Published on: 25th February 2026
Authored By: K.L.B.S.Aswini
VIT-AP University
Citation – 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 493
Court – Supreme Court of India
Bench – Sudhanshu Dhulia and Prashant Kumar Mishra
Date of Judgement – April 28, 2025
Brief facts of the case
Murugesan and Kannagi, from different castes, secretly married and registered their marriage on May 5, 2003, but Kannagi’s family refused to acknowledge it. Kannagi’s brother (A-2) continually intimidated Murugesan’s father with a false claim that Murugesan owed him money, tricking Murugesan into returning to their village. Murugesan was apprehended by A-1 and A-13 on July 7, 2003, undressed, chained to a pole, and violently assaulted in front of numerous locals in order to expose Kannagi’s location. Kannagi was caught early the next morning and taken to a cashew grove with Murugesan, where A-1 brought a toxic chemical (Nuvacron) and instructed A-2 to administer it to Kannagi.
A-2 forced the poison into her mouth, killing her within minutes, and Murugesan died as a result of the same poison. Their remains were later burned and disposed of. Even though the police station was barely 3 kilometers away, the officers did not file a FIR despite knowing about the murders. When Murugesan’s stepmother attempted to complain, she was harassed with caste slurs and expelled. Due to media pressure, the police manufactured a phony confession after nine days and attempted to incriminate innocent Dalit people rather than their actual killers. Because of this shady inquiry, the Madras High Court referred the case to the CBI. After taking over the case, the CBI filed a new FIR on 21 May 2004 under Sections 147, 302, and 201 of the IPC, followed by a charge-sheet on 14 October 2005 against fifteen suspects. There were two Dalits (A-4 and A-9) and two police officials (A-14 and A-15), with the rest belonging to the Vanniyar community. The Trial Court eventually acquitted A-4 and A-9, followed by the High Court acquitting A-3 and A-13. The case was significantly delayed the incident occurred in July 2003, but the trial was not completed until September 2021.
The case was transferred to the Sessions Court after more than seven years, and charges were filed only in 2017, owing to the accused’s numerous appeals to delay proceedings. The High Court commuted A-2’s death sentence to life imprisonment while upholding his conviction and acquitting A-14 of charges under the SC/ST Act and Section 218 IPC. The remaining eleven guilty suspects filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, claiming that the prosecution’s case was weak due to contradictions in witness statements, particularly those of PW-49. A-14 and A-15 claimed that no witness specifically identified them as the police officers who refused to register the FIR, and that their inquiry was objective. The Supreme Court heard arguments from senior advocates for the accused, Murugesan’s family, and the CBI. The Court then examined significant testimonies from Murugesan’s family members, including PWs 1, 2, 3, 15, and 49.
Issues
- Why there is delay of trial for 18 years?
- What is the evidentiary value of hostile witness?
Arguments
Arguments of Petitioner
The accused claimed that the prosecution case was untrustworthy and filled with discrepancies. They maintained that many of the prosecution witnesses, including crucial witness PW-49, had become hostile and modified their previous testimony, raising considerable doubt on the prosecution’s story. They contended that the Trial Court and High Court relied incorrectly on connected family witnesses such as PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-15, and PW-49, alleging they were “interested witnesses” who would naturally favour the victim’s side. Accused argued that the prosecution’s case was unreliable due to contradictions and the fact that many of the prosecution witnesses, including the key witness PW-49, had turned hostile, claiming this should introduce serious doubt. They further contended that the lower courts wrongly relied on the testimonies of family members (such as PW-1 and PW-49) because they were inherently “interested witnesses”. Procedurally, they asserted that the 18-year delay in the trial, combined with the defective and dishonest investigation, destroyed the credibility of the case and violated their right to a fair trial. In defense of the police officers, A-14 and A-15 argued that they had not been specifically identified by witnesses who were refused the FIR, and A-15 claimed that filing a charge-sheet against members of both the Dalit and Vanniyar communities demonstrated the absence of caste bias, which should absolve them of charges under the SC/ST Act.
Arguments of Respondent
The prosecution and CBI successfully argued that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt, relying heavily on the consistent and credible testimonies of key witnesses, notably PW-49, an eyewitness who confirmed that A-2 administered poison to Murugesan. The respondents countered the defense’s argument regarding hostile witnesses by stating that the law permits courts to rely on any portion of hostile witness testimony that supports the case and is corroborated by other evidence. Furthermore, they asserted that the evidence of related witnesses (like PW-1, PW-15, and PW-49) cannot be rejected simply because they are family members, as they are natural witnesses to the crime, especially since other villagers refused to come forward. The prosecution blamed the long delay in the trial on the accused’s repeated petitions and intimidation, arguing that the accused should not benefit from their own misconduct. Crucially, concerning the police officers, the respondents maintained that both A-14 and A-15 intentionally failed to register the FIR despite visiting the crime scene, thereby suppressing the truth to protect the main culprits, which amounted to dereliction of duty and an offense under the SC/ST Act.
