COMMERCIAL SURROGACY BAN: PROTECTION OR PATERNALISM

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  

The prohibition of commercial surrogacy in India through the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 marks a major transformation in India’s reproductive rights framework. India was once regarded as the global centre for commercial surrogacy because of inexpensive fertility services and the availability of economically vulnerable women willing to act as surrogate mothers. However, concerns regarding exploitation, trafficking, unethical medical practices, and commodification of women’s bodies eventually led to legislative intervention.

The enactment of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 prohibited commercial surrogacy and allowed only altruistic arrangements where surrogate mothers receive no compensation except medical expenses and insurance coverage. The State justified the prohibition as a measure necessary to protect vulnerable women from exploitation. However, critics argue that the legislation reflects excessive State paternalism because it denies women the autonomy to make decisions concerning their reproductive labour.

This article critically examines whether the commercial surrogacy ban genuinely protects women or whether it imposes patriarchal control under the guise of welfare. The paper analyses constitutional principles under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution, feminist theories concerning reproductive labour, and important judicial precedents including Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. The article argues that while exploitation concerns are legitimate, an outright prohibition may not be constitutionally proportionate. A regulated commercial framework with strong safeguards could better balance autonomy, dignity, and protection.

Keywords: Commercial Surrogacy, Reproductive Rights, Feminist Jurisprudence, Bodily Autonomy, Constitutional Morality, Exploitation, Paternalism

II. INTRODUCTION

The evolution of assisted reproductive technologies has fundamentally transformed the understanding of family, parenthood, and reproductive rights in contemporary society. Among these technologies, surrogacy has emerged as one of the most controversial legal and ethical issues across jurisdictions. Surrogacy enables an intended parent or couple to have a child through another woman who carries the pregnancy on their behalf[1]. While the practice has provided hope to infertile couples and individuals unable to conceive naturally, it has simultaneously generated debates concerning exploitation, commodification, consent, and reproductive autonomy.

The enactment of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 marked a decisive policy shift. The legislation prohibits commercial surrogacy entirely and permits only altruistic surrogacy under stringent conditions. The law was presented as a welfare-oriented measure intended to protect women from exploitation and preserve the dignity of motherhood[2].

This article seeks to critically examine whether the commercial surrogacy ban constitutes a genuine protective measure or whether it reflects unconstitutional paternalism inconsistent with modern constitutional values of dignity, privacy, equality, and autonomy[3].

III. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To analyse the legal framework governing surrogacy in India.
2. To examine the constitutional validity of banning commercial surrogacy.
3. To study whether the prohibition protects women or restricts reproductive autonomy.
4. To critically evaluate feminist perspectives on reproductive labour.
5. To analyse important judicial precedents concerning surrogacy and reproductive rights.
6. To suggest reforms for a balanced surrogacy framework.

IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Whether the prohibition of commercial surrogacy violates reproductive autonomy under Article 21?
2. Whether the ban is a legitimate protective measure or an instance of State paternalism?
3. Whether altruistic surrogacy effectively addresses exploitation concerns?
4. Whether regulation would be more effective than prohibition?

V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This article adopts a doctrinal and analytical approach. The study relies upon primary sources including statutes, constitutional provisions, parliamentary debates, judicial decisions, and Law Commission reports. Secondary sources include journal articles, feminist scholarship, commentaries, and academic literature relating to reproductive rights and constitutional law.

VI. EVOLUTION OF SURROGACY LAW IN INDIA

India became a major centre for international surrogacy after commercial surrogacy was effectively legalized in 2002[4]. The absence of comprehensive regulation enabled fertility clinics to operate with minimal oversight.

Commercial surrogacy was often defended on the ground that it created economic opportunities for poor women while helping infertile couples achieve parenthood[5]. However, reports gradually exposed exploitative practices including:

• coercive contractual conditions;
• lack of informed consent;
• confinement of surrogate mothers;
• inadequate healthcare facilities;
• abandonment of children;
• trafficking concerns.

The Indian government eventually introduced legislative proposals aimed at regulating the industry[6]. After several drafts and parliamentary debates, the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 was enacted.

VII. THE SURROGACY (REGULATION) ACT, 2021

The Act prohibits commercial surrogacy while permitting altruistic surrogacy subject to statutory conditions.

A. Objectives of the Act

The legislation seeks:

• to prohibit commercialization of surrogacy;
• to prevent exploitation of surrogate mothers;
• to regulate fertility clinics;
• to prevent unethical practices;
• to protect children born through surrogacy.

