Judicial Accountability in India

ABSTRACT

In the intricate landscape of Indian democracy, the judiciary serves a dual purpose: it is both a guardian and an interpreter of the Constitution. Its role involves safeguarding fundamental rights while also ensuring that its own powers are exercised with accountability. The pursuit of judicial accountability has gained prominence in recent years, as the integrity of judges comes under scrutiny amidst various allegations and controversies. The imperatives of independence and transparency are no mere theoretical concerns; they are essential to maintaining public trust in an institution that has significantly influenced pivotal outcomes, such as the recognition of privacy as a fundamental right and holding individuals, regardless of stature, accountable for environmental violations.

Visualize the judge’s robe not as a barrier to scrutiny but as a symbol of transparency that upholds dignity. This vision often contrasts with the reality in India, where the independence that emerged in the wake of colonialism sometimes obscures the necessity for accountability. Recent events—including biased public statements and allegations of financial misconduct—have spurred calls for reform, emphasizing that esteemed institutions must adapt to contemporary expectations. This article explores the historical context, existing mechanisms, ongoing challenges, and prospective reforms, seeking to illuminate a judiciary that is both resilient and adaptable.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

In the vast drama of Indian democracy, the judiciary is more than just an institution—it is both a watchful guardian and a wise counselor. It protects the Constitution’s spirit while giving life to its deeper meaning. But like every guardian, the courts too must face a question: how do they use their immense power while also being answerable for it? This is where the idea of judicial accountability comes in—ensuring that judges remain fair and impartial without drifting into unchecked authority. In recent years, this issue has taken center stage. Controversies and whispers of impropriety have shaken public trust, while reformers argue for a more open and transparent system. The real test is balance: keeping the judiciary independent, strong enough to stand against tyranny, yet transparent enough to maintain the faith of the people. This balance is not a theoretical exercise; it is what keeps democracy alive, especially in a country where courts have shaped society—from declaring privacy a fundamental right to holding the powerful responsible for harming the environment.

Picture the robe of a judge not as a shield that hides everything, but as a veil that still allows light to pass through—protecting dignity, but never shutting out accountability. In India, this vision often clashes with the realities of power and tradition. The independence of the judiciary, forged with pride after independence, sometimes overshadows the need for scrutiny. Recent controversies—from biased remarks to doubts over integrity—have sparked louder calls for change. They remind us that even the noblest of institutions must evolve with time.

This discussion is not just about pointing out flaws but about imagining a judiciary that is both firm and flexible, proud yet answerable, powerful yet people-oriented. This article looks back at its historical journey, examines today’s safeguards, highlights the roadblocks, and explores how future reforms might make the judiciary stronger, more transparent, and deeply connected to the people it serves.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The roots of judicial accountability in India lie in the Constitution, which allows removal of judges only through parliamentary impeachment. This high threshold was meant to protect independence but soon revealed its limits. The 1993 impeachment attempt against Justice V. Ramaswami failed despite serious charges, showing how politics could shield judges from consequences. Later, the Judges (Protection) Act of 1985 reinforced judicial immunity for acts done in office, though it allowed action in proven cases of misconduct. At the same time, the evolution of judicial appointments became a central issue. Through the “Three Judges’ Cases” (1981, 1993, 1998), the collegium system emerged, giving judges control over appointments to preserve independence. Yet, its opacity and allegations of favoritism raised questions about accountability. The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC), introduced to reform this, was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2015, reaffirming the primacy of judicial independence but also reviving the debate on transparency.

Historical moments further deepened this discourse. During the Emergency (1975–77), the ADM Jabalpur case became infamous for allowing suspension of fundamental rights, with Justice H.R. Khanna’s lone dissent standing as a powerful reminder of judicial integrity. Such episodes revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of judicial independence when unaccompanied by accountability. Civil society groups like the Committee on Judicial Accountability and Judicial Reforms (CJAR) have consistently pushed for reforms, while jurists and commentators argue for statutory mechanisms similar to judicial councils abroad. These developments show that judicial accountability in India has always walked a tightrope—protecting judges from external pressure while ensuring that their power is not exercised without responsibility.

RATIONALE FOR JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

It is fundamentally rooted in the core tenets of a democratic society, where public trust and institutional legitimacy are inextricably linked. The Indian judiciary, as the final arbiter of law and a guardian of constitutional principles, commands immense power. However, this power, as with all public institutions, is predicated on its answerability to the people it serves. While judicial independence is rightly hailed as a cornerstone of the rule of law, enabling judges to make impartial and fearless decisions unburdened by political, social, or financial pressures, this principle has been misconstrued as a form of immunity from scrutiny. The text underscores that true independence is not an end in itself but a means to an end—the delivery of justice—and it must be balanced by an equally strong commitment to accountability. This balance is not a theoretical exercise but has tangible, real-world consequences that directly impact the public’s faith in the justice system.

