Published On: April 25. 2026
Authored By: Parul Raj
Amity University, Jharkhand
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India[1] examines whether the non-recognition of same-sex marriage under Indian law is constitutionally sustainable. The petitioners sought recognition of marriage rights under several personal and secular laws, contending that the denial of such rights violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, particularly the rights to dignity, autonomy, and personal freedom.
A Constitution Bench declined to legalize same-sex marriage, holding that the matter falls within the legislative domain rather than the judicial sphere. The Court reaffirmed the separation of powers, clarifying that it cannot modify existing marriage legislation. The ruling nonetheless affirmed the rights, dignity, and equal citizenship of LGBTQ+ persons, building on the foundations laid in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.[2]
The Court further directed the State to examine mechanisms to protect queer relationships from discrimination and to ensure equitable access to social welfare. While the ruling stops short of granting marriage equality, it sustains the constitutional conversation and reflects the evolving nature of rights jurisprudence in India.
Keywords: Same-sex Marriage, LGBTQ+, Constitutional Morality, Fundamental Rights, Separation of Powers, Equality, Dignity, Judicial Restraint.
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India marked a paradoxical moment in India’s LGBTQ+ rights jurisprudence. While the Court affirmed the right of queer couples to cohabit without discrimination, its refusal to grant legal recognition under marriage laws has left millions in a state of civil limbo.[3]
The case represents a significant moment in the ongoing struggle for LGBTQ+ rights in India. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether same-sex couples are entitled to legal recognition of their marriage under existing Indian law. The petitioners argued that the denial of such recognition violated fundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, specifically, the rights to equality, non-discrimination, dignity, and personal freedom.
To appreciate the significance of this case, its historical context is essential. The struggle for LGBTQ+ rights in India has been prolonged and deeply shaped by colonial legislation. Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code,[4] enacted in 1860 during British rule, criminalized consensual same-sex relationships and sustained discrimination for over a century. The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India[2] was a turning point, decriminalizing consensual same-sex conduct and affirming the constitutional rights of LGBTQ+ persons.
In the wake of Navtej, the constitutional conversation shifted from decriminalization to the recognition of affirmative rights, including marriage equality. The petitioners in Supriyo sought to extend the principles of dignity, autonomy, and constitutional morality to encompass the right to marry a person of one’s choosing, regardless of gender. The Court, however, adopted a more cautious approach, holding that the recognition of marriage is a matter reserved for the legislature.
The case thus represents a broader transition, from recognition of LGBTQ+ identity to the pursuit of full legal and social equality. It moves the discourse beyond decriminalization toward questions of marriage, family rights, and institutional recognition, and illustrates the ongoing challenge of translating constitutional guarantees into lived realities.
II. Case Description
On November 14, 2022, two same-sex couples filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, seeking legal recognition of same-sex marriage in India. The petitions centered on the constitutionality of the Special Marriage Act, 1954.[5] The first petition was filed by Supriyo Chakraborty and Abhay Dang; the second by Parth Phiroze Mehrotra and Uday Raj Anand.
The petitioners challenged Section 4(c) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which restricts marriage to a union between a “male” and a “female,” thereby excluding same-sex couples from the legal benefits of marriage, including adoption, surrogacy, employment benefits, insurance, and retirement entitlements. They sought a declaration that Section 4(c) is unconstitutional. Related petitions challenging analogous provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 were also filed.
The petitioners relied on NALSA v. Union of India[6] and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India[2] as precedents recognizing non-binary gender identities and affirming the equal constitutional rights of LGBTQ+ persons.
On March 13, 2023, a three-judge Bench led by CJI D.Y. Chandrachud referred the matter to a five-judge Constitution Bench, which commenced hearing the case on April 18, 2023. After ten days of arguments, the Bench reserved judgment on May 11, 2023. On October 17, 2023, the Constitution Bench pronounced its verdict, unanimously holding that there is no fundamental right to marry and that the Court could not recognize LGBTQ+ persons’ right to marry under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.[7]
III. Facts of the Case
Institution of the Writ Petitions: Two same-sex couples filed writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court of India, seeking legal recognition of same-sex marriages and challenging the constitutionality of existing marriage laws that restrict recognition to heterosexual couples.
The Petitioners’ Identity: The first petition was filed by Supriyo Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, seeking recognition of their relationship under Indian marriage law. The second petition was filed by Parth Phiroze Mehrotra and Uday Raj Anand, who similarly sought equal marital rights and legal recognition.
Challenge to Section 4(c) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954: The petitioners specifically contested Section 4(c) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which bars same-sex couples from the legal institution of marriage through gender-specific language requiring a “male” and a “female” party.
Constitutional Challenge Grounds: The petitioners argued that the impugned provision violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. They contended that the non-recognition of same-sex marriage deprived them of significant legal entitlements, including rights relating to adoption, surrogacy, inheritance, employment benefits, pensions, insurance, and retirement.
Transfer of Related Petitions: Several High Courts had received similar petitions raising the same constitutional questions. Given the national and constitutional significance of the issue, these cases were transferred to the Supreme Court for an authoritative determination.
Challenge to Other Marriage Legislation: In addition to the Special Marriage Act, 1954, several petitions challenged provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Foreign Marriage Act, 1969 on the ground that they similarly fail to recognize same-sex unions.
IV. Issues Raised
1. Whether the Constitution of India recognizes a fundamental right to marry, and if so, whether that right extends to same-sex couples under Articles 14, 19, and 21, particularly in the context of autonomy, privacy, dignity, and personal liberty.
2. Whether same-sex couples are entitled to equal parental rights, including the right to adopt, and whether the denial of such rights constitutes discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
3. Whether Section 4(c) of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 is unconstitutional on the ground that its gender-specific language violates the principles of equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14 and 15.
