Role of Governor in State Politics: Constitutional Limits and Judicial Review

Abstract

This paper examines the changing role of the Governor in Indian state politics with special reference to constitutional limits on gubernatorial discretion in granting assent to legislation. While historically the agents of the centre, nowadays the Governors have been seen as entities caught in the tussle between federal interest and provincial autonomy. An analysis of Article 200 along with landmark decisions like Nabam Rebia and State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor reveals the judiciary’s struggle in arresting the phenomenon of “evasive constitutional inaction”. Lastly, the evaluation of the 2025 Presidential Reference, which rejected “deemed assent” while putting in place a “limited mandamus” to guarantee institutional accountability without reducing the Governor to rubber-stamp status.

Introduction: –

1.1. The office of the governor is always a place of embroiling zone. The office has come into existence from company’s rule in India. When company has setup different factories in India It has appointed governors to look after them also known as presidents. Which are interconnected to company’s headquarters in London. During Charter Act 1833, The governors remained as the agents of the central government in the Presidencies and other provinces. But soon the empowering Indian Independence movement as a Popular movement has compelled British Government to grant self-government to the India people by establishing provincial autonomy in Government of India Act of 1935.

1.2. This act of British government has totally eradicated dyarchy in provinces, but it has introduced dyarchy in another form retaining office of governor. Where they were sustained and vested with a vast reserve of powers over which they could act on their own with their discretion. Later In the New Constitution in 1950 also the office of governor has been retained vesting them with the powers of constitutional head and should be aided by a ministry in his executive functions except where he must be an agent of the central government. He is also vested with legislative powers of assenting bills passed by the state legislature. The governor has emerged as a key figure for protection of minorities.

1.3. Office of governor has first come into controversy when the governor’s office has been used to destabilize and destruct the non-congress state government’ s. with example such as dismiss of Mr. Namboodripad’s led government in Kerala (1959) and the end of coalition government in Orissa (1961). Despite a limelight post, a governor acts much powerful & show’s high influence during a internal party struggles or inter-party conflicts.[1]

Constitutional Powers of Governor Regarding Assent of Governor and President: –

2.1. Article 200[2] of the Indian Constitution gives four options to the governor when a bill is passed by state legislature to (i) Grant Assent, (ii) Withhold Assent, (iii) Return for Reconsideration and (iv) Reserve for the President’s consideration.  Article 201[3] of the Indian Constitution gives president the power to (i) Grant Assent (ii) Withhold Assent and (iii) Direct Reconsideration. The only crucial difference is if the governor return the bill and if the state legislature passes the bill again and sends it back, governor must grant assent and cannot withhold it for second time, But in case of president it is not bounded on him/her to give assent and can still withhold the bill passed by legislature

2.2. The only ministerial advice is needed for the ordinance-making process under Article 213 of the Constitution, unless there is an urgency that warrants exercising his discretion. State governors administer the state, report to the President, and grant pardons under Article 161, but these also follow the advice of the cabinet. The Constitution restrains excessive use of this power: disregarding cabinet advice would risk calling for floor tests or invoking court orders against it.

Judicial Analysis of Governor Powers: –

3.1. The Supreme Court, in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker ((2016), 8 SCC 1), achieved a landmark explication on the constitutional powers of the Governor by restraining the discretionary overreach through what may be a finely spun judicial lens. A five-judge bench headed by Justices J.S. Khehar and Madan B. Lokur dissected the Arunachal Pradesh crisis in which Governor J.P. Rajkhowa unilaterally preponed the Assembly sitting to 16 December 2015 under Article 163(1) disregarding the chief minister Nabam Tuki’s aid and advice. This set the stage for Speaker Nabam Rebia to pre-emptively disqualify 21 dissident MLAs under the anti-defection law before the House itself under Deputy Speaker Karakape Ete could remove Rebia amid cacophony. The Court’s verdict of 4:1 quashed these actions, restored the Tuki government and annulled the President’s Rule imposed of 9 January 2016, being the first judicial revocation of such a proclamation.[4] (SCObservor, n.d.)

3.1.1. Judicial scrutiny pivoted on the summoning powers of Article 174: the majority found that Governors are not free to act in this regard unless they consult the Council of Ministers applicant seeking invocation in those instances classified as ‘constitutional emergencies’, such as a complete breakdown. Justice Khehar advocated the flourishing of a “doctrine of constitutional legitimacy” in terms of which he could argue that the discretion was not complete but rather ‘limited’ and ‘structured’, like the criteria of influences due to the norms of the Sarkaria Commission. The bench clarified that while exceptions under Article 163(2) are few, they do not include powers relating to consideration of legislative agendas or of overriding the Speaker without ministerial advice. Justice Goel dissented, championing a broader gubernatorial latitude in emergencies, but majority found things otherwise, emphasizing on basic structure of federalism.

