Published On: October 30th 2025
Authored By: Vaibhav Dixit
Chhatrapati Shahuji Maharaj University, Kanpur
Abstract
The Indian judiciary, a cornerstone of the nation’s democratic framework, is at a critical crossroads, balancing its independence with the necessity for institutional accountability. While independence acts as a safeguard against executive and legislative overreach, it can become a shield for misconduct without proper oversight. This report critically examines the effectiveness of existing frameworks by analyzing high-profile cases of alleged judicial misconduct involving Justice Yashwant Varma and Justice Nirmal Yadav. It also highlights systemic vulnerabilities, such as corruption at lower court levels, the lack of transparency in the Collegium system for judicial appointments, and insufficient gender diversity. The report notes internal pressures for reform, citing Justice B.V. Nagaratna’s recent dissent and the ongoing Presidential Reference under Article 143, which reflect a judiciary grappling with the need for change. In conclusion, the analysis suggests that to regain public trust, the judiciary must move beyond self-regulation and embrace fundamental reforms that institutionalize transparency, meritocracy, and accountability without compromising its autonomy.
Introduction: The Foundation of Judicial Independence and Accountability
The principle of an independent judiciary is a fundamental tenet of India’s constitutional democracy, serving as a vital check on the powers of the executive and legislative branches. This separation of powers is intended to safeguard the rights and liberties of citizens by ensuring that judicial decisions are rendered without fear or favor. Judicial independence is not an end in itself but a means to uphold the rule of law and secure a just and fair society. However, as with any institution vested with great power, the judiciary must also be subject to a commensurate degree of accountability.
This core tension between independence and accountability is a defining challenge for the Indian legal system. As former Chief Justice J.S. Verma once observed, “Judicial independence is not a shield for judicial accountability”. The integrity of the judicial system is founded on public trust, which is sustained by the perception that justice is administered with impartiality and honesty. When independence is misconstrued as immunity from scrutiny, it can become a veil for inefficiency, nepotism, and corruption, thereby eroding the very institutional credibility it is meant to protect. Without transparency in its internal functioning, particularly in the domains of appointments and disciplinary actions, the judiciary risks becoming an isolated and unaccountable elite body.
The Constitutional and Institutional Framework for Judicial Accountability
The Constitutional View
The Indian Constitution provides the foundational framework for judicial accountability, most notably through the stringent process for the removal of judges. Articles 124(4) and 217(1)(b) stipulate that a judge of a Supreme Court or High Court, respectively, can be removed from office only through an impeachment process on the grounds of “proven misbehaviour or incapacity”. This constitutional provision is designed to insulate judges from political pressure, ensuring their decisions are not influenced by the threat of arbitrary removal.
Beyond the higher judiciary, the Constitution also provides a clear mechanism for oversight of the subordinate judiciary. Article 235 grants the High Court “control” over all subordinate courts, a provision that acts as a robust enforcement mechanism to hold the lower judiciary responsible. This delegation of control to the High Court maintains the independence of the subordinate judiciary from the executive and legislature, ensuring that accountability is enforced from within the judicial hierarchy itself.
“In-House Procedure”( A Self-Regulatory Mechanism)
In 1997, the Supreme Court of India adopted the “in-house procedure” as a self-regulatory mechanism to address allegations of misconduct against members of the higher judiciary. This procedure empowers the Chief Justice of India (CJI) to receive complaints against Supreme Court judges and Chief Justices of High Courts, while Chief Justices of High Courts are authorized to handle complaints against other High Court judges. Complaints received are forwarded to the appropriate Chief Justice for action.
The in-house procedure for judicial accountability, intended as a preliminary step to impeachment, is highly secretive and lacks public transparency. Its inquiry reports are confidential, and the proceedings are not made public. While it may satisfy legal requirements, it often fails to deliver substantive accountability. The mechanism’s findings are not legally binding, frequently resulting in judges being “advised” or “transferred” rather than facing concrete disciplinary action. A notable example is the case of Justice S.N. Shukla, where an in-house inquiry found allegations of bribery credible, leading to the withdrawal of his judicial work, yet he continued to receive full pay and benefits until retirement without facing any formal disciplinary consequences. This process raises questions about its effectiveness in fostering public trust
In August 2025, the Supreme Court, in dismissing a writ petition filed by Justice Yashwant Varma, affirmed that the in-house procedure has “legal sanctity” and is not a parallel mechanism outside the constitutional framework. This judicial affirmation strengthens the procedure’s legal standing while leaving its opaque nature and non-binding character largely untouched, thereby perpetuating a paradox where the mechanism is legally unassailable but practically toothless.
