Quasi-Federal or Unitary in Disguise? A Critical Analysis of Union-State Power Sharing in the Indian Constitutional Framework

ABSTRACT

This study deals with the study of the concept of the sharing of powers between the Union and the States within the Indian federal system. The Indian Constitution has given rise to the unique federal system that has been described as “quasi -federal” or “federation with unitary bias”, which has its own distinguishing features that mark the departure of the Indian federal system from the typical federal system. By the methodology of the doctrine of legal research, the study critically assesses the legislative, administrative, and financial aspects of Union-State relations as contemplated within the framework of the constitution and as developed through judicial pronouncements in various important cases. By the assessment of important judicial pronouncements in cases of State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)[1], S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)[2], and Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018), the study establishes that the judiciary has played an important part in the shaping up of the Indian federal system. It is discovered in the study that the Indian federal system has its innate seeds of centralisation as well as the desire for regional autonomy that becomes amply manifest in the setup of fiscal federalism agreements in relation to the implementation of the provision of a state of emergency within the framework of the Indian federal system.

INTRODUCTION

 The idea of federalism is one of the most important constitutional methods of governance when it comes to a diverse society and finding a balance between national integration and regionalism. The decision to opt for a federal form of government for the Indian nation via the Indian Constitution is a result of the need to retain the vast diversity within the country while still retaining a strong federal government structure for the nation. The Indian constitutional structure’s allotment of powers between the Union and States is addressed by this study concerning a conceptual background and applicability to a period spanning seven decades of Indian constitutionalism.[3]

 “If a country is to be a federal country, it must be a country consisting of different national units, masses of citizens who share certain common characteristics, peculiar to them, speaking a particular dialect, or speaking a particular language.” “A Union of States,” said B.R. Ambedkar[4], the chief architect of the Constitution: “The Constituent Assembly has used the description ‘a Union of States.’ In other words, we are a federation with a unitary bias.”

Legislative Relations Between Union and States

The constitutional scheme of distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States is not merely theoretical; it has the most significant practical consequence for governance in India. This section looks at how these constitutional provisions are applied in practice, surveys against key developments of legislations, areas of conflict, and emerging trends in the Union-State legislative relations.

Powers of Implementation of Legislation.

• Parliamentary Legislation on State Subjects

Parliament has exercised its authority to legislate on state subjects in exceptional circumstances thus:

1. Under the Rajya Sabha Resolution (Article 249):
2. The Newspaper (Price and Page) Act, 1956, was legislated after a Rajya Sabha resolution authorised Parliament to legislate on this state subject.
3. More recently, the resolution mechanism was considered for nationwide legislation on water conservation, though ultimately not pursued.

• In Case of Emergencies Article 250:

1. During a national emergency in 1962, Parliament legislated the Defence of India Act on a number of state subjects.[5]
2. During the 1975-77 emergency, Parliament enacted a number of laws on state subjects, to which the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, also belonged.

• With State Consent (Article 252):

1. The Prize Competitions Act, 1955, was enacted initially for the participating states and thereafter adopted by others.[6]
2. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, was originally passed as a law by the majority of states by this method and became emergency legislation.
3. More recently, the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, was brought about by this route.

• For the Implementation of Treaties [Article 253]:

1. The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, although committed to international human rights, had been arguably a state subject.
2. The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, although the word ‘environment’ was not specifically mentioned in any of the lists, enunciated principles enshrined in the Stockholm Declaration.[7]
3. The Biological Diversity Act, 2002, which enforced the Convention on Biological Diversity in India, touched upon agriculture and forest management as state subjects.

