Published On: 11th February, 2025
Authored By: Kesar Prakash Sukali
Vivekananda Education Society College of Law
TITLE AND CITATION
Title: Air India Etc. Etc vs Nergesh Meerza & Ors. Etc. Etc on 28 August 1981.
Equivalent citations: 1981 AIR 1829, 1982 SCR (1) 438, AIR 1981 SUPREME COURT 1829, 1981 LAB. I. C. 1313, (1981) 2 LAB LN 572, 1981 (4) SCC 335, (1981) 2 SERVLJ 349, 1981 SCC (L&S) 599, (1981) 2 LABLJ 314[1]
INTRODUCTION
The case of Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981), therefore, stands as one of the landmark cases in Indian legal history, confronting the widespread issue of gender discrimination in the employment practices of the airline industry. Emerging as one of the commendable and stout defenses against a deeply rooted prejudice in the workplace, the case was brought forward by Nergesh Meerza: women flight attendants contested the constitutionality of some discriminatory regulations that Air India imposed on them. Such regulations called for the retirement of air hostesses at the age of 35, on marriage within four years of service, or on their first pregnancy-things that exempted men from any encumbrance.
The petitioners maintained that the provisions went against the fundamental rights guaranteed to them in Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Indian Constitution, which provided for equality before the law, prohibited discrimination based on sex, and provided for equal opportunities in public employment. Not only was it a true reflection of deep-rooted gender stereotypes, the same also represented an inequality that was systemic concerning both pay scales and promotional opportunities accorded to and available to male and female employees.
This case became a milestone in labor and constitutional law in the country and marked the conflict between traditional gender roles and modern approaches to equality. The judgment of the Supreme Court was balanced, making way for reasonable job-related classifications but utterly condemning arbitrary and discriminatory practices.
Essentially, Air India vs Nergesh Meerza is the turning point in the battle against gender inequalities across workplaces in India. It unveiled the still-greater societal reluctance to embrace tenets of fairness and impartiality, which were deeply grounded in centuries of patriarchal norms. The case has now expanded beyond the aviation industry to serve as a rallying point towards the litigation of similar discriminatory policies across sectors.
This judgment engages gender bias and inequality at the workplace level and lays the groundwork for progressive interpretations of constitutional equality. It reminds us that the pursuit of justice entails not just the dismantling of overt discrimination but also those subtle societal structures through which inequalities persist in an era when modernization has made everything more accessible and globally linked. Essentially, Air India vs Nergesh Meerza is the turning point in the battle against gender inequalities across workplaces in India. It unveiled the still-greater societal reluctance to embrace tenets of fairness and impartiality, which were deeply grounded in centuries of patriarchal norms. The case has now expanded beyond the aviation industry to serve as a rallying point towards the litigation of similar discriminatory policies across sectors.
This judgment engages gender bias and inequality at the workplace level and lays the groundwork for progressive interpretations of constitutional equality. It reminds us that the pursuit of justice entails not just the dismantling of overt discrimination but also those subtle societal structures through which inequalities persist in an era when modernization has made everything more accessible and globally linked.
FACTS OF THE CASE
According to Section 3 of the Air Corporation Act of 1953[2], the Central Government has constituted two corporations, namely Air India International and Indian Airlines. Air India was for international flights and India Air Lines (IAC) was for servicing the domestic routes inside the country. Membership of the hostesses of Air India was under the purview of Regulations 46 and 47 of the Air India Employees Service Regulations.[3]
On the other side, Indian Airlines Service Regulation No. 12 governed the air hostess employees of IAC. The specifications for retirement from Air India for its Air Hostesses are as follows:
(a) Age of 35 years.
(b) Within four years of entering the service, if they got married.
(c) On the first pregnancy.
The petitioners contended that such regulations were violative of their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21.[4]
For example, while Flight Pursers (male cabin crew) had a retirement age of 58 years according to Regulation 46, Air Hostesses were required to retire at 35 years of age, or upon marrying (if they married within four years of entering the service), or upon having their first baby, whichever occurred sooner.
Regulation 47 allowed for this to be extended solely at the Managing Director’s discretion.
The initial proceedings were held in front of two tribunals that upheld the rules, which justified using ‘young and attractive’ air hostesses to manage temperamental customers.
Numerous petitions, including that of Nergesh Meerza, an employee of Air India, along with other air hostesses were pending in the High Court of Bombay questioning the validity of these regulations when Air India moved to SC to decide all such petitions under one judgment as they all raise the same question of law.
ISSUES RAISED
- Do Regulations 46 and 47 therefore violate Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution of India and are thus ultra vires in whole or part?
- Whether the discretionary powers accorded to the Managing Director to extend the service of Air Hostesses, as mentioned under Regulation 47, can be perceived as an excessive delegation of authority.
- Whether the discrimination in services between the male and female was justified as a reasonable classification under Article 14?
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
Arguments raised by the appellate:
- Distinct Classification:
According to Air India, air hostesses and male pursers have distinct occupations and thus should be classified differently. This is in terms of the differences in their job functions; recruitment criteria; qualifications; promotion paths; and conditions of retirement. The company claimed that Article 14, which prohibits discrimination among equals, does not apply because male pursers and air hostesses are not in the same class.
- Sex Based Recruitment:
It maintained that air hostess recruitment did not involve recruitment based solely on sex, but on other factors hence the application of Article 15(2) was not in order
- Validity of the Regulations:
Air India defended the constitutionality of Regulation 46 of the Air-India Employees’ Service Regulations and Regulation 12 of the Indian Airlines (Flying Crew) Services Regulations. The corporation stated that those regulations had stood validated by Khosla and Mahesh Awards, which have statutory authority, and thus were neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.
- Reasonable Restrictions:
Marriage and pregnancy were mentioned as reasonable restrictions imposed in the public interest. The restrictions were justified as Air India posits that the operational challenges resulting from post-marriage household responsibilities may affect performance and efficiency due to prenatal status or extremely short maternity leave.
- Operational hindrances:
The corporation highlighted that practically and financially, it would have faced enormous difficulties under the removal of restrictions on marriage and pregnancy. These include long periods of leave and incurred costs in search of replacements for air hostesses incapacitated from performing their duties.
Putting it simply, Air India asserted that it had enacted reasonable classifications and practical considerations as the basis of its rules and therefore did not violate Articles 14 or 15 of the Constitution. The corporation has contended that such divergences in the service conditions were justified as well as necessary for maintaining efficiency in the operation.
Arguments raised by the respondent:
- Equality in Service Roles:
It was argued that AHs and Airline Flight Pursers (AFPs) had the same class of service by actually performing similar or identical duties. Thus, any form of differentiation or discrimination between these two groups was an affront to the right of equality as guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.
- Interservice discrimination:
Differential treatment was also meted out to AHs in India-terminated flights for the United Kingdom, proving yet again the discrimination in their service conditions and arbitrariness.
- Hostile Sex Discrimination:
They were also discriminated against on a hostile basis because of gender or disabilities caused by gender-specific conditions for example pregnancy. This was said to violate Articles 15(1) and 16 of the Constitution which provide against discrimination on grounds of sex
- Unreasonable Termination Policies:
It was stated that termination of AH service because of pregnancy or marriage within four years of entering the service was unreasonable, arbitrary, and a violation of Article 14.
- Denial of promotional opportunities:
Promotional avenues, usually available to male cabin crew members, were systematically denied to AHs, thus reinforcing the discriminatory treatment within the service structure.
In brief, the AHs contended that the various discriminatory practices in Air India violated their rights under the Constitution, such as treatment bias, arbitrary termination policies, and gender-based denial of opportunities.
JUDGEMENT
This subject has been taken by the Supreme Court for the sake of Air India regulations on government retirement age and conditions for air hostesses. The Court found such regulations to be arbitrarily discriminatory but did not strike down the regulations as a whole.[5]
It, however, invalidated certain provisions: abridgment of retirement by one portion of Regulation 47 made undue discretion to manage a service extension under the Managing Director. So, once medically fit, air hostesses should receive automatic extensions. Such a fact has been corroborated by the Hon’ble Court in holding that, “Under the provision, as it stands, the extension of the retirement of an air hostess is entirely at the mercy and sweet will of the Managing Director. The conferment of such a wide and uncontrolled power on the Managing Director is violative of Art. 14, as the provision suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of powers. For these reasons, therefore, we have no alternative but to strike down as invalid that part of Regulation 47 which gives the option to the Managing Director to extend the service of an air hostess.”[6]
The Court also struck down Regulation 46(i)(c)-which demanded an air hostess’s retirement after the very first pregnancy unconstitutional and contravening Article 14. The court stated, “It seems to us that the termination of the services of an AH under such circumstances is not only a callous and cruel act but an open insult to Indian womanhood, the most sacrosanct and cherished institution.”[7]
It will be recalled that under Article 14, although hostile discrimination is prohibited, reasonable classification is permitted, that is, those different classes with distinct conditions of service shall not be subjected to the same standards of equality.
The argument that asserted that the conditions of service for air hostesses were discriminatory on account of sex has been overruled, as the provisions providing for termination on account of pregnancy were found to be harsh and immoral, the Court suggests that steps be taken to ameliorate such conditions of work.
The judgment will ascertain the fair regulatory practices that must be there and at the same time address the problem of excessive discretionary power, emphasizing employment regulations to conform with constitutional principles and modern standards of equality.
All in all, the judgment ultimately marked a very important milestone toward correcting gender-based discrimination in employment and establishing an appropriate balance between reasonable classification and the need for equality and fairness.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The matter has considerable importance in the cause of employment law and gender equality jurisprudence in India. There are some areas where the judgment may bring progress, but it also shows the limitations and other lost possibilities in challenging some embedded discriminatory features.
