Genocide and International Justice: Legal accountability in Gaza,Myanmar, and beyond

Abstract

Genocide, prohibited under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, continues to occur in modern conflicts despite its status as a jus cogens norm. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the authority, under Article 41 of its Statute, to issue provisional measures aimed at preventing irreparable harm to protected groups while cases are pending. This paper examines the practical effectiveness of such measures through a comparative study of two ongoing cases: The Gambia v Myanmar and South Africa v Israel.

Both cases reveal a troubling gap between judicial orders and ground realities, with humanitarian conditions deteriorating despite the ICJ’s intervention. In parallel, the evidentiary landscape of atrocity documentation is evolving. Modern tools including satellite imagery and open-source intelligence (OSINT) are increasingly used by United Nations fact-finding missions to corroborate allegations of mass atrocities. However, questions remain about their admissibility, reliability, and role in enforcing provisional measures.

This research combines doctrinal legal analysis with qualitative examination of case documents, UN reports, and investigative materials. It aims to assess the operational impact of ICJ provisional measures during ongoing genocides and explore how emerging evidentiary technologies can enhance the enforcement of these measures. Recommendations are offered for procedural reforms that could bridge the gap between international legal orders and tangible protection for vulnerable populations.

Introduction – Genocide, International Justice, and the Limits of Prevention

Genocide is recognized as one of the gravest crimes in international law. It is defined in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (“Genocide Convention”) as certain prohibited acts including killing, causing serious harm, or deliberately inflicting destructive living conditions  committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group. [1] This prohibition is considered a jus cogens norm, binding on all states regardless of treaty ratification. [2]

To address genocide and other serious breaches of international law, the global community has established judicial mechanisms, notably the International Criminal Court (ICC) for individual responsibility and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for state responsibility. The ICJ’s authority under Article 41 of its Statute allows it to indicate provisional measures urgent, binding orders aimed at preventing irreparable harm to rights in dispute while a case is pending. [3] These measures seek to halt atrocities before they escalate, but their effectiveness is often challenged given the Court’s lack of direct enforcement powers. [4]

Two ongoing ICJ cases The Gambia v Myanmar, concerning the alleged genocide against the Rohingya Muslim minority, and South Africa v Israel, involving allegations of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza  demonstrate both the potential and the limitations of provisional measures. [5] In each case, the ICJ issued binding orders intended to protect vulnerable populations. However, reports from United Nations bodies indicate ongoing deterioration of humanitarian conditions, raising questions about the practical impact of such legal interventions. [6]

Meanwhile, modern conflicts have transformed the nature of evidence available to courts. Alongside traditional witness testimony, technologies such as satellite imagery and open-source intelligence (OSINT) have become powerful tools for documenting atrocities in real time. This paper examines the effectiveness of ICJ provisional measures in preventing genocide during ongoing conflicts and explores how modern evidentiary technologies might enhance enforcement, with Gaza and Myanmar serving as comparative case studies.

Legal Foundations: Genocide Law, ICJ Powers, and Emerging Evidence

The Legal Definition of Genocide

The Genocide Convention 1948 defines genocide in Article 2 as certain prohibited acts such as killing members of a protected group, causing serious harm, or creating conditions designed to bring about its destruction  committed with the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy the group, in whole or in part. [7]This mental element distinguishes genocide from other mass atrocity crimes such as crimes against humanity or war crimes. [8]

The prohibition of genocide is regarded as a peremptory norm (jus cogens) of international law, binding on all states regardless of whether they have ratified the Convention. [9] It is accompanied by an erga omnes obligation to prevent and punish genocide, meaning that every state has a legal interest in ensuring compliance. [10]

The role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The ICJ is the main judicial body for resolving disputes between states, including allegations of genocide. Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ allows the Court to suggest provisional measures when needed to protect the rights of either party and prevent irreparable harm before a final ruling. [11]

These measures are binding on states, as confirmed in LaGrand (Germany v United States), [12] but the ICJ does not have independent enforcement powers. If a state does not comply, the only official route is to refer the matter to the UN Security Council under Article 94 of the UN Charter a process often hindered by the veto power of the permanent members, especially in politically sensitive cases. [13] Consequently, the actual effectiveness of provisional measures largely depends on political will, international pressure, and oversight.