The growing “credibility gap” within the Indian judiciary is a direct result of this imbalanced equation. The public’s faith is strained when the judiciary’s self-governing mechanisms appear opaque and ineffective. A compelling example is the case of Justice M.M. Sundresh’s unexplained recusal. The abrupt and silent withdrawal from a high-profile case, particularly after numerous adjournments, left the public to speculate on the motives behind the decision. Such a lack of transparency creates an environment of distrust and raises valid questions about the integrity of the process. In a democratic system, justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. The public’s inability to understand the reasons for a judge’s actions breeds cynicism and undermines the very legitimacy of the institution.

In stark contrast, the actions of judges like Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma and Justice Vishal Mishra provide a compelling counter-narrative and a blueprint for effective accountability. By explicitly documenting their reasons for recusal—even citing attempted external influence—they demonstrated a commitment to transparency that builds public trust. This behavior is a powerful affirmation that the judiciary is not an unaccountable monolith but a body of individuals who are subject to ethical standards and are willing to be transparent with the public. It shows that judges are not above the very principles they are sworn to uphold.

Ultimately, the argument for judicial accountability is that it is the very force that strengthens judicial independence. When the public has confidence that the judiciary operates with integrity and is answerable for its actions, its judgments carry greater weight and moral authority. Systemic reforms aimed at enhancing accountability—such as mandatory public disclosure of recusal reasons, a more transparent collegium system for appointments, and a robust and effective in-house mechanism for addressing misconduct—are not an assault on the judiciary’s autonomy. Instead, they are essential measures to bridge the “credibility gap” and enhance the institution’s legitimacy. By embracing a culture of transparency and responsibility, the Indian judiciary can reaffirm its role as a bulwark of democracy and the ultimate protector of citizens’ rights, ensuring that its independence serves the people, not itself.

BALANCING ACT: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN INDIA

Navigating the complexities of judicial accountability in India presents a distinctive challenge, balancing the critical principle of judicial independence with the increasing public expectation for transparency and ethical conduct. The Judges (Inquiry) Act of 1968 serves as a constitutional basis for impeachment; however, it often functions more as a formidable yet ineffective monument than an operational mechanism. Its cumbersome and politically sensitive structure has resulted in a situation where, in a nation of over a billion people, no judge has ever been successfully removed under its provisions. This framework, while significant, has become an improbable instrument of reform.

Understanding the limitations of a comprehensive legislative approach for addressing routine misconduct, the judiciary adopted an in-house procedure. This process, akin to a family meeting, involves the Chief Justice carrying out investigations into complaints against fellow judges within a self-regulatory framework. Although this approach appears practical, its lack of transparency has drawn criticism, leading to concerns that a self-regulating system may lack the necessary rigor. Efforts to create a more effective structure have included initiatives like the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill of 2010, which unfortunately faded into obscurity without becoming law. A further attempt to reform judicial appointments through the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) met a similar fate when the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional in the landmark case of Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India (2015). This ruling firmly established that the judiciary retains ultimate authority over its own governance.

Moreover, accountability must extend beyond internal mechanisms; it thrives through public participation. The introduction of Public Interest Litigation (PIL) revolutionized access to justice, enabling individuals to advocate for societal causes. Courts have thus evolved from mere adjudicators of private disputes into active protectors of social justice. The media plays a crucial role in this dynamic, serving as a vital check on judicial conduct while needing to navigate the constraints imposed by contempt of court provisions. Additionally, the Right to Information (RTI) Act significantly empowers citizens, granting them the ability to scrutinize the opaque workings of public institutions, including the judiciary, creating an impetus for transparency that is frequently met with resistance. For judges at the lower court level, accountability is more straightforward, as High Courts, under Article 235, oversee their functions, ensuring that justice remains consistent and intact at the foundational level of the judicial system.

The Indian framework for judicial accountability presents an intriguing paradox. It embodies a highly visible ideal that often remains difficult to grasp. This framework combines aspirational constitutional principles with self-regulatory measures and is continually scrutinized by an informed citizenry.

 JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AND CASE LAWS

The judicial discourse on accountability reached a seminal point with the introduction and subsequent invalidation of the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). This episode, detailed in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015), stands as a constitutional clash that definitively cemented the judiciary’s self-governance in appointments. The unanimous passage of the 99th Constitutional Amendment and the NJAC Act by Parliament sought to democratize the appointment process by including members from the judiciary, executive, and civil society, thereby addressing the perceived opacity of the existing Collegium system. Proponents, including the then-Attorney General, posited that the NJAC would enhance transparency, accountability, and meritocracy, with its functioning falling under the purview of the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005.

However, the Supreme Court, in a 4:1 majority, declared the NJAC unconstitutional, holding that it violated the “basic structure” of the Constitution by imperiling judicial independence. The majority opinion, relying on the principles established in the Second Judges Case (1993) and the Third Judges Case (1998), emphasized that “primacy of the judiciary” in judicial appointments was an inalienable component of the basic structure. The Court specifically objected to the veto power vested in the “eminent persons,” arguing that it could undermine a unanimous recommendation by the Chief Justice of India and the two senior-most judges. This verdict underscored a fundamental principle: the judiciary is the sole custodian and interpreter of its own independence.

The powerful dissent by Justice J. Chelameswar provided a compelling counter-narrative, arguing that the majority’s reasoning created a system of “incestuous accommodations” and a “credibility gap” between the judiciary and the public. He challenged the notion that judicial primacy was an absolute part of the basic structure, pointing out that the framers of the Constitution never intended for the judiciary to be an entirely self-contained entity. This opinion highlighted the critical need for a balanced approach that reconciles independence with accountability. The judiciary’s subsequent move, post-verdict, to invite suggestions for improving the Collegium system, as seen in the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) consultations, can be viewed as a tacit acknowledgement of the system’s flaws.

While the NJAC debate focused on appointments, judicial accountability also extends to conduct. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, which governs the impeachment of judges on grounds of “proved misbehaviour or incapacity,” has proven to be an ineffective mechanism due to its cumbersome nature. This procedural rigidity was highlighted in the case of Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India (1991), where the Supreme Court had to clarify the procedure for an inquiry against a sitting judge, further underscoring the lack of a clear, functional framework. In an attempt to fill this void, the judiciary relies on an informal “in-house procedure,” a mechanism that, while offering a semblance of internal oversight, has been criticized for its lack of transparency and legal backing. These judicial pronouncements and their legislative counterparts reveal a persistent institutional tension, where every attempt to introduce external accountability is met with a strong defense of judicial independence, leaving the judiciary to navigate its own path to reform.

Parameter	Collegium System	NJAC
Composition	Chief Justice of India (CJI) and four senior-most Supreme Court judges.	CJI, two senior-most Supreme Court judges, Union Minister for Law and Justice, and two “eminent persons”
Legal basis	Established by the Supreme Court through its interpretation of Articles 124 and 217 in the Second and Third Judges Cases.	Established by the Constitution (99th Amendment) Act, 2014, and the NJAC Act, 2014, passed by Parliament.
Appointment Primacy	Judicial Primacy: The judiciary holds the final say in appointments.	Shared Primacy: Appointments are made by a multi-member body with representation from both the judiciary and the executive.
Transparency	Highly opaque. Selection criteria are not disclosed, and rationale for decisions is often not public.	Proposed to be transparent, with an external commission and falling under the ambit of the RTI Act.
Arguments For	Safeguards judicial independence and prevents executive interference in appointments	Introduces democratic accountability, ends opacity, and diversifies the selection pool.
Arguments Against	Criticized for fostering nepotism, lack of diversity, and a closed-door system with no accountability mechanism.	Opponents argue it undermines judicial independence through executive interference and a non-judicial veto.
Outcome	Reinstated and continues to be the system for appointing judges to the higher judiciary after the NJAC was struck down	Struck down by the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judges Case as unconstitutional for violating the basic structure doctrine.

 

CHALLENGES AND CRITICISMS

The debate on judicial accountability in India is marked by several significant challenges and criticisms.

