130th Amendment Bill: Reshaping India’s Future or Threatening Democracy? 

The Indian Constitution is one of the longest written constitutions in the world. It has evolved through numerous amendments that balance the Constitution’s core principles with the need to adapt to a changing society and address emerging issues. After 129 amendments, the 130th Amendment Bill has sparked a nationwide debate over the intention behind it. The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on August 20, 2025, and seeks to alter Articles 75, 164, and 239AA of the Constitution by mandating the automatic removal of a minister who has been in detention for 30 consecutive days. This raises an important question: does the Bill address the real challenge of criminalisation in politics, or does it undermine popular democracy? Although the Bill is framed as advancing constitutional morality and good governance, its underlying political effect may be to remove representatives on the basis of detention alone. This article examines the issue in four parts: first, why ministers alone are singled out for removal after 30 days of detention while MLAs and MPs are not; second, David Landau’s theory of abusive constitutionalism; third, a comparative analysis of similar provisions in other jurisdictions; and fourth, the Bill’s implications for the rule of law and personal liberty.

I. Why Ministers Alone Are Removed After 30 Days of Detention, and Not MLAs or MPs

The Bill creates a constitutional tension: while a minister facing detention is treated with suspicion, ordinary legislators continue to enjoy protection from disqualification unless and until they are convicted.

Article 14
This provision violates Article 14’s guarantee of equality, since it prescribes a different consequence for the same offence depending on whether the accused is a minister or an ordinary legislator. The rule of law requires that everyone — irrespective of caste, race, gender, or status — be treated equally before the law.

Article 21
Removing a person from office without a conviction amounts to penalising someone who is still presumed innocent. A delay in judicial proceedings does not mean that the accused is necessarily guilty.

Article 19
The people choose their representatives through the electoral process. Removing a minister solely on the basis of 30 days’ detention undermines popular democracy and erodes public faith in the democratic process.

Articles 75 and 164: Tenure and the Pleasure of the President/Governor
Ministers hold office only during the pleasure of the President or Governor. The Prime Minister and Chief Minister, however, remain accountable to the House and continue in office for as long as they command a majority. The newly inserted Article 75(5) provides that if a minister who has been detained does not resign by the thirtieth day, they shall cease to hold office on the day following, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.

Article 239AA: Special Provisions for Delhi
Article 239AA contains special provisions for the National Capital Territory of Delhi. The amendment inserts a new clause, Section 5A, under which a minister who is arrested or detained in custody for 30 consecutive days for an offence punishable with imprisonment of five years or more shall be removed from office on the advice of the President or the Chief Minister.

This creates both constitutional tension and an element of arbitrariness. A provision framed as a means of cleansing politics risks becoming a tool for effecting a change of government through investigation rather than through the confidence of the House. Arbitrary treatment of this kind should be eliminated rather than used to privilege one section of officeholders over another.

In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court affirmed that allowing the executive to control legislative composition through automatic disqualification would make a mockery of the principle of parliamentary confidence.

Under the Westminster system, the Prime Minister and Chief Minister hold office for as long as they command a majority. By allowing the President or Governor to effectively remove a Prime Minister or Chief Minister, this Bill undermines that core constitutional principle.

II. Landau’s Abusive Constitutionalism

David Landau defines abusive constitutionalism as the use of constitutional amendments, replacements, or reforms to make a political system significantly less democratic than it was before. Such changes carry the appearance of constitutional legitimacy while actually weakening democratic checks and consolidating power, precisely because their formal legality makes them difficult to identify and challenge. The 130th Amendment Bill fits this description: outwardly, it is projected as a measure to protect constitutional morality and good governance, but its practical effect is to erode democracy without arousing suspicion. Treating 30 days of detention as tantamount to guilt can become a tool for destabilising or weakening a government in a state or at the centre.