Evidence in international adjudication

The ICJ has broad discretion in admitting evidence, as provided under Article 48 of its Statute and the Rules of Court. [14] The Court regularly relies on state submissions, witness testimony, and reports from UN agencies or fact finding missions. [15] 

In recent years, new forms of digital and geospatial evidence have emerged, notably satellite imagery and open-source intelligence (OSINT). These tools have been deployed by UN bodies to document mass atrocities in hard-to-access conflict zones. For example, satellite analysis supported findings of village burnings in Rakhine State, Myanmar, [16] while OSINT investigations have been used to verify the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Gaza. [17]

However, while such materials can corroborate allegations and provide near real-time monitoring, the ICJ has not yet established detailed standards for their admissibility, authentication, or weight. This legal uncertainty limits the full integration of modern evidence into genocide prevention orders.

Gaza Under thr ICJ’s Lens: Provisonal Measures Amid Humanitarian Crisis                        

Background to the Conflict

The Gaza Strip, a densely populated territory home to over two million Palestinians, has been the scene of recurrent armed escalations between Israel and Palestinian armed groups. In October 2023, following large-scale attacks by Hamas on Israeli territory, Israel launched extensive military operations in Gaza, citing self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. [18] Reports by UN agencies and humanitarian organisations documented extensive civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure, and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents.[19]

Amid escalating hostilities, South Africa applied to the International Court of Justice in December 2023, alleging that Israel’s conduct constituted violations of the Genocide Convention. The application sought urgent provisional measures to prevent further harm to the Palestinian population. [20]

ICJ’s Provisional Measures

On 26 January 2024, the ICJ ordered Israel to take all measures within its power to prevent acts falling within Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance, and preserve evidence related to the alleged acts. [21] The Court also directed Israel to submit a report on the implementation of these measures within one month.[22]

The orders were legally binding; however, the ICJ emphasised that its decision did not prejudge the merits of the case. Importantly, the Court refrained from ordering an immediate ceasefire, a measure requested by South Africa but deemed beyond the scope of the provisional orders in the circumstances. [23]

Compliance and Challenges

Subsequent UN situation reports indicated that, despite the ICJ’s orders, large-scale military operations and restrictions on humanitarian access persisted. [24] Human rights monitors and open-source analysts documented the continued destruction of civilian structures, including hospitals and schools, through satellite imagery and geolocated video evidence.[25] This raised serious concerns regarding compliance with the provisional measures.

One challenge is the ICJ’s reliance on state self-reporting for monitoring compliance, which is often contested or incomplete. Additionally, political dynamics within the UN Security Council make enforcement unlikely when the state concerned is supported by a permanent member with veto power.[26] As a result, provisional measures risk becoming declaratory rather than operational tools for preventing genocide.

Myanmar and the Rohingya: Legal Action & Enforcement Gaps                                                          

Background to the Crisis

Myanmar’s Rakhine State has long been the site of systemic discrimination against the Rohingya Muslim minority. Tensions escalated dramatically in August 2017 when the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) launched “clearance operations” in response to attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.[27] UN investigations documented mass killings, sexual violence, and the destruction of hundreds of villages, leading to the displacement of over 740,000 Rohingya into neighbouring Bangladesh.[28]

In November 2019, The Gambia, acting on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, applied to the International Court of Justice alleging that Myanmar’s actions constituted violations of the Genocide Convention[29] The case marked one of the rare instances in which a non-injured state invoked the erga omnes partes obligation to prevent genocide.

