Published on: 7th July 2026
Authored by: Dev Sharma
National Law University, Jodhpur
Case Details
Case Name – Gorakhnath v. State of Chhattisgarh
Court – High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur
Bench – Hon’ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
Date of Judgment – 10 February 2025
CRA No.[1] – 891 of 2019[2]
Introduction
Gorakhnath v. State of Chhattisgarh is widely known as the “Marital Rape Exception Case.” It involves a criminal appeal filed by the appellant, Gorakhnath Sharma (husband), against a judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 11 February 2019, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (FTC), Bastar, Jagdalpur, in Sessions Trial No. 32 of 2018. The trial court had convicted the appellant under Sections 377, 376, and 304 of the IPC.[3] On appeal, the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur overturned that conviction and acquitted the appellant on the ground that marital rape does not constitute a criminal offence by virtue of Exception II to Section 375 of the IPC.[3]
What Is Marital Rape?
Marital rape is defined as any unwanted sexual act, intercourse, or penetration committed by a spouse against their partner without the partner’s consent. It is also recognised as a form of domestic violence and intimate partner violence.[4]
The Prosecution’s Case
The appellant was the husband of the deceased victim, and worked as a driver. On the night of 11 December 2017, the appellant committed unnatural sexual intercourse with the victim against her will and thereafter left her and went to work. It is alleged that the appellant inserted his hand into the victim’s anus, following which the victim complained of pain and informed her sister-in-law and neighbours. She was subsequently admitted to Maharani Hospital for treatment. A report was made to Police Station Bodhgan, and an offence under Section 377 IPC (Unnatural Offences) was registered in Crime No. 419/17. The victim’s dying declaration was recorded before a Magistrate on 11 December 2017, in which she stated that she had fallen ill as a result of forcible sexual intercourse by her husband. The victim died during treatment on 11 December 2017. An intimation of merger No. 61/17 under Section 174 CrPC[5] (Inquest into Unnatural or Suspicious Death) was registered. An offence under Section 304 IPC (Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder) was also added, and the appellant was arrested on 11 December 2017. Dr. Kolaskar Sashikant conducted the post-mortem of the deceased and found two perforations in the rectum: the first on the anterior side, approximately 1 cm above the pelvic floor, and the second on the left side, approximately 2 cm above the pelvic floor.[6]
The Trial Court Judgment
After considering the evidence and material on record, the trial court convicted the appellant for commission of offences under Sections 377 (Unnatural Offences), 376 (Rape), and 304 (Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder) of the IPC,[3] and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 10 years with a default stipulation.[6]
Arguments Between Appellant and Respondent
Appellant’s Arguments[7]
Lack of Evidence – Counsel argued that no legally admissible or cogent evidence exists on record to prove the appellant’s guilt, asserting that the conviction relies solely on the victim’s statement.
Denial of Charges – The appellant’s statement was recorded under Section 313 CrPC[5] (right of accused to explain incriminating circumstances), and the charges were denied.
Omission of Key Witness Statements – The trial court allegedly failed to consider the statements of Kalawati Sharma (PW-1) and Taraknath Sharma (PW-2), both of whom stated in their court depositions that the victim had suffered from piles since her first delivery, on account of which she experienced bleeding from the anus and abdominal pain.
Unreliable Dying Declaration – The appellant argued that the dying declaration on which the trial court relied was inherently doubtful, and that corroboration with the statement of the doctor (PW-3) was legally impermissible.
Perverse Findings by the Trial Court – The appellant contended that the trial court’s finding that he had inserted his hand into the deceased’s anus and committed rape, thereby causing abdominal pain and anal bleeding, was perverse and unsupported by the evidence.
On these grounds, counsel requested that the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence be set aside and the appellant be acquitted.
Respondent’s Arguments[7]
Guilt Is Proven – The prosecution had proved the commission of the offence against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt, and the conviction and sentence were accordingly justified.
Trial Court Was Correct – The trial court’s approach reflected a proper appreciation of the evidence in conformity with law, and did not warrant interference at the appellate stage either by way of acquittal or modification of sentence.
Appeal Should Be Dismissed – The respondent submitted that it was evident the appellant had attempted to commit rape, for which he had been rightly charged and sentenced, and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.
The Constitutional Framework and Legal Provisions
Article 14 – Raises the question of why the law affords criminal protection against non-consensual sexual intercourse to unmarried women but not to married women.[8]
Article 21 – As affirmed in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India,[9] bodily integrity forms a core component of the right to life and personal liberty.
Doctrine of Coverture – Under this historical doctrine, a married woman lost the legal capacity to own property, enter contracts, retain wages, or sue and be sued independently, since husband and wife were treated as one legal person, with the husband holding all legal authority. Although this doctrine has long been abolished in India, its legacy continues to inform discussions on marital immunity in criminal law.[10]
Exception II to Section 375 IPC – This exception provides that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under the age of 15 years, is not rape. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)[11] retains this immunity, raising the age threshold to 18 years under Exception 2 to Section 63 BNS.
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Although marital rape is not a criminal offence, a wife may seek civil relief under this Act for sexual abuse, humiliation, or violation of her modesty.