B. Ban on Commercial Surrogacy and Women’s Economic Rights

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 prohibits commercial surrogacy in India to safeguard women against exploitation. While the law addresses genuine concerns regarding unethical practices, it undermines women’s autonomy by presuming that all compensated surrogacy is inherently exploitative[7]. This approach overlooks the reality that many women may choose surrogacy as a legitimate means of livelihood. By removing this option, the law risks perpetuating economic dependence and reinforcing patriarchal[8] control over women’s bodies and decisions. Thus, although the intention is protective, the outcome may disempower women. A more nuanced approach is needed that respects women’s agency and economic rights.

C. Reproductive Autonomy and the Right to Choose

The ban on commercial surrogacy represents excessive State intrusion into personal reproductive decisions. It undermines women’s reproductive autonomy by prohibiting payment and imposing moral authority over their choices[9]. This autonomy is intrinsically linked to the right to privacy and dignity under Article 2[10]1 of the Constitution, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, which recognized privacy as including personal decision-making. Restricting commercial surrogacy not only limits women’s economic opportunities but also infringes upon constitutional freedoms. A balanced regulatory framework is therefore essential to prevent exploitation while preserving women’s liberty to make informed choices.

D. Economic Empowerment and Feminist Critique of State Control

From a feminist perspective, the ban on commercial surrogacy may harm women’s economic opportunities rather than protect them. Economically disadvantaged women often relied on surrogacy as a source of significant income to support education, marriages[11], or debt repayment. Many exercised agency by negotiating terms and improving their circumstances, rather than remaining passive victims. The law, however, treats all compensated surrogacy as exploitative and promotes unpaid altruistic[12] arrangements, thereby imposing moral judgments on women’s choices. This reflects economic paternalism that undermines women’s capacity for informed decision-making and devalues their reproductive labour.

E. Altruistic Surrogacy and Moral Control

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 promotes an altruistic model of surrogacy, restricting surrogates to close relatives and allowing only medical expenses and insurance coverage. Presented as an unpaid “gift” rooted in family and emotional bonds, the model aims to eliminate the exploitation associated with commercial surrogacy. However, it reinforces traditional ideologies of motherhood and familial obligation, potentially pressuring women[13] to participate out of duty rather than free will. By denying compensation, the Act disregards the substantial physical and emotional costs of surrogacy. This approach conflicts with CEDAW Article 11, which recognizes reproductive labour as work deserving economic recognition and protection[14].

F. Familial Obligation and the Illusion of Consent

The assumption that family ties automatically ensure genuine consent in altruistic surrogacy is flawed. Limiting surrogates to close relatives can generate coercion within patriarchal family structures, making participation feel obligatory rather than voluntary. This undermines informed consent, which is central to reproductive rights and personal liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) held that a woman’s[15] autonomy over her body is fundamental. Independent counselling mechanisms could strengthen safeguards and ensure consent remains free from familial or societal pressure.

G. Ethical and Social Narratives Surrounding Altruistic Surrogacy

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 seeks to prevent exploitation by permitting only altruistic surrogacy. However, its restrictive provisions have revealed several limitations. The Act limits surrogacy primarily to heterosexual married couples, excluding LGBTQ+ persons, single individuals, widows, and divorcees in many cases. It also requires surrogates to be married women who already have at least one child. These conditions reflect conventional family norms and raise concerns about autonomy and exclusion. Judicial interventions in 2025, including Supreme Court rulings on age restrictions and frozen embryos, have highlighted the link between reproductive choice and Article 21 rights. Feminist scholars argue that altruism can mask coercion in patriarchal settings, while the law’s heteronormative bias raises equality concerns under Article 14.

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The constitutional validity of the commercial surrogacy ban must be examined under Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution[16].

A. Article 21 and Reproductive Autonomy

Article 21 guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. Judicial interpretation has expanded its scope to include dignity, privacy, bodily integrity, and reproductive choice[17].

In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, the Supreme Court recognized reproductive autonomy as a dimension of personal liberty under Article 21. The Court observed that a woman’s right to make reproductive choices is an aspect of personal liberty, dignity, and bodily integrity[18].

Similarly, in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, the Supreme Court recognized privacy as a constitutionally protected fundamental right encompassing decisional autonomy and intimate personal choices.