4. Whether same-sex couples are entitled to legal recognition of their union either through a gender-neutral reading of existing marriage statutes or through judicial recognition of a new statutory framework.
5. Whether the denial of legal recognition to same-sex unions violates the petitioners’ rights to privacy, autonomy, dignity, and equal citizenship under Article 21 of the Constitution.
V. Contentions on Behalf of the Petitioners
The petitioners argued that the Supreme Court had already recognized the rights to privacy, equality, and dignity as fundamental rights in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India[8] and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India,[2] and that these rights had been explicitly extended to LGBTQ+ persons, affirming their identity and autonomy. Accordingly, the recognition of the right to marry and adopt was not the creation of a new right but a natural and constitutionally necessary extension of rights already protected.
It was further submitted that Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, which protect liberty and freedom, necessarily encompass the right to choose a life partner, a right integral to personal autonomy and individual dignity. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the choice of a partner is fundamental to the rights of privacy and dignity. Denying LGBTQ+ individuals the right to marry their chosen partner, it was argued, constitutes an unjustified infringement of their fundamental freedoms and violates the guarantee of equal protection under law.
The petitioners additionally challenged the constitutional validity of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, contending that its restriction of marriage to unions between a “man” and a “woman” operates within an impermissible heteronormative framework. This exclusion effectively denies same-sex couples access to the institution of marriage and the associated legal and social benefits. The denial was argued to constitute discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, in violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21. It was urged that the Act be read down to include same-sex couples, or declared unconstitutional to the extent of such exclusion.
VI. Contentions on Behalf of the Respondents
The respondents contended that the Special Marriage Act, 1954 was enacted with the understanding that marriage constitutes a union between a man and a woman, and that its constitutionality cannot be challenged solely on the basis that it excludes same-sex unions. They argued that the legislature in 1954 did not contemplate non-heterosexual unions, and that the Act cannot be said to have been intentionally discriminatory in its original design. The present challenge, they submitted, seeks to introduce a conception of marriage that was not part of the legislative intent at the time of enactment.
The respondents further argued that no provision of Part III of the Constitution explicitly confers a fundamental right to marry or to establish a legally recognized union. While Articles 19 and 21 protect liberty, dignity, and privacy, they do not, on their terms, guarantee a right to marriage. The petitioners therefore cannot assert an enforceable constitutional right to marry based solely on implication, particularly where statutory recognition is required for such a right to have legal effect.
It was also contended that the State is not constitutionally obligated to recognize all forms of personal relationships. Marriage laws reflect legislative policy and legitimate state interests, including matters of inheritance, child legitimacy, succession, and family structure, and the State retains the prerogative to grant legal recognition to relationships that serve established social and legal purposes. The non-recognition of same-sex unions does not, the respondents argued, constitute a constitutional violation.
VII. Judgment
A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is not a fundamental right expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, nor can it be implied in a manner that renders same-sex marriage legally enforceable. The Court held that marriage is, in its essence, a creature of legislation, governed by statutes such as the Special Marriage Act, 1954, and that any expansion of its scope is a matter for Parliament, not the judiciary.
The Court reaffirmed the principle of separation of powers, holding that it cannot rewrite existing legislation or effectively create new legal institutions. It clarified that if the State and Parliament determine that LGBTQ+ persons should have legally recognized marriage rights, it is for them to legislate accordingly.
The Court simultaneously reaffirmed that Article 21 guarantees LGBTQ+ persons full constitutional rights to privacy, dignity, autonomy, and freedom of choice. It held that the absence of legal recognition of same-sex marriage does not negate queer persons’ identity, personal liberty, or the right to maintain consensual relationships free from State interference.
The petitions seeking legal recognition of same-sex marriage were accordingly dismissed. The question of marriage equality was left for the legislature to address.[7]
VIII. Conclusion
Marriage occupies a central place among the legal and social institutions that contemporary societies recognize and sustain. It is both a personal union and a legal structure that confers rights, obligations, status, and recognition. Judicial decisions concerning its legal enforceability therefore carry significant normative, constitutional, and social weight, shaping not only the rights of the parties before the court, but the broader constitutional understanding of citizenship, equality, and the family.
The judgment in Supriyo underscores the need for a consistent, dynamic, and progressive approach to the interpretation of fundamental rights. The Constitution is a living document, and its provisions must be read in a manner that evolves alongside changing social realities and contemporary understandings of dignity, identity, and personal liberty. A rigid or formalistic interpretation risks failing to protect marginalized communities, particularly LGBTQ+ persons, whose claims for recognition are grounded in the foundational constitutional principles of equality and justice.
The decision also sustains the constitutional dialogue on the scope of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21, provisions guaranteeing equality before law, protection against discrimination, freedom of expression, and the right to life and personal liberty. A progressive judicial approach would ensure that these rights are not confined to conventional interpretations but are extended to uphold substantive equality and human dignity for all persons, regardless of gender identity or sexual orientation.
The ruling ultimately reaffirms that constitutional interpretation must remain consonant with the foundational values of equality, non-discrimination, and human dignity embodied in the Indian Constitution, keeping the door open for a more inclusive and rights-based legal order in the future.
References
[1] Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1348.
[2] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
[3] Supreme Court Observer, Case Overview: Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India, available at https://www.scobserver.in/cases/plea-for-marriage-equality/ (last visited Apr. 2025).
[4] Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA CODE (1860), § 377.
[5] Special Marriage Act, No. 43 of 1954, INDIA CODE (1954), § 4(c).
[6] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
[7] Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1348 (verdict pronounced Oct. 17, 2023).
[8] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