The Impeachment Process
The impeachment process is a quasi-judicial mechanism that blends legal scrutiny with legislative accountability. It is governed by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, and is initiated by a motion signed by at least 100 members of the Lok Sabha or 50 members of the Rajya Sabha. If the motion is admitted, a three-member inquiry committee—comprising a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice, and a distinguished jurist—investigates the charges. If the committee finds the judge guilty, the motion is debated and must be passed by a special majority in both Houses of Parliament. If successful, the President issues an order for the judge’s removal.
While designed to prevent the arbitrary removal of judges and protect their independence, the process has proven to be politically cumbersome and practically unworkable. Since Independence, not a single judge has ever been successfully impeached or convicted for corruption. In the case of Justice V. Ramaswami in 1993, the first Supreme Court judge to face impeachment, the motion failed despite a judicial committee finding him guilty on 11 of 14 charges. The failure was a result of political abstentions in the Lok Sabha, which prevented the motion from reaching the required special majority. This demonstrates that the ultimate completion of the process is contingent on political will rather than the merits of the case. In other instances, such as those of Justice Soumitra Sen and Justice P.D. Dinakaran, judges facing impeachment motions chose to resign before a parliamentary vote could be finalized, thereby avoiding a formal removal and the associated loss of benefits.
High-Profile Cases of Alleged Judicial Misconduct
The Yashwant Varma Case
The “cash-at-home” scandal involving Allahabad High Court Justice Yashwant Varma represents a critical test for India’s judicial accountability mechanisms. The controversy erupted on March 14, 2025, when firefighters responding to a fire at his official residence in New Delhi reportedly discovered sacks of charred currency notes. While Justice Varma denied any knowledge of the unaccounted cash, the incident triggered a swift and unprecedented administrative response.
Consequently, on May 9, 2025, the CJI formally recommended the initiation of removal proceedings against him, forwarding the inquiry report to the President and Prime Minister. This unprecedented step has cleared the way for a parliamentary impeachment motion. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, on August 7, 2025, dismissed Justice Varma’s writ petition challenging the in-house inquiry report. The Court held that a writ petition challenging the conduct of a sitting judge under this mechanism is not maintainable and that the procedure enjoys legal sanctity, having been “scrupulously followed” by the CJI and the committee. The Court’s ruling, which found no violation of Justice Varma’s fundamental rights, effectively closed the door on his legal challenge and pushed the matter into the political domain.
The Nirmal Yadav Scandal: A Test of Prosecutorial and Judicial Integrity
The “cash-at-judge’s-door” scandal involving Justice Nirmal Yadav of the Punjab and Haryana High Court has been a prolonged case that highlights the immense difficulty of prosecuting corruption allegations against a member of the higher judiciary. The controversy began in August 2008 when a bag containing ₹15 lakh was mistakenly delivered to the residence of another judge, Justice Nirmaljit Kaur, allegedly intended for Justice Nirmal Yadav. An in-house probe by the Supreme Court confirmed the mix-up, and the CJI sanctioned her prosecution. The CBI filed a charge sheet on the day of her retirement, alleging an offense under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
After a 17-year legal battle, a special CBI court acquitted Justice Yadav and three co-accused in March 2025. The court’s verdict was based on its finding that the CBI’s case was built on “fabricated” and untrustworthy testimony from a key witness. The court criticized the CBI for relying on speculation and failing to substantiate its case with solid evidence. In response, the CBI has filed an appeal in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, arguing that the verdict was “perverse” and ignored key circumstantial and direct evidence, including call records and confessional statements. The prolonged nature of this case, its ultimate acquittal, and the subsequent appeal raise serious questions about prosecutorial integrity and the ability of the system to hold judges accountable even when allegations are widely publicized and initially corroborated by internal probes.
Other Notable Cases of Judicial Malpractice
1-Justice Soumitra Sen (Calcutta High Court)
Allegations–Misappropriation of public funds.
Action and Consequencces– Impeachment motion passed by Rajya Sabha. He resigned before the Lok Sabha could vote.