The commercial surrogacy ban raises important constitutional concerns because it interferes with:

• bodily autonomy
• decisional privacy
• reproductive choice
• economic agency.

The legislation assumes that women cannot voluntarily engage in compensated reproductive labour without being exploited. Such an assumption may undermine the constitutional value of autonomy recognized under Article 21.

B. Article 14: Equality and Non-Arbitrariness

Article 14 prohibits arbitrary classification and guarantees equality before law.

The earlier legislative framework excluded:

• LGBTQ+ persons
• single individuals
• unmarried couples
• foreign nationals.

The Supreme Court in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India emphasized dignity, equality, and sexual autonomy. Excluding LGBTQ+ individuals from surrogacy rights may therefore raise constitutional concerns[19].

C. Article 19(1)(g): Right to Occupation

Commercial surrogacy may also be viewed as a form of labour involving reproductive services. By prohibiting compensation, the State restricts women from engaging in a particular form of economic activity.

While reasonable restrictions are permissible under Article 19(6)[20], a complete prohibition may fail the test of proportionality if regulation could achieve the same objective with lesser

IX. THE IMPACT OF THE BAN ON WOMEN

The prohibition has significantly affected economically marginalised women who relied on surrogacy as a source of income[21]. For many, it provided funds for buying homes, educating children, achieving financial independence, or clearing debts. The ban removed this avenue without offering viable alternatives.

Consequently, the legislation may symbolically protect women while practically disempowering them. It has also pushed some arrangements underground, where women face greater risks due to the absence of legal protections and medical safeguards[22]. The ban may thus worsen the very exploitation it sought to eliminate.

X. LGBTQ+ RIGHTS AND SURROGACY

The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 has been criticised for its exclusionary approach towards LGBTQ+ individuals and non-traditional families. By limiting surrogacy primarily to heterosexual married couples, the law reinforces a narrow view of family and parenthood[23].

In Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, the Supreme Court emphasised that constitutional morality demands protection of dignity and autonomy irrespective of sexual orientation. Excluding LGBTQ+[24] persons from surrogacy rights potentially violates Articles 14, 15, and 21. Modern constitutional jurisprudence views the family as a dynamic institution. Restricting surrogacy to traditional heterosexual marriages appears inconsistent with transformative constitutionalism.

XI. TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE

Transformative constitutionalism requires the Constitution to be interpreted in a manner that dismantles structures of inequality and promotes substantive freedom[25]. Reproductive justice goes beyond mere choice and includes access to healthcare, freedom from coercion, socio-economic equality, and dignity in reproductive decision-making.

A transformative approach to surrogacy demands respect for women’s agency, strong safeguards against coercion, and protection from exploitation without criminalising their choices[26].

XII. JUDICIAL APPROACH TO SURROGACY IN INDIA

The Indian judiciary has played a significant role in addressing issues relating to surrogacy and protecting the interests of surrogate mothers and children. In 2002, the Government of India permitted commercial surrogacy, which soon transformed the country into a global “surrogacy hub,” often described as the “womb on rent[27].”

A. Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (2008)

The most landmark judgment on surrogacy in India is Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India. The case arose in Anand, Gujarat. A Japanese couple, Dr. Ikufumi Yamada and his wife, entered into a surrogacy arrangement with an Indian surrogate mother. However, the couple separated before the birth of the child[28]. The wife returned to Japan, and the husband’s visa expired. On 25 July 2008, a baby girl named Manji was born. The surrogate mother refused to accept the child, while the biological father wished to take custody. The child was cared for by her paternal grandmother.

B. Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009)

In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, the Supreme Court held that a woman’s right to reproductive choice is an integral part of her personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution[29]. The Court emphasised that decisions concerning a woman’s body must respect her autonomy, dignity, and privacy.

Critics rely on this judgment to argue that the complete ban on commercial surrogacy infringes upon women’s reproductive autonomy. Since the right to personal liberty includes the freedom to decide how to use one’s body, prohibiting monetary compensation for surrogacy may amount to an unjustified restriction[30]. The judgment underscores that any regulation must balance protection from exploitation with respect for women’s informed choices[31].

C. Jan Balaz v. Union of India

In Jan Balaz v. Union of India, a German couple faced severe legal complications after twins were born through surrogacy in Gujarat[32]. Germany did not recognise surrogacy, while Indian law created confusion regarding citizenship and parentage. The children remained stateless for nearly two years[33]. The case highlighted the conflicts arising in international surrogacy arrangements and the urgent need for clear legal provisions on parental rights, citizenship, and child welfare[34]. The Court stressed that the welfare of the child must be the paramount consideration.

