Case Summary: RAMESH CHAND V. SURESH CHAND & ANR. (CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6377 OF 2012)

• TITLE: RAMESH CHAND V. SURESH CHAND & ANR. 
• CITATION: (C) Appeal No. 6377/2012
• BENCH: Justice Aravind Kumar, Justice Sandeep Mehta
• DATE: September 1 2025

BACKGROUND

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India vide judgment dated 01 September 2025 in Ramesh Chand v Suresh Chand & Anr (Civil Appeal No 6377 of 2012)  held that an Agreement to Sell, General Power of Attorney (GPA), Will, Receipt, and Affidavit, individually or collectively, do not constitute instruments of transfer for conferring valid title to immovable property under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Court set aside the judgments of the lower courts which had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for declaration, possession, and mesne profits. The succession to the suit property was held to open intestate upon the death of the original owner. 

FACTS AND CONTENTIONS

The property at the centre of this dispute was House No. 563, Ambedkar Basti near Balmiki Gate, Delhi – 110053, owned by Shri Kundan Lal, father of both the appellant (Ramesh Chand) and the respondent (Suresh Chand).

According to the plaintiff, Suresh Chand, his father executed in his favour on 16 May 1996 a bundle of documents:

1. A General Power of Attorney authorising him to manage and deal with the suit property;
2. An Agreement to Sell purporting to record transfer for consideration;
3. An Affidavit affirming the arrangement;
4. A Receipt acknowledging payment of ₹1,40,000 by Suresh Chand to his father; and
5. A Registered Will, allegedly bequeathing the property exclusively to him.

On this basis, Suresh Chand contended that he became the exclusive owner of the property. He asserted that Ramesh Chand continued in occupation only as a licensee and, after the alleged transfer, became a mere trespasser. He further alleged that Ramesh, acting without right or authority, sold 50% of the property to a third party (Defendant No. 2 / Respondent No. 2), thereby necessitating his suit.

Accordingly, Suresh filed a civil suit (Suit No. 613/1997) seeking:

• Possession of the property;
• Mesne profits for wrongful occupation;
• A Declaration of title in his favour; and
• Mandatory injunction directing Ramesh Chand to hand over original title deeds and restraining further alienation.

In response, Ramesh Chand filed his written statement and counterclaim, raising several key defences:

• He asserted that the property had been orally transferred to him by their father in July 1973, and that since then, he had been in continuous, uninterrupted possession in his own right.
• He pointed out that Suresh himself had filed an earlier suit (OS No. 294/1996), where he admitted that their father was the owner, thereby contradicting his later claim of having acquired title in 1996. That suit was withdrawn on 6 June 1997.
• He alleged that the 1996 documents were procured through misrepresentation and were void.
• He sought a declaration that the GPA, Agreement to Sell, Will, Affidavit, and Receipt were null and void and not binding on him.

The trial court accepted Suresh Chand’s case, decreed the suit in his favour, and dismissed Ramesh’s counterclaim. On appeal (RFA 358/2000), the Delhi High Court upheld the decree, relying on the precedent in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank, which treated GPA-sales as valid transactions. However, this view was later overruled by the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries v. State of Haryana (2012), which held that GPA-sales are not recognised transfers of title.

Ramesh challenged the High Court’s decree before the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 9012/2011). The Court, by order dated 31 October 2011, partly allowed the appeal and remanded the matter back to the High Court, directing it to reconsider in light of Suraj Lamp. On remand, the High Court again dismissed Ramesh’s appeal on 9 April 2012, leading to the present appeal (Civil Appeal No. 6377 of 2012) before the Supreme Court.

Thus, the factual conflict centred on two competing narratives:

• Suresh’s case: title through GPA, Agreement to Sell, Affidavit, Receipt, and Will executed in 1996.
• Ramesh’s case: oral transfer in 1973, continuous possession since then, and invalidity of the 1996 documents.

ISSUES 

1. Whether the impugned documents (the Agreement to Sell, General Power of Attorney, receipt of consideration, and the registered Will, all executed by Kundan Lal) confer a valid title over the suit property?
2. Whether the plaintiff can claim any benefit under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (doctrine of part performance)?
3. What relief are the parties entitled to?

JUDGMENT 

The Supreme Court allowed Ramesh Chand’s appeal. It set aside the High Court’s judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s suit. The Court held that none of the contested documents conveyed title to Suresh, and without valid transfer the plaintiff could not prevail. The Court also clarified that Respondent No.2’s rights to the half-share he purchased from Ramesh would remain protected to that extent. No costs were ordered.

RATIO DECENDI

• Requirement of Registered Conveyance (Section 54 TP Act):

 The Court reaffirmed that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a sale of immovable property must be effected by a registered instrument. An “agreement for sale” by itself does not transfer any interest. Quoting precedents (e.g. Suraj Lamp), it emphasized that “a contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in … property”. Here, the Agreement to Sell dated 16.05.1996 (and the GPA, receipt, etc.) were not registered sale deeds. Consequently, they conferred no title on Suresh; at best they entitled him to sue for specific performance, not to immediate ownership.

