Published On: April 1st 2026
Authored By: Ganisrika
SASTRA DEEMED TO BE UNIVERSITY
Abstract
Freedom of the press occupies a central position within India’s constitutional democracy, functioning as both a facilitator of public discourse and a mechanism of governmental accountability. This article undertakes a comprehensive examination of media law and freedom of expression in India by analysing the constitutional framework under Article 19(1)(a), the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2), and the evolving statutory landscape governing print, broadcast, and digital media. Particular attention is paid to the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, digital media regulation under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Intermediary Guidelines Rules, 2021, and broadcasting controls under the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995. Through a study of landmark judicial pronouncements, the article evaluates how courts have shaped the balance between press autonomy and regulatory control. It further explores recent developments, emerging challenges, and the need for principled regulation consistent with democratic values and international free speech standards.
I. Introduction
Freedom of expression is foundational to every democratic polity. It enables citizens to articulate their views, scrutinise governmental conduct, and participate meaningfully in public life. The media, encompassing the print press, broadcast channels, and digital platforms, serves as the principal vehicle for this expression, facilitating informed public debate and holding power to account. These functions are, however, not without constraint. Constitutional provisions, criminal statutes, and sector-specific regulations collectively define the boundaries within which the press operates. These boundaries find expression in the text of the Constitution, in legislative enactments, and in the body of judicial precedent that has shaped their application over decades.
This article examines media law and freedom of expression in India through a comparative lens, drawing upon the regulatory approach of the United Kingdom and applicable international human rights standards where relevant. It proceeds section by section through the relevant legal framework, analysing both the normative content of the law and its practical application. It further considers how judicial decisions have influenced the real-world operation of media freedom in India, and it identifies the tensions that continue to define this field. The discussion proceeds from the constitutional framework to criminal regulation, digital governance, broadcasting law, landmark case law, and recent regulatory developments, before offering recommendations for a principled path forward.
II. Constitutional Framework Governing Media Freedom in India
A. Article 19(1)(a): Constitutional Scope of Media Freedom
Article 19(1)(a) guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression.[1] While the Constitution does not expressly refer to the press, the Supreme Court has consistently held that freedom of the press is an integral component of this guarantee. The rationale is that the effective exercise of individual speech rights depends upon the ability to disseminate ideas and information through media channels.[2] The two freedoms are therefore constitutionally inseparable. Courts have interpreted Article 19(1)(a) to encompass:
(i) the right to publish and circulate information;
(ii) the right to criticise governmental actions;
(iii) the right of the public to receive information; and
(iv) the use of electronic and digital platforms for expression.[3]
The significance of a free press within a constitutional democracy thus extends beyond the individual journalist; it inheres in the public’s entitlement to know what its government does.
B. Article 19(2): Constitutional Limits on Media Speech
The right under Article 19(1)(a) is not absolute. Article 19(2) permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offence.[4] Courts have established that any restriction must satisfy three conditions: it must be grounded in a valid law, it must pursue a legitimate aim falling within Article 19(2), and there must be proportionality between the restriction and its objective.[5] The State bears the burden of justifying any restraint imposed on the press or media. Prior restraints on publication have been viewed with particular suspicion; any censorship mechanism must demonstrate a direct and proximate nexus with a protected ground.[6]
III. Criminal Regulation of Media Speech Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023
A. Section 356, BNS: Defamation
The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 criminalises defamation under Section 356. Defamation consists in the making or publication of an imputation concerning a person, with knowledge or reasonable belief that it will harm that person’s reputation.[7] The offence extends to words (whether spoken or written), signs, and visible representations, thereby encompassing newspapers, television broadcasts, and online publications.