3.2. The State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu :- In a judgment delivered on 8 April 2025 by Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, (W.P. (C) No. 1239 of 2023), the Court examined the conduct of Governor R.N. Ravi with respect to the 10 university-related bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislature during the period 2020-2023. The DMK government challenged the Governor’s so-called “pocket veto” under Article 32, where he indefinitely kept the bills pending till October 2023 and thereafter simply withheld assent on 13 November 2023 without returning them for consideration under the first proviso to Article 200, while reserving them for the President on 28 November 2023 by alleging repugnancy with Entry 66, Union List. By invoking Article 142, the Court retrospectively gave assent to the bills from the date of their second presentation, termed the reservations as “illegal and erroneous,” and set timelines to prevent gubernatorial obstructionism.[5]

3.2.1. The bench judgement will be based on the contention between the mandatory triad of Article 200 requiring through assent, withholding with prognosis for reconsideration (first proviso, non-Money Bills), or keeping the bill reserved for the President (subject to Article 201). As per, State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to Governor ((2024) 1 SCC 384). Justice Pardiwala traces historical lineage from Government of India Act, 1935’s Section 75-dropping in his discretion-to Constituent Assembly Debates (CAD), where Dr. Ambedkar rejected vetoes in responsible government. Both Sarkaria and Punchhi (2010) Commissions recommended a period of 3-6 months; the Court interprets “reasonable time” as one month absolute for ordinary bills, three for complex ones, extendable only on “exceptional circumstances” with justification, hence rendering delays justiciable without Article 361 immunity. [6]

3.3. Presidential Reference to Supreme Court led to Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, on November 20, 2025, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising five judges, pronounces an iconic advisory opinion that has recast the functional interplay between the State Legislature and Governor with the President. An advisory opinion had become necessary because of the aftermath of the legal fallout of the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) decision, whereby fourteen critical questions were referred to under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India by the President touching upon the scope of gubernatorial discretion and the justiciability of legislative assent.[7] (OBSERVER, n.d.)

3.3.1. The interpretation of Article 200 was the crux of the reference. The Court explained that there are only three constitutional options available to the Governor when he receives a Bill: Approbation, reservation for the assent of the President, and withholding assent and returning the Bill for reconsideration. The Court made it clear that the “withholding” option is not a “simplicitest” power to kill a Bill forever; it is, instead, a power that requires dialogue by returning the Bill to the House(s) with a message. The Court expressly rejected the idea of a “fourth option” or of an absolute veto. The only thing that the Bench admitted on this point was that if the Legislature repasses the Bill (with or without amendment), the power of the Governor to withhold assent becomes exhausted in respect of that Bill. However, the Bench made a very significant distinction: even if the Bill is repassed, the Governor still has the right to reserve it for the consideration of the President in case it affects federal interests or the powers of the High Court.

3.3.2. Restoration of gubernatorial prerogatives/discretion. The Constitution Bench though in contrast with the State of Tamil Nadu judgment ruled that the Governor is in check to choose one of these three options and is not bound by aid and advice of the Council of Ministers while exercising functions under Article 200. It said that if the Governor were to be strictly bound by ministerial advice, the check-and-balance system would prove to be nugatory-the power to refer the Bills to the President-as a Cabinet would never advise a Governor to refer its own Bill to the Centre.

3.3.3 Deemed Assent Limitation, the final judgment put to rest the rigid timelines set by the Division Bench in the Tamil Nadu case. The SC held that the Constitution-makers had deliberately chosen the words “as soon as possible,” “within six months,” and so on, to convey that institutional respect would allow a wider range of cases to be considered on a more complex level. Consequently, the Bench held that the notion of “deemed assent,” which allows for a Bill to be considered passed merely by the elapse of time, does not form part of the Indian Constitution. The Court went on to say that Article 142 could not serve to “supplant” the express legislative authority of the Governor or President, as to do so would be a judicial encroachment into the realm of executive action, violating the basic structure of separation of powers.

3.3.4. Justiciability and the ‘Limited Mandamus, It is in keeping with justiciability in the Supreme Court. The merit of the decision by either the Governor or the President to assent to or not is not justiciable. However, the Court asserted that the assailing office of the Governor is not cognizable in situations of “prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite inaction”. This meant a limit on the remedy of a “limited mandamus”. If a Governor sits on a Bill indefinitely without exercising any of the three constitutional options, the Court can direct the Governor to take a decision within a reasonable time, though it cannot dictate what that decision should be. This ensures institutional accountability without overreaching into the Governor’s discretionary domain.

3.3.5. The Court reaffirmed the principle laid down in Rameshwar Prasad (2006): while Article 361 provides an absolute bar against personally impleading the Governor or making them “answerable” to the Court for official acts, it does not shield the actions of the office from judicial review. The constitutional office remains subject to the Court’s jurisdiction to prevent “evasive constitutional inaction”. In concluding terms this presidential reference has become a  “functional reference” to restore an intended balance “swadeshi” in the Indian Constitution, the Supreme Court furthered the dialogic process over obstructionism, thereby adding to the cooperative spirit of federalism. Thus, the Governor cannot become a “rubber stamp” but equally the office cannot be used as a procedural barricade to thwart the democratic spirit of the people.[8] (Mishra, n.d.)

What’s the furtherance : 

4.1. In Special Reference No. 1 of 2025, the Supreme Court’s so-called “functional reference” offers a much-needed constraint on the frictions between State Executives and Gubernatorial offices. Henceforth, constitutional functionaries must take the so-called “dialogic process” into consideration as a legally important methodology for law-making. It is therefore fitting that governors refrain from indulging in “obstructionism,” viewing the options of returning a Bill or reserving it for the President as tools for institutional reconciliation instead of political vetoes. That is to say, the states have to make their legislative propositions in consonance with the Constitution so that causes for reservation would be sparse. While the Court has allowed this, it has removed rigid, judicially prescribed timeframes, and yet, the “constitutional imperative of expedition” remains. The present “limited mandamus” is held as a sword of Damocles, so that if an office-bearer chooses to remain engaging in “evasive constitutional inaction,” the judiciary will impose its decision. This would require a transition from a conflict-based “checks-and-balances” model to a collaborative federalism based on mature statesmanship.

Conclusion:

5.1. Federalism must live regardless of whether it is heavily eroded by an overreaching Centre or an inactive Governor; rather, the Supreme Court’s opinion has put much weight on the feasibility of an Indian polity with “amphibian” characteristics. On one basis, SC has awarded the prospect of non-justiciability to the merits of the actions of the Governor, while on another, SC imposed accountability upon the same  “office” for an act of non-performance with respect to the call of duty. The Court has thereby commended the dignity of that high office without making it a procedural barricade to the democratic will.

5.2.The rejection of supposed assent and the imposition of legally mandated timelines are essential for protecting the continued vitality of the constitutional apparatus; yet they deny any authority the right to absolute discretion. Ultimately, this decision is thus a vindication for “swadeshi” constitutionalism- a system where the Governor shall be neither a unable to do and also a centre of parallel power but one of the most important links in a vibrant, evolving, and accountable republican democracy.

References

[1] Daljit Singh, The Position of a State Governor in India, 22 Indian J. Pol. Sci. 232 (1961)

[2] India Const. art. 200

[3] India Const. art. 201

[4] Arunachal Pradesh President’s Rule: Nabam Rebia v Deputy Speaker, SUPREME COURT OBSERVER, https://www.scobserver.in/cases/nabam-rebia-deputy-speaker-arunachal-pradesh-presidents-rule-case-background/ (last updated Dec. 5, 2023).

[5] Supreme Court Sets Aside TN Governor’s Reservation Of 10 Bills For President; Says Governor Acted Without Bona Fides, LIVELAW (Dec. 20, 2024, 6:30 PM), https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/supreme-court-sets-aside-tn-governors-reservation-of-10-bills-for-president-says-governor-acted-without-bona-fides-288744.

[6] State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 4 SCC 123 (India)

[7] Presidential Reference on Powers of the Governor and President, SUPREME CT. OBSERVER, https://www.scobserver.in/cases/presidential-reference-on-powers-of-the-governor-and-president-re-assent-withholding-or-reservation-of-bills-by-the-governor-and-president-of-india/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2025)

[8] Adv Ramesh Kumar Mishra, Supreme Court Advisory Opinion (Presidential Reference): A Critical Analysis, LIVELAW (Dec. 20, 2025), (Mishra, n.d.) (Mishra, n.d.) (Adv Ramesh Kumar Mishra)