Published on: 01st February 2026
Authored By: Sonali Ravindra Takankhar
Manikchand Pahade Law College, Ch. Sambhajinagar
Citation: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 SCR (3) 844.¹
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and others
INTRODUCTION
The Shah Bano case is one of the most prominent and widely debated decisions in post-independence Indian jurisprudence. Delivered by the Supreme Court of India in 1985, the judgment addressed whether a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), a secular provision designed to prevent destitution. The Court’s decision in favour of Shah Bano gave rise to intense public debate, legislative action, and long-term implications for the interaction between personal laws, constitutional guarantees, and gender justice.
Background of the Case
Shah Bano, born in 1916, married Mohammed Ahmed Khan, who was a well-known advocate in Indore. The couple lived together for over forty years and had five children. In 1975, Shah Bano was forced out of the matrimonial home and compelled to live separately. As an elderly woman with limited means of livelihood, she approached the court under Section 125 CrPC, which allows any person—irrespective of religion—to claim maintenance from their spouse if they cannot maintain themselves. Initially, her husband was paying her Rs. 200 per month, but he later stopped and argued that, under Muslim personal law, he was only required to maintain her during the iddat period (a waiting period after divorce), not beyond that. In 1978, while the maintenance case was pending, he divorced her by pronouncing triple talaq and argued that his only legal responsibility was to pay the Mehr (dower), which in this case was a modest sum of Rs. 3,000.
Feeling deprived, Shah Bano fought for her right to maintenance, leading to legal proceedings that eventually reached the Supreme Court of India.
FACTS
Shah Bano, an elderly Muslim woman, had been married to Mohammed Ahmed Khan for several decades. In 1975, she was driven out of the matrimonial home and sought maintenance under Section 125 CrPC on the ground that she was unable to support herself. Her husband initially paid Rs. 200 per month but later ceased payments and, during the pendency of the maintenance proceedings, pronounced talaq (triple talaq). He maintained that under Muslim personal law his obligation to maintain his divorced wife ceased after the iddat (waiting) period and that payment of mehr (dower) discharged his obligations. Shah Bano contested this position and claimed maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.
LEGAL ISSUES
- Whether Section 125 CrPC applies to Muslim women seeking maintenance after divorce.
2. Whether a Muslim husband’s obligation to maintain his divorced wife ends with the iddat period.
3. Whether payment of Mehr constitutes a full and final settlement of all financial obligations on divorce.
4. Whether personal law can override secular welfare provisions aimed at preventing destitution.
ARGUMENTS
Arguments for the Husband:
– He contended that Muslim personal law governed matrimonial relations and limited a husband’s maintenance obligation to the iddat period.
– Payment of mehr was argued to be a complete settlement of post-divorce claims.
– It was further argued that Section 125 CrPC was not intended to intrude upon personal laws and that enforcing maintenance beyond iddat would impinge on religious freedom under Article 25 of the Constitution.
Arguments for Shah Bano:
– Shah Bano’s counsel argued that Section 125 CrPC is a secular, humanitarian provision applicable to all citizens regardless of religion and is intended to prevent destitution.
– Mehr was not maintenance but a distinct obligation; it did not relieve the husband of continuing responsibility where the wife remained unable to maintain herself.
– The case raised issues of social justice and equality; constitutional values required the protection of vulnerable women irrespective of their religion.
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, held that Section 125 CrPC is a secular provision and applies to all citizens, including Muslim women. The Court ruled that a divorced Muslim woman who is unable to maintain herself is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 even after the iddat period. The Court further clarified that the payment of mehr does not replace the liability to provide maintenance. The judgment emphasized the humanitarian purpose of Section 125 CrPC and the need to prevent destitution, stressing that personal law cannot override the secular welfare provisions contained in the statute.
RATIONALE (RATIO DECIDENDI)
- Secular Nature of Section 125: The Court interpreted Section 125 broadly as a social welfare provision that is neutral to religion; its object is to prevent vagrancy and destitution.
2. Distinction between Mehr and Maintenance: The Court held that mehr is a contractual or ceremonial obligation distinct from ongoing maintenance; it is not a substitute for maintenance where a divorced wife is helpless.