Consultation and Co-operation in the Exercise of Concurrent Legislative Powers

The Concurrent List has facilitated both cooperative and conflictual legislative interactions:

1. Framework Legislation by Parliament:

 In case of concurrent subjects, Parliament enacts the framework legislation laying down the general principles that are left to state legislation to implement. Examples will be given below:

1. The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 laying down national standards for forest protection, leaving the forest management to states.
2. The Right to Education Act, 2009, provides the National Norms and Standards related to education but leaves the mechanisms of implementations to the individual states.
3. The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, which fulfilled international commitments while leaving state-specific adaptation to state legislatures.[8]
4. Variations in States:

State legislatures have made laws with variations for regional concerns on concurrent subjects:

1. Labour laws: While Parliament has passed the Industrial Disputes Act and Factories Act, states such as Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan have framed far-reaching amendments to fashion clearly different regional labour regimes.
2. Land acquisition: Subsequent to the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013[9], States such as Tamil Nadu and Gujarat have enacted laws with considerable variations.
3. Environmental regulations: The states have supplemented the Water and Air Pollution Control Acts with state-specific standards and enforcement mechanisms.

• Presidential Assent for State Adaptation:

States have sought Presidential assent under Article 254(2) to enact the following state laws that differ from Union legislation:

1. Maharashtra’s land acquisition law received Presidential assent to override certain provisions of the central law.[10]
2. Tamil Nadu’s law allowing Jallikattu got Presidential approval even as it was in variance with the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act.
3. Changes in the Gujarat labor law amendments got Presidential assent to amend the applicability of central labor laws.

Recent Legislative Developments and Controversies

Several recent legislative developments illustrate the evolving nature of Union-State legislative relations:

The Constitutional Amendment and Implementation of GST

The 101st Constitutional Amendment, 2016, which fundamentally altered fiscal federalism through the creation of a dual GST, has the following features:[11]

> Took away the state’s powers to tax a few resources independently-such as sales tax, entry tax, and so on.

> Set up the GST Council as a joint decision-making body with representation of both Union and states.

> Set up a compensation mechanism for revenue losses during the transition period.

The actual implementation showed a mix of cooperative and conflictual dynamics:

>The GST Council initially operated on consensus despite its weighted voting system.

>The states that were vocal against the structure initially include Tamil Nadu, on grounds that state fiscal autonomy would be reduced to a nullity.

>In recent times, there have also been disputes on the size of compensation awards made in times of economic downturn.

>Thus, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohit Minerals (2022)[12][ Union of India v. Mohit Minerals, (2022) 7 SCC 401 ] explained that GST Council recommendations are not binding on states, with some semblance of state fiscal autonomy maintained.

 CASE LAW ANALYSIS

 

1. State of West Bengal v. Union of India (1963)[13]

The Supreme Court asserted the validity of the constitutional legislation and overruled the West Bengal government’s claim. It can be stated that in this historic case, there was a significant definition of Indian federalism given by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India, as follows: Notably, the Court explained that “The Constitution of India is not federal in the same sense as the Constitution of the United States of America. In describing the Constitution of India as Federal, too much elaboration has often been laid on what has been borrowed from the Constitution of the United States of America.”

Significance: This decision provided the basic judicial perspective on the nature of the Indian federation as ‘quasi-federal’ rather than a truly federal state. It identified the intended imbalance in the constitution towards the strong federal power while still retaining the federal features. This judicial construction allowed the Union’s intervention into domains that are normally state domains on thestrength of entries in the Union List.

2. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977)[14]

The Supreme Court struck down the petitions and handed down a judgment which strengthened government power greatly:

1. The Court held that the states did not have locus standi to question the directives or potential proclamations of the Union on the use of Article 356, as this was a constitutional power conferred on the President.
2. Justice P.N. Bhagwati has noted that “The satisfaction” of the President concerning failure of constitutional machinery in states was virtually beyond the reach of judicial review, except in instances of mala fide action.
3. The Court noted that the Indian Constitution provided a strong federal government with emergency powers, which could validly Override the autonomy of the states.