• General Power of Attorney:

 The Court observed that a GPA is merely a power of agency, revocable in nature, and not an instrument of transfer. Even an irrevocable power of attorney does not automatically transfer title. In this case, the GPA granted to Suresh authorized him to manage and even let out the property, but contained no conveyance. Thus, the GPA, regardless of its validity, could not vest any ownership in the plaintiff.

• The Will: 

Under Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, a Will is a declaration by the testator concerning his property to take effect after death. It is inherently ambulatory and revocable during the testator’s lifetime. The Court quoted Suraj Lamp to note that “a will is not worth the paper on which it is written” while the testator lives. Here, the registered Will of 16.05.1996 was purportedly executed by Kundan Lal. However, the Court found its terms highly suspicious: Kundan Lal had four children but the Will gave the entire property to Suresh, excluding the others. No rationale or evidence of estrangement was offered. Such unexplained adverse treatment of three heirs raised “suspicious circumstances”. The plaintiff failed to remove this cloud (e.g. by calling independent witnesses to prove the Will’s execution). As a result, the Court held that even though the Will was registered, it did not conclusively prove title. In the Court’s words, the Will “though registered would not confer any valid title on the plaintiff”.

• Receipt of Consideration/Affidavit:

The affidavit dated 16.05.1996 and the receipt for Rs.1,40,000 (allegedly paid by Suresh) were examined. These documents acknowledged payment but contained no conveyance of property. The Court noted that under Section 54 only a deed of conveyance can transfer title. None of the affidavit’s provisions were proved by independent witnesses. Consequently, these documents likewise could not transfer any interest to the plaintiff.

• Part Performance (Section 53A):

 Turning to Section 53A, the Court reiterated that the doctrine of part performance can operate only if the alleged transferee has taken possession under the contract. The essential elements (as in Nathulal v. Phoolchand) include a signed contract and that the transferee is in possession, among others. Here, Suresh’s own suit for possession showed that he was not in possession of the entire property when he filed the suit. Thus, the requirement of possession was unmet. Accordingly, Section 53A offered no aid to him. (The Court also observed that Section 53A shields a purchaser only against the original transferor, not against third-party purchasers – though this point was not central given the finding on possession.)

• Succession and Relief: 

Because the claimed transactions did not vest title in Suresh, the property devolved according to the ordinary rules of succession. Upon Kundan Lal’s death on 10.04.1997, his legal heirs (including Ramesh and Suresh) inherited the property. Since the plaintiff’s Will was held invalid, no testamentary disposition arose and each heir’s share was subject to inheritance law. The appellant Ramesh had sold half of his undivided share to Respondent No.2. The Court noted that its interim order of 26.08.2013 had already directed that Respondent No.2’s rights would not be prejudiced. Consequently, it reaffirmed that Respondent No.2’s title to the 50% share he purchased would remain protected. Beyond protecting Respondent No.2’s interest, the Court made no further orders on that issue, leaving the parties to settle their remaining rights in accordance with law.

OBITER DICTA

The judgment contained a few general observations reiterating established principles. For example, it reiterated that a Will is entirely revocable during the testator’s life – “so long as the testator is alive, a will is not worth the paper on which it is written”. It also noted (via Suraj Lamp) that merely registering a Will “does not make it any more effective”. These comments underscore the inherent fragility of testamentary documents but were incidental to the holding that the specific Will in question was not proved. 

CONCLUSION

The decision in Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. LRs. v. Suresh Chand & Anr. marks a reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s consistent stance on property transfers, testamentary instruments, and equitable doctrines. The Court’s ultimate conclusion was that the plaintiff’s claim of exclusive ownership failed at every level of legal scrutiny.

First, none of the documents relied upon by the plaintiff — the Agreement to Sell, General Power of Attorney, Affidavit, Receipt, or Registered Will — met the statutory requirements for conferring title to immovable property. In the absence of a registered conveyance deed, ownership could not pass under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.

Second, the registered Will of 16 May 1996, which purported to bequeath the entire property to Suresh Chand, was found unproved and suspicious. The plaintiff failed to examine attesting witnesses as mandated under the Succession Act and the Evidence Act. The unexplained exclusion of three natural heirs further undermined its credibility. The Court held that mere registration could not salvage such a document.

Third, the plaintiff’s reliance on Section 53A TPA (doctrine of part performance) was rejected because possession is the sine qua non of that provision, and Suresh Chand had himself sued for possession. The equitable shield of part performance could not apply when the plaintiff was not in possession.

Having rejected the plaintiff’s claims, the Court held that succession opened intestate upon the death of Kundan Lal in April 1997. Accordingly, all his Class I heirs inherited the property equally under the Hindu Succession Act. The Court further protected the interest of Respondent No. 2, who had purchased 50% share from Ramesh Chand, noting that his rights as a bona fide purchaser had already been safeguarded by interim orders.

The plaintiff’s suit was therefore dismissed in its entirety, the judgments of the trial court and the High Court were set aside, and the appeal of Ramesh Chand was allowed. Importantly, the Court made no order as to costs, leaving the parties to bear their own litigation expenses.