3. Constitutional Values and Social Welfare: The Court relied on constitutional principles of equality, social welfare (Articles 15, 21, and Directive Principles such as Articles 38 and 39) to justify extending the protection of Section 125 to women of all religions.
4. Interpretation of Personal Law: While recognizing personal laws, the Court observed that where a secular law exists to secure basic social welfare and prevent starvation, it will apply across religions.
SIGNIFICANCE AND IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH
The judgment brought the plight of divorced Muslim women into national focus and generated significant political, religious, and social reactions. Conservative sections within the Muslim community protested the judgment as an interference with Muslim personal law. The political fallout prompted the Legislature to enact the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which sought to clarify that the liability of a Muslim husband to provide maintenance to his divorced wife is limited to the iddat period and that beyond iddat the divorced woman should seek maintenance from her relatives or the Waqf Board. The 1986 Act was widely criticized as being motivated by appeasement politics and for undermining the broader protection the Supreme Court had afforded under Section 125.
LONGER-TERM IMPACT
Although the 1986 Act narrowed the effect of Shah Bano, later judicial developments softened the legislative impact. In Danial Latifi v. Union of India (2001),² the Supreme Court read the 1986 Act in a manner that ensured divorced Muslim women could still receive maintenance beyond iddat through a ‘reasonable and fair provision’ obligation on the husband, thus restoring substantive protection consistent with Shah Bano’s spirit. The Shah Bano case also influenced the broader discourse on the Uniform Civil Code and the protection of women’s rights under constitutional guarantees. Importantly, the case contributed to an evolving jurisprudence on Muslim personal law, which culminated in developments like the 2017 judgment in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (striking down instant triple talaq).³
CRITICISMS
- Charges of Judicial Overreach: Critics argued that the Supreme Court’s approach involved detailed engagement with religious texts and that the decision risked judicial overreach into matters of faith.
2. Lack of Sensitivity to Minority Concerns: Some commentators and political actors argued that the judgment did not sufficiently address the apprehensions of a minority community about state intrusion into their personal laws.
3. Politicisation of Personal Law Reform: The controversy demonstrated how reform of personal laws quickly becomes politicised, diverting attention from substantive gender justice to communal rhetoric.
4. Implementation Challenges: Administratively, ensuring maintenance for divorced women—across communities and regions—posed practical enforcement difficulties.
ANALYSIS AND LESSONS FOR INTERNS
- Understand Statutory Purpose: Section 125 must be read keeping its humanitarian purpose in view. When drafting notes or memos, interns should emphasise object and purpose rather than narrow literalism.
2. Separation of Concepts: Appreciate legal distinctions (e.g., mehr vs. maintenance). Clarity on such differences can change the legal outcome.
3. Constitutional Context Matters: Link statutory interpretation to constitutional values—equality, dignity, and social justice—when analyzing case law.
4. Expecting Legislative Response: Major judicial pronouncements on personal law often trigger legislative responses. Be prepared to track subsequent statutes and judicial interpretations (e.g., Danial Latifi).
5. Research Skills: For internship assignments, always cross-reference primary sources (judgments, statutes) and reliable commentaries; be ready to cite them in Bluebook style.
CONCLUSION
The Shah Bano judgment remains a landmark in Indian legal history. It affirmed the application of a secular, welfare-oriented provision to protect vulnerable persons irrespective of religion. While the political and legislative reaction to the judgment complicated its immediate application, subsequent judicial interpretations have preserved much of its protective intent. For law interns, the case is a rich study in statutory interpretation, constitutional values, the interplay between personal laws and secular statutes, and the socio-political context that shapes legal reform.
REFERENCES (BLUEBOOK STYLE)
- Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 SCR (3) 844.
2. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (India).
3. Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740.
4. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 (striking down instant triple talaq).
5. For commentary: C. Hamilton, ‘Women and Personal Law in India’ (Journal of Indian Law Studies, 1990) (example).
FOOTNOTES
- Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 SCR (3) 844.
2. Danial Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740.
3. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
