Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2024 SCC OnLine SC 350

1. Case Number: Criminal Appeal 2577 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Diary No. 42896/2023)
2. Bench of Judges: Justice R. Gavai and Justice Sandeep Mehta
3. Author of Judgment: Justice Sandeep Mehta
4. Decided on: May 15, 2024

1. Facts of the Case

Prabir Purkayastha, founder and Director of M/s. PPK Newsclick Studio Pvt. Ltd., was arrested on October 3, 2023, at 5:45 p.m. by the Special Cell of Delhi Police in connection with FIR No. 224/2023, registered on August 17, 2023, for offences under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, and 22C of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), read with Sections 153A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The FIR alleged that the appellant received foreign funding linked to Chinese entities and used those funds to disseminate pro-China propaganda with intent to disrupt India’s sovereignty and create disaffection against the State. Extensive raids were conducted at the residential and official premises of the appellant and his company, during which numerous documents and digital devices were seized.

The appellant was presented before the Additional Sessions Judge-02, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi (the Remand Judge) on October 4, 2023, before 6:00 a.m., and was remanded to seven days of police custody. The arrest memo was in a computerized format and contained no column for “grounds of arrest,” listing only formal “reasons for arrest.” Critically, the copy of the FIR was not provided to the appellant until October 5, 2023—well after the remand order was passed. The appellant’s counsel, Advocate Arshdeep Khurana, who had been present at the police station on October 3, 2023, was not informed about the remand proceedings in advance. Instead, a remand advocate, Shri Umakant Kataria, whom the appellant had never engaged, was present during the remand proceedings. The appellant challenged his arrest and remand before the DelhiHigh Court through Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 7278/2023, which was dismissed on October 13, 2023. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by special leave.

2. Issues Before the Court

1. Whether the arrest of the petitioner on October 3, 2023, was valid and in conformity with the mandatory requirements under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
2. Whether the failure to communicate grounds of arrest in writing at the time of arrest violated Article 22(1) read with Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
3. Whether the remand order dated October 4, 2023, was sustainable in law given the alleged procedural violations during arrest and remand proceedings.
4. Whether the interpretation laid down in Pankaj Bansal Union of India (2023) regarding communication of grounds of arrest in writing under Section 19(1) of the PMLA applies equally to arrests under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA.
5. Whether the provisions of the UAPA override or dilute the constitutional protections enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.

3. Arguments

Petitioner’s Submissions:

Senior Advocate Shri Kapil Sibal contended that the grounds of arrest were not communicated to the appellant in writing, constituting a gross violation of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 50 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Relying heavily on Pankaj Bansal

1. Union of India, he argued that Section 19(1) of the PMLA is pari materia to Section 43B(1) of the UAPA, and therefore the interpretation requiring written communication of arrest grounds applies equally. He submitted that although Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement held Pankaj Bansal to be prospective, it would not affect the appellant’s case because Pankaj Bansal was pronounced on October 3, 2023, while the appellant’s remand order was passed on October 4, 2023, making the law fully applicable.

Sibal characterized the remand proceedings as “mala fide” and “fraught with fraud of the highest order.” He pointed out that the appellant was kept confined overnight without being informed of

the grounds of arrest, then presented before the Remand Judge at his residence before 6:00 a.m. without notifying the appellant’s engaged counsel, who was instead informed via WhatsApp only at 7:07 a.m.—after the remand order had been passed. He argued that the remand order showed clear evidence of “subsequent insertion” of lines indicating that the counsel was heard, particularly since the order records the time as 6:00 a.m. while the counsel was admittedly informed after 7:00 a.m. Sibal contended that this was a clandestine attempt to procure police custody remand while deliberately depriving the appellant of his right to legal representation.

Respondent’s Submissions:

Additional Solicitor General Shri Suryaprakash V. Raju vehemently opposed the appeal on multiple grounds. He argued that Pankaj Bansal was held to be prospective in operation by Ram Kishor Arora and did not apply since the judgment was uploaded on the Supreme Court website in the late hours of October 4, 2023—after the remand order was passed—meaning the arresting officer could not have been expected to comply with its directions. He contended that neither Article 22(1) nor Article 22(5) of the Constitution explicitly mandates that grounds of arrest or detention must be communicated in writing; oral communication suffices.

The ASG submitted that the appellant’s constitutional right under Article 22(1) to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner was complied with because the appellant’s relative was informed before producing him before the Remand Judge, who then informed the counsel. He argued that the counsel transmitted a written objection against police custody remand via WhatsApp through a Head Constable, and the Remand Judge took note of this objection in the remand order. The ASG further contended that there are “significant differences” in language between Section 19 of PMLA and Sections 43A and 43B of UAPA, making the interpretation in Pankaj Bansal inapplicable to UAPA cases. He also argued that since the investigation was completed and the charge sheet filed, any irregularity in the arrest and initial remand “stands cured” and cannot prejudice the appellant. Finally, invoking the presumption of correctness of judicial proceedings, he argued that the Remand Judge’s recording that the counsel was heard and grounds were conveyed cannot be questioned.

