crp/aac_1052024crp_21 _0_html/AC105_2024_CRP21E.pdf
