Published On: Aprill 11th 2026
Authored By: Aditi Mukherjee
Manikchand Pahade Law College, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar
Abstract
India’s fiscal situation warrants serious attention.[1] Throughout the year, the government has maintained that the economy is performing well and that public finances are under control.[2] However, data released by the Union Government and the Reserve Bank of India tell a different story: national debt is rising.[3] Financial markets are also sending warning signals.[4] This is no longer merely a question of economics.[5] The issue of India’s public debt has become a matter of constitutional significance.[6] When transparency in government finances is diminished, parliamentary discourse is weakened, and public attention is persistently diverted from long-term fiscal concerns, democratic accountability is the casualty.[7] Confining its focus to developments between January 2025 and January 2026, this article examines recent budgets, government borrowing patterns, market reactions, and the silence of key institutions to ask whether the Indian State is truly meeting its constitutional duty to remain financially accountable to its citizens.[8]
I. Introduction: When a Fiscal Issue Becomes a Constitutional Problem
Public debt is not inherently alarming.[9] Governments across the world borrow to function.[10] Fiscal deficits are a feature of most economies.[11] States routinely take loans to finance expenditures that generate long-term social returns.[12] The problem arises when debt grows beyond manageable limits.[13] When borrowing proceeds without transparency and without effective accountability, democratic governance suffers.[14]
Between January 2025 and January 2026, India has exhibited persistent signs of fiscal stress. The government has continued borrowing at elevated levels, and the fiscal deficit, that is, the gap between government expenditure and revenue, remains unresolved.[15][16] The State has also continued to access market-based financing at scale.[17]
What is striking is not the existence of this data, but the absence of sustained public engagement with it.[18] The government has itself released documents during this period that clearly show the extent of increased borrowing.[19][20] What remains missing is a serious national conversation about what these numbers mean for governance, for the rights of citizens, and for the fiscal burden being transmitted to future generations.[21][22][23]
The Constitution provides a formal mechanism for addressing fiscal emergencies under Article 360.[24] No such declaration was made during this period.[25] Yet the conditions on the ground are beginning to resemble precisely the kind of fiscal stress that constitutional provisions are designed to address. Parliament is not exercising robust oversight of public finances, and institutions are not being held accountable for fiscal decisions.[26][27] The fact that no emergency has been formally declared does not mean the crisis is absent; it means it is proceeding without the accountability that formal recognition would compel.[28][29][30]
This article proceeds from a simple but uncomfortable premise: a democracy cannot truly function when its citizens are kept unaware, whether intentionally or otherwise, of the financial commitments being made in their name.[31]
II. The Constitutional Framework of Public Finance in India
Public debt in India cannot be understood by examining the Union alone.[32] Article 292 of the Constitution provides for the Union’s borrowing power, while Article 293 governs State-level borrowing, often subject to conditions imposed by the Union.[33] A consolidated view of Union and State liabilities reveals a fiscal position considerably more strained than headline deficit figures suggest.[34] The Constitution treats these matters as anything but minor or technical.[35] Articles 112 to 117 establish that the Union Budget is not merely an economic instrument; it is a constitutional mechanism of accountability.[36]
Article 292 empowers the Union to borrow on the security of the Consolidated Fund of India.[37] Crucially, however, this power must be exercised in the manner Parliament prescribes by law.[38] Parliament has never enacted a general law imposing a strict upper limit on national debt.[39] In the absence of such a limit, borrowing practice is directed largely by executive policy.[40] The implications for parliamentary control over public finances are deeply concerning.[41]