ICJ’s Provisional Measures

On 23 January 2020, the ICJ unanimously indicated provisional measures ordering Myanmar to:

1. Prevent acts under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention.
2. Ensure its military and other security forces did not commit genocidal acts.
3. Preserve evidence related to the alleged acts.
4. Submit regular reports on compliance to the Court. [30]

The Court stressed that these measures were binding and aimed at preventing further irreparable harm to the Rohingya population pending the outcome of the case. [31]

Compliance and Ongoing Violations

Reports from the UN Fact-Finding Mission and independent human rights groups indicate that discriminatory restrictions, forced displacement, and sporadic violence against Rohingya communities continued after the ICJ order.[32] In some cases, satellite imagery revealed ongoing destruction of villages and the expansion of military infrastructure in Rakhine State, raising questions about Myanmar’s compliance.[33]

Enforcement was further complicated by Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup, which disrupted international engagement and created a government less inclined to cooperate with the ICJ. The Security Council, paralysed by geopolitical divisions, did not take steps to enforce the Court’s orders.[34] As with Gaza, the ICJ’s lack of direct enforcement powers meant that provisional measures relied heavily on the political will of the state concerned a factor largely absent in Myanmar’s case.

Provisional Measures in Practice: Why Legal Orders Struggle to Halt Atrocities

Similarities in Judicial Intervention

Both South Africa v Israel and The Gambia v Myanmar demonstrate the ICJ’s willingness to respond quickly to allegations of genocide through provisional measures. In each case, the Court:

• Recognised a prima facie basis for jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention[35]
• Found that the rights claimed by the applicant states notably the protection of vulnerable populations  were plausible. [36]
• Ordered measures aimed at preventing further harm, preserving evidence, and requiring compliance reports.

In both situations, the ICJ emphasised the binding nature of its orders and the urgency of preventing irreparable harm. [37] These parallels reflect the Court’s consistent application of its mandate, irrespective of the political sensitivities surrounding the respondent states.

Divergence in Context and Compliance

Despite these similarities, the cases differ in political, military, and procedural context. In Gaza, hostilities were ongoing at the time of the ICJ order, with high-intensity military operations continuing daily.[38]In Myanmar, while mass violence had peaked before the ICJ’s intervention, systemic persecution and rights violations persisted under an entrenched military regime.[39]

Compliance in both cases was limited, but for different reasons:

• Israel contested the legal characterisation of its actions and maintained that its military operations complied with international law, framing the ICJ’s orders as overly broad and politically motivated[40]
• Myanmar faced a change of government through a military coup in 2021, after which engagement with international legal processes diminished significantly.[41]

In both contexts, political resistance to external judicial authority undermined the operational effect of the provisional measures.

The Enforcement Deficit

The most significant structural weakness lies in the ICJ’s inability to enforce its orders directly. Under Article 94(2) of the UN Charter, non-compliance may be referred to the Security Council a body often paralysed by the veto power of permanent members.[42] In the Gaza case, anticipated political deadlock discouraged such referral. In Myanmar’s case, the coup government’s isolation further reduced leverage.

Without credible enforcement mechanisms, provisional measures risk functioning more as symbolic affirmations of legal norms than as practical tools for halting atrocities. This enforcement gap also weakens deterrence, as states may calculate that the political costs of non-compliance are manageable compared to perceived security or strategic interests.

The Potential Role of Modern Evidence

While enforcement depends on political will, modern evidence  particularly satellite imagery and OSINT can increase transparency and international pressure. In both Gaza and Myanmar, independent verification of ongoing violations has been instrumental in sustaining global awareness.[43] However, the ICJ has yet to systematically integrate such evidence into compliance monitoring. Doing so could strengthen the factual basis for Security Council action or other diplomatic measures.

Evidence, Technology, and Intent: Proving Genocide in the Digital Era

The Importance of Proving Dolus Specialis

Under the Genocide Convention, establishing state responsibility requires proof of both the prohibited acts (actus reus) and the specific intent (dolus specialis) to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group.[44] While the actus reus may be easier to demonstrate through physical evidence and witness accounts, intent is often inferred from patterns of conduct, official statements, and contextual indicators.[45] The provisional measures phase does not require conclusive proof, but the ICJ must be satisfied that the alleged rights are plausible.[46]

Modern evidence technologies can play a critical role here. Satellite imagery, geolocation analysis, and other open-source tools can help demonstrate systematic patterns of destruction, enabling the Court to assess whether the alleged acts plausibly indicate genocidal intent.