Issues in Appointment and Conduct Mechanisms

• Collegium Opacity: The system of judicial appointments by judges themselves is heavily criticized for its lack of transparency. The absence of published reasons for appointments and transfers makes it difficult for the public to gauge the criteria used for selection, fueling accusations of favoritism and nepotism. This is the ultimate “we know best” club, where the public is simply expected to trust the process without ever seeing its inner workings.
• Ineffective In-House Discipline: The judiciary’s in-house procedure for addressing judicial misconduct lacks a statutory basis and transparency. Critics argue it’s a closed-door system with limited external oversight and no public findings, raising concerns about its impartiality and effectiveness. For serious misconduct, the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, provides the constitutional framework for impeachment, but this process is so cumbersome and politically influenced that it has proven ineffective.
• Judicial Primacy vs. Accountability: A core tension lies in the judiciary’s assertion of primacy in judicial appointments and conduct, a principle it cemented in the Second Judges Case (1993) and the Third Judges Case (1998). While this primacy is defended as essential for independence, it can create significant accountability deficits by resisting external scrutiny and reinforcing a self-governance model.

Challenges in Performance and Governance

• Case Pendency and Limited Metrics: India’s legal system is plagued by a staggering backlog of cases, which erodes the public’s access to justice and confidence in the system. There is a notable absence of standardized performance indicators for judges, such as timeliness or docket management. This lack of clear metrics makes it difficult to hold judges accountable for case delays and inefficiencies.
• Judicial Overreach: The judiciary is often criticized for judicial overreach, where it extends its role beyond interpreting law into the domain of policy-making. While some judicial activism is praised for protecting rights, critics argue that the courts sometimes substitute their judgment for that of democratically elected bodies, raising questions about institutional competence and the separation of powers. This can lead to a public perception that an unelected body is making decisions that rightfully belong to the people’s representatives.
• Limited External Oversight: Unlike many other democracies, India lacks a statutory, independent body to oversee judicial conduct. This leaves judicial oversight to internal, often opaque mechanisms, which critics say allows for a culture of impunity and makes the system vulnerable to a crisis of legitimacy.

REFORMS AND WAY FORWARD

1. Make Judicial Appointments Transparent

• The Collegium system needs to move out of its “closed-room mystery” phase. Clear criteria for merit, diversity, and integrity should be laid down.
• Publishing reasons for appointments and transfers would stop the perception that it is more about “who you know” than “what you know.”

2. Create a Real Disciplinary Mechanism

• Impeachment is so rare in India that it might as well be in the museum of constitutional relics.
• A statutory Judicial Conduct Commission under a revived Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill could handle complaints in a structured, fair, and transparent 

3. Fix Recusal and Disclosure Rules

• Judges should be required to give at least a short reason when stepping away from a case. Silent recusals only fuel speculation.
• Mandatory asset disclosures by judges and their families can prevent conflicts of interest—after all, even Caesar’s wife was expected to be above suspicion.

4. Embrace Technology for Transparency

• Initiatives like e-Courts and FASTER should be expanded to ensure faster case updates, online access to orders, and less room for delay tactics.
• If pizza can be tracked in real time, so should a bail application.

5. Adopt a Cultural Shift Towards Accountability

• A formal judicial code of conduct is needed to remind judges that independence doesn’t mean invisibility.
• Accountability should be seen as strengthening the bench, not undermining it. After all, justice done in darkness will always look suspicious in the light.

CONCLUSION

The Indian judiciary has long been celebrated as the sentinel of the Constitution, safeguarding fundamental rights and ensuring the balance of power among the organs of the State. However, judicial independence, though rightly entrenched as part of the basic structure in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), cannot be equated with immunity from accountability. The persistent opacity in judicial appointments under the Collegium system, the impracticability of impeachment as the sole disciplinary mechanism, and the limited scope of the in-house procedure collectively highlight a structural deficit in accountability. This was most evident in the NJAC Case (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India, 2015), where the Court’s striking down of a democratically enacted reform reinforced judicial primacy but left unanswered the pressing question of how accountability can be meaningfully institutionalized.

The way forward lies in reforms that preserve independence while embedding transparency and responsibility into the judicial framework. Internal reforms must aim at introducing objective and published criteria for appointments, establishing a statutory Judicial Conduct Commission through a revived Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, codifying recusal norms, and mandating asset disclosures to pre-empt conflicts of interest. Additionally, technological initiatives such as e-Courts and FASTER must be expanded to ensure efficiency, accessibility, and public oversight. Such measures would not weaken the judiciary’s autonomy but rather strengthen its institutional legitimacy by shifting from reliance on individual integrity to enforceable systemic safeguards.

In conclusion, judicial accountability should not be viewed as an external imposition but as an intrinsic component of judicial independence itself. An accountable judiciary is not a diminished judiciary; it is a stronger, more credible one. By embracing reforms that align with democratic values of transparency and responsibility, the Indian judiciary can reaffirm its role as the ultimate guardian of constitutional governance while bridging the existing “credibility gap” with the people it serves.

REFERENCES

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