The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act was enacted to institutionalise fiscal discipline and provide a sustainable long-term framework for government borrowing.[42] In the aftermath of the pandemic, however, the original 3% deficit target was set aside in favour of a “glide path” designed to bring the deficit below 4.5% by FY 2025-26.[43] Targets have been relaxed so often that the Act is now treated more as a guideline than a binding constraint.[44] Fiscal discipline has effectively been delegated to executive discretion rather than firm statutory limits, an outcome that sits uneasily with the spirit of constitutional accountability.[45] Borrowing must be justified not only in economic terms but also in terms of democratic accountability.[46]
III. The Fiscal Picture (January 2025 to January 2026): What the State’s Own Data Shows
The Union Budget for FY 2025-26, presented in February 2025, set a fiscal deficit target of approximately 4.4% of GDP, which was received as a positive step.[47][48] The Union Budget of February 1, 2026, however, brings that optimism into question.[49]
Despite the government’s stated commitment to holding the 4.5% target, the data leave little room for doubt: interest payments have become the single largest item of non-discretionary expenditure.[50] The fiscal data for 2026 confirm that budgetary allocations for public health, education, and climate adaptation are contracting as more revenue is earmarked for debt servicing.[51]
Rising Borrowing RequirementsOfficial data, including revised figures from the Controller General of Accounts, confirm the structural nature of this deficit financing.[52] Four interacting trends drive this outcome:[53]
1. Heavy Market Reliance: The government continues to depend extensively on market borrowing even for routine expenditures.[54]
2. Refinancing Load: Gross and net issuance of government securities has reached substantial levels, with a significant proportion devoted to refinancing and roll-over rather than to financing new public investment.[55]
3. Growing Interest Costs: Debt repayment now absorbs a disproportionately large share of the Union’s tax revenues.[56]
4. Off-Budget Liabilities: The use of off-budget borrowings, that is, debt incurred by government-sponsored entities that bypasses the Consolidated Fund of India and thereby evades direct parliamentary oversight, appears to be on the rise.[57]
Reports from the RBI and quarterly fiscal indicators confirm that creditor and bondholder repayments have displaced productive expenditure in the hierarchy of fiscal priorities.[58] What was once a manageable cost has become an overwhelming budgetary constraint.[59] This “fiscal squeeze” progressively erodes the State’s capacity to invest in social, infrastructural, and developmental priorities. It represents not a theoretical concern but a slow-motion decline in fiscal autonomy.[60]
IV. Debt Without Debate: Parliamentary and Institutional Silence
Despite the scale of government borrowing and its implications for long-term sustainability, parliamentary debate on debt sustainability has been remarkably limited over the past year.[61] Budget discussions have focused on headline deficit numbers rather than the long-term debt trajectory, the rising interest-to-revenue ratio, or the fiscal burden being imposed on future generations.[62]
Question-and-answer exchanges in parliamentary sittings do reflect some piecemeal interest, but not structured or systematic examination.[63] More troubling is the near-total absence of any serious constitutional challenge to the entrenchment of debt-dependent fiscal policy.[64]
This institutional silence is compounded by the diminishing effectiveness of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).[65] The CAG continues to function under Articles 148 to 151 as the constitutionally mandated watchdog of the public purse.[66] Its findings on off-budget borrowings and fiscal opacity are, however, increasingly treated as advisory rather than as instruments of accountability.[67] Simultaneously, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), the parliamentary body responsible for examining CAG findings, has seen its work reduced to a formality by political polarisation.[68] Even when fiscal alerts are issued, vigorous legislative follow-up seldom materialises.[69]
In constitutional terms, silence is not neutrality. It is a significant accountability failure.[70][71]
V. Market Signals: When Financial Markets Speak Louder Than Institutions
Financial markets typically respond more rapidly than political institutions.[72] India’s inclusion in leading global bond indices during this period opened the market to a wider investor base, particularly foreign institutional investors.[73] These capital inflows helped finance the government’s elevated borrowing requirements and shielded the bond market from acute pressure.[74] Elevated yields, however, should not be read as a signal that the fiscal position is sound.[75] They reflect a temporary insulation of risk by strong external demand, which allows markets to absorb short-term warning signals without resolving the underlying sustainability concerns.[76]
