Published On: July 28, 2026
Authored By: Reshmi MS
CSI College for Legal Studies, Kanakkary, Kottayam
Abstract
The rapid growth of India’s digital platform economy has revolutionized consumer logistics, causing a massive surge in gig and platform work. NITI Aayog projects this workforce to rise from 7.7 million in 2020-21 to 23.5 million by 2029-30. This expansion has created a precarious workforce operating outside traditional labor protections. While the Code on Social Security (CSS), 2020 recognizes this workforce, this paper evaluates if such legislation is sufficient, particularly following the major legislative activations of late 2025. It critically analyzes government regulatory attempts, focusing on the structural limits of the CSS 2020 and comparing the recent 2025 state-level interventions in Rajasthan and Karnataka. While the Central Code introduces an aggregator-funded cess and mandatory e-Shram portal integration, it limits its scope to welfare accumulation rather than rights of enforcement. Concurrently, tech platforms exercise pervasive algorithmic control—dictating wages, task allocation, and unilateral deactivations—creating severe challenges under Articles 14, 21, and 23 of the Constitution of India. This study demonstrates that India’s binary employment framework is inadequate, arguing for a shift toward a co-regulatory framework that mandates a statutory minimum wage floor for active screen time, algorithmic transparency, and a legally recognized “dependent contractor” status.
Keywords: Digital Platform; Gig and Platform workers; Government; Social Security; Constitutional Rights.
Introduction
The Fourth Industrial Revolution has replaced traditional factory floors with digital interfaces, triggering an era of on-demand labor. In India, this shift is highly visible across major urban centers like Bengaluru, Mumbai, and Delhi. What began as a consumer convenience has become a vital economic pillar. NITI Aayog projects the gig and platform workforce to triple to 23.5 million by 2030, establishing them as a permanent component of the national economy.[1] Yet, deep structural problems persist despite recent legislative recognition. The very technology offering workers flexibility and autonomy has rendered them legally invisible, leaving them trapped in a gray area between independent partners and traditional proletariats.
Historically, Indian labor laws operated on a simple binary: an individual is either an employee entitled to statutory protections or an independent contractor working at their own risk. The digital platform economy completely breaks this dichotomy. Platforms like Uber, Zomato, and Swiggy exercise profound control over workers through algorithmic management, mimicking the authority of a traditional employer. Crucially, these workers lack the safety nets—such as minimum wages, insurance, and retirement benefits—that define standard employment in labor economics. This disparity raises vital questions about systemic unfairness and potential violations of the Right to Equality and the Right to Life with Dignity.
The Indian government attempted to address this crisis through the Code on Social Security (CSS), 2020. This legislation formally recognized gig and platform workers, introducing a welfare cess and a central registration portal. However, a major gap remained. The Code treats workers as charity rather than rights, denying them access to a statutory minimum wage or collective bargaining.
Because the federal framework proved insufficient, the year 2025 marked a breaking point where the battle for worker rights shifted directly to the states. Regional governments have introduced standalone laws to fill the central vacuum. These states have established tripartite welfare boards and grievance redressal bodies to assist exploited workers. This paper evaluates the structural limits of the CSS 2020 in light of its recent implementation updates, compares the legislative innovations of the Rajasthan and Karnataka models, and argues that India must evolve toward a co-regulatory framework that recognizes a dependent contractor status, mandates algorithmic transparency, and properly enforces worker rights.