Judgement
Delay of trial – The local police initially failed to register a FIR on the date of the double murder (July 8, 2003) and only registered a case nine days later, on July 17, 2003, after political and media pressure mounted. The delay from the “gross inefficiency at the hands of the prosecution” and was exacerbated by “dilatory tactics employed by the defence”. Even after the CBI took over the investigation and filed a charge-sheet in October 2005. The case was only committed to Sessions on March 15, 2010, more than seven years after the incident. Proceedings stalled again, and charges were ultimately framed as late as July 14, 2017.[1]
The High Court found, and the Supreme Court noted, that the reason for this long and inordinate delay was partly “because of the multiple petitions filed by the accused for one reason or the other primarily as a challenge to the proceedings itself”. The delay caused by the accused’s attempts to challenge the proceedings “cannot be discounted”[2]. The Supreme Court identified this long and inordinate delay as one of the many reasons why witnesses often turn hostile in Indian criminal courts.
Despite the substantial delay, the Court proceeded, with the depositions of most prosecution witnesses being recorded only towards the end of 2017. This overall judicial timeline of nearly two decades underscores the challenges faced in achieving timely justice in complex criminal cases.
Evidentiary value of hostile witness – Section 154(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[3], allows a party, with the leave of the Court, to put questions to its own witness that might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. The Calcutta High Court, in Khijiruddin Sonar v. Emperor[4], held that permitting cross-examination of one’s own witness discredits that witness altogether, meaning the entire testimony is discarded. This was overruled by the five-Judge bench in Praphullakumar Sarkar v. Emperor[5], which established the principle that cross-examination under Section 154 does not automatically invalidate or totally discard the witness’s entire evidence. The entire evidence goes to the jury/judge “for what it is worth,” and they decide what part, if any, to rely on.
The Supreme Court initially approved the Khijiruddin view in Jagir Singh v. State Delhi[6]. However, a subsequent decision in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration [7]clarified that the ruling in Jagir Singh was applicable only as a rule of prudence, not a rule of law, and only in cases where the witness is “totally discredited.”
Current Law & Evidentiary Value – The evidence of a witness cross-examined by the party who produced them will not stand totally discredited as a matter of law. Court must consider if the witness is thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in part. If the credit is not completely shaken, the court may accept the creditworthy part of the testimony, especially if it is corroborated by other reliable evidence[8]. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything) is not applicable in the Indian criminal justice system; the court must “distinguish the wheat from the chaff.” [9]The testimony of such a witness can be used by both the prosecution and the defence to build their case. Total rejection of the evidence would cause the cause of justice to suffer.
Ratio Decidendi
Even if witnesses turn hostile, courts can rely on parts of their testimony that are credible and corroborated. Their evidence is not wiped out entirely, and related witnesses are not disqualified merely for being family members.
Final Decision
- Dismiss the appeals filed by the convicted accused and uphold the judgment of the Madras High Court.
- The convictions and sentences of the remaining eleven accused, which had been upheld or modified by the High Court, were affirmed. This included the conviction of A-2 (Maruthupandiyan) for murder, with the sentence maintained as life imprisonment (as modified by the High Court from the Trial Court’s death sentence). It also upheld the conviction of the two police officers, A-14 (K. P. Tamilmaran) and A-15 (M. Sellamuthu), under various sections, including Section 217 IPC and Section 4 of the SC/ST Act.
- The Court awarded additional compensation of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) to PW-1 (Samikannu, father of Murugesan) and PW-49 (Chinnapillai, step-mother of Murugesan) jointly, or to the nearest of their kins. This compensation is to be paid by the State of Tamil Nadu and is in addition to any amount already awarded or directed by the lower courts.[10]
Key Takeaway
- The Supreme Court used this case not just to decide guilt, but as a platform to authoritatively re-state the law on “hostile witnesses” under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
- The core principle upheld is that even if a witness turns hostile and is cross-examined by the party that called them, their entire testimony is not automatically rejected as a matter of law.
- The credible portions of the hostile witness testimony can and should be relied upon, especially if they are corroborated by other reliable evidence on record.
- The judgment explicitly rejects the application of the Latin maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything) in the Indian criminal justice system.
- The Court affirmed that the evidence of family members (like PW-1 and PW-49) cannot be rejected solely because they are “interested witnesses,” as they are often the most natural witnesses to a crime.
[1] K P Tamilmaran v State by Deputy Superintendent of Police 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 [46].a
[2] K P Tamilmaran v State by Deputy Superintendent of Police 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 [50].ind
[3] The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s 154.
[4] Khijiruddin Sonar v Emperor 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 259.pr
[5] Praphullakumar Sarkar v Emperor 1931 SCC OnLine Cal 7
[6] Jagir Singh v State (Delhi) (1975) 3 SCC 562.
[7] Sat Paul v Delhi Administration (1976) 1 SCC 727.
[8] Bhajju v State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327
[9] K P Tamilmaran v State by Deputy Superintendent of Police 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 [62].
[10] K P Tamilmaran v State by Deputy Superintendent of Police 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493 [72].