VI. Is the Government Doing Anything to Mitigate the Crisis?
It would be unfair and intellectually dishonest to suggest that the government has taken no action.[77] Over the past year, the Union Government has taken the following documented steps:
1. Reaffirmed its commitment to reducing the fiscal deficit.[78]
2. Justified borrowing on the basis of capital expenditure-led growth.[79]
3. Continued gradual alignment with revised FRBM targets.[80]
4. Maintained transparency by regularly publishing fiscal data, budget documents, and borrowing calendars.[81]
These steps demonstrate intent.[82] Intent, however, does not by itself resolve a structural problem.[83] The real question is not whether measures have been taken, but whether those measures are adequate, sustainable over the long run, and consistent with constitutional accountability.[84]
VII. The Democratic Deficit: Distraction, Discourse, and Fiscal Amnesia
Among the most troubling features of this fiscal picture is not the data itself, but the silence surrounding it.[85][86] Over the past year, public attention has been consumed by divisive cultural controversies, cycles of social media outrage, and short-lived political disputes.[87][88][89] None of these issues are without significance.[90] However, sustained engagement with them has come at the cost of meaningful scrutiny of how the government manages public finances.[91] When fiscal decisions involving trillions of rupees receive less democratic scrutiny than transient controversies, oversight erodes and accountability is diminished.[92]
VIII. Public Debt as an Intergenerational Issue
Every rupee borrowed today will eventually be repaid, and the constitutional and moral burden of that repayment will fall on future citizens who had no say in the original fiscal decisions.[93][94][95] In the enthusiasm to celebrate India’s demographic dividend, public discourse sometimes overlooks a sobering corollary.[96] If the next generation is required to service debts accumulated by the present one, in conditions of shrinking fiscal space, rising interest payments, and declining public investment headroom, this amounts to a form of delayed, intergenerational taxation without representation.[97]
The Supreme Court of India has recognised the principle of intergenerational equity as grounded in the right to life under Article 21.[98] If the current trajectory of borrowing materially diminishes the financial resources available to future generations for leading a life of dignity, the question is no longer merely economic. It becomes constitutional.[99][100] Fiscal policy is therefore not only about numbers; it is about intergenerational equity rooted in constitutional morality.[101][102]
IX. Why This Is a Constitutional Crisis, Not Just an Economic One
At the centre of this discussion are not figures, percentages, or forecasts.[103] The core concerns are:
1. Parliament is not exercising meaningful control over public finances.[104]
2. Citizens are not being adequately informed about the government’s fiscal direction.[105]
3. Institutions are not asking the right questions at the right time.[106]
In a constitutional democracy, oversight of public finances should not depend on signals from financial markets or credit rating agencies.[107] It must arise from within the constitutional system itself, operating continuously, visibly, and through democratically accountable mechanisms.[108][109]
X. The Way Forward: Legal and Institutional Correctives
If India is serious about addressing this silent fiscal crisis, the following correctives deserve urgent consideration:
1. Stricter Parliamentary Oversight: Parliamentary standing committees should not limit themselves to reviewing annual deficit projections. They must conduct sustained examination of debt sustainability, the interest-to-revenue ratio, and the long-term implications of government borrowing.[110]
2. Plain Language Debt Disclosure: Budget documents should include clear, accessible disclosures explaining the implications of rising debt for citizens over the long term, in a form comprehensible to the general public.[111]
3. Restoring the FRBM Framework’s Credibility: Fiscal targets must be credible, enforceable, and insulated from short-term political pressures. The current practice of repeatedly adjusting targets undermines the statutory purpose of the FRBM Act.[112]
4. Judicial Awareness of Fiscal Constraints: Courts should not assume a policymaking role. However, where long-term fiscal policies raise identifiable constitutional concerns affecting the rights of future citizens, judicial engagement cannot be dismissed as inappropriate.[113][114]
5. Reintegrating Fiscal Issues into Democratic Discourse: The media and civil society must position fiscal governance not as a technical matter reserved for economists but as a core dimension of Indian democracy requiring broad public engagement.[115]
XI. Conclusion: Choosing Between Comfort and Constitutional Responsibility
India has now reached a point at which fiscal decisions made in silence will shape the future of its democracy.[116] The institutions of State have survived another year, but the more delicate apparatus of fiscal prudence is suffering from neglect, popular distraction, and institutional drift.[117]
This article does not argue that India is already in a debt trap.[118] It raises a concern that is in some ways more troubling: the country may be moving toward one without the public debate that such a trajectory demands.[119]
In a constitutional democracy, silence is an active choice.[120] And silence on fiscal matters is hardly consistent with the constitutional vision of democratic accountability.[121] The question that demands an answer is not a technical one: are we building for the future, or merely passing on the costs?[122]
References
[1] Reserve Bank of India, State of the Economy: January 2026 (RBI Bulletin 2026) 22.
[2] Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2025-26 (Government of India 2026) ch 1, para 1.10.
[3] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Budget at a Glance (Government of India 2026) 4; Reserve Bank of India, Quarterly Report on Public Debt Management: October–December 2025 (RBI 2026) 8.
[4] NSE India, ‘Market Pulse: Monthly Report January 2026’ (2026) accessed 5 February 2026.
[5] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[6] Constitution of India, art 292; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 214.
[7] PRS Legislative Research, ‘Vital Stats: Parliamentary Oversight of Public Finance’ (2025) accessed 2 February 2026.
[8] See Constitution of India, arts 112–117 (prescribing the procedure for financial matters and executive accountability to the legislature).
[9] IMF, Global Debt Monitor 2025 (International Monetary Fund 2025) 4–6.
[10] ibid.
[11] Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2025-26 (Government of India 2026) ch 2, para 2.3.
[12] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[13] Reserve Bank of India, State of the Economy: January 2026 (RBI Bulletin 2026) 45.
[14] Constitution of India, art 292 (providing parliamentary power to limit borrowing).
[15] Reserve Bank of India, Quarterly Report on Public Debt Management: October–December 2025 (RBI 2026) 8.
