Published On: April 18th 2026
Authored By: Tanya
Dr. B. R. Ambedkar National Law University, Rai, Sonepat
Introduction
A Governor who indefinitely withholds assent to Bills adopted by an elected State Legislature may appear to create a mere procedural delay, but in reality this conduct can bring the entire legislative process to a standstill — without overturning a single democratic vote. In recent years, Governors across several states have been deferring action on Bills for unspecified, unaccountable durations — a course of conduct with no clear constitutional sanction. The effect has been to cripple state legislatures, dilute the democratic mandate of elected assemblies, and generate acute tension between states and the Centre.
This constitutional fault line became particularly acute in 2023, when the Governors of Tamil Nadu and Kerala withheld assent to approximately ten Bills already passed by their respective State Legislatures, effectively paralysing the law-making process. The crisis reached its constitutional apex in 2025 when the Supreme Court intervened in the Tamil Nadu matter and a Presidential Reference was subsequently filed under Article 143.[1] The central question crystallised sharply: how long can the constitutional silence under Articles 200[2] and 201[3] be stretched before the balance of governance is irreparably disturbed?
Background
The refusal of Governors to act on Bills submitted by elected State Legislatures — which first emerged as a pressing constitutional concern in 2023 — reignited a broader debate about the scope of executive discretion under Article 200. On November 1, 2023, a writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court challenging the conduct of Kerala Governor Arif Mohammad Khan, who had been withholding action on several Bills for periods ranging from eight to twenty-one months. The Court declared this prolonged, unexplained inaction unconstitutional and directed the Governor to act in accordance with the principles laid down in State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab.[4]
A near-identical situation arose in Tamil Nadu, where the Governor had been sitting on ten Bills for years without taking any constitutionally mandated action. These Bills remained pending — neither assented to nor formally reserved for the President. The entire assent procedure is governed by Articles 200 and 201, yet neither provision prescribes any timeline for action. This legislative silence creates a structural vulnerability that enables the Governor — an appointee of the President — to frustrate the will of elected state assemblies and, by extension, to centralise effective control over state legislation.
Constitutional Framework Governing Assent
The constitutional mechanism for the assent of Bills is set out principally in Articles 200 and 201. Once a Bill is passed by the State Legislature, Article 200[2] is engaged. The Governor must then elect one of three constitutionally prescribed courses of action: grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. Where the Bill is not a Money Bill, the Governor may additionally return it to the Legislature with a message requesting reconsideration. If the Legislature re-passes the Bill — whether with or without the modifications suggested — the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent. The sole exception arises where the Bill was originally reserved for presidential consideration.
Where a Bill appears to derogate from the powers of the High Court, the Governor may reserve it for the President’s consideration. In such cases, Article 201[3] operates. The President may then assent to the Bill, withhold assent, or direct that the Bill be returned to the State Legislature for reconsideration. Should the Legislature re-pass the Bill within six months, it must be presented once again to the President. Article 361[5] confers a form of personal immunity on the President and Governors, shielding them from legal proceedings for acts performed in the exercise of their constitutional powers. Critically, neither Article 200 nor Article 201 prescribes any time limit within which the Governor or President must act. This textual lacuna — far from conferring unlimited discretion — has increasingly been characterised by the courts as a source of constitutional abuse rather than as a legitimate grant of unfettered authority.
Intervention of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court delivered its landmark judgment in the Tamil Nadu case on April 8, 2025. The Bench examined Article 200 in detail and unequivocally affirmed that the placement of a Bill before the Governor is an indispensable step in the legislative process. The Governor, upon receiving a Bill, is confined to three constitutionally exhaustive options: grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve the Bill for presidential consideration. Once a Bill has been re-passed and re-presented by the Legislature, the Governor cannot withhold assent again — unless the Bill incorporates substantial new modifications not previously considered by the President.
On the question of timelines, the Court laid down significant guidance. Where the Governor acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers, he must return the Bill to the Legislature within one month. Should he act contrary to that advice, he must do so within three months. In the event that no ministerial advice is forthcoming, the three-month period commences from the date of receipt of the Bill. For Bills that are re-passed and re-presented, the Governor must act within one month. The Court made clear that failure to observe these timelines would render the Governor’s conduct amenable to judicial scrutiny by way of a writ of mandamus.
Of equal constitutional significance, the Court held that Article 361,[5] while conferring personal immunity on the Governor and the President, does not exempt their constitutional actions from judicial review. Arbitrary or unconstitutional conduct — notwithstanding the shield of Article 361 — remains open to scrutiny by the courts. This marked a significant departure from earlier judicial thinking which had treated such acts as beyond the reach of review.
Presidential Reference Under Article 143
The Tamil Nadu judgment, while landmark, left a degree of constitutional uncertainty regarding the precise interaction between the assent process and the foundational principles of separation of powers, federalism, and the balance of governmental authority. A Presidential Reference was accordingly filed under Article 143[1] seeking advisory clarification from the Supreme Court. The Reference underscored the prevailing confusion about the extent of executive discretion and the constitutional limits on presidential action in the assent process.
