Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors.

Published On: December 30th 2025

Authored By: Apurva Sharma

Bhartiya Vidyapeeth deemed to be University, New Delhi

Introduction

The Shah Bano case (1985) is one of the most significant constitutional and family law judgments in India, remembered for its bold interpretation of secular maintenance laws and its impact on the debate over the Uniform Civil Code (UCC). Decided by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, the case highlighted the conflict between secular statutory provisions under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and Muslim personal law, particularly in matters of maintenance after divorce.

At its core, the case dealt with whether a divorced Muslim woman, who had not remarried and could not support herself, was entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband beyond the iddat period under Section 125 CrPC. The judgment did not merely resolve a dispute between two individuals but opened a wider debate on women’s rights, religion-based personal laws, and the role of the judiciary in upholding constitutional principles in the face of religious sensitivities.

Case Title: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors.
Citation: AIR 1985 SC 945; 1985 (2) SCC 556; 1985 SCR (3) 844
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: The judgment was delivered by a five-judge constitutional bench consisting of Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and Justices Rangnath Misra, D.A. Desai, O. Chinnappa Reddy, and E.S. Venkataramiah.
Date of Judgment: April 23, 1985
Statutory Provisions Involved:

Section 125, CrPC (1973): Provides maintenance to wives (including divorced wives), minor children, and dependent parents if they are unable to maintain themselves.
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: Governs personal law issues for Muslims, including marriage, divorce, and maintenance.
Article 44, Constitution of India: A Directive Principle urging the State to secure a Uniform Civil Code for all citizens.

Factual Background

The dispute originated in a long-standing marriage. Shah Bano married Mohd. Ahmed Khan, a wealthy lawyer from Indore, in 1932. The marriage lasted for over four decades and produced five children. However, in 1978, at the age of 62, Shah Bano was driven out of her matrimonial home by her husband, leaving her without financial support.

Faced with destitution, she approached the local court under Section 125 CrPC, seeking a maintenance allowance of ₹500 per month. While her petition was pending, Khan sought to evade liability by pronouncing an irrevocable triple talaq in November 1978. His defense was that under Muslim personal law, his responsibility was limited to providing maintenance during the iddat period (a period of approximately three months post-divorce), and he had already discharged this obligation by paying a sum of ₹3,000 as mehr along with maintenance for the iddat duration.

The trial court awarded Shah Bano a nominal amount of ₹25 per month. On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court increased the sum to ₹179.20 per month. Dissatisfied, Khan approached the Supreme Court, contending that Section 125 CrPC could not override the Muslim Personal Law applicable to him.

Issues Before the Court

Does Section 125 of the CrPC apply to Muslim women, particularly those who are divorced?
Can there be a conflict between Section 125 CrPC and Muslim personal law on the question of maintenance?
Is the payment of mehr sufficient to discharge a Muslim husband’s liability to maintain his divorced wife?
Does a divorced Muslim woman fall within the definition of “wife” under Section 125 CrPC?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Mohd. Ahmed Khan)

Maintenance obligations were governed by Muslim personal law, which restricted liability to the iddat period.
By paying mehr and maintenance for the iddat duration, he had discharged all legal duties.
Section 125 CrPC should not apply where personal law provides otherwise, as it would interfere with religious freedom.

Respondent (Shah Bano Begum)

Section 125 CrPC is a secular, religion-neutral provision intended to prevent destitution. It applies universally, irrespective of personal law.
Mehr is not equivalent to maintenance; it is a customary payment at marriage as a token of respect and cannot substitute for a divorced woman’s right to sustenance.
Since she was old, divorced, and incapable of supporting herself, the protection under Section 125 CrPC was directly applicable to her.

Judgment of the Court

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, dismissed Khan’s appeal and upheld the High Court’s order of maintenance. The ruling was remarkable for several reasons:

Universality of Section 125 CrPC:
The Court held that Section 125 is secular in nature and applicable to all citizens, regardless of religion. Its object is to prevent vagrancy and poverty by ensuring that those with sufficient means do not neglect their dependents.
CrPC Prevails Over Personal Law:
In cases of conflict between personal law and Section 125, the secular law prevails. The Court emphasized that personal law cannot override statutory provisions enacted in the interest of public welfare.
Maintenance Beyond Iddat Period:
A divorced Muslim woman unable to maintain herself can claim maintenance even after the iddat period. The obligation continues until she remarries or becomes financially self-sufficient.
Mehr Not Equivalent to Maintenance:
The Court clarified that mehr is a mark of respect and part of the marriage contract. It cannot be equated with maintenance nor treated as a final settlement for the wife’s sustenance after divorce.

Ratio Decidendi

The Court interpreted the word “wife” under Section 125 CrPC to include a divorced woman who has not remarried. This interpretation ensured that the provision met its primary objective—preventing destitution. Thus, maintenance is not just a matter of personal obligation but a social responsibility, which transcends the boundaries of personal laws.

Obiter Dicta

Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, in an influential remark, lamented the non-implementation of Article 44 (Uniform Civil Code), calling it a “dead letter.” He stressed that a UCC would promote national integration and eliminate conflicting personal laws that foster separate identities among communities.

This observation, though not binding, ignited a wider debate on the necessity of a common code governing marriage, divorce, and maintenance across religions.

Impact and Aftermath of the Judgment

The Shah Bano judgment was hailed by women’s rights activists and progressive groups as a milestone in securing gender justice. It recognized divorced Muslim women’s right to maintenance under a secular law, thereby strengthening their social and financial security.

However, the decision also triggered strong opposition from orthodox Muslim groups, who viewed it as an interference with Sharia-based personal laws. The political backlash eventually led to the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which sought to dilute the impact of the judgment by limiting the husband’s liability primarily to the iddat period, with further provisions for maintenance by relatives or the Waqf Board.

This legislative response sparked another round of controversy, with critics arguing that the Act curtailed Muslim women’s rights and undermined the principle of equality before law under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Critical Analysis

The Shah Bano case demonstrates the delicate balance between individual rights, gender justice, and religious freedoms. Several critical aspects emerge:

Progressive Interpretation of Law:
By interpreting “wife” to include divorced women under Section 125, the Court ensured that the law fulfilled its welfare objective rather than being constrained by religious limitations.
Gender Justice:
The judgment recognized the vulnerability of divorced women, particularly elderly women like Shah Bano, and secured them from being left destitute by their former husbands.
Constitutional Morality vs. Religious Sentiments:
While the Court upheld secular statutory law, the political response in the form of the 1986 Act reflected a compromise with religious orthodoxy. This revealed the tension between constitutional values and identity politics.
Uniform Civil Code Debate:
The obiter on UCC remains one of the most cited judicial remarks in debates around personal law reforms. It underscored the need for a uniform framework to ensure equality, though such a reform continues to face resistance even today.