For members of the media, the law provides several important exceptions permitting:
(i) publication of true statements made for public good;
(ii) fair comment on the conduct of public servants;
(iii) reporting of judicial proceedings; and
(iv) expression of opinion on public questions.[8]
B. Section 356(2), BNS: Penal Consequences
The penal consequences for defamation under Section 356(2) include imprisonment, fine, or both.[9] The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation on the basis that a person’s reputation constitutes an aspect of the right to life under Article 21. It has simultaneously cautioned, however, that criminal defamation provisions must not be deployed as instruments of intimidation against journalists or as mechanisms to prolong litigation for the purpose of silencing the press.[10]
IV. Digital Media Regulation Under the Information Technology Act, 2000
A. Section 69A: Blocking of Online Content
Section 69A confers upon the Central Government the power to issue directions for the blocking of online content in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, defence, security of the State, public order, or friendly relations with foreign States. The provision requires that a designated committee examine the content and record its reasons prior to issuing a blocking order.[11]
The Supreme Court has held that Section 69A is constitutionally valid by reason of the procedural safeguards embedded within it. The Court has nevertheless held that blocking orders ought not to remain undisclosed, particularly where they affect news portals and journalistic platforms. A persistent concern remains the lack of public transparency in the exercise of Section 69A powers against media organisations.[12]
B. Section 79: Intermediary Safe Harbour
Section 79 grants immunity to intermediaries in respect of third-party content, provided that the intermediary neither originates nor modifies the content in question and complies with the prescribed due diligence requirements. This provision is central to the architecture of free expression online. It relieves online platforms of liability for user-generated content while preserving their obligation to act against unlawful material upon receiving actual knowledge.[13]
V. IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
A. Rule 3: Due Diligence Obligations
Rule 3 mandates intermediaries to publish user guidelines, remove unlawful content within prescribed timelines, and appoint grievance and compliance officers. Failure to comply results in loss of safe harbour protection, exposing platforms to liability.[14]
B. Part III: Regulation of Digital News Media
Part III establishes an oversight regime for digital news publishers and OTT platforms through a Code of Ethics and a three-tier grievance redressal mechanism. The 2021 Rules represent a significant shift in India’s approach to digital media governance, extending regulatory reach well beyond traditional broadcasting into the domain of online news publishing.[15]
VI. Broadcasting Regulation Under the Cable Television Networks Act, 1995
Section 5 of the Act mandates compliance with Programme and Advertising Codes, which prohibit content that is obscene, defamatory, or promotes communal disharmony. Sections 19 and 20 empower the government to prohibit the transmission of channels in the public interest.[16] Judicial interpretation has emphasised that such powers must be exercised sparingly and only where there exists a clear and present danger to protected interests.[17]
VII. Constitutional Cases Laying the Foundation of Press Freedom
1. Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras
In Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, the Supreme Court was called upon to examine a State decision to completely prohibit the distribution of a political journal. The Court declined to accept the State’s invocation of public safety as a justification and used the occasion to affirm that freedom of speech and expression is a foundational guarantee, not an ancillary liberty. The judgment established that media freedom is indispensable to the functioning of a democracy, not merely incidental to it. The significance of the decision lies not only in the quashing of the ban but in its declaration that executive concerns about public order cannot, without more, justify the suppression of ideas. The judgment made clear that any governmental attempt to restrict press expression would be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.[18]
2. Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi
In Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, the government had imposed a requirement of prior approval before a newspaper could publish. The Court rejected this arrangement, recognising that newspapers must retain the freedom to make independent editorial decisions in real time. Pre-publication approval fundamentally impairs a newspaper’s capacity to report on current events. The Court confined the permissible scope of governmental control to post-publication accountability rather than pre-emptive censorship. This judgment firmly established the principle that regulatory power over the press must operate after expression occurs, not before.[19]
3. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India
The principle against indirect control of the press was developed further in Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, where the Court examined regulations restricting the import of newsprint. The Court held that control over the physical means of publication is, in practical effect, control over the volume and content of expression itself. The judgment recognised that quantitative restrictions on circulation are as constitutionally impermissible as direct content restrictions. Together with Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, this decision forms the bedrock of the principle that economic autonomy is a necessary precondition for genuine editorial independence.[20]
4. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal
In Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, the Court addressed the constitutional status of broadcasting freedom in the context of emerging electronic media. The government contended that it held exclusive authority over all electronic broadcasting. The Court rejected this claim, holding that the airwaves are a public resource and that their use must be regulated in a manner consistent with free expression values. The judgment was significant in recognising that broadcast media deserves the same constitutional protection as the print press. Crucially, the Court repudiated the notion that the State should function as the sole arbiter of what citizens may see and hear through electronic communication.[21]
5. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India
In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, the constitutional validity of criminal defamation was challenged. The Court upheld the provision, reasoning that a person’s reputation is a component of dignity protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court simultaneously acknowledged the chilling effect that criminal defamation proceedings can have on journalistic practice and the risk of the provision being weaponised to silence criticism. The judgment therefore reflects the judiciary’s ongoing attempt to balance the right to free political expression against the right to protection of reputation, without providing a fully satisfactory resolution to the tension between the two.[22]
6. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
The judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India is of enduring importance to digital free expression. The Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act on the ground of unconstitutional vagueness. Examining the phenomenon of self-censorship online, the Court recognised that unclear prohibitions on speech deter lawful expression because individuals cannot predict what is prohibited. Terms such as “offensive” and “annoying” were held to be constitutionally inadequate. The decision reaffirmed that penal provisions must be precisely defined and limited to speech that causes tangible harm. The case continues to shape the boundaries of permissible regulation of online expression in India, and stands as an authoritative reminder that vagueness itself constitutes a form of censorship.[23]
VIII. Recent Developments: Administrative Regulation and Procedural Transparency
The government introduced the Sahyog Rules, 2025, as part of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules framework. The Sahyog Rules establish a governmental mechanism for the removal of online content.[24]
The Sahyog Rules have attracted substantial criticism from civil liberties organisations. Critics contend that the Rules permit content removal without prior notice to the affected party, without a stated reason, without any requirement of a hearing, and without public disclosure. This procedural framework stands in contrast to the approach adopted by courts in matters affecting expression, where the principles of natural justice ordinarily require that the person affected be heard before adverse action is taken. This is precisely the concern that the Supreme Court addressed in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, and the Sahyog Rules have been criticised for departing from that standard.[25]
IX. Limitations and Risks of Press Freedom
A. Risk to Individual Reputation and Privacy
Expansive press freedom carries the risk of harm to individual reputation and privacy. Investigative reporting or sensationalist coverage can damage a person’s standing before any judicial determination of the truth of the allegations concerned. The social and psychological consequences for affected individuals can be severe. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 addresses this concern through its defamation provisions, which provide a remedy for reputational injury caused by false publication.
In Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court affirmed the importance of press freedom while simultaneously holding that the press ought not to publish material concerning the private life of an individual without their consent, nor to disseminate unverified allegations.[26]
B. Threat to Public Order and Societal Harmony
Irresponsible media coverage can exacerbate communal tensions or contribute to public disorder. Article 19(2) of the Constitution expressly acknowledges this risk by permitting restrictions on speech in the interests of public order. The framework therefore seeks to balance press freedom with the State’s obligation to maintain social peace.
In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised that publications calculated to incite hostility between communities are not entitled to absolute protection, particularly in contexts of communal sensitivity or electoral tension.[27] The Cable Television Networks Act, 1995 operationalises this principle through its Programme Code restrictions.
C. Dissemination of Misinformation and Fake News
The proliferation of digital and social media platforms has created significant challenges with respect to the rapid spread of false or misleading content. The consequences can include public panic, reputational harm, and threats to institutional integrity. The safe harbour framework under Section 79 of the IT Act limits platform liability in respect of user-generated content, provided due diligence obligations are met. However, the speed at which false content propagates on digital platforms continues to outpace regulatory responses.
In Rajeev Kumar v. Union of India, the Delhi High Court examined the potential for harm arising from the dissemination of unverified information during public protests, underscoring the importance of editorial standards and fact-checking obligations even in the context of lawful reporting.[28]
D. National Security Risks
Press freedom may come into tension with legitimate national security interests. The IT Act, Section 69A, and related provisions permit the government to restrict reportage that poses a genuine threat to the security or sovereignty of the State. These provisions reflect the recognition that press freedom, like all fundamental rights, is not exercisable in a manner that threatens the constitutional order.
In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, the Court made observations relevant to the limits of permissible expression where content might incite violence or undermine constitutional institutions.[29]
E. Commercial Influence and Editorial Bias
Economic and political pressures can subtly distort media coverage. News organisations dependent on advertising revenue or corporate financing may prioritise commercially attractive or editorially partial narratives over balanced public-interest reporting. This represents a structural threat to genuine press freedom, one that operates through incentive rather than legal coercion.