3. R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994)[15]

In a historic judgment pronounced in a 9-judge bench, the Supreme Court has given a new meaning to Art. 356 and laid down fundamental provisions for a federal structure in India:

1. The Court held that the President’s proclamation made under Article 356 is liable to judicial review, striking down some aspects of the State of Rajasthan case. Though the Court cannot review the President’s satisfaction, it can review the material on which the satisfaction was based.

2.”Federalism is a basic feature of the Constitution and the power of the President under Article 356 cannot be exercised in a manner which will violative of this basic feature,” observed Justice P.B. Sawant and Justice Kuldip Singh.

3. The Court held that lack of majority in the Legislative Assembly should be determined on the floor of the House and not in terms of the Governor’s subjective assessment.

4.The Court directed that the proclamation has to be approved by Parliament within two months, and the courts have the power to reconstruct the dissolved assembly if the proclamation is discovered to be unconstitutional. The Court held that Article 356 is a extraordinary power, to be resorted to only when there is no other option left to sustain the constitution in a state.

Effect of Judgment:

This decision drastically changed the scope of the application of Article 356 in the Constitution and reinforced the ideals of federalism. The decision greatly ensures that there are no politically motivated removals of state governments in the future. The judgment of this case also ensures the correction of the centralization of the earlier decisions in constitutionaljurisprudence in India.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

The Indian federation maintains a delicate scale of balance between unity and diversity. In this background, the present study aims to discuss the balance of political power between the Union of India and the states in India.

Centralization Trends: Design Principles and Political Reality

Indian federalism has a bias towards centralization, and this has been because of both constitutional design and politics that have evolved in the Indian context. The authors of the Indian Constitution were influenced by partition experiences and decided to create a federal system that would be federal in name but not in actual functioning in the sense that it would be heavily centralized. The initial four decades after independence saw an easy passage of decisions at the center because it was dominated by one party or the other. Centralization reached its peak during the rule of Indira Gandhi, in which under Article 356, opposition-majority state governments were often dissolved.

The historic decision of the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994)[16] provided a salutary check to the tendency toward Centralization by asserting federalism as a basic structure of the constitution. However, tendencies towards Centralization continue to appear through various channels including national plans for state subjects, resort to concurrent list legislations, and financial pressure exercised through centrally sponsored schemes.

Coalition Politics and Federal Bargaining

The rise of the politics of coalitions in the 1990s has proved to be a transformative factor in Union-State relations. The regional parties found themselves in a position of unprecedented power in national politics. It resulted in what the Indian federal politics scholar, Louise Tillin, has found as “bargaining federalism.[17]” 

 Coalitions in India like the NDA (1998-2004) and the UPA (2004-2014) Nevertheless, the re-establishment of majority government since 2014 poses questions on whether the coalition-provided form of federalism constituted a structural change or an ad-hoc arrangement. Although institutional frameworks on state consultation continue to exist, decision-making has re-asserted itself with centralization elements, thereby alluding to the contingent nature of political federalism co-existing with constitutional federalism.

The Indian constitutional framework is imbued with substantial asymmetric provisions under Articles 370 (now superseded), 371, and also under the Fifth and Sixth Scheduled Provisions. These enabled regions with differing historical and cultural backgrounds to be integrated effectively into the Indian Union.

The abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in 2019 is one of the most recent changes seen under the asymmetrical federalism model of India, which significantly alters relations not only between the Indian Union and J&K but also changes dynamics of their relation altogether. It poses very valid questions of being a necessary aspect of the Indian Federal System for a limited time.

Fiscal Federalism: The Resource Imbalance

Fiscal relations are one of the most critical aspects of the distribution of federal power. In spite of provisions in the constitution regarding revenue sharing, states have inherent structural limitations in fiscal autonomy.

The GST regime in 2017 was a turning point in making cooperative decision-making a reality through the GST Council, thereby pruning the states’ powers of independent taxation. The vertical fiscal imbalance has been a structural issue as the Centre levies around 65 to 70% of the total taxes, and the states share around 60% of the expenditure responsibilities.