THE STATUTORY MATRIX: Analysing the Code on Social Security, 2020
The enactment of the Code on Social Security 2020, marked a decisive, irreversible turning point in Indian labour jurisprudence as for the first time, a federal legislation explicitly dismantled the fiction that the informal digital workforce does not exist and also by providing separate statutory definitions under Section 2(35) for a “gig worker” and Section 2(61) for a “platform worker,” the legislature acknowledged that millions of workers operating via online applications require state-backed intervention.[1] The primary mechanism introduced by the Code to address gig and platform workers in precarious nature is an aggregator-led funding model. Under Section 114, digital intermediaries—spanning ride-hailing, food delivery, and ecommerce—are mandated to contribute to a welfare cess ranging from 1% to 2% of their annual turnover into a national social security fund.[2] This fund is intended for bankroll schemes relating to life and disability cover, health benefits, and old-age protection.[3]
However, a critical analysis of the Code on Social Security, 2020 reveals that its progressive facade masks a deeper, regressive structural flaw i.e., the Code fundamentally approaches the platform economy through a lens of corporate benevolence and state-sponsored charity rather than basic labour rights. While it creates a mechanism for welfare accumulation, it entirely abdicates its responsibility toward rights enforcement and by meticulously keeping gig workers compartmentalized outside the definition of an “employee,”[4] the Code systematically denies them access to the remaining three pillars of India’s modern labour codes that is the Code on Wages, the Industrial Relations Code, and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code. Consequently, under federal law, platform workers remain stripped of the right to a statutory minimum wage floor, overtime pay, regulated hours, or the right to form legally recognized trade unions for collective bargaining and furthermore, the operationalization of the Code relies heavily on the e-Shram portal for worker integration, through which there happens to be severe behavioral lag which is it requires economically marginalized workers to navigate bureaucratic self-registration, rather than forcing tech aggregators to dynamically link their active digital back-ends to state systems.[5] Recognizing this failure, the Ministry of Labour and Employment implemented a structural course correction by enforcing the Social Security Rules, 2026 (Ministry of Labour & Employment, 2026). Under Rule 48(2), the government shifted the burden onto corporations, mandating that aggregators directly integrate their live databases via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) into the central e-Shram portal.
While major tech corporations—including Zomato, Swiggy, Blinkit, Uber, and Ola— have completed initial onboarding to map worker Universal Account Numbers (UAN),[6] this digital integration has exposed a deep conceptual contradiction. The state is attempting to use automated, rigid tracking software to count fluid, unorganized human labour and if the same worker signs out of an app mid-day due to a medical emergency or algorithmically induced low demand, their access to state welfare safety nets immediately become unstable.
The Code on Social Security 2020 creates a legal paradox which is, it recognizes the workforce but legitimizes their exploitation by leaving the structural engine of platform work— namely, algorithmic control and piece-rate wage manipulation which is held to be completely unregulated. It is this exact central deficiency that has forced individual state legislatures to step into the vacuum.[7]
STATE-LEVEL INTERVENTIONS: A Comparative Study of Rajasthan and Karnataka
The enactment of the Code on Social Security (CSS), 2020, marked a decisive turning point in Indian labor jurisprudence. For the first time, federal legislation explicitly dismantled the fiction that the informal digital workforce does not exist. By providing distinct statutory definitions under Section 2(35) for a “gig worker” and Section 2(61) for a “platform worker,” the legislature acknowledged that millions of application-based workers require state intervention.[2]
The primary mechanism introduced to address the precarious nature of this work is an aggregator-led funding model. Under Section 114, digital intermediaries—spanning ride hailing, food delivery, and e-commerce—must contribute a welfare cess of 1% to 2% of their annual turnover into a national social security fund.[3] This fund is designed to bankroll schemes for life and disability cover, health benefits, and old-age protection.[4]
However, a critical analysis reveals that this progressive facade masks a deeper, regressive structural flaw: the Code approaches the platform economy through a lens of corporate benevolence and charity rather than enforceable labor rights. While it creates a system for welfare accumulation, it abdicates its responsibility toward rights enforcement. By meticulously keeping gig workers excluded from the definition of an “employee,”[5] the Code systematically denies them access to the remaining three pillars of modern Indian labor reform: the Code on Wages, the Industrial Relations Code, and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code. Consequently, platform workers remain stripped of the right to a statutory minimum wage floor, overtime pay, regulated hours, or the right to form trade unions for collective bargaining.
Furthermore, the operationalization of the Code historically relied heavily on self-registration via the e-Shram portal, creating a severe behavioral lag among economically marginalized workers. Recognizing this failure, a major development occurred when the Central Government officially notified the Code on Social Security (Central) Rules.[6] Under these updated rules, the government shifted the compliance burden entirely onto corporations, mandating that aggregators directly integrate their live databases via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) into the e-Shram portal.
While major tech corporations—including Zomato, Swiggy, Blinkit, Uber, and Ola—have onboarded to map worker Universal Account Numbers (UAN),[7] this digital integration exposes a deep conceptual contradiction. The state is attempting to use rigid tracking software to count fluid, unorganized human labor. If a worker signs out of an app mid-day due to a medical emergency or low demand, their access to state safety nets become instantly unstable. The CSS 2020 creates a legal paradox: it recognizes the workforce but structurally legitimizes their exploitation by leaving the core engines of platform work—algorithmic control and piece-rate wage manipulation—completely unregulated. This central deficiency has forced individual state legislatures to step into the vacuum.[8]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS: Evaluating Algorithmic Management under Articles 14, 21, and 23
The structural deficiencies of the Central Code and the defensive actions taken by states prove that unregulated algorithmic control is a deep constitutional crisis. Because platforms use automated code to govern human labor without statutory oversight, their daily operations directly challenge the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India.