In S.P. Gupta v. President of India, the Court emphasised that editorial independence is meaningful only where the press is free from the influence of both government and powerful private interests.[30]
X. Recommendations for Press Freedom
A. Strengthen Procedural Safeguards in Digital Speech Regulation
Arbitrary arrests or content blocks undermine constitutional guarantees under Article 19(1)(a). Implementing mandatory preliminary inquiries ensures Article 19(2) compliance, balancing State interest and individual rights. Digital laws such as IT Act Section 69A require codified notice-and-hearing mechanisms. This would reduce the chilling effects on journalists and intermediaries, and judicial oversight would prevent misuse of enforcement powers.
B. Enhance Accuracy Standards
Misinformation threatens public trust and harms individuals. Strengthening editorial review and independent fact-checking aligns with Section 79 safe harbour obligations. Courts, in Rajeev Kumar v. Union of India, emphasise proportionality in addressing false reporting. Accurate reporting safeguards democracy while protecting reputations.
C. Clarify Scope of Public Order and National Security Limitations
Broad provisions in the IT Act Section 69A risk overreach. Clear statutory definitions of “public order” and “national security” are needed. Judicial review ensures proportionality; clarification prevents misuse and arbitrary suppression of critical reporting. Balanced laws protect State interests without undermining press freedom.
D. Protect Editorial Independence and Reduce Commercial Bias
Economic or political pressures can distort reporting. Statutory recognition of autonomous editorial boards and transparency in funding would mitigate bias. Courts in S.P. Gupta v. President of India stress editorial freedom as essential to meaningful press liberty. Legal safeguards must complement ethical codes, preserving media credibility and public trust.
E. Institutionalise Transparency in Takedown Mechanisms
Opaque administrative takedowns threaten lawful expression. Public disclosure of reasons and timelines enhances accountability. Independent appellate mechanisms should allow challenges to orders under IT Act Section 69A. Transparency reduces misuse while maintaining the executive’s capacity to address genuinely harmful content.
F. Promote Media Literacy and Ethical Journalism
Law alone cannot prevent the abuse of press freedom. Media literacy programmes cultivate critical news consumption. Statutory or professional ethical codes guide responsible reporting on sensitive issues. Collaboration between regulators, civil society, and academia enhances compliance. Educated citizens and ethical journalists reinforce the democratic purpose of press freedom.
XI. Conclusion
The development of press freedom jurisprudence in India reflects a consistent judicial effort to protect free expression while recognising that some degree of regulation is inevitable in a diverse and complex society. Article 19(1)(a) has been interpreted generously to safeguard editorial independence, curb indirect forms of censorship, and affirm the role of the press as a public watchdog. Simultaneously, legislative measures in criminal law, broadcasting regulation, and digital media governance reflect the State’s concern with issues such as misinformation, public order, and protection of reputation. Yet recent regulatory approaches, particularly in the digital media space, have raised serious questions about executive dominance and the resulting chilling effect on journalistic work. Courts have therefore stressed that any restriction on press freedom must be precise, proportionate, and open to judicial review. For the future, a balanced and rights-oriented framework, rooted in transparency and informed by international free speech standards, is essential to preserve a free, responsible, and democratic media ecosystem.
References
Legislations
[1] Constitution of India, art. 19(1)(a).
[4] Constitution of India, art. 19(2).
[7] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 356. [Author’s Note: Original article cited s. 354 and s. 355. These section numbers require verification against the enacted BNS, 2023.]
[8] Ibid.
[9] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 356(2).
[11] Information Technology Act, 2000, s. 69A.
[13] Information Technology Act, 2000, s. 79.
[14] IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, r. 3.
[15] IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, pt. III.
[16] Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995.
Judicial Precedents
[2] Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
[6] Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
[3] Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
[20] Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 788.
[27] K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 13.
[26] Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632.
[17] Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161.
[29] S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
[30] S.P. Gupta v. President of India, (1981) 2 SCC 87.
[23] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
[10] Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221.
[5] Modern Dental College and Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353.
[28] Rajeev Kumar v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) No. 152/2025 (Delhi High Court).
Reports
[24] Internet Freedom Foundation, Statement on the Sahyog Rules, 2025.
[25] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (cited for procedural principles applicable to takedown mechanisms).
[18] Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
[19] Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
[21] Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, (1995) 2 SCC 161.
[22] Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221.