Satellite Imagery: Monitoring and Verification

Satellite imagery has become a key tool for documenting atrocities in inaccessible conflict zones. In the Gaza case, satellite analysis has been used to confirm the destruction of civilian infrastructure, track displacement patterns, and assess damage to agricultural land  all potential indicators of acts prohibited under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. [47]

In Myanmar, similar imagery helped verify reports of village burnings and structural demolition in Rakhine State, corroborating survivor testimonies and UN fact-finding reports. [48]By providing consistent, time-stamped evidence, satellite imagery can strengthen the ICJ’s factual basis for issuing or reinforcing provisional measures, especially when state self-reporting is unreliable.

Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) and Digital Verification

OSINT refers to the collection and analysis of publicly available data  including social media posts, news footage, and online maps to verify events in real time. [49] Independent investigative groups have geolocated videos showing damage to hospitals, schools, and civilian areas in Gaza, while in Myanmar, OSINT helped identify military units involved in specific attacks. [50]

Such evidence can help overcome one of the ICJ’s key challenges: the lack of an independent fact-finding mechanism for monitoring compliance with provisional measures. By relying on verified open-source data, the Court could supplement state reports with independent, real-time assessments.

Admissibility and Procedural Integration

While the ICJ has not yet established formal rules for digital evidence, Article 50 of its Statute allows it to “entrust any individual, body, bureau, commission, or other organization” with conducting an inquiry and providing a report.[51] This provision could be interpreted to authorise the use of third-party expert analyses based on satellite and OSINT data.

To ensure admissibility, such evidence must be authenticated, with clear metadata, geolocation coordinates, and a verifiable chain of custody. Emerging international standards such as the Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, provide methodologies that the ICJ could adopt to assess reliability and weight. [52]

Strengthening Provisional Measures Through Technology

Integrating satellite and OSINT evidence into provisional measures orders could make them more operationally effective by:

1. Providing objective, time-stamped data to verify compliance.
2. Enabling the Court to order specific, measurable actions (e.g., halting attacks on identified sites).
3. Increasing political and reputational costs for non-compliance through publicly verifiable data.

In both Gaza and Myanmar, systematic integration of such evidence could have allowed for more precise monitoring and stronger international pressure on respondent states.

The Road Ahead: Strengthening ICJ Enforcement Through Modern Evidence 

Bridging the Enforcement Gap

The ICJ’s authority to indicate provisional measures is clear under Article 41 of its Statute, but the absence of direct enforcement powers means compliance depends on political will. [53] Without reforms, the gap between judicial orders and ground realities seen in both Gaza and Myanmar will persist. While amending the UN Charter to limit Security Council vetoes in genocide prevention cases has been proposed, [54]political feasibility remains low. Therefore, practical, procedural reforms within the ICJ’s existing framework are essential.

Integrating Modern Evidence into Compliance Monitoring

One immediate step is to formally integrate satellite imagery and open-source intelligence (OSINT) into the monitoring of provisional measures. Under Article 50 of its Statute, the ICJ can appoint independent technical experts or request reports from UN bodies with geospatial and digital verification capabilities. [55] These experts could provide objective, time-stamped evidence to assess whether specific orders such as halting the destruction of civilian infrastructure are being respected.

Such integration would:

• Reduce reliance on state self-reporting.
• Provide an independent factual basis for Security Council or General Assembly action.
• Increase the reputational and diplomatic costs of non-compliance by making violations publicly verifiable.

Establishing Interim Reporting Mechanisms

The Court could strengthen compliance by requiring regular, public interim reports from both the respondent state and independent monitoring bodies. In Gaza and Myanmar, such mechanisms could have allowed the Court to assess violations in near real-time and issue follow-up orders if necessary. [56]This approach mirrors practices in certain human rights treaty bodies, which maintain ongoing supervision of urgent measures.

Enhancing Cooperation with UN Fact-Finding Bodies

The ICJ could institutionalise cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Satellite Centre (UNOSAT), and commissions of inquiry. These bodies already produce verified reports based on digital and geospatial evidence, which could be directly incorporated into ICJ proceedings. While the Court has historically been cautious in relying on non-state fact-finding, the credibility of these UN mechanisms provides a basis for procedural integration. [57]

Encouraging a Normative Shift

Even without formal enforcement power, the ICJ can shape state behaviour through the development of legal norms. Consistently referencing modern evidence in provisional measures orders could establish an emerging standard that genocide prevention requires the use of verifiable monitoring tools. Over time, this could influence both diplomatic practice and the expectations of the international community, increasing pressure on states to comply.