First, algorithmic management creates a clear violation of Article 14, which protects against systemic arbitrariness.[20] Under settled constitutional principles established in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, arbitrariness is the absolute opposite of equality.[21] Platforms routinely practice algorithmic arbitrariness by unilaterally changing piece-rate delivery fees, altering incentive thresholds, and executing automated deactivations without giving the worker a right to be heard. This systemic denial of procedural fairness directly breaches the principles of natural justice embedded in Article 14.
Second, the platform business model infringes upon Article 21, which guarantees the right to life with human dignity. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, the Supreme Court established that the right to life inherently encompasses the right to a livelihood.[22] For a gig worker, their livelihood is entirely dependent on an app’s login. Unilateral app bans destroy this livelihood instantly without due process, failing the constitutional threshold of a life lived with basic human dignity.
Finally, this system activates Article 23, which prohibits forced labor and “begar”.[23] In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, the Court held that forced labor occurs whenever extreme economic desperation forces an individual to provide labor for less than a minimum wage.[24] Gig workers possess zero bargaining power and must sign rigid, take-it-or-leave-it digital agreements. By exploiting this economic vulnerability and refusing to pay a minimum wage floor for active screen time, the aggregator model fosters conditions that border directly on forced labor under Article 23.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The recent legal developments—shaped by the Central Rules implementation and Karnataka’s statutory breakthrough—prove that India’s binary employment framework is completely obsolete. Leaving gig workers caught between an inadequate central welfare model and absolute corporate control violates their fundamental constitutional rights.
True empowerment requires the Indian government to transition from defensive welfare handouts to a comprehensive co-regulatory framework. Moving forward, labor laws must focus on three mandatory pillars:
Formally recognizing a “dependent contractor” status to bridge the gap between employee and freelancer.
Mandating a statutory minimum wage floor for all active screen time, ensuring workers are paid for their availability.
Enforcing absolute algorithmic transparency and banning human less, automated deactivations.
Only by legally regulating the algorithm can the state ensure that technological innovation does not destroy human and constitutional dignity.
References
[1] The Code on Social Security, 2020, § 2(35), § 2(61), No. 36, Acts of Parliament, 2020 (India).
[2] Id. at § 114(4), read with Schedule VII.
[3] NITI Aayog, India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy: Perspectives and Recommendations on the Future of Work, Policy Report, Government of India, 42-45 (June 2022).
[4] The Code on Social Security, 2020, § 2(26), No. 36, Acts of Parliament, 2020 (India) (defining an “employee” through a standard contract of service, which textually isolates platform workers).
[5] Press Information Bureau (PIB), Towards Universal and Inclusive Social Protection: Status of National Registration & Unique Identification on e-Shram Portal, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India (Factsheet, 2023).
[6] Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, Directive on Mandatory Onboarding of Online Aggregators and API Integration on the e-Shram Portal, Circular File No. W-11015/15/2024-RW (2024-2026 mandates).
[7] L. Nambiar & A. Roy, A Study on Social Security Benefits for Gig Workers under the New Indian Labour Laws, 14(2) J. Emp. Legal Stud. 112, 118 (2026).
Bibliography
A. Primary Sources: Domestic Statutes & Rules
The Code on Social Security, 2020, No. 36, Acts of Parliament, 2020 (India).
The Code on Social Security (Central) Rules, 2025, Notification No. S.O. 5422(E), Ministry of Labour and Employment, Government of India.
The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, No. 14, Acts of Parliament, 1947 (India).
The Karnataka Platform-Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025, LA Bill No. 31, Acts of Karnataka State Legislature, 2025 (India).
The Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023, No. 30, Acts of Rajasthan State Legislature, 2023 (India).
B. Government Reports
Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India, Directive on Mandatory Onboarding of Online Aggregators and API Integration on the e-Shram Portal, Circular File No. W-11015/15/2024-RW.
NITI Aayog, India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy: Perspectives and Recommendations on the Future of Work, Policy Report, Government of India (June 2022).