[16] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Budget at a Glance (Government of India 2026) 3.
[17] Reserve Bank of India, Quarterly Report on Public Debt Management: October–December 2025 (RBI 2026) 10.
[18] PRS Legislative Research, ‘Vital Stats: Parliamentary Oversight of Public Finance’ (2025) accessed 2 February 2026.
[19] Ministry of Finance, Monthly Summary for the Cabinet: December 2025 (Government of India 2026).
[20] Controller General of Accounts, ‘Union Government Accounts at a Glance: November 2025’ (CGA 2025) accessed 5 February 2026.
[21] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[22] Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 214.
[23] ibid 216.
[24] Constitution of India, art 360.
[25] Gazette of India (January 2025 – February 2026).
[26] See MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 750 (discussing the limits of Article 360).
[27] PRS Legislative Research, ‘Vital Stats: Parliamentary Oversight of Public Finance’ (2025) accessed 2 February 2026.
[28] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12.
[29] Reserve Bank of India, State of the Economy: January 2026 (RBI Bulletin 2026).
[30] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 750.
[31] Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 220.
[32] Reserve Bank of India, State Finances: A Study of Budgets of 2025-26 (RBI 2025) 14.
[33] Constitution of India, arts 292, 293.
[34] Reserve Bank of India, Annual Report 2024-25 (RBI 2025) 88–92 (discussing General Government Debt).
[35] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 712.
[36] Constitution of India, arts 112–117.
[37] ibid art 292.
[38] ibid; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 218.
[39] PRS Legislative Research, ‘The FRBM Act: Explanation and Analysis’ (2025) accessed 4 February 2026.
[40] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[41] Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 220.
[42] Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2003.
[43] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2025-26: Medium Term Fiscal Policy cum Strategy Statement (Government of India 2025) 4–7.
[44] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12.
[45] ibid; see also Constitution of India, art 112.
[46] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 195.
[47] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2025-26: Budget at a Glance (Government of India 2025) 3.
[48] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 190.
[49] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Budget Speech (Government of India 2026) para 14.
[50] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Key to Budget Documents (Government of India 2026) 8.
[51] See Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Expenditure Profile (Government of India 2026) Statement 1.
[52] Controller General of Accounts, Union Government Accounts at a Glance: Period Ending December 2025 (CGA 2026) 2–4.
[53] Reserve Bank of India, Quarterly Report on Public Debt Management: October–December 2025 (RBI 2026) 5.
[54] ibid 7.
[55] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Receipts Budget (Government of India 2026) 12–14.
[56] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Budget at a Glance (Government of India 2026) 6.
[57] Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report on Compliance of FRBM Act for FY 2024-25 (Report No 10 of 2025) 22–25; see also Constitution of India, art 266.
[58] Reserve Bank of India, State of the Economy: February 2026 (RBI Bulletin 2026) 18.
[59] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12, 14.
[60] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 192.
[61] PRS Legislative Research, ‘Vital Stats: Parliament at Work in 2025’ (2026) accessed 4 February 2026.
[62] Lok Sabha Debates, Discussion on the Union Budget 2025-26 (February 2025); see also M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12.
[63] See Lok Sabha, ‘Starred and Unstarred Questions: Ministry of Finance’ (Winter Session 2025) accessed 8 February 2026.
[64] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[65] Madhav Khosla, ‘The Dwindling Watchdog: The CAG in Recent Times’ (2025) 12(1) Journal of Indian Constitutional Law 44.
[66] Constitution of India, arts 148–151.
[67] Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report on Compliance of FRBM Act for FY 2024-25 (Report No 10 of 2025) 5–8; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 215.
[68] Public Accounts Committee, Review of CAG Reports on Union Finances: 2025 Status Report (PAC No 42, 2025) 15.
[69] Madhav Khosla, ‘The Dwindling Watchdog: The CAG in Recent Times’ (2025) 12(1) Journal of Indian Constitutional Law 48.
[70] Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 222.
[71] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 755.
[72] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 194.
[73] JP Morgan, ‘Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets (GBI-EM) Inclusion: India’ (Market Report, June 2025); see also Bloomberg, ‘India Emerging Market Local Currency Index Inclusion’ (January 2025) accessed 10 February 2026.
[74] Reserve Bank of India, Quarterly Report on Public Debt Management: October–December 2025 (RBI 2026) 15; see also National Stock Exchange of India, ‘Market Pulse: Monthly Report January 2026’ (NSE 2026) 8–10.
[75] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12.
[76] Reserve Bank of India, State of the Economy: February 2026 (RBI Bulletin 2026) 18–22.
[77] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 192.
