Published on: 19th November 2025
Authored by: Bala Nivetha S
SASTRA University
Court: Supreme court of India
Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud, Syed Murtaza Fazalali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, O. Chinnappa Reddy, A. Varadarajan
Date of Judgement: July 10, 1985
Relevant provisions/statutes: Articles 19, 21, & 32 of the Constitution, Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888.
Petitioners: Olga Tellis & ors
Respondents: Bombay Municipal Corporation
FACTS:
The case of Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. originated from the misfortune of many pavement and slum dwellers who lived in the city of Bombay (now Mumbai). The petitioners, consisting of Olga Tellis—a reporter—and other persons residing in temporary huts on pavements and in bastes, came to the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, appealing against their prospective eviction by the state government. During July 1981, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra, A.R. Antulay, made a state-wide announcement to systematically evict pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay by force and send them back to their homeland or resettle them beyond city limits. After this announcement, the Bombay Municipal Corporation started razing hutments on pavements and public roads with police authorities’ support.The petitioners were from various rural areas of India who had moved there because of poverty, unemployment, and the absence of livelihood. They had settled at or close to their workplaces in the city to save on transportation expenses and earn their livelihood in casual jobs like daily wage labour, cobbling, or other forms of unorganized sector work. Pavements were the only accessible and affordable means for shelter for most of them in the city.Firstly, the petitioners had filed a petition in the Bombay High Court for relief from demolition. In such proceedings, they had admitted that they had no fundamental right to reside on public sidewalks and agreed to vacate their homes by October 15, 1981. But when the state government started demolishing their shelters before the scheduled date and without providing them any alternative accommodation, the petitioners moved writ petitions before the Supreme Court alleging infringement of their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19, and 21.
The petitioners argued that their eviction by force was a deprivation of their source of livelihood and hence their right to life. They assailed the constitutional validity of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which provided for removal of encroachments without notice. The petitioners urged that this provision was discriminatory and violated the doctrine of natural justice. The respondents, however, argued that no one had a right to take over public spaces and that the action was for public safety, sanitation, and urban design.
ISSUES:
- Whether the right to livelihood is a part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution?
- Whether Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, which allows removal of encroachments without notice, violates the principles of natural justice?
- Whether pavement dwellers, despite being unauthorised occupants, are entitled to constitutional protection under Articles 14, 19, and 21?
- Whether estoppel or waiver can prevent a citizen from asserting fundamental rights?
- Whether the State is constitutionally obligated to provide alternate accommodation before evicting slum or pavement dwellers?
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner’s Arguments:
- Right to Livelihood is a Part of Right to Life
- Eviction Without Hearing is Unfair
- Poverty is Not a Crime
- Eviction Without Rehabilitation is Unjust
- No Estoppel Against Fundamental Rights
Respondent’s arguments:
- No Right to Occupy Public Land
- Public Interest Must Be Protected
- Section 314 is a Valid Law
- Concession Already Given by Petitioners
- Government Already Provided Assistance
JUDGEMENT:
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, the Supreme Court of India gave a milestone judgment that widened the scope of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. The case came into being when the Government of Maharashtra and the Bombay Municipal Corporation resolved to evict pavement and slum residents from parts of Bombay forcibly, arguing that they had encroached upon public land. The petitioners objected to this action in the Supreme Court under Article 32, arguing that evicting them would take away their livelihood and hence their right to life. The Court ruled that the right to livelihood is part and parcel of the right to life under Article 21. It argued that no human being can exist without the means of sustenance, and if the right to livelihood is taken outside the ambit of Article 21, then the right to life becomes futile. Taking away someone’s roof over their head and thus their livelihood through eviction would go against this fundamental right, unless this deprivation has been done in accordance with a fair and equitable legal process. The Court dismissed the contention that the petitioners had waived their right by earlier having said in the Bombay High Court that they did not have a right to occupy pavements. The court ruled that there can be no estoppel against the Constitution, and people cannot be prevented from raising fundamental rights, even though they had conceded something contrary at some point in the past. In terms of Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, under which the municipal authorities can proceed to remove encroachments without notice, the Court interpreted the section in a way that is harmonious with constitutional principles. It held that even if the law does not presume notice, principles of natural justice, and more particularly the right to be heard, have to be read into it. The Court further asserted that any action imposed on an individual’s fundamental rights shall be subject to a fair, just, and reasonable procedure.
But the Court also recognized the illegality of taking over public footpaths and roads. It declared that public areas such as pavements are reserved for walkers and cannot be occupied on a permanent basis by anyone, even in times of economic distress. But it did see that economic necessity compelled the poor to settle like this, and that they were not trespassers in the criminal sense. Although the Court reaffirmed the legality of eviction, it ordered that no eviction shall occur prior to October 31, 1985, to let the monsoons pass. It also held that those pavement dwellers included in the 1976 census have to be resettled with alternative accommodation prior to eviction. It appealed to the State to design policies to rehabilitate and schemes with sympathy and compassion, just as a welfare state. In reality, the judgment found a balance between the rule of law and the poor’s needs and thus became a landmark case in India’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence.
RATIO DECIDENDI :
1. Right to Livelihood is a Fundamental Right under Article 21:
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution is inclusive of the right to livelihood. If the state takes away a person’s livelihood, it, in effect, takes away the person’s life. Hence, any action to take away a person’s means of livelihood has to be supported by a just, fair, and reasonable procedure.
2. No Estoppel Against Fundamental Rights:
The Court ruled that estoppel against the Constitution is not possible. A concession or promise given by a citizen in court, even one waiving a fundamental right, cannot preclude them from claiming the right subsequently. Fundamental rights cannot be waived on behalf of a person, particularly under duress or financial constraint.
3. Natural Justice Must be Read into Section 314 of the BMC Act
Even though Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 does not envisage notice prior to eviction, the Court held that natural justice principles, especially the right to be heard, must be implied in the provision so that it is constitutional. Administrative discretion under such enactments must be exercised reasonably and justly, not arbitrarily.
4. Illegality Does Not Deny Constitutional Protection
Although pavement dwellers were in unauthorized occupation of public land, their economic necessity does not deprive them of constitutional protection. The Court expressed that even individuals who operate in contravention of municipal laws are entitled to a reasonable procedure prior to eviction.
FINAL JUDGEMENT:
In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (AIR 1986 SC 180), the Supreme Court ruled that while pavement dwellers were encroaching upon public land without any right, they could not be evicted in contravention of constitutional safeguards. The Court stated that the right to livelihood forms a part of the right to life under Article 21 and any action which impacts it has to adopt fair and reasonable procedure. While affirming the lawfulness of eviction under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Court held that natural justice had to be implied in the law, and an opportunity should be provided to the persons affected to be heard. The Court further reiterated that fundamental rights cannot be waived, and there can be no estoppel against the Constitution. While eviction was permissible, the Court ordered that no eviction was to be carried out prior to October 31, 1985, and rehabilitation was to be extended to eligible residents.
