Right To Life vs. Right To Die: A Critical Analysis of Right to Die with Dignity in India

Introduction

The word “euthanasia,” derived from the Greek terms eu and thanatos, means a “good death.” Euthanasia refers to compassionately allowing, hastening, or causing the death of another, typically to relieve suffering, preserve dignity, or shorten the course of dying when death is inevitable. The concept has several dimensions. Active euthanasia involves administering something to cause death, while passive euthanasia involves withdrawing life-supporting measures. Euthanasia may also be classified as voluntary (requested by the patient), non-voluntary (decided without the patient’s consent), or involuntary (decided against the patient’s wishes). It is often difficult to distinguish euthanasia from physician-assisted suicide (PAS), since both involve a desire to end life and result in an assisted death.[1]
This article examines whether the right to die with dignity contradicts the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Attempted suicide was formerly a criminal offence under Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the abetment of suicide remains criminalised under Section 108 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The Supreme Court permitted the first court-approved implementation of passive euthanasia in Harish Rana v. Union of India (2026), even though active euthanasia continues to be criminalised under Sections 100 (culpable homicide) and 101 (murder) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. The central question this article explores is why the right to life is guaranteed as a fundamental right while the right to die with dignity has historically been punished. This article discusses the issue, offers a critical analysis, examines related judgments, and considers the challenges that remain.

Understanding the Concept of Rights

A right is essential for a human being to place himself at his best. It is good both for the individual and for society. Rights are generally provided and protected by the State for its people, allowing individuals to raise their voice on matters affecting the public and to represent common concerns. Scholars have defined rights in various ways:

“Rights are powers necessary for the fulfilment of man’s vocation as a moral being.”
— T.H. Green

“Rights are those conditions of social life without which no man can seek, in general, to be himself at his best.”
— Laski

Article 21 – Right to Life as a Fundamental Right

Protection of Life and Personal Liberty

“No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”[2]
This article makes clear that every person has the right to live except by a procedure established by law, and that it is the State’s obligation to protect the life and liberty of its people. Article 21 has been interpreted broadly to include the right to privacy, the right to livelihood, and the right to a safe environment, extending far beyond a narrow reading of the text. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (2017),[3] the Supreme Court recognised the right to privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985),[4] the Court recognised the right to livelihood as an integral part of Article 21.
Article 21 carries two distinct strands of interpretation. The first is the protection of life, which includes the right to live with dignity and other rights that enable a person to live with dignity. The second is the right to personal liberty, which the courts have progressively expanded. In A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras,[5] the Court gave “liberty” a narrow meaning, limited to freedom from arrest and detention. In R.C. Cooper v. Union of India,[6] the Court recognised that personal liberty also includes the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1). In Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,[7] the Court further widened the scope of “personal liberty” to include the rights under Article 19(1). Finally, in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,[8] the Court held that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to live with dignity.
Through this line of cases, Article 21 has been read to carry a wide and evolving meaning. Its central purpose — the protection of life and personal liberty — has traditionally meant that a person may not end their own life except through a procedure established by law, even where the person themself consents to it. As a result, the right to live with dignity is protected by law, while the right to die with dignity was, until recently, criminalised under Section 309 of the IPC, 1860. This raises an evident inconsistency: dignity in life is protected, but dignity in death is denied. The rest of this article examines the right to die with dignity in greater depth.

Article 21 – Is the Right to Die with Dignity a Fundamental Right?

Euthanasia is broadly divided into active and passive forms. Active euthanasia remains illegal in most countries and can attract punishment of up to fourteen years’ imprisonment. Passive euthanasia, by contrast, has gained wide acceptance internationally, and in India it was first judicially implemented in Harish Rana v. Union of India. The Supreme Court initially declined to permit passive euthanasia, but later allowed it, subject to stringent conditions supervised by a medical board, in Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011).
The constitutional validity of Section 309 IPC was first challenged in P. Rathinam v. Union of India,[9] where the Supreme Court held the provision unconstitutional. In 1996, however, a Constitution Bench reversed this position in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, holding that the right to life under Article 21 does not include the right to die.[10] In that case, the accused had been convicted at trial for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, and the conviction was upheld by the High Court. Before the Supreme Court, the accused argued that the “right to die” should be read into Article 21, and that a person who abets another’s suicide is merely giving effect to that right. The Court rejected this argument.
Subsequently, a five-judge Constitution Bench, in its judgment of 9 March 2018, recognised that a terminally ill patient, or a person in a persistent vegetative state, has the right to seek the termination of medical treatment by executing an “Advance Directive.” The Court held that the right to live with dignity under Article 21 also includes, in certain circumstances, the right to die.[11] In Common Cause v. Union of India, the Court went further, formally recognising the right to die with dignity as a fundamental right under Article 21 and affirming that individuals have the right to refuse medical treatment.

Comparative Analysis with Other Countries

India did not permit euthanasia until the Aruna Shanbaug case allowed it in a limited form, and Common Cause later upheld the right to die as a fundamental right under Article 21. The landmark judgment in Harish Rana v. Union of India was the first instance of a court-approved implementation of passive euthanasia in the country. In India, active euthanasia and assisted suicide remain illegal, while passive euthanasia is lawful under strict conditions. Belgium previously imposed an age restriction on euthanasia, but its parliament has since passed legislation lifting that restriction entirely.[12]
In the United States, the right to life is treated as a natural right, but suicide has generally been viewed by courts as an unnatural termination of life and, therefore, incompatible with the concept of a “right to life.”[13] Several European countries permit both assisted suicide and euthanasia: Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands have legislation specifically permitting euthanasia, while Germany, Italy, and Austria permit assisted suicide only. In addition, several EU countries — including Ireland, France, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, and Slovenia — are currently developing legislation on euthanasia or assisted dying.[14] Swiss law does not formally recognise the concept of euthanasia, and although the decriminalisation of euthanasia has been debated, it remains illegal in Switzerland.

