Mizaji vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 1958

INTRODUCTION

An unlawful assembly refers to a group of individuals united by a shared goal to commit a crime using force, including the illegal seizure of property. Even if an assembly starts as lawful, it can evolve into an unlawful one. Murder, on the other hand, is defined as the illegal killing of another person. The concept of “common object” differs significantly from “common intention.” For a group to be considered as acting with a common object, it must consist of at least five members, and mere membership in the group is enough for liability. In contrast, “common intention” requires at least two participants, with each member actively involved in the criminal act. This case highlights the significance of the common object in determining liability for offenses, illustrating its crucial role in the context of unlawful assembly and murder[1].

FACTS

On December 18, 1958, the judgment of the Court was delivered by Kapur, J., involving two appeals stemming from the same judgment and order of the High Court at Allahabad. The appeals involved a common question of law and addressed the convictions and sentences of several individuals, including Tej Singh, Mizaji, Subedar, Machal, and Maiku. These individuals were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for their involvement in a violent confrontation leading to the murder of Rameshwar.

Tej Singh and Mizaji were father and son, respectively; Subedar was Tej Singh’s nephew; Machal was his cousin; and Maiku was Tej Singh’s servant. Alongside the murder charge, they were convicted of rioting under Section 147 of the IPC. Tej Singh and Mizaji, who were armed with a spear and a pistol, were sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 148 of the IPC, while the others, armed with lathis, were sentenced to two years under Section 147 of the IPC. Mizaji’s term of imprisonment was set to conclude only upon his execution.

The offenses occurred on July 27, 1957, at sunrise, involving a dispute over field No. 1096, known as Sukhna Field. The field was originally recorded in the name of Banwari, who had mortgaged it to Lakhan Singh in 1949. By 1953, the mortgage was redeemed, and the field was under the cultivation of Rameshwar (the deceased) and four others: Ram Sarup (Rameshwar’s uncle), Jailal (his brother), Sita Ram, and Saddon. Despite the redemption, Banwari’s ownership was contested.

On April 18, 1957, Banwari sold the field to Tej Singh, who sought to have the land mutated in his name. This action was contested by the deceased and the other occupants. On the morning of July 27, 1957, the appellants arrived at the field armed with weapons. Mizaji carried a pistol in the fold of his dhoti, while Tej Singh had a spear. They brought a plough, a plank, and bullocks to the field. The field was divided into three portions: one with a sugarcane crop, one sown with Jowar, and the rest uncultivated.

Maiku began ploughing the Jowar field, causing damage to the crop, while Tej Singh stood watch. When Ram Sarup and his companions arrived and inquired about the destruction of the crop, Tej Singh claimed ownership and refused to stop. This led to an altercation, during which Mizaji, under Tej Singh’s instigation, fired his pistol, injuring Rameshwar, who succumbed to his injuries an hour later.

Following the incident, the accused fled the scene. An FIR was lodged by Ram Sarup at 7:30 a.m., naming all five accused. Despite initial difficulties in locating the accused, they eventually appeared in court between August 3 and August 14, 1957. The prosecution relied on eyewitnesses and Bateshwar’s testimony, while the defense claimed the murder occurred during a dacoity at Ram Sarup’s house.

The Sessions Judge accepted the prosecution’s case, concluding that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of forcibly taking possession of the field, even to the extent of causing death if necessary. The High Court affirmed these convictions and sentences, finding that the appellants were fully prepared to commit murder if required to achieve their objective[2].

ISSUES

1. Whether the case warranted the imposition of the death penalty for the brutal act committed by Mizaji.
2. Whether Pavitri Devi was correctly convicted under Section 34 of the IPC in the context of the case.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

Jai Gopal Sethi and B.C. Misra represented the appellants, arguing that the High Court erred in inferring that the other members of the party were aware of Mizaji’s pistol. They conceded that Tej Singh knew of the pistol but contended that the rest of the assembly may not have been aware. They argued that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to forcibly take possession of the land, not to commit murder.

The appellants’ counsel emphasized that the common object was indeed to take possession of the field. They argued that the murder was neither committed in prosecution of this common object nor was it something the members knew was likely to occur. They referred to the weapons carried by the accused: a spear by Tej Singh, a pistol by Mizaji, and lathis by the others. The counsel argued that these weapons were intended to intimidate, not necessarily to commit murder.