D. Siddaraju & Anr. v. Union of India & Others (Karnataka High Court)

In this case, the Karnataka High Court evolved the “triple test theory” to grant permission for surrogacy where the intending father exceeded the prescribed age limit under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021[35]. The Court applied genetic, physical, and economic tests while considering the couple’s special circumstances. It also questioned the logic of requiring a genetic link in altruistic surrogacy and urged legislative amendments. However, the Court refrained from striking down the provisions as the constitutional validity[36] of the Act was pending before the Supreme Court.

XIII. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMERCIAL SURROGACY BAN

The prohibition of commercial surrogacy under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 reflects the Indian State’s attempt to address exploitation, trafficking[37], and unethical practices in the surrogacy industry. However, the legislation raises serious constitutional and feminist concerns regarding bodily autonomy, reproductive liberty, and State paternalism[38].

The legislation also fails to recognise reproductive labour as labour. Pregnancy involves substantial physical pain, emotional stress, health risks, and long-term bodily consequences. Denying compensation while expecting women to bear these burdens under an altruistic model appears inconsistent with constitutional values of dignity and equality. The law romanticises motherhood by keeping reproductive labour outside economic recognition.

The legislation also reflects a moralistic and heteronormative understanding of family. By excluding LGBTQ+ individuals, unmarried persons, and live-in couples in its earlier framework, it reinforces a narrow conception of parenthood. Such exclusions appear inconsistent with constitutional morality as recognised in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India[39].

Thus, while the legislative objective is valid, the means adopted by the State remain deeply problematic. The prohibition appears to prioritise moral paternalism over reproductive autonomy and constitutional liberty[40].

XIV. CRITICISMS OF THE SURROGACY (REGULATION) ACT, 2021

1. Excessive State Paternalism The Act adopts a paternalistic approach by assuming that women cannot independently decide whether to engage in compensated reproductive labour. This undermines bodily autonomy and infantilises women by treating them as incapable of informed consent[41].
2. Denial of Reproductive Autonomy The prohibition interferes with decisional autonomy protected under Article 21. In Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, the Supreme Court recognised reproductive choice as part of personal liberty. By criminalising compensated[42] surrogacy, the State restricts women’s freedom to make decisions about their reproductive capacities.
3. Failure to Recognise Reproductive Labour Pregnancy involves physical, emotional, and economic sacrifice. Denying compensation devalues reproductive labour and reinforces patriarchal expectations that motherhood must remain self-sacrificial and unpaid[43].
4. Unrealistic Dependence on Altruism The altruistic model assumes women will willingly undergo pregnancy without compensation. In reality, surrogacy involves medical risks, emotional burden, social stigma, and loss of employment opportunities. Expecting women to bear these burdens purely for altruistic reasons is unrealistic[44].
5. Possibility of Underground Surrogacy Markets Complete prohibition may push surrogacy underground. Illegal markets are more likely to expose women to trafficking, coercion, unsafe medical conditions, and contractual abuse[45]. The ban may therefore worsen the exploitation it sought to eliminate.
6. Exclusionary and Heteronormative Framework The legislation privileges heterosexual married couples while excluding diverse family structures[46]. Such exclusions appear inconsistent with constitutional morality and equality jurisprudence developed in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India and Joseph Shine v. Union of India[47].

XV. CONCLUSION

The prohibition of commercial surrogacy under the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 represents a major shift in India’s reproductive rights jurisprudence. The legislation was enacted with the objective of preventing exploitation, trafficking, and commercialization of women’s reproductive capacities. Given the absence of regulation in the earlier surrogacy industry, the State’s concern regarding unethical practices and the abuse of economically vulnerable women cannot be ignored. Commercial surrogacy in India had often developed into a profit-driven industry where surrogate mothers faced unequal bargaining power, medical exploitation, and inadequate legal protection. However, despite these legitimate concerns, the complete prohibition of compensated surrogacy raises significant constitutional and feminist issues. The legislation assumes that women participating in commercial surrogacy are incapable of exercising informed consent due to economic vulnerability. Such reasoning reflects a paternalistic understanding of women’s autonomy and undermines the constitutional principles of dignity, privacy, and decisional freedom recognised under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The constitutional challenge lies in balancing protection against exploitation with respect for reproductive autonomy. A democratic constitutional framework must empower women rather than deny them agency under the guise of protection. The State has a constitutional obligation to prevent coercion and abuse, but it must do so without completely eliminating women’s reproductive choices. While the objective of the legislation is constitutionally legitimate, the method adopted by the State appears excessively restrictive and paternalistic. A regulated commercial surrogacy framework with strict safeguards would better reconcile dignity, autonomy, equality, and reproductive justice.