[78] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2025-26: Budget Speech (Government of India 2025) para 82; see also Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Budget at a Glance (Government of India 2026) 3.
[79] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2025-26: Key Takeaways (Invest India, 1 February 2025) accessed 10 February 2026.
[80] Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2003 (as amended); see also Ministry of Finance, Medium Term Fiscal Policy cum Strategy Statement 2025-26 (Government of India 2025) 4–6.
[81] See Controller General of Accounts, ‘Union Government Accounts at a Glance’ (CGA 2025) accessed 5 February 2026; see also Reserve Bank of India, ‘Issuance Calendar for Marketable Dated Securities: October 2025 – March 2026’ (Press Release, 26 September 2025).
[82] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 192.
[83] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12, 15.
[84] See Constitution of India, art 292; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 218–220.
[85] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12.
[86] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 194.
[87] World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2026 (World Economic Forum 2026) ch 2.
[88] ibid; see also APSA Connect, ‘2026 Division Calls: Democracy under Threat’ (January 2026) accessed 10 February 2026.
[89] ‘Political Science, Public Policy and Development Studies: India’s Next Intellectual Breakthrough’ Open Magazine (Delhi, 25 January 2026).
[90] Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 220.
[91] See ‘Decline of Indian Parliament: Explained Pointwise’ (ForumIAS, 22 March 2025) accessed 5 February 2026.
[92] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 755; see also ‘Rushing Through Critical Legislations: Erosion of Parliamentary Scrutiny in India’ (NUS Institute of South Asian Studies, 5 January 2026) accessed 9 February 2026.
[93] Ministry of Finance, Union Budget 2026-27: Budget at a Glance (Government of India 2026) 4–6.
[94] State of Himachal Pradesh v Ganesh Wood Products (1995) 6 SCC 363 (articulating the obligation of the present generation to act as trustees for the future).
[95] Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, and Intergenerational Equity (United Nations University 1989) 21–25.
[96] Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2025-26 (Government of India 2026) ch 7.
[97] See ‘No Taxation Without Representation’ (2025) 12(4) Journal of Indian Constitutional Law 112; see also Constitution of India, art 265.
[98] Goa Foundation v Union of India (2014) 6 SCC 590 (holding that intergenerational equity and sustainable development are integral parts of the right to life under Article 21); see also M.K. Ranjitsinh v Union of India (2024) INSC 280.
[99] Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v State of Karnataka (2013) 8 SCC 154.
[100] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 710–712.
[101] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[102] Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 222.
[103] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188.
[104] See ‘Role of Parliament in Budgetary Process’ (Shankar IAS Parliament, 1 February 2026) accessed 10 February 2026; see also Constitution of India, arts 112, 113.
[105] Lekha S Chakraborty, ‘Fiscal Transparency and Budgetary Processes in India’ (NIPFP Working Paper 424, March 2025) 12–15.
[106] Public Accounts Committee, Review of CAG Reports on Union Finances: 2025 Status Report (PAC No 42, 2025) 18; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 215.
[107] MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 755.
[108] Constitution of India, art 266; see also Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, ‘High-Level Principles on Fiscal Transparency, Participation and Accountability’ (GIFT 2025) Principle 10.
[109] Ram Jawaya Kapur v State of Punjab AIR 1955 SC 549.
[110] Standing Committee on Finance, Review of the Public Debt Management Framework (Report No 14, 2025) 22–26; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 218.
[111] Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, ‘High-Level Principles on Fiscal Transparency, Participation and Accountability’ (GIFT 2025) Principle 4.
[112] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12; see also Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 2003 (as amended).
[113] Goa Foundation v Union of India (2014) 6 SCC 590; see also MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (8th edn, LexisNexis 2025) 710.
[114] M.K. Ranjitsinh v Union of India (2024) INSC 280.
[115] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 196.
[116] Nirvikar Singh, ‘Fiscal Rules and Governance in India’ (2025) 14(2) Indian Economic Review 188, 195.
[117] M Govinda Rao, ‘The Quiet Fiscal Crisis’ (2025) 60(4) Economic and Political Weekly 12, 16.
[118] Reserve Bank of India, State of the Economy: February 2026 (RBI Bulletin 2026) 24.
[119] PRS Legislative Research, ‘Vital Stats: Parliamentary Oversight of Public Finance’ (2025) accessed 2 February 2026.
[120] Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.
[121] See Constitution of India, arts 112, 266, 292; see also Subhash C Kashyap, Our Constitution (6th edn, National Book Trust 2025) 222.
[122] State of Himachal Pradesh v Ganesh Wood Products (1995) 6 SCC 363.
