Case Summary: Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India

• Case Title: Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India
• Citation: AIR 2015 SC 1523, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012
• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Bench: A Division Bench of Justice Jasti Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman
• Date of Judgment: March 24, 2015
• Key Provisions: The Constitution of India: Article 19(1)(a) (Freedom of Speech and Expression), Article 19(2) (Reasonable Restrictions), Article 14 (Right to Equality) Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000: Section 66A (Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication device etc), Section 69A (Procedure of blocking access of information for public), and Section 79 (Exemption from liability of intermediary).

Brief Facts:

1. The case primarily challenged the constitutional validity of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
2. The controversy and subsequent Public Interest Litigation (PIL) were triggered by the arrest of two young women, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan in Mumbai in 2012 under Section 66A of IT Act, 2000. The women had posted and “liked” comments on Facebook questioning the propriety of a bandh (city-wide shutdown) following the death of political leader, Bal Thackeray. The arrests led to widespread public outrage over the misuse of the law to curb online dissent.
3. Section 66A made it a punishable offence to send, using a computer or communication device, any information that was considered “grossly offensive” or of a “menacing character,” or any false information for the purpose of “causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult,” etc. The offence was punishable with imprisonment upto 3 years and a fine.
4. Shreya Singhal, a law student, along with other individuals and organizations, filed a series of writ petitions before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, arguing that Section 66A violated the fundamental right to Freedom of Speech and Expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.
5. The petitions also challenged the validity of Section 69A (power to block content) and Section 79 (intermediary liability) of the IT Act. Section 69A empowers the Central Government to direct the blocking of online content (websites, apps, or information) if it is necessary in the interest of India’s sovereignty, security, public order, or to prevent incitement to an offence. Section 79 grants online intermediaries (platforms like social media and search engines) immunity from legal liability for content posted by their users. 

Issues Involved:

1. Is Section 66A of IT Act violative of Article 19(1)(a) and if so, is it protected by any ground under Article 19(2)?
2. Does Section 79(3) IT Act read with Intermediary Guidelines Rules, 2011 align with Articles 19(1)(a) & 19(2)?
3. Are Section 69A IT Act and IT Rules, 2009 constitutionally valid?

Arguments:

The major arguments presented by the petitioner and the respondent in the case regarding the constitutional validity of Sections 66A, 79(3) (read with the Rules), and 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, are:

Section 66A of IT Act: Violation of Article 19(1)(a) and Protection under Article 19(2):

• Petitioner:

1. Violation of Article 19(1)(a): Section 66A was unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. Terms like “grossly offensive,” “annoyance,” “inconvenience,” and “insult” are subjective and lack precise definitions, leading to arbitrary application and potential misuse by law enforcement.
2. Not saved by Article 19(2): The intended restrictions (annoyance, inconvenience, etc.) fall outside the exhaustive scope of permissible “reasonable restrictions” under Article 19(2) (e.g., security of the state, public order, defamation).
3. Chilling Effect: The provision created a “chilling effect” on the right to free speech and expression, as citizens would self-censor for fear of prosecution under the vague law.

• Respondent:

1. Presumption of Constitutionality: There is a presumption in favor of the validity of the law, and the legislature is best placed to address the needs of the people, including novel methods of disturbing rights online.
2. Possibility of Abuse: The mere possibility of a provision’s misuse by authorities is not a sufficient ground to declare it unconstitutional.

Section 79(3) IT Act read with Intermediary Guidelines Rules, 2011: Alignment with Articles 19(1)(a) & 19(2):

• Petitioner:

1. Liability without Safeguards: Section 79(3)(b), which removes the ‘safe harbour’ immunity for intermediaries if they fail to remove “unlawful information” upon receiving “actual knowledge,” was problematic, especially when read with the Intermediary Guidelines.
2. Private Censorship: The Rules effectively forced intermediaries to adjudicate the legality of content, and to avoid liability, they would likely err on the side of caution and takedown lawful speech, leading to private censorship and a chilling effect.
3. Vagueness in Rules: The Rules, by including phrases like “disparaging,” “blasphemous,” and “grossly harmful” as “unlawful,” went beyond the permissible restrictions of Article 19(2).

• Respondent:

1. Due Diligence and Safe Harbour: Section 79 provides a conditional exemption to intermediaries, provided they observe due diligence as per the Rules. This is a reasonable requirement for the smooth functioning of the internet.
2. “Actual Knowledge”: The provision ensures that once an intermediary has “actual knowledge” of unlawful content being hosted on its platform, it must act to remove it, which is necessary to prevent harm and maintain public order.
3. Government Notification: Compliance with government or court orders/notifications to remove illegal content is essential to maintain law and order.