XVI. REFERENCES

A. TABLE OF CASES

1. Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (2008) 13 SCC 518.
2. H. Siddaraju v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 1123.
3. Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality AIR 2010 Guj 21.
4. Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39.
5. Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.
6. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597.
7. Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353.
8. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.
9. Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1.
10. Supriyo v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1348.

B. TABLE OF STATUTES

1. Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act, 2021.
2. Constitution of India 1950.
3. Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021.
4. Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985.

C. BOOKS

1. Gautam Bhatia, Transformative Constitutionalism (HarperCollins 2019).
2. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford University Press 1986).
3. Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero (PM Press 2012).
4. Nivedita Menon, Seeing Like a Feminist (Zubaan 2012).
5. Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge University Press 2000).
6. Amrita Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press 2014).

D. JOURNAL ARTICLES

1. Karl Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146.
2. Amrita Pande, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect Mother-Worker’ (2010) 35 Signs Journal of Women in Culture and Society 969.
3. Sama Resource Group for Women and Health, ‘Constructing Conceptions: The Mapping of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in India’ (2012).

E. REPORTS

1. Law Commission of India, Need for Legislation to Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics as well as Rights and Obligations of Parties to a Surrogacy (228th Report, 2009).
2. United Nations Human Rights Council, Report on Women’s Reproductive Rights and Bodily Autonomy (2021).

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979.

[1] Amrita Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press 2014) 39.

[2] Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (2008) 13 SCC 518.

[3] Law Commission of India, Need for Legislation to Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics as well as Rights and Obligations of Parties to a Surrogacy (Law Com No 228, 2009) 51.

[4] Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (2008) 13 SCC 518.

[5] Law Commission of India (n 3) 62.

[6] Amrita Pande, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect Mother-Worker’ (2010) 35 Signs 969.

[7] Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge University Press 2000) 115

[8] Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero (PM Press 2012) 17.

[9] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

[10] Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[11] Amrita Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press 2014) 74.

[12] Nivedita Menon, Seeing Like a Feminist (Zubaan 2012) 84.

[13] Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art 11.

[14] Margaret Radin, Market-Inalienability (Harvard University Press 1987) 189.

[15] Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[16] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597.

[17] Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[18] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1.

[19] Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39.

[20] Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 7 SCC 353.

[21] Amrita Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press 2014) 102.

[22] Nivedita Menon, Seeing Like a Feminist (Zubaan 2012) 97.

[23] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.

[24] Supriyo v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1348.

[25] Karl Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 146.

[26] Gautam Bhatia, Transformative Constitutionalism (HarperCollins 2019) 214.

[27] Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India (2008) 13 SCC 518.

[28] Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality AIR 2010 Guj 21.

[29] Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[30] Gautam Bhatia, Transformative Constitutionalism (HarperCollins 2019) 201.

[31] Vrinda Narain, ‘Reproductive Autonomy and Constitutionalism in India’ (2020) 12 NUJS Law Review 88.

[32] Jan Balaz v. Anand Municipality AIR 2010 Guj 21.

[33] Anil Malhotra and Ranjit Malhotra, The Law and Practice of Surrogacy in India (Universal Law Publishing 2016) 91.

[34] Law Commission of India, Need for Legislation to Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics as well as Rights and Obligations of Parties to a Surrogacy (Law Com No 228, 2009) 71.

[35] H. Siddaraju v. Union of India 2023 SCC OnLine Kar 1123.

[36] Aparna Chandra and Mrinal Satish, ‘Testing the Constitutionality of Restrictions on Personal Liberty’ (2017) 9 Indian Journal of Constitutional Law 5

 [39] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.

[40] Joel Feinberg, Harm to Self (Oxford University Press 1986) 15.

[42] Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero (PM Press 2012) 29.

[43] Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009) 9 SCC 1.

[44] Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (Cambridge University Press 2000) 119.

[45] Amrita Pande, Wombs in Labor: Transnational Commercial Surrogacy in India (Columbia University Press 2014) 119.

[46] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1.

[47] Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2019) 3 SCC 39.