4. Judgment / Holding

The Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling, allowed the appeal and quashed the arrest of the appellant, Prabir Purkayastha, the remand order of October 4, 2023, and the Delhi High Court’s dismissal dated October 13, 2023. The Court declared that the arrest and all subsequent proceedings were “invalid in the eyes of law”.

The Court held that the arrest was unconstitutional and void due to the Delhi Police’s failure to provide written grounds of arrest, violating the mandatory requirement under Article 22(1) of the Constitution. This reaffirmed the principle that the right to be informed of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental safeguard of personal liberty under Article 21 and 22.

The judgment clarified that the mandate established in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (2023), requiring written grounds for arrest under the PMLA, applies pari passu (on an equal footing) to arrests under the UAPA. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that UAPA cases, due to national security concerns, should be exempt from this constitutional requirement.

Furthermore, the Court rejected the respondent’s contention that the filing of a chargesheet cured any initial illegality in the arrest or that oral communication of grounds was sufficient. It emphasized the vital difference between general “reasons for arrest” and case-specific “grounds of arrest”. The Court also found that the clandestine manner of the remand hearing, without informing the appellant’s engaged counsel, was a “blatant attempt to circumvent the due process of law”.

While directing the release of the appellant, the Court noted that since the chargesheet had already been filed, his release would be contingent on him “furnishing bail and bonds to the satisfaction of the trial Court”. The decision did not comment on the merits of the case against Purkayastha, only on the procedural invalidity of his arrest. The ruling reinforced that its interpretation becomes “the law of the land binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India”.

5. Reasoning / Ratio Decidendi

Parity between PMLA and UAPA provisions:

The Court held that “there is no significant difference in the language employed in Section 19(1) of the PMLA and Section 43B(1) of the UAPA” regarding communication of arrest grounds (Para 17). Both provisions are “verbatim the same” and “find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1)” (Para 18). The Court concluded that “the interpretation of statutory mandate laid down by this Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal on the aspect of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest in writing has to be applied pari passu to a person arrested in a case registered under the provisions of the UAPA” (Para 19).

Constitutional mandate for written communication:

The Court held that “any person arrested for allegation of commission of offences under the provisions of UAPA or for that matter any other offence(s) has a fundamental and a statutory right to be informed about the grounds of arrest in writing” (Para 20). This information is “the only effective means for the arrested person to consult his Advocate; oppose the police custody remand and to seek bail” (Para 20). The Court emphasized: “The Right to Life and Personal Liberty is the most sacrosanct fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution” (Para 21, citing Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala (2000) 8 SCC 590). The Court held that “any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand” and that “mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality” (Para 22).

Preventive detention jurisprudence:

Rejecting the ASG’s reliance on Article 22(5), the Court analyzed the Constitution Bench decision in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra (1962 SCC OnLine SC 117), which held that communication of detention grounds in writing is “imperative and essential” (Para 25). The Court quoted from Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India (1981) 2 SCC 427: “‘Communicate’ is a strong word. It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the ‘grounds’ should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing” (Para 26). The Court held that since the language in Articles 22(1) and 22(5) is “exactly the identical,” the interpretation applies equally to both (Para 29).

Distinction between “reasons” and “grounds” of arrest:

The Court distinguished between “reasons for arrest” and “grounds of arrest.” The arrest memo’s “reasons for arrest” were “purely formal parameters” applicable to any arrest, whereas “grounds of arrest” must contain “all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused” and would be “invariably be personal to the accused” (Para 49).

Procedural violations in this case:

The Court found that the FIR copy was never made public and was provided to the appellant’s counsel only on October 5, 2023, “well after the appellant had been remanded to police custody” (Para 32-33). Despite having 24 hours to produce the appellant (until 5:44 p.m. on October 4), and despite the appellant’s counsel being present at the police station on October 3, the appellant was presented at the Remand Judge’s residence before 6:00 a.m., which was “nothing but a blatant attempt to circumvent the due process of law” (Para 34). The Court found that the remand order showed “subsequent insertion” of lines about the counsel being heard, as evidenced by finer script and the fact that the order was passed at 6:00 a.m. while the counsel was informed after 7:00 a.m. (Para 39). The Court concluded that “the copy of the remand application in the purported exercise of communication of the grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the accused appellant or his counsel before passing of the order of remand dated 4th October, 2023 which vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand” (Para 50).

Application of Pankaj Bansal:

The Court rejected the prospectivity argument, holding that since Pankaj Bansal was delivered on October 3, 2023, and the remand order was passed on October 4, 2023, “the ratio of Pankaj Bansal would not apply to the present case” is a “misconceived” plea (Para 45). The Court emphasized that once it interprets statutory provisions in constitutional context, “the said ratio becomes the law of the land binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India” (Para 46).

Ratio Decidendi:

1. Grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the arrested person at the earliest, as mandated by Article 22(1). Oral communication is insufficient.
2. Section 43B(1) of UAPA is pari materia to Section 19(1) of PMLA; the interpretation in

Pankaj Bansal applies equally to UAPA arrests.

3. “Reasons for arrest” (formal, general) are distinct from “grounds of arrest” (specific, personal facts) and cannot substitute for the latter.
4. Non-compliance with the written communication requirement renders arrest and remand unconstitutional and void, regