Case Summary: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461

• Title: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
• Citation: AIR 1973 SC 1461
• Court: Supreme Court of India  
• Bench: Thirteen judges – the largest ever in Indian judicial history, comprising S.M. Sikri (CJI), J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, M.H. Beg, Y.V. Chandrachud, K.K. Mathew, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, S.N. Dwivedi and A.K. Mukherjea JJ.
• Date of Judgment: 24 April 1973  
• Duration of Hearing: 68 days (31 October 1972 to 23 March 1973)
• Relevant Provisions:

1. Article 13: Laws not abiding by fundamental rights.  
2. Article 26: Freedom to manage religious affairs (invoked by the petitioner).  
3. Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, and 31: Equality before law, right to property, freedom of religion.  
4. Article 368: The power to amend the Constitution by the Parliament.
5. 24th & 25th Constitutional Amendments: Expanded Parliament’s amending power by modifying Article 368 and curtailing judicial review in certain contexts.  
6. 29th Constitutional Amendment (1972): Added the Kerala Land Reforms Act to the Ninth Schedule, granting it immunity from fundamental rights challenges.

Brief Facts

His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati, the head of the Edneer Mutt in Kerala, challenged the constitutional validity of certain provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, as amended in 1969. The law imposed ceilings on landholdings and authorised the State to acquire surplus land for redistribution.  

As the land belonged to a religious institution, Kesavananda argued that his rights under Articles 14, 19(1)(f), 25, 26, and 31 were being infringed. The Kerala High Court dismissed his petition, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Parliament enacted the 24th, 25th, and 29th Constitutional Amendments, which significantly altered the scope of its amending power.  

What began as a challenge to land laws evolved into a constitutional confrontation over the extent of Parliament’s power to alter the Constitution itself. The case, argued by eminent counsel led by Nani Palkhivala, thus became a historic test of constitutional philosophy, democracy’s limits in amending its own foundations.

Issues Involved

1. Does Article 368 confer an unlimited power upon Parliament to amend any part of the Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights?  
2. Are there implied or inherent limitations on Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution, preventing it from destroying its essential features or basic structure?  
3. Do the 24th, 25th, and 29th Amendments violate such implicit limitations by curtailing judicial review or shielding laws from constitutional scrutiny?  
4. Is the protection granted by Article 31C, insulating laws enacted to implement Directive Principles from challenge under Part III, constitutionally valid?

Key Arguments

Petitioner’s Arguments (Nani Palkhivala, Fali Nariman, Soli Sorabjee)

1. The power to “amend” under Article 368 means the power to modify or improve, not to destroy or abrogate the Constitution.  
2. Fundamental Rights, flowing from the Preamble’s ideals of justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity, form the inviolable core of the Constitution.  
3. If Parliament’s power were unlimited, it could even abolish democracy, dissolve the judiciary, or establish a totalitarian state, defeating the entire constitutional design.  
4. The 25th Amendment’s second part, which ousted courts from examining the adequacy of compensation under Article 31(2), was unconstitutional.  
5. Inclusion of laws in the Ninth Schedule to shield them from judicial review was an abuse of power incompatible with constitutional supremacy.

Respondents’ Arguments (Union of India and State of Kerala)

1. Article 368 grants Parliament sovereign and plenary power to amend any provision of the Constitution, as sovereignty ultimately resides with the people represented by Parliament.  
2. The Constitution is a political document aimed at achieving socio-economic transformation. Hence, amendments to achieve Directive Principles cannot be fettered by implied limitations.  
3. Precedents such as Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) upheld Parliament’s unrestricted amending authority, and the contrary view in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab (1967) should be overruled.  
4. The 24th Amendment merely clarified the original meaning of Article 368 and restored Parliament’s true constitutional intent.

Judgment

In a historic 7:6 decision, the Supreme Court held that Parliament’s amending power is very wide but not absolute. The Court introduced the Basic Structure Doctrine, a fundamental principle of Indian constitutional law.  

Ratio Decidendi

1. S.M. Sikri CJI: The amending power cannot be exercised to alter the basic elements embodied in the Preamble: justice, liberty, equality, and fraternity. A constitutional amendment must operate within these contours.  
2. Shelat and Grover JJ.: The harmony between Fundamental Rights (Part III) and Directive Principles (Part IV) is an essential feature that cannot be disrupted.  
3. Hegde and Mukherjea JJ.: The Constitution possesses a “social philosophy” that distinguishes its permanent core: rule of law, judicial review, and individual freedoms, from transient political goals.  
4. Jaganmohan Reddy J.: Amendment signifies reform, not destruction. The basic features: justice, freedom of expression, and equality, flowing from the Preamble are immune from amendment.  
5. H.R. Khanna J.: Parliament’s amending power is expansive but not absolute; it cannot destroy the Constitution’s underlying framework. The term “amendment” inherently excludes the power to repeal or rewrite.

Obiter Dicta

Beyond the binding ratio, several judges made profound observations that continue to illuminate Indian constitutional philosophy. The bench, despite being deeply divided in outcome, converged on one essential idea , that the judiciary must remain the sentinel of the Constitution, a guardian against the excesses of transient political majorities. The judges underscored that elected governments, though accountable to the people, may not always uphold constitutional morality or the enduring values the Constitution enshrines.  

Justice H.R. Khanna offered particularly insightful reflections. While acknowledging that the legislature represents the will of the people, he warned that unrestrained faith in elected representatives could endanger the foundational ideals of the Constitution. He observed that in a constitutional democracy, the permanence of values must outweigh the impermanence of power. His remarks emphasised the judiciary’s solemn duty to preserve the spirit of the Constitution even when the majority wills otherwise, an idea that would later guide Indian constitutional jurisprudence during periods of political turbulence.  

The Court also remarked upon the living nature of the Constitution, describing it as an organic document designed to adapt with time, yet not to be stripped of its identity. Several judges cautioned that flexibility in amendment should not be confused with the power to alter the document’s essence or core values. The Constitution, they noted, must strike a delicate balance between stability and change,  permitting progressive reform while guarding against structural annihilation.  

Another important observation concerned the subordination of property rights to social and economic justice. The judges recognised the legitimacy of land reforms and redistribution measures as instruments for achieving substantive equality. While reaffirming the sanctity of property as a legal right, they emphasised that it must yield to broader national goals of equity, poverty eradication, and social welfare. These remarks influenced subsequent constitutional and legislative developments relating to the right to property, eventually leading to its reclassification as a constitutional, rather than fundamental, right through the 44th Amendment (1978).

Final Decision

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kesavananda Bharati ultimately constituted a partial victory for the petitioner and a landmark victory for constitutionalism. Although Kesavananda Bharati himself did not obtain specific relief regarding his landholdings, the Court’s broader pronouncement revolutionised Indian constitutional law. The petition was allowed only to the limited extent that the impugned amendments would henceforth be subject to the Basic Structure Doctrine, ensuring that no future Parliament could destroy the Constitution’s essential identity.  

The judgment thus left Kesavananda’s individual grievances unresolved, yet it laid down a doctrine that permanently altered the balance of power in India. Following the decision, all future amendments, including the sweeping 42nd Amendment (1976) – became subject to judicial scrutiny under the basic structure test. When Parliament later sought to widen its powers drastically during the Emergency, the Supreme Court invoked the Kesavananda principle in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) to strike down such excesses, reaffirming the supremacy of the Constitution over transient political will.  

However, the immediate aftermath of the verdict was politically charged. The Government, displeased with the majority opinion, superseded three senior judges — Justices Shelat, Grover, and Hegde, who were part of the majority, and appointed Justice A.N. Ray, a dissenting judge in Kesavananda, as the next Chief Justice of India. This unprecedented departure from the seniority convention underscored the tensions between the executive and the judiciary and marked a defining moment in the struggle for judicial independence.  

Despite the controversy and the mixed relief granted to the petitioner, Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala remains one of the most enduring affirmations of constitutional supremacy in India. The case transcended its facts to become the foundation of the Basic Structure Doctrine, ensuring that the Indian Constitution, while adaptable and progressive, would forever remain a document of limited government, rule of law, and balance of powers.