Progressive Elements of the Judgement
- Invalidation of Discriminatory Provisions
The judgment that invalidated the discriminatory provision requiring the termination of air hostesses on the first pregnancy was essentially a recognition of the rights of women. It made clear that such measures were inherently arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This highlighted the need to align workplace policies with these ideals of gender equality and human dignity.
- Recognition of Arbitrariness in Regulations
The Court emphasized that certain provisions were arbitrary and paved the way for developing jurisprudence, which would demand consideration in the formation of rules with respect to employment-related matters. In other words, it implied that, from now on, the stereotypical notions of women concerning their work competency and positioning have to be discarded in determining where they have to go professionally.
Missed Opportunities and Limitations
- Retention of Retirement Age Regulation
The Court invalidated some of the provisions on discrimination but upheld the retirement age of 35 years for air hostesses in distinction from male pursers. It showed how unwilling the Court was to accept fully the principles of substantive equality and continued holding on to archaic ideas justifying differential treatment on a sex basis. The recognition of obsolescence as regards social changes and changing dynamics of work was indicative of conservativeness.
- Misinterpretation of Article 15(1)
It adopted a narrow interpretation of Article 15(1) that sex discrimination plus “other considerations” `does not come under the Article. This formalistic treatment did not interrogate those other considerations, which themselves were rooted in sex-based stereotypes. So, by rejecting the claim of sex discrimination, the Court missed the opportunity to redress structural biases in service regulations.
- Not Recognizing Structural Discrimination
The judgment kept at bay the fact that structural inequalities damage women disproportionately. The very idea of forming separate cadres for air hostesses and pursers along the different conditions of service was not sufficiently critiqued. This classification itself, based on stereotypical roles and social constructs, created systemic disadvantages.
- Subsequent Developments in Jurisprudence
The recent judgments of the Union of India in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India and Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India have highlighted the inadequacies pervading Nergesh Meerza. The judgments were seen to have shifted the focus towards admitting the phenomena of indirect and structural discrimination under the rights-based conception of substantive equality. The concurring views of Justice Chandrachud played a significant role in breaking stereotypes and offering a liberal interpretation of Article 15.
For Example:
In Navtej Singh Johar, the Court’s interpretation of “only” in Article 15(1) was termed formalistic; with the finding that discrimination based on an intersection or stereotype is still contrary to principles of equality.[8]
In Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, the Court stated that the law would not excuse the gender role assigned and practiced by society from being discriminatory.[9].
Lt. Col. Nitisha brought forth the Fraser test: disproportional disadvantage by such policies that enhance and continue systemic inequality. Consequently, such jurisprudence falls in line with global standards of equality.
To exemplify, Nergesh Meerza was also a landmark judgment for the times in which it was pronounced. That itself, however, highlighted the problem of matching established practices with constitutional principles. Because of the partial dependence of the Court on traditional norms of gender, the need for a much more radical policy on employment equality emerged. Other developments in law show the mark’s increasingly substantive form, which speaks of indirect discrimination as one such signal of delay long overdue in the evolution of India’s constitutional framework.[10]
CONCLUSION
This kind of discrimination is social–amiss where men and women do not enjoy equal rights and stand discriminated against on grounds of gender. ‘In full view, society houses them in countless ways.
The case concerns the perception that after 35 years of age, women have lost their youthfulness and glamor. Hence, the retirement age for the air hostesses was fixed at 35 years. Very obviously, the clause is unreasonable regarding pregnancies and marriages at times of retirement, making it unconstitutional.
The court also invalidated those provisions that stood in stark violation of Articles 14, 15, and 16 for the basic rights of women. Regulation 47 was, Similarly, deemed void on misuse of authority by MDs.[11]
Reference(s):
[1] Indian Kanoon
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1903603/
[2] Air Corporation Act, 1953, Section 3
[3] Air India Employees Service Regulations
[4] Constitution of India, Art 14, 15 and 21
[5] Aishwarya Agrawal, Air India vs Nargesh Meerza, July 8,2023
https://lawbhoomi.com/air-india-v-nargesh-meerza/
[6] Indian Kanoon
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1903603/
[7] Khushboo Bansal, Case Comment: Air India vs Nergesh Meerza, August 14, 2024
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/case-comment-air-india-vs-nergesh-meerza-and-ors/
[8] Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, 2018.
[9] Anuj Garg and Ors v Hotel Association of India and Ors, 6th December, 2007.
[10] National Law University Odisha, Revisiting Air India v Nergesh Meerza from a feminist and intersectional prism
[11] Legalvidhiya, AIR INDIA v. NARGESH MEERZA, 1981, Unconstitutionality of clause regarding retirement and pregnancy, 8 April 2008.