2-Justice P.D. Dinakaran (Sikkim High Court)
Allegations–Corruption, land grabbing, and disproportionate assets.
Action and Consequences– Impeachment motion initiated. He resigned to avoid the inquiry.
3-Justice V. Ramaswami ( Supreme Court of India )
Allegations –Misappropriation of public funds. (First Supreme Court judge to face impeachment.)
Action and Consequences –The motion failed in Lok Sabha as it didn’t get the required two-thirds majority.
4-Justice C.S. Karnan
Reason Contempt of court, making public and unsubstantiated allegations against judges.
Action and Consequences –Sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of court, making him the first sitting High Court judge to be jailed for the offense.
5-Justice S.K. Gangele ( Madhya Pradesh High Court)
Allegations –Sexual harassment of a junior female judge.
Action and Consequences –An impeachment motion was initiated, but a judicial inquiry committee found the charges unproven, and the motion was dropped.
6-Justice Shamit Mukherjee (Delhi High Court)
Allegations –Involvement in a land scam. Arrested by the CBI while a sitting judge.
Action and Consequences –He later resigned from his position.
Systemic Fault Lines: Corruption, Appointments, and Representation
The Rot at the Grassroots: Corruption in the District and Subordinate Judiciary
While high-profile cases garner media attention, the most pervasive form of judicial corruption occurs at the grassroots level. The district and subordinate courts are the primary interface between the judicial system and the common citizen, and they are widely perceived to be plagued by corruption. Surveys indicate an alarming public perception of corruption, with one report showing that 85% of respondents believe the judiciary is either deeply or somewhat corrupt. A 2013 Transparency International report found that 45% of surveyed households viewed the judiciary as corrupt, with Indians giving an average score of 3.3 on a scale of 1 to 5.
The prevalence of corruption at this level is not merely a result of individual venality but a symptom of deep-seated systemic inefficiencies. A staggering backlog of over 5 crore cases across India’s courts creates an environment of interminable delays. Litigants, desperate for timely justice, often pay “speed money” to court officials or intermediaries to expedite hearings or secure favorable orders. A 2007 survey revealed that bribes were most often paid to lawyers (59%) and court officials (30%), with judges themselves receiving a smaller percentage (5%). This suggests a complex ecosystem of corruption where an opaque and inefficient system creates perverse incentives for illicit gain, trapping the public in a cycle of delay and bribery. The judiciary’s own internal mechanism for addressing complaints against judges is also inadequate, with 1631 complaints of judicial corruption received between 2017 and 2021. However, the outcomes of these complaints remain largely unknown to the public.
The Collegium under Scrutiny: Appointments and the Absence of Transparency
The Collegium system, which is used to appoint and transfer judges in India’s top courts, is under heavy criticism because it operates with a lack of transparency. Critics argue that the secret nature of the system promotes nepotism and favoritism over merit, often excluding talented candidates from diverse backgrounds. The criteria for selecting judges are not publicly known, and while the names of the chosen judges are now released, the full reasons behind the decisions are not. This lack of an open and merit-based process damages the public’s trust in the judiciary, especially when serious allegations of corruption are made by respected legal figures. Ultimately, the absence of a clear and accountable system for appointing judges raises questions about the integrity of the institution itself
A Dissenting Voice: Justice B.V. Nagarathna’s Note(2025)
Against this backdrop of institutional opacity, Justice B.V. Nagarathna’s formal dissent against a recent Collegium recommendation has emerged as a powerful statement for internal reform. Justice Nagarathna, who is poised to become the first woman CJI in 2027, issued a dissenting note against the elevation of Justice Vipul Pancholi to the apex court.
Although her dissent has not been made public, reports indicate her concerns centered on principles of seniority, regional representation, and institutional credibility. She reportedly argued that the appointment would be “counterproductive” to the administration of justice and would “damage whatever credibility the collegium system still holds”. The appointment of Justice Pancholi reportedly superseded 56 High Court judges, including 21 Chief Justices, and overlooked judges from underrepresented High Courts and minority communities. The fact that her dissent was suppressed, despite her explicit request for its public release, demonstrates a profound institutional resistance to internal transparency. Her intervention should be viewed not as a destabilizing act but as a constitutional demand for a more open, fair, and accountable system from within the judiciary itself.