Proposed Reform Summary

1. Procedural Integration – Amend the ICJ Rules of Court to explicitly allow submission and evaluation of authenticated digital and satellite evidence.
2. Independent Monitoring – Appoint technical experts under Article 50 to assess compliance.
3. Interim Public Reporting – Require regular, transparent updates from respondent states and independent monitors.
4. Cooperation with UN Agencies – Institutionalise data-sharing agreements with UNOSAT, OHCHR, and investigative commissions.
5. Norm-Building – Consistently incorporate modern evidence into provisional measures to establish a best practice standard. 

Conclusion: From Orders to Outcomes 

The comparative analysis of South Africa v Israel (Gaza) and The Gambia v Myanmar demonstrates that while the ICJ’s provisional measures are legally binding and symbolically powerful, they are not, on their own, sufficient to halt atrocities in progress. The enforcement gap  caused by the Court’s reliance on state cooperation and the political paralysis of the Security Council  remains the most significant obstacle to transforming legal orders into tangible protection for at-risk populations.

In both case studies, the Court acted promptly and by its mandate, but continued reports of mass harm reveal the limits of judicial authority without operational monitoring and credible enforcement mechanisms.  The inability to independently verify compliance undermines both the practical effect and the deterrent value of provisional measures.

This research has argued that the integration of modern evidentiary tools — including satellite imagery and open-source intelligence (OSINT) — offers a realistic, procedurally viable path to strengthening enforcement within the ICJ’s current legal framework. By appointing independent technical experts under Article 50, formalising cooperation with UN fact-finding bodies, and requiring interim public compliance reports, the Court could significantly improve the transparency and credibility of its orders.

Such reforms would not remove the political challenges inherent in international law, but they would enhance the ICJ’s ability to translate its orders into concrete outcomes. Over time, consistent incorporation of verifiable digital evidence could establish an emerging normative expectation: that genocide prevention is not merely a matter of issuing urgent legal declarations, but of ensuring continuous, fact-based monitoring and accountability.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of provisional measures will depend on both legal innovation and political resolve. While the ICJ cannot compel compliance through force, it can reshape the evidentiary and procedural landscape to make non-compliance more visible, politically costly, and morally indefensible. In an era where technology can reveal atrocities in near real time, the challenge is no longer whether the world will know, but whether it will act — and the ICJ has a critical role to play in making that knowledge actionable.      

References

Treaties

• Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277.
• Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 33 UNTS 993.

Cases

• Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998).
• Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ.
• Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Provisional Measures) [2024] ICJ.

Reports

• UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018) https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index accessed 12 August 2025.
• UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ UN Doc A/HRC/56/59 (12 June 2024) https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/coi-opt/index accessed 12 August 2025.
• United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report’ (OCHA, 2024) https://www.ochaopt.org/ accessed 12 August 2025.
• Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: Evidence of Military Atrocities’ (Amnesty, 2021) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/myanmar-evidence-of-military-atrocities/ accessed 12 August 2025.
• Amnesty International, ‘Gaza: Evidence of Civilian Infrastructure Destruction’ (Amnesty, 2024) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/05/gaza-infrastructure-destruction/ accessed 12 August 2025.
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel’s Response to the ICJ Decision’ (MFA, 2024) https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/icj-response-2024 accessed 12 August 2025.
• United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations (OHCHR, 2022).
• Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Provisional Measures Practice (2020) https://www.corteidh.or.cr/ accessed 12 August 2025.

Articles

• ‘France and Mexico Call for Suspension of Veto in Cases of Mass Atrocities’ (UN News, 25 September 2015) https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/509732-france-and-mexico-call-suspension-veto-cases-mass-atrocities accessed 12 August 2025.

[1] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277, art 2

[2] Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 34.

[3] Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 41.

[4] Charter of the United Nations, art 94; see also Christopher Greenwood, ‘Provisional Measures before the International Court of Justice’ (2011) 82 BYIL 1, 24–26.

[5] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ Rep 3; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Provisional Measures) [2024] ICJ.

