Published On: 15th October, 2023
Olga Tellis & Ors v. Bombay Municipal Corporation
FACTS
In the case Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [1], the state of Maharashtra and the BMC resolved to expel squatters and pavement dwellers from Bombay in 1981.
By it, Mr. A. R. Antulay, the then-chief minister of Maharashtra, issued an order on July 13 ordering the eviction of pavement and slum residents from Bombay and their deportation to their country of origin.
According to Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888, the eviction was to take place.
Upon learning of the Chief Minister’s pronouncement, they filed a writ suit in the High Court of Bombay, asking for an order of injunction preventing the officers of the State Government and the Bombay Municipal Corporations from acting in the manner in question.
An ad interim injunction was issued by the High Court of Bombay and would be in effect until July 21, 1981. It was agreed by the respondents that the huts wouldn’t be pulled down until October 15, 1981. In violation of the agreement, petitioners were packed into State Transport buses on July 23, 1981, and expelled from Bombay.
The petitioner objected to the respondent’s action because it contravenes Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Additionally, they requested a declaration that Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution are violated by Sections 312, 313, and 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act of 1888.
ISSUES INVOLVED
The following were the issues that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in this decision took into consideration:
- Question of Estoppels against fundamental rights or Waiver of Fundamental Rights?
- Scope of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution?
- Constitutionality of provisions of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.
- Whether pavement dwellers are “trespassers” under IPC.
ARGUMENTS RESPONDENT
According to the defense attorney, the occupants of the pavement agreed to the High Court that they did not assert any fundamental right to erect cabins on sidewalks or public roadways and that they would not stop their demolition once the date had passed.
Comments of the Court.
The Constitution cannot be diminished, and neither can fundamental rights.
No one can exchange the freedoms that the Constitution grants him, the court ruled. He cannot be barred from asserting a particular basic right in this action or any other proceeding in the future due to a concession he made in a previous proceeding, whether due to a legal error or otherwise. If such a concession is made.
PETITIONERS
The council argued on behalf of the applicant that the “right to life” protected by Article 21 encompassed the right to a means of support and that if he were forced out of his slum and its sidewalks, it would deprive him of his rights to life and be therefore unconstitutional.
COURT OBSERVED
“Article 21 right to life is extensive and comprehensive. It doesn’t just indicate that life can only be ended or taken by the legal process. This is just one aspect of the right to life. Since no one can survive without a means of sustenance, the right to livelihood is a crucial component of this right.
The simplest approach to revoke someone’s right to life would be to completely take away their means of subsistence if the right to subsistence is not recognized as a component of the constitutional right to life. A life like that would not only be devoid of purpose and meaning, but also impossible.
However, the Court added, such deprivation should not necessarily be by the procedure established by law if the right to livelihood is not considered to be part of the right to life. You can take away someone’s right to a means of support without also taking away his right to life. In light of Article 41, it would be pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.” Court looked on Article 21 right to Life is extensive and comprehensive. It doesn’t just indicate that life can only be ended or taken by the legal process. The right to life encompasses more than just this. Since no one can survive without a means of sustenance, the right to livelihood is a crucial component of this right.
The simplest approach to revoke someone’s right to life would be to completely take away their means of subsistence if the right to subsistence is not recognized as a component of the constitutional right to life. In addition to depriving life of its purpose and meaning, such a condition would also make life meaningless.
The petitioner argued that the process outlined in Section 314 of the 1888 Act for removing encroachment on the sidewalk is arbitrary and unreasonable because it not only lacks a notification provision before encroachment elimination but also states that the municipal commissioner can make sure the encroachment is removed “without notice.”
COURT HELD
The denial of life or personal liberty is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. According to Article 21, such a deprivation must adhere to the legal process. The essence of Section 314 is that of an enabling provision, not one that is mandatory.
Chinnappa Reddy, J. Said:
Considering whether it would have mattered if natural justice had been upheld, we believe that the principles of natural justice do not contain an exclusionary rule. Any man is prejudiced when natural justice is violated, hence proof of harm—regardless of the existence of evidence of a violation of natural justice—is not required. The claim that the victim of injustice is unharmed will come from the one who denied justice. Court looked on
In this city, who doesn’t commit a crime? There is little doubt that the petitioners utilize sidewalks and other public property without authorization, but their intentions are not to “commit an offense or to intimidate, insult, or bother anyone,” as defined by Article 441 of the Criminal Code, which is the crime of criminal intrusion.
These individuals’ incursions are involuntary acts in the sense that they are compelled by unavoidable circumstances rather than being motivated by free will. The invasion is unlawful.
The right of wrongs, however, requires that even if an invader must be violently removed, the amount of force used must not exceed what is reasonable and proportionate under the circumstances.
DECISION
The following was mandated by the court despite its refusal to find that the evicted residents had a right to a different location:
- Nobody has the right to trespass on public property, including sidewalks, trails, and other areas.
- The provision of section 314 of the Bombay Municipality Act is not unreasonable in the circumstances of this case.
- Sites must be provided to censored residents in 1976.
- Slums that have been there for 20 years or longer shouldn’t be eliminated unless the land is needed for the public good, in which case alternative locations must be offered.
SUMMARY
All inhabitants of the city of Bombay’s slums and pavement were ordered to leave in 1981 by the state of Maharashtra and the Mumbai City Council. Since being in the city allowed them to earn a living and required suitable resettlement if the evictions occurred, the residents argued that such a move would violate their right to life.
The court determined that the petitioner’s right to a hearing had been breached at the time of deportation, but it rejected their request for compensation. The Supreme Court ruled that access to means of subsistence is a part of the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.
The right to subsistence should not be included in the scope of the right to deceive. The right to a means of support was not absolute, though, and it was possible to be deprived of one’s means of support provided a legal, fair, and just process was started. Legitimate government action is required.
Everyone who will be impacted by the government’s decision must be given the chance to express their views on why it should not be made. In this instance, the court determined that the Supreme Court proceedings gave the citizens a chance to be heard. The inhabitants concluded that it was appropriate for the government to evict persons who were living on sidewalks, trails, and public roadways even if they had no intention of breaking in.
Finally, the entire Benthamite philosophy, which Justice Chandrachud used on behalf of all the brother Justices, can be summed up in the following line found in Paragraph 46 of the judgment: Human compassion (happiness) must always smooth out the sharp edges of justice. Thus, it might be said that the Supreme Court adopted the Utilitarian Principle in terms of Jermy Beth’s hedonistic calculus, which measures pleasure and pain.
