Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs Shah Bano Begum & Ors.

Introduction:

The supreme court in this revolutionary case dealt with the issue of maintenance to be given to be aggrieved divorced Muslim women by her husband after the divorced. The Supreme Court referred to the holy Quran as the authoritative text with a great emphasis on the friction between section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure Code and Muslim protection law. While the appeal of the husband to not provide maintenance was denied, the same received substantial resistance and was claimed to be against the Islamic law. The then Government declared the law to only be valid in the Iddat period. The case was later upheld by the apex court in further decisions.

• Title: Mohd. Ahmed Khan Vs Shah Bano Begum and Ors.
• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Citation: 1985 AIR 945
• Bench: YV Chandrachud (CJ) Justice Misra Rangnath Justice D.A Desai Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy Justice E.S Venkataramiah.
• Date of Judgement: 23 April, 1985

Brief Facts:

 This is one of the landmark cases of the Indian Judicial system which bought about reforms in the country. This case ensured the protection of the rights of women. The application filed by a woman against her husband. The woman had been married in the year 1932 and had three sons and two daughters. In the year 1975, the appellant threw his wife out of his house without any valid reason. The appellant then filed a petition under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to claim for maintenance. According to that section, the rate of maintenance that could be awarded to a woman was fixed at Rs. 500 per month. 

Later on, on 6th November 1979, the appellant divorced his wife through the mode of an irrevocable talaq (triple talaq). After the divorce, the appellant contented that section 125 would automatically be revoked after divorce, thus the husband would not be entitled to pay any sum of money to his wife. He also held that he had paid his wife an amount of Rs. 200 per month for almost two years and also deposited a sum of Rs.3000 in the court as an amount of dower Mehr which she was entitled to receive during the iddat period.

The learned Magistrate upon receiving an application directed the appellant to pay a sum of Rs. 25 per month as a maintenance to his wife. A review petition was filed before the High Court by the respondent and increased the amount of maintenance to Rs.179.20 per month.

This judgement by the courts raised a lot of questions among the people and also led to a lot of controversy in the Muslim community.

Issues Raised: 

The main issues that were raised before the courts in this case were

• Does a divorced woman have the right to maintenance even after the iddat period?
• Would section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to a Muslim woman?
• Which would prevail CrPC or the or the personal laws?

Cases Referred: 

• Fazlunbi vs K. Khader Vali, AIR 1980 SC1730
• Bai Tahira vs Ali Hussain Fidaali Chothia AIR 1979 SC 362
• Nanak Chand vs Chandra Kishore Agarwala, AIR 1970 SC446
• Jagir khan vs J aswant Singh, AIR 1963SC1521
• Hamira Bibi vs Zubaide Bibi, AIR 1916PC 46
• Syed Sabir vs Farzand Hasan, AIR 1983 PC80

Interpretation by Courts:

The intention of the legislature: the courts had a job of interpreting various terms in this case, to be able to provide justice fairly and most reasonably. The term first term which was interpreted by the courts, in this case, was ‘wife” which was included under section 125 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. the question raised here was whether the term whether the term wife would include Muslim women also and if it does is it also applicable to a divorced woman. The courts interpreted this term and held that the term “wife” given under section 125 (1) [ (explanation b)] is very clear and unambiguous. There is no clause or term which would limit the usages of ‘wife’ to just a few categories of people or would not include certain classes of people. The term is very clear and thus through interpretation, it can be understood that the legislature intended to include divorced Muslim woman as well in the gambit of the term ‘wife’. But it would be limited only to those divorced women who are divorced and have not remarried yet.

Internal aid: – 

Proviso: section 125 (3) also through its proviso clarifies that the wife can also refuse to live with her husband if she has justifiable grounds to do so. And one such reason would be the multiple marriages by the husband. A wife could deny living with her husband if he has another wife or keeps a concubine in the house. Thus, through the interpretation of this section and the aid of the proviso added it can be clearly understood that section 125 of the CRPC would override the personal laws in case of any conflicts between them.

The intention of legislature: 

The courts also tried to interpret the meaning of the word ‘Mehr’. According to Muslim law, a Mehr can be of two types.

1. Prompt and 
2. Deterred 

A prompt Mehr is received immediately after marriage but a deterred Mehr is paid by the husband after the divorced or after the husband’s death. Thus, according to this case, when the appellant contended that he had paid the amount of Mehr to his wife and treated this amount as an amount of maintenance that would be given during divorce, the courts tried to interpret the meaning of the term and understand the intention of legislation in these aspects. The courts held that the Mehr is an amount is paid to the women as a mark of respect anytime during or after marriage. But paying the same amount after divorce and treating it in the same manner as Mehr, is opposite to its meaning. A divorce is detrimental to the concept of Mehr. As an amount payable as a mark of respect can’t be the same as given during divorce. Thus section 127 (3) (b) does not include the amount payable as ‘Mehr’ as it is an amount that is paid as a customary discharge and is within the cognizance of the provision of law. 

External aid-

Parliamentary history:  Parliament history was also relied upon to see why the Muslim personal laws were left untouched. In the words of Shri Ram Niwas Mirdha, the term Minister of Home Affairs, ‘he held that that Muslim woman, unlike other women should be treated with equality and must be entitled to receive what is justly theirs. But this change should come from the Muslim community directly. Making a change to the Criminal Procedure Code would be like interfering with the personal laws which would create unnecessary tension in the country. Through the laws under section 125, the legislation has tried to protect the rights of a Muslim women, but they have also given a limitation to this right, using section 127, to maintain a healthy compromise between the personal laws and the code.

Judgment:

After considering various facts and circumstances of the case, the honor Supreme Court has come to the view that the judgment provided by the High Co concerning the amount of maintenance is right and justified, thus it must implement and acted upon. The court also ordered the appellant to pay the cos appeals that the respondent has incurred. The total costs incurred sum up to Rs. 10,000. The court also added on stating that the respondent would be allowed to seek an increase in maintenance under section 127(1) of the CrPC. A Muslim husband according to laws had the privilege to pay his wife any sum of money during the iddat period and the amount paid by him (no matter how little), would relieve him from his duties to maintain his divorced wife. The courts went ahead and tried to give a clear explanation of the various clauses included in this case.

They held that the provisions of sections 125(1)(a) and 125(1)(b) are clear and unambiguous. Where section 125(1)(a) limits the maximum amount of maintenance to Rs. 500 to be awarded in a situation where the wife is unable to maintain herself. Section 125(1)(b) clarifies the definition of the term ‘wife’ and the courts interpret it, stating that this term would include all divorced women no matter what religion they or their spouses follow. Thus, it was held that section 125 of the CrPC was truly secular.

While analyzing the concept of maintenance and the rights of women, the courts also went ahead and looked upon the provisions of section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. According to that section, a woman is entitled to maintenance only till the time she is married, thus this was one such provision that a husband could use for his privilege and divorce his wife whenever needed, to escape from paying maintenance. To correct this mischief, the Joint Committee recommended that this law be amended and interpreted to include divorced women as well, so long as they have not remarried. Due to this mischief, the explanation of the term ‘wife’ was included under section 125.

The overriding effect of section 125 over the personal laws was also clarified, stating that section 125 allows a wife to deny living with her husband if he has more than one wife, and according to Muslim law a Mahommedan can have up to four wives. Thus, this contention was rejected and the woman was given the right to refuse to live wither husband in case of 2 marriage only. This explanation by the courts and the legislation clarified that the code would override the personal laws.

The supporters of the husband also intervened stating that the Muslim Personal Laws relieved the husband to pay maintenance to a woman after the iddat period. According to various books, it was clarified that a Muslim male is not entitled to pay maintenance to a wife whom he has already divorced. He is under no obligation to do so.

Thus, after a lot of analyzing and understanding the honorable judge of the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the appeal.