[6] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report’ (OCHA, 2024)https://www.ochaopt.org/ accessed 12 August 2025; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Rohingya Refugee Crisis Situation Report’ (OCHA, 2024) /https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/bangladesh/ accessed 12 August 2025

 

[7] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277, art 2

[8] Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) ICTY-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 571.

[9] Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Second Phase) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 34.

[10] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, para 162.

[11] Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 41.

[12] LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466, para 109.

[13] Charter of the United Nations, art 94.

[14] Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 48; Rules of Court, arts 49–54.

[15] Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court (4th edn, Brill 2006) 1074–1077.

[16] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018 https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/indexaccessed 12 August 2025.

[17] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ UN Doc A/HRC/56/59 (12 June 2024)https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/coi-opt/index accessed 12 August 2025.

[18] Charter of the United Nations, art 51.

[19] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report’ (OCHA, 2024) https://www.ochaopt.org/accessed 12 August 2025.

[20] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Application Instituting Proceedings) [2023] ICJ.

[21] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Provisional Measures) [2024] ICJ, para 86.

[22] ibid para 87

[23] ibid para 82.

[24] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (n 2)

[25] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ UN Doc A/HRC/56/59 (12 June 2024) ) https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/coi-opt/indexaccessed 12 August 2025.

[26] Charter of the United Nations, art 27(3)

[27] Human Rights Watch, ‘“All of My Body Was Pain”: Sexual Violence Against Rohingya Women and Girls in Burma’ (HRW, 2017) https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/11/16/all-my-body-was-pain/sexual-violence-against-rohingya-women-and-girls-burma accessed 12 August 2025.

[28] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018)  https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index accessed 12 August 2025.

[29] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Application Instituting Proceedings) [2019] ICJ

[30] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ, para 86

[31] ibid para 87

[32] UN Human Rights Council (n 2

[33] Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: Evidence of Military Atrocities’ (Amnesty, 2021)https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/myanmar-evidence-of-military-atrocities/ accessed 12 August 2025.

[34] Charter of the United Nations, art 27(3).

[35] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ, para 16; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel) (Provisional Measures) [2024] ICJ, para 18.

[36] ibid paras 43–45 (Myanmar); ibid paras 45–48 (Gaza).

[37] ibid para 86 (Myanmar); ibid para 86 (Gaza).

[38] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Gaza Strip: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report’ (OCHA, 2024) https://www.ochaopt.org/accessed 12 August 2025

[39] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018)https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index  accessed 12 August 2025.

[40] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Israel’s Response to the ICJ Decision’ (MFA, 2024)https://www.gov.il/en/departments/news/icj-response-2024  accessed 12 August 2025.

[41] Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: Evidence of Military Atrocities’ (Amnesty, 2021) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/myanmar-evidence-of-military-atrocities/ accessed 12 August 2025.

[42] Charter of the United Nations, art 94(2).

[43] Amnesty International (n 7); UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ UN Doc A/HRC/56/59 (12 June 2024)https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/coi-opt/index index accessed 12 August 2025.

[44] Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277, art 2.

[45] Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 523.

[46] Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar) (Provisional Measures) [2020] ICJ, para 43.

[47] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ UN Doc A/HRC/56/59 (12 June 2024)https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/coi-opt/index .

[48] UN Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar’ UN Doc A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018)https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/myanmar-ffm/index  .

[49]  United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations (OHCHR, 2022) 1.

[50] Amnesty International, ‘Myanmar: Evidence of Military Atrocities’ (Amnesty, 2021)https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/myanmar-evidence-of-military-atrocities/; Amnesty International, ‘Gaza: Evidence of Civilian Infrastructure Destruction’ (Amnesty, 2024)https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/05/gaza-infrastructure-destruction/ .

[51]   Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 50.

[52] United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 6) 14–19.

[53]   Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 41.

[54] ‘France and Mexico Call for Suspension of Veto in Cases of Mass Atrocities’ (UN News, 25 September 2015)https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/09/509732-france-and-mexico-call-suspension-veto-cases-mass-atrocities

[55]   Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 50.

[56] Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Provisional Measures Practice (2020)https://www.corteidh.or.cr/

[57] UN Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations (OHCHR, 2022) 14–19.