Section 69A IT Act and IT Rules, 2009: Constitutional Validity:

• Petitioner:

1. Secretive and Non-Transparent: The power granted to the government to block public access to content is exercised through an opaque and secretive process under the Rules, which violates the principles of natural justice and transparency.
2. Lack of Hearing: The rules lack explicit provisions to grant a hearing to the content originator before an order to block their content is passed, thus violating the right to be heard.
3. Potential for Misuse: The section grants vast, unchecked power to the Executive to arbitrarily restrict online content, posing a significant threat to free speech.

• Respondent:

1. Alignment with Article 19(2): Section 69A allows blocking only in the interests of “sovereignty, integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order,” which are grounds explicitly permitted under Article 19(2) for restricting free speech.
2. Procedural Safeguards: The Rules framed under Section 69A include sufficient procedural safeguards, such as the requirement for a designated committee to examine the request, recording reasons in writing, and allowing a review.
3. Necessity for National Security: The provision is necessary to enable the government to act swiftly in cases of grave threat to national security or public order that may arise from online content.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court of India held in the case as follows:

• Section 66A Struck Down

Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, was declared unconstitutional and struck down in its entirety as it violated the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). It held that the provision was vague and over-broad, as terms like “grossly offensive” or “menacing” were undefined, giving rise to arbitrary enforcement. The section was deemed not to fall under the “reasonable restrictions” permitted by Article 19(2), as it did not have a clear, proximate relationship to public order, defamation, or incitement. The court noted its vagueness created a chilling effect on free speech.

• Intermediary Liability (Section 79) Clarified

The court upheld the constitutionality of Section 79 of the IT Act (dealing with the liability of internet intermediaries/platforms). However, the court “read down” Section 79 to clarify that intermediaries are only obligated to take down content upon receiving an actual court order or a notification from a government authority. This removed the earlier provision that allowed content to be taken down based on “actual knowledge” of unlawful content without a judicial or formal executive directive.

• Other Provisions

The court upheld the constitutionality of Section 69A (power to issue directions for blocking public access to any information through any computer resource). Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act was also struck down for suffering from the same vices of vagueness and overbreadth as Section 66A.

• IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011

These rules were held to be valid, but Rule 3(4) was “read down” (interpreted restrictively) to safeguard the freedom of speech. The Court interpreted “actual knowledge” in Rule 3(4) (and the related Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act) to mean that an intermediary is only legally obligated to remove or disable access to content upon receiving an order from a court or a notification from the appropriate government or its agency.

• IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009

These rules, framed under Section 69A of the IT Act, relate to the government’s power to issue directions for blocking public access to information. The Court upheld the constitutional validity of both Section 69A of the IT Act and the 2009 Rules. The Court determined that the 2009 Rules provided a proper mechanism for implementing the blocking power under Section 69A, thus preventing its arbitrary misuse.

Ratio Decidendi:

The Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 66A of the IT Act as unconstitutional. The Court, however, upheld the validity of Section 69A (government power to block content) and read down Section 79 (intermediary liability) along with IT Rules, 2009 and 2011 Intermediary Guidelines. The binding decision (ratio decidendi) included:

1. Declaring Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, unconstitutional in its entirety for violating the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) as it was vague, over-broad, and did not fall under any of the reasonable restrictions permitted by Article 19(2).
2. Reading down Section 79 (Intermediary Liability) to mean that intermediaries are only required to take down content upon receiving a court order or a notification from a government authority.
3. Upholding the constitutionality of Section 69A (Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information) and the associated rules, as it was a narrowly drawn provision with adequate procedural safeguards.

Obiter Dicta:

The obiter dicta (observations “by the way” that are not binding precedent) in the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015 primarily revolve around the principles of free speech and the differential treatment of online communication. Key obiter dicta or important observations include:

• The Court noted that there is an “intelligible differentia” between the internet medium and other traditional forms of communication (like print, broadcast, and real live speech). This observation suggested that the legislature could validly create separate offenses pertaining to free speech over the internet, provided the restrictions meet the test of reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). This was a response to the petitioners’ argument that Section 66A violated Article 14 (right to equality) by treating internet users differently.
• The judgment repeatedly emphasized that vague and overly broad statutory language, like that used in the terms “grossly offensive” or “menacing character” in Section 66A, can have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. This observation, while instrumental in the reasoning for striking down the Section, reinforces the general principle that a law must be clear to avoid arbitrary application and to protect constitutional freedoms.
• The Court articulated a clear framework for understanding the scope of free speech, categorizing it into three concepts- Discussion, Advocacy, Incitement

The observation was that mere discussion or advocacy, even of an unpopular cause, is at the “heart” of Article 19(1)(a) and can only be restricted under Article 19(2) if it reaches the level of incitement, which has a proximate relationship to public disorder. The lack of this distinction was one of the reasons Section 66A was struck down.

Final Decision:

Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 was declared unconstitutional and void in its entirety. The decision was given in the favour of the petitioners, Shreya Singhal and others.

REFERENCES

1. Shreya Singhal v Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523
2. The Information Technology Act 2000
3. The Constitution of India 1950