Understanding Exception II to Section 375 IPC and Section 63 BNS in Context
Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines rape as sexual intercourse or penetration by a man with a woman without her consent.[12] Exception II to Section 375 historically provided that sexual intercourse by a husband with his own wife, if the wife is not under 15 years of age, does not amount to rape. Under the BNS, 2023, which replaces the IPC, this immunity is retained under Exception 2 to Section 63, with the age threshold raised to 18 years: “Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape.”[13]
The continued retention of this exception creates a fundamental inconsistency within the law: a man who commits rape is criminally liable regardless of who the victim is, and equal criminal accountability should follow from an equal act. In practice, the exception permits perpetrators to evade criminal liability by marrying their victims, then continuing to commit the same offence without legal consequence. Although marital rape may constitute a ground for divorce, it does not currently attract criminal punishment, leaving the victim without meaningful legal recourse after the marriage ends.
Judicial Rulings on Marital Rape
Independent Thought v. Union of India, 2017[14] – The Supreme Court struck down Exception II to Section 375 IPC (now Section 63, BNS[11]) in respect of wives aged 15–18, holding that sexual intercourse with a minor wife under the age of 18 constitutes rape, irrespective of consent.
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2017[9] – The Supreme Court clarified the importance of sexual autonomy as an intrinsic component of the constitutional right to privacy.
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, 2018[15] – The Supreme Court partially struck down Section 377 IPC, decriminalising consensual same-sex relations between adults.
Comparison with High Courts and International Jurisdictions
Gujarat High Court – Observed that marital rape represents an archaic “shackle” on women’s rights.[16]
Karnataka High Court – Refused to quash marital rape charges, observing: “Marital rape cannot be the reason to unleash a brutal beast.”
Bombay High Court – Ruled that consensual sexual intercourse with a minor wife constitutes rape.
Madhya Pradesh High Court – Ruled that unnatural sexual intercourse with a wife does not constitute rape, and that the wife’s consent is irrelevant in such matters.
Delhi High Court – Delivered a split verdict. Justice Rajiv Shakdher held that Exception II to Section 375 IPC is unconstitutional and struck it down; Justice C. Hari Shankar rejected the plea to criminalise marital rape. The matter has since been referred to the Supreme Court and remains pending.
According to Amnesty International data, 77 out of 185 countries (approximately 42%) have criminalised marital rape, while a number of jurisdictions, including India, continue to permit a man to avoid rape prosecution by reason of his marriage to the victim.[17]
Conclusion
The debate on marital rape reflects an enduring tension between bodily autonomy, legal equality, and entrenched socio-cultural norms. While a significant majority of countries have criminalised marital rape, India retains the legal immunity afforded to husbands by Exception II to Section 375 IPC and its BNS equivalent. The matter is currently pending before the Supreme Court of India, awaiting a definitive constitutional determination. Any resolution will require careful consideration of bodily autonomy, constitutional equality, and the social realities of the country.
References
[1] Criminal Appeal.
[2] Casemine, Gorakhnath v. State of Chhattisgarh, 10 February 2025 <https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/67acf1d989e2140979d4f372> accessed 26 May 2026.
[3] Indian Penal Code, 1860.
[4] ‘Marital Rape in India’ (Drishti IAS, 15 February 2025) <https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-analysis/marital-rape-in-india-2> accessed 26 May 2026.
[5] Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[6] Official Judgment PDF, Gorakhnath Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh (Live Law) <https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/gorakhnth-sharma-v-state-of-chhattisgarh-10-february-2025-586220.pdf> paras 2, 8 accessed 26 May 2026.
[7] Ibid, paras 9–10.
[8] India Fellow Alumni, ‘Exception 2 of Section 375 (IPC)’ (India Fellow, 13 February 2025) <https://indiafellow.org/blog/all-posts/exception-2-of-section-375-ipc/> para 7, accessed 27 May 2026.
[9] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC (Supp) 1841.
[10] ‘Coverture’ (Historica) <https://historica.fandom.com/wiki/Coverture> accessed 27 May 2026.
[11] Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
[12] Indian Kanoon, ‘Section 375 IPC’ <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/623254/> accessed 27 May 2026.
[13] Ministry of Law and Justice, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (Official PDF) <https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883_english_01042024.pdf> s 63, Exception 2, accessed 27 May 2026.
[14] Independent Thought v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4904.
[15] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 4321.
[16] Krishnadas Rajagopal, ‘Marital Rape Case: CJI Chandrachud Bows Out’ (The Hindu, 24 October 2024) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/marital-rape-case-cji-chandrachud-bows-out-of-hearing-says-it-may-not-conclude-in-foreseeable-future/article68786257.ece> accessed 27 May 2026.
[17] Amnesty International Data (30 January 2020) <https://the-amnesty.com/2020/01/30/there-is-no-such-thing-as-marital-rape-2/> accessed 27 May 2026.
Bibliography
Gemini AI • Casemine • Indian Kanoon • Amnesty International • Ministry of Law and Justice • The Hindu • The Economic Times • India Fellow • Drishti IAS • Live Law
