Published on 04th September 2025
Authored By: Divyanshi Singh
Bharati Vidyapeeth New Law College Pune
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Dipak Misra (CJI), R.F. Nariman, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra, JJ.
Date of Judgment: September 27, 2018
Relevant Statutes/Key Provisions:
Section 497, Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Offence of adultery)
Section 198(2), CrPC
Article 14 (Right to Equality), Article 15 (Prohibition of Discrimination), and Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution of India
Brief Facts
Joseph Shine, a non-resident Indian originally from Kerala, filed a Public Interest Litigation before the Supreme Court in October 2017, challenging the constitutional validity of Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code. This provision criminalized adultery, punishing only a man who engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with a married woman without the consent of her husband. Women, under this section, were exempt from punishment and treated as victims rather than participants. Additionally, Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed only the husband of the woman to file a complaint, further reinforcing the patriarchal notion of a woman as the property of her husband.
Shine argued that these provisions violated the fundamental rights to equality, non-discrimination, and personal liberty enshrined in Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. He contended that the laws were rooted in archaic, colonial-era morality and failed to align with the principles of modern constitutionalism.
Issues Involved
The Supreme Court considered several critical questions:
- Whether Section 497 violated the right to equality under Article 14 by discriminating on the basis of sex?
- Whether the exemption of women from prosecution perpetuated gender stereotypes and violated Article 15(1)?
- Whether criminalizing adultery infringed upon the right to privacy and personal liberty under Article 21?
- Whether the state had a legitimate interest in regulating private sexual conduct through criminal sanctions?
Arguments
Petitioner’s Arguments:
The petitioner contended that Section 497 was fundamentally flawed as it treated men and women unequally. The law punished only the man in an adulterous relationship, exempting the woman even when she was an equal participant. This selective criminal liability was seen as arbitrary and violative of Article 14. Moreover, it was argued that Section 497 reduced a woman to a mere chattel of her husband, stripping her of agency and autonomy in matters of her own sexuality.
Further, the petitioner argued that criminalizing consensual sexual relations between adults, even if outside the bounds of marriage, intruded into the private sphere protected by Article 21. Adultery, it was claimed, might be a moral wrong but did not warrant criminal punishment. It was emphasized that such personal choices are best dealt with within the realm of civil law, such as divorce proceedings, and not through the coercive force of criminal law.
Respondent’s Arguments
The Union of India defended the provision, asserting that Section 497 served the purpose of protecting the sanctity of marriage. It was argued that criminalizing adultery acted as a deterrent against extramarital relationships, thereby upholding family values and social order. The government further contended that any reform of such laws should be left to Parliament and not be undertaken through judicial intervention. It stressed that the legislature, being representative of the people, was the appropriate forum to decide whether adultery should remain a criminal offence.
Judgment
In a unanimous decision, the Constitution Bench struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code and read down Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court declared that adultery, as defined in Section 497, was unconstitutional and could no longer be treated as a criminal offence in India.
The judges held that the provision violated the right to equality under Article 14 due to its discriminatory treatment of men and women. It was noted that while the law punished only the man in an adulterous relationship, it treated women as passive victims, thereby perpetuating patriarchal stereotypes. The law was also found to be violative of Article 15(1) as it discriminated on the basis of sex.
Regarding Article 21, the Court held that criminalising adultery infringed upon the right to privacy and personal liberty. The judges observed that matters of consensual sexual relationships among adults fall within the private sphere and cannot be subject to state intrusion through criminal law.
The Court further clarified that while adultery may constitute a moral wrong and a valid ground for divorce under civil law, it does not warrant criminal sanctions. The role of criminal law, it observed, is not to enforce moral obligations within a marriage.
Ratio Decidendi
The Supreme Court laid down the principle that the criminal law cannot regulate private moral wrongs in a marriage. It ruled that Section 497 of the IPC violated the principles of equality, non-discrimination, and personal liberty, as it was based on gender stereotypes and undermined the autonomy of women.
Obiter Dicta
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud made significant observations on the patriarchal nature of Section 497. He stated that the law “institutionalized gender stereotypes” and reduced a married woman’s role to that of her husband’s property. He emphasized that constitutional morality must prevail over social morality, and the state cannot use criminal law to enforce moral standards in private relationships.
Chief Justice Dipak Misra observed that “husbands are not the masters of their wives,” underscoring the need to recognize the agency of women within the marital relationship. Justice Nariman, concurring with the others, noted that the provision was a colonial relic that no longer held relevance in a modern democratic society.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court struck down Section 497 IPC as unconstitutional, declaring that adultery would no longer be a criminal offence in India. Section 198(2) CrPC was read down to align with this decision. The Court clarified that while adultery is no longer punishable under criminal law, it remains a valid ground for divorce under civil laws governing marriage.
Impact and Analysis
This landmark ruling was hailed as a progressive step towards gender equality and individual autonomy. It reaffirmed the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and privacy by rejecting laws that treated women as subservient to their husbands.
The decision marked a shift from using criminal law to enforce personal morality towards recognizing the private sphere of marital relationships. It brought Indian law in line with global trends, where most democratic countries have decriminalized adultery, treating it as a civil issue rather than a criminal offence.
Critics of the judgment expressed concern about its potential impact on marital fidelity and family structures. However, the Court emphasized that the purpose of criminal law is not to safeguard marital sanctity but to address public wrongs that harm society at large. The verdict also opened up discussions about the need for gender-neutral laws in marriage and the scope of privacy in personal relationships.
Conclusion
Joseph Shine v. Union of India stands as a significant milestone in India’s constitutional jurisprudence. By striking down an archaic and discriminatory provision, the Supreme Court advanced the cause of gender justice and personal liberty. It recognized that in a modern constitutional democracy, individual autonomy and equality must be given primacy over outdated notions of social morality. This judgment not only decriminalized adultery but also reaffirmed the principle that the state should not intrude into the intimate choices of consenting adults