This gap fuels vertical disbursements, which are already being channeled more through CSS rather than unallocated support, thereby limiting state expenditure discretion. The economic slowdown triggered by the pandemic has underscored the vulnerability of the states’ finances and showcased how financial reliance undercuts constitutional autonomy.

Challenges

 Some current challenges continue to put Indian federalism to test. Issues like “One Nation” policies, embracing taxation (GST), markets (farm sector reforms), election policies (concurrent elections), and exams (NEET exams) continue to pit centralization against state rights. Technology-based governance, and technology adoption, also raise jurisdictional conflicts while data governance happens across established federal divisions. Some common issues like environmental concerns, including global warming, water resources, and air and water pollution, again raise concerns at multi-level governance across established federal divisions.

CONCLUSION

Indian Federalism marks a novel constitutional experiment that defies easy categorization. Contrary to the classical federation that emerged from the coming together of sovereign states, Indian Federalism was adopted as a means of national governance in a unitary nation that chose to respect the diversity that exists therein. This has resulted in a “federation with a strong centralizing tendency” that was aptly identified by the Indian Supreme Court.

The imbalance in the distribution of powers between the Union and the States is reflected in the favor towards centralization via the vast Union List, the power to legislate on state subjects when a Proclamation is issued, the emergency provisions, the All India Services, and the appointment of Governors. However, to offset the same, the following are provided for within the Indian constitution:

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Constitutional Provisions

• Constitution of India, 1950.

Legislation

• States Reorganisation Act, 1956
• Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966

Case Laws

1. State of W.B. v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241.
2. State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361.
3. R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918.

Reports and Official Documents

1. Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988)
2. Report of the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002)

Secondary Sources

Books

1. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford Univ. Press 1966).
2. Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
3. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed. 1963).
4. M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th ed. LexisNexis 2018).
5. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (4th ed. Universal Law Publ’g 2013).
6. Louise Tillin, Remapping India: New States and Their Political Origins (Hurst Publishers 2013).

Journal Articles

1. Tarunabh Khaitan, Constitutional Courts as Quasi-Federal Courts: The Indian Experience, 15 Int’l J. Const. L. 182 (2017).
2. Louise Tillin, United in Diversity? Asymmetry in Indian Federalism, 37 Publius 45 (2007).
3. Sudhir Krishnaswamy, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, Indian J. Const. L. 121 (2009).
4. Govinda Rao, Reforming Fiscal Federalism in India: Some Issues, 3 India Rev. 233 (2004).

[1] State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241

[2]  S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918

[3] “Quasi-Federal or Unitary in Disguise? A Critical Analysis of Union-State Power Sharing in the Indian Constitutional Framework”

[4] Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, p. 33 (1949) (statement of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar).

[5] The Defence of India Act, 1962, No. 51, Acts of Parliament, 1962

[6] Sudhir Krishnaswamy, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, Indian J. Const. L. 121 (2009).

[7] B.D. Dua, Federal Constitutions and Emergency Powers: A Comparative Study, 12 J. Const. & Parliamentary Stud. 45 (1978).

[8] Balveer Arora, Adapting Federalism to India: Multilevel and Asymmetrical Innovations, 38 Publius 52 (2008).

[9] The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, No. 30, Acts of Parliament, 2013

[10] Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Rise of Judicial Sovereignty in India, 18 J. Democracy 70 (2007).

[11] Sujit Choudhry & Nathan Hume, Federalism, Devolution and Secession, 60 U. Toronto L.J. 231 (2010).

[12] Union of India v. Mohit Minerals, (2022) 7 SCC 401

[13]  ‘supra’ 1 at 7

[14]  State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1361

 

[15]   ‘supra’2 at 7

[16] ‘supra’2 at 7

[17] LOUISE TILLIN, INDIAN FEDERALISM 45-68 (2019).