The Lack of Women’s Representation in the Judiciary
The lack of diversity, particularly gender representation, is another critical systemic fault line that undermines the judiciary’s legitimacy and public trust. The gender gap in the Indian judiciary remains alarmingly wide, reflecting a system that has long been a “man’s world”.
As of 2025, there were only four women judges in the Supreme Court out of a total of 34. Women’s representation in the High Courts stands at a mere 11.8%. While the subordinate courts show representation at 36.3%, the disproportionate gap at the higher levels of the judiciary is a cause for serious concern. The lack of women in leadership positions is even more stark, with only one woman serving as a Chief Justice in a High Court. The absence of women’s voices and perspectives at all levels of the judiciary, particularly in a country where women constitute nearly half of the population, undermines the institution’s claim to be a representative of all citizens. While the possibility of Justice B.V. Nagarathna becoming the first female CJI in 2027 is a landmark moment, her anticipated short tenure of 36 days underscores the long journey ahead for achieving true gender parity in the legal system.
The Presidential Reference: A Constitutional Clash over Separation of Powers
The ongoing Presidential Reference case under Article 143 of the Constitution is a high-stakes constitutional standoff that tests the very limits of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers. The reference was invoked on May 13, 2025, by President Droupadi Murmu, seeking the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion on 14 questions concerning the powers of Governors and the President regarding their assent to bills.
This action was a direct consequence of the Supreme Court’s April 8, 2025, judgment in the State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu case. In that landmark ruling, the Supreme Court found the Governor’s indefinite delay in granting assent to 10 bills passed by the state legislature to be “illegal” and “erroneous”. The Court clarified that the Governor has only three constitutional options: grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve the bill for the President’s consideration. It further stipulated that the Governor has no “absolute veto” and must grant assent to bills that are re-enacted by the state assembly. Most significantly, the Court set specific, judicially enforceable timelines for the Governor to act, a move that was seen by many as a form of judicial overreach.
During the subsequent hearings Several states, including West Bengal, Himachal Pradesh, and Karnataka, are challenging the discretionary powers of their Governors. Their lawyers argue that a Governor is merely a “titular head” with no real power to stop or delay laws passed by the state legislature, which represents the will of the people. This ongoing legal dispute is significant because its outcome in the Presidential Reference will redefine the balance of power in India’s federal structure, creating clearer rules about how Governors can interact with state governments and ultimately leading to a more predictable legislative process.
Conclusion
The Indian judiciary faces a serious crisis of accountability due to a lack of effective mechanisms for addressing judicial misconduct. The current impeachment process is politically unworkable, while the internal ‘in-house procedure’ is secretive and non-binding, allowing judges to avoid consequences. This failure to hold judges accountable at the top contributes to widespread corruption and a massive case backlog at lower court levels. The judiciary’s resistance to change is also seen in the opaque Collegium system for appointments and the suppression of internal dissent. To regain public trust, the report recommends a multi-layered reform: creating a new, transparent Judicial Conduct Commission to replace the current internal process; reforming the Collegium system to be more merit-based and diverse; and addressing grassroots corruption by increasing the number of judges, improving infrastructure, and using technology to reduce the case backlog. The report concludes that judicial independence must be paired with genuine accountability and transparency.
References
- Constitution of India 1950, art 124(4).
- Constitution of India 1950, art 217(1)(b)
- Constitution of India 1950, art 235.
- In re Justice V Ramaswami (1993) SC.
- Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968.
- Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.
- Justice Soumitra Sen, In re (2011) SC.
- Justice PD Dinakaran, In re (2011) SC.
- Justice CS Karnan v Supreme Court of India (2017) 7 SCC 1.
- Central Bureau of Investigation v Justice Nirmal Yadav (2025) CBI Special Court (Chandigarh).
- Justice Yashwant Varma v Supreme Court of India (2025) SC.
- Transparency International India, ‘India Corruption Study 2007’ (Transparency International, 2007) (https://www.transparency.org) (accessed 10 September 2025).
- Transparency International, ‘Global Corruption Barometer Report 2013: India’ (2013) (https://www.transparency.org) (accessed 11 September 2025).
- Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, ‘Judicial Accountability Reports’ (2024) (https://lawmin.gov.in) accessed 10 September 2025.
- JN Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (Central Law Agency)(2023).
- State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) SC.
- Justice SN Shukla, In re (2019) SC.