Critical Analysis of the Right to Die as a Fundamental Right

The right to life is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, whereas the right to die was recognised only through later judgments. This raises an important question: if the right to die has now been recognised as fundamental, why was the right to die with dignity denied for so long? The Common Cause judgment was the first to treat the right to die with dignity as fundamental. In that judgment, the Supreme Court recommended that Parliament consider the feasibility of deleting Section 309 from the Penal Code, noting that if this recommendation were implemented, the case for legalising euthanasia — even active euthanasia — would be strengthened, since no penal provision would then treat it as a crime. The Court clarified, however, that passive euthanasia need not wait for such reform: it is not a crime, carries no constitutional taboo, and is fully justified on rational and humane grounds.[15]
Passive euthanasia is thus not a constitutional taboo; it is an act of relief for a suffering patient, not an act of killing. Euthanasia is typically administered where the individual has voluntarily given consent or executed a living will before the injury. Where a patient refuses treatment, that refusal should be honoured rather than the patient being pushed toward the extremity of prolonged pain. Just as there is respect for the right to life, there should be equal respect for the right to die with dignity — no one should be compelled to live in suffering for the remainder of their life.
The 241st Report of the Law Commission of India observed:

“5.2 The 196th Report of the Law Commission stated the fundamental principle that a terminally ill but competent patient has a right to refuse treatment, including discontinuance of life-sustaining measures, and the same is binding on the doctor, provided that the decision of the patient is an ‘informed decision.’ ‘Patient’ has been defined as a person suffering from terminal illness. ‘Terminal illness’ has also been defined under Section 2(m). The definition of a ‘competent patient’ has to be understood by reference to the definition of ‘incompetent patient.’ ‘Incompetent patient’ means a patient who is a minor, a person of unsound mind, or a patient who is unable to weigh, understand, or retain relevant information about their medical treatment, or unable to make an informed decision because of an impairment or disturbance in the functioning of the mind or brain, or a person unable to communicate an informed decision regarding medical treatment through speech, sign, or any other mode (vide Section 2(d) of the Bill, 2006).”[16]

Accordingly, a person who is competent to give an informed decision, or who has executed a living will, may be permitted euthanasia. Ultimately, the right to refuse or to live rests solely on the consent of the patient, as Lord Goff observed in the Airedale case:

“Where a patient is brought into hospital in such a condition that, without the benefit of a life support system, he will not continue to live, the decision has to be made whether or not to give him that benefit, if available. That decision can only be made in the best interests of the patient… The question is not whether the doctor should take a course which will kill his patient, or even take a course which has the effect of accelerating his death. The question is whether the doctor should or should not continue to provide his patient with medical treatment or care which, if continued, will prolong his patient’s life.”[17]

Accordingly, the right to die with dignity should be treated as a fundamental right rather than criminalised as an offence. While the Indian Constitution guarantees fundamental rights and freedoms to its people, the primary concern surrounding passive euthanasia remains the risk of its misuse or of causing harm to vulnerable groups. Harish Rana v. Union of India marked the first instance in which a court implemented passive euthanasia in line with the guidelines laid down in Common Cause.

Conclusion

The right to life has long been a fundamental right under Article 21, and the right to die with dignity should equally be recognised as a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. The right to die with dignity was first treated as a fundamental right in Common Cause v. Union of India, and it was also recommended for recognition by the 241st Report of the Law Commission. A comparative analysis shows that several countries have allowed assisted suicide and adopted euthanasia legislation. Under Indian law, passive euthanasia has been legalised and recognised, while active euthanasia and assisted suicide remain illegal and criminal. The right to die is a necessary right to relieve patients suffering from severe pain, and the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Harish Rana v. Union of India marks a historic step in implementing passive euthanasia in practice. Passive euthanasia meets one of modern society’s genuine needs, and the right to die should be recognised as a fundamental right without unnecessary encumbrances. This shift reflects a broader movement — from a focus on mere biological preservation toward the preservation of human dignity. Future reforms will require a structured legal framework and streamlined procedures to ensure a dignified death for all citizens.

References

[1] Kalaivani Annadurai et al., “Euthanasia: Right to Die with Dignity,” Journal of Family Medicine and Primary Care 3(4): 477–478 (Oct–Dec 2014).
[2] India Const. art. 21.
[3] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 2017 SC 4161 (India).
[4] Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors., 1986 AIR 180, 1985 SCR Suppl. (India).
[5] A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 AIR 27 (India).
[6] Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 AIR 564 (India).
[7] Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. and Others, 1963 AIR 1295 (India).
[8] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 AIR SC 597 (India).
[9] P. Rathinam v. Union of India, 1994 AIR SC 1844 (India).
[10] Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, 1996 AIR SC 946 (India).
[11] Dasari Harish et al., “The Current Status of Euthanasia in India,” J. Indian Acad. Forensic Med. 40(2) (Apr–Jun 2018), ISSN 0971-0973.
[12] European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing (2025), available at europarl.europa.eu.
[13] Common Cause v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 1665 (India).
[14] European Parliamentary Research Service, Briefing (2025), available at europarl.europa.eu.
[15] Common Cause v. Union of India, AIR 2018 SC 1665 (India).
[16] Law Commission of India, 241st Report on Passive Euthanasia (2012), Government of India.
[17] Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] AC 789 (HL) (per Lord Goff).