The maintainability of the Reference was challenged by the States of Punjab, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, which contended that the questions raised were merely a disguised appeal against the Tamil Nadu judgment and that they had already been conclusively decided, precluding their re-examination under the advisory jurisdiction. The Court, however, held that the Reference itself arose from the very uncertainties generated by the Tamil Nadu ruling and that it was both necessary and appropriate to address them. It further affirmed that the Court is duty-bound to respond to questions placed before it by the highest constitutional authority of the land.
The unresolved questions included whether prolonged gubernatorial inaction could give rise to a doctrine of deemed assent, and whether the Supreme Court could, under Article 142,[6] supply timelines where the Constitution had deliberately remained silent. The Court emphasised that addressing these questions was essential to prevent the paralysis of constitutional machinery and clarified that the Reference did not seek to revisit the Tamil Nadu decision, but to interpret Articles 200, 201, 142,[6] 143,[1] and 361[5] in a manner consistent with the constitutional design.
Supreme Court’s Response to Presidential Queries
In addressing the questions raised in the Presidential Reference, the Supreme Court provided important clarifications on the operation of Articles 200 and 201. The Court reiterated that Article 200 prescribes three clear and exhaustive courses of action available to the Governor — assent, withholding of assent, or reservation for the President — and that the Governor’s conduct must remain within these constitutional bounds at all times.
While the Court acknowledged that Governors ordinarily act on the advice of the Council of Ministers, it held that Article 200 does preserve a limited degree of discretion — though not of an absolute or unchecked character. Even where this discretion is technically non-justiciable, prolonged and unexplained delays may be addressed by the courts through a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor to act.
On the question of immunity, the Court reaffirmed that Article 361 confers personal immunity on Governors and Presidents but does not immunise their constitutional actions from judicial scrutiny. Crucially, the Court held that since the Constitution does not provide timelines for the assent procedure, courts cannot judicially create such timelines — a limitation essential to preserving federal balance. Where a Bill is reserved for the President, seeking the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court under Article 143[1] is not a mandatory step; the satisfaction of the President suffices.
The Court also clarified that judges cannot undertake pre-enactment review of Bills; judicial review is available only in respect of enacted laws. Finally, it held that the extraordinary powers under Article 142[6] cannot be invoked to remove the Governor or President from office, nor can they be used to deem a Bill as having received assent. Article 200 is unambiguous: no Bill may become law without the mandatory assent of the Governor.
Analysis
The constitutional position of the Governor under Article 200 encapsulates a fundamental tension between executive discretion and constitutional accountability. The Governor’s authority is not unfettered, but neither is it entirely mechanical. The Supreme Court’s approach — disapproving judicially-imposed timelines while simultaneously holding open the avenue of mandamus for egregious delays — introduces a nuanced but carefully calibrated separation-of-powers framework: courts may not legislate timelines, but they will not tolerate legislative paralysis born of deliberate gubernatorial inaction.
The federalism dimension adds further complexity. The Governor is a central appointee. His power to withhold assent — even if temporarily — effectively places an instrument of the Union in the legislative pathway of the states. Unchecked, this capacity risks centralising legislative power and subordinating state assemblies to the will of an unelected constitutional functionary. The democratic concern is equally serious: an indefinitely prolonged withholding of assent by an appointed officer amounts, in effect, to a negation of the electoral verdict of the state’s citizens.
Ultimately, the Court struck a pragmatic balance: it declined to introduce the doctrine of deemed assent for Governors and Presidents, restricted its intervention to procedural fairness rather than policy evaluation, and preserved constitutional flexibility while placing abuse within reach of judicial correction. This approach respects the constitutional design without leaving democratic governance defenceless.
Unresolved Concerns
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s rulings, several constitutional questions remain open. The question of re-reservation — where a Governor reserves a Bill for the President after its re-passage — has no express constitutional provision. While the Court in the Tamil Nadu case stated there was no ambiguity, it did not categorically prohibit the practice. Whether a sufficient change in circumstances could justify a fresh reservation remains unsettled.
A continuing tension also persists between the personal immunity guaranteed under Article 361 and the judicial review of gubernatorial and presidential action. Since the Constitution prescribes no timelines for the assent process, future disputes — and further constitutional litigation — appear inevitable. The most durable long-term solution may lie not in judicial pronouncements alone, but in the development of robust constitutional conventions that bring predictability, transparency, and democratic accountability to this critical aspect of the legislative process.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has performed a vital constitutional function by delineating the outer limits of executive discretion under Articles 200 and 201 — resolving critical ambiguities while resisting the temptation to overstep its own institutional boundaries. The judgments safeguard democratic governance by preventing indefinite delays that would permit an appointed constitutional functionary to override elected assemblies; they protect federalism by checking the centralising potential of gubernatorial inaction; and they affirm the separation of powers by confining judicial review to procedural fairness rather than policy merit.
Of equal significance is the Court’s preservation of constitutional flexibility — its refusal to impose rigid timelines or to introduce deemed assent reflects a sophisticated fidelity to the framers’ design. By combining this structural restraint with a clear willingness to deploy mandamus against abuse, the Court has placed the constitutional machinery of legislative assent on sounder footing and set healthier precedents for the operation of India’s cooperative federal structure.
References
[1] India Const. art. 143.
[2] India Const. art. 200.
[3] India Const. art. 201.
[4] State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab, (2024) 1 SCC 384 (India).
[5] India Const. art. 361.
[6] India Const. art. 142.