The counsel cited Queen v. Sabed Ali (1873)[3], arguing that Section 149 of the IPC was inapplicable. In that case, the unlawful assembly did not intend to commit murder, and the murder was a result of unexpected resistance, which did not align with the common object. They also referenced Chikkarange Gowde and Ors. v. State of Mysore (1956)[4], where the Supreme Court held that the charge under Section 149 was unsustainable due to improper framing and insufficient notice to the accused. They argued that similarly, in this case, the murder was not a foreseeable consequence of the common object.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

Represented by G.C. Mathur and C.P. Lal, the respondents argued that the High Court correctly found that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of forcibly taking possession of the field. The prosecution established that the appellants were armed and prepared to use deadly force if necessary.

The respondents contended that the appellants’ preparation and conduct indicated their readiness to commit murder to achieve their objective. Eyewitnesses testified that the appellants threatened the complainants and were ready to resort to violence. The respondents argued that this demonstrated the appellants’ preparedness to go to the extent of committing murder.

They also argued that the High Court’s findings aligned with the precedent set in Queen v. Sabid Ali and Chikkarange Gowde. The High Court found that the common object was indeed to take forcible possession, and murder was a foreseeable consequence of this objective, given the appellants’ conduct and weaponry.

RATION OF THE CASE

The Supreme Court had to determine whether the murder of Rameshwar was committed in furtherance of the common object of the unlawful assembly and whether the common object included the possibility of committing murder.

The Court observed that the appellants went to the field armed with various weapons, including a pistol, spear, and lathis, demonstrating their readiness to use force. The Court found that the unlawful assembly’s common object was to forcibly take possession of the field, and this included the potential to commit murder if necessary.

The Court distinguished the case from Queen v. Sabid Ali, noting that in that case, the murder occurred due to an unexpected counter-attack, whereas in Mizaji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the appellants were not responding to an unexpected event but were the aggressors prepared to use deadly force. The Court also differentiated from Chikkarange Gowde, where the charge was improperly framed. In Mizaji, the charge under Section 149 was clear and based on the collective actions and intent of the appellants.

The Court found that the appellants, including Mizaji, were liable for murder under Section 149 of the IPC. Mizaji’s use of the pistol was in line with the common object of the unlawful assembly, and thus he was held responsible for the murder. The Court concluded that the death penalty for Mizaji was appropriate given his direct involvement in the murder, while the other appellants were sentenced to life imprisonment for their roles in the unlawful assembly[5].

JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court upheld the convictions under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC. The Court agreed that the appellants formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of forcibly taking possession of the land and were prepared to commit murder if required. Mizaji’s direct involvement in the murder warranted the death penalty, while the other appellants were sentenced to life imprisonment for their collective liability under Section 149.

The Court held that there were no mitigating circumstances for Mizaji, given the premeditated nature of the crime. The death sentence was deemed appropriate for his role in the murder, while the other appellants were found guilty of unlawful assembly and sentenced to life imprisonment.

CONCLUSION

In Mizaji v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court reinforced the principle that the liability of members of an unlawful assembly under Section 149 of the IPC extends to offenses committed in furtherance of the common object, including murder if it is a foreseeable consequence. The case underscored the importance of assessing the intent and preparedness of the assembly in determining liability and sentencing. Mizaji’s direct involvement in the murder, coupled with the assembly’s readiness to use deadly force, justified the imposition of the death penalty, while the other appellants were appropriately sentenced to life imprisonment.

References:

[1] Shraddha Jindal, ‘Mizazi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh: Case Summary’, EjusticeIndia (April 20, 2021), https://www.ejusticeindia.com/mizazi-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh-case-summary/

[2] J.L. Kapur, ‘Mizaji And Another vs The State Of U.P on 18 December, 1958’, Indian Kanoon, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/902660/

[3] Queen vs. Sabed Ali and Others, (1857), (India)

[4] Chikkarange Gowda And Ors. vs State Of Mysore, (1956), AIR 1956 SC 731, (India)

[5] Harry Rana, MIZAJI vs STATE OF UP Case Summary 1959 SC, Lawplanet (September 12, 2021), https://lawplanet.in/mizaji-vs-state-of-up-case-summary/