III. Comparative Perspective on the Bill

India
Indian courts have consistently declined to support the arrest or disqualification of ministers in the absence of a conviction. Until an accused is proven guilty, disqualification does not follow — a position the judiciary has firmly maintained in order to safeguard the presumption of innocence and the separation of powers. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between disqualification upon conviction and mere arrest or detention without trial, holding that disqualification under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 takes effect only upon conviction for a specified offence.

United Kingdom: Ethical Standards and Political Accountability
In the United Kingdom, there is no legal or constitutional requirement for a minister to resign upon being arrested or even upon being charged. However, under the ministerial code, a minister facing serious charges or allegations is expected to step aside voluntarily and resign to preserve public trust. Such a resignation is ethical and political, not legal. To ensure that the executive remains answerable to Parliament and the public, the Prime Minister has the authority to request a resignation. This ensures that due process and moral responsibility coexist.[1]

United States of America
The United States allows for the impeachment of the President and Vice President, but only for reasons such as treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanours. Notably, impeachment is a political process, not an automatic or judicial one. An indicted official may continue in office unless and until convicted. In Powell v. McCormack (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress cannot exclude a member except through constitutionally defined processes, meaning that disqualification — as opposed to pre-trial detention — must occur through a court decision or a defined constitutional process. By preventing the political misuse of arrests or accusations, the American model safeguards democratic representation.[2]

Canada
Canada’s approach ensures that mere suspicion or allegation cannot deprive an elected representative of office, which would otherwise undermine democracy. In Canada, disqualification arises only upon conviction for an offence or a violation of ethical codes. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that the rule of law rests on both accountability and fairness, meaning that punishment cannot precede adjudication.[3]

IV. Undermining the Rule of Law

Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and the rule of law includes judicial review as a safeguard against arbitrariness.[4] In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Supreme Court held that the rule of law is an essential feature of the Constitution’s basic structure.[5] By disqualifying ministers on the mere basis of accusation and detention, this Bill undermines that principle.

Conclusion

The 130th Amendment Bill, 2025 is presented, on its face, as a measure to promote constitutional morality and good governance. Viewed from another angle, however, it risks undermining democracy at both the state and central levels. David Landau’s concept of abusive constitutionalism offers a useful lens for understanding the Bill’s likely intent and effect. The comparative analysis further shows that few, if any, other democracies provide for automatic disqualification on the basis of detention alone; most instead require a conviction before disqualification follows. Because the rule of law demands that everyone be treated equally, a provision that shields ordinary legislators while singling out ministers for disqualification undermines that principle and infringes the fundamental rights of the ministers concerned. The presumption of innocence until proven guilty must therefore be upheld, failing which, the Bill risks becoming a political tool to destabilise governments and erode a core principle of the Constitution.

References

[1] A. Kashyap and U.K. Roy, “Constitutionality and Policy Implications of 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2025: A Critical Analysis of Arrest-Based Disqualification of Ministers,” IJLLR Journal (2025), available at https://www.ijllr.com/post/constitutionality-and-policy-implications-of-130th-constitutional-amendment-bill-2025-a-critical-a (accessed 15 June 2026).
[2] A. Kashyap and U.K. Roy, “Constitutionality and Policy Implications of 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2025: A Critical Analysis of Arrest-Based Disqualification of Ministers,” IJLLR Journal (2025), available at https://www.ijllr.com/post/constitutionality-and-policy-implications-of-130th-constitutional-amendment-bill-2025-a-critical-a (accessed 15 June 2026).
[3] A. Kashyap and U.K. Roy, “Constitutionality and Policy Implications of 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2025: A Critical Analysis of Arrest-Based Disqualification of Ministers,” IJLLR Journal (2025), available at https://www.ijllr.com/post/constitutionality-and-policy-implications-of-130th-constitutional-amendment-bill-2025-a-critical-a (accessed 15 June 2026).
[4] ADM, Jabalpur v. S.S. Shukla, Supreme Court of India, 28 April 1976, p. 19, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/5622.pdf.
[5] Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Supreme Court of India, 7 November 1975, para. 687, p. 4, https://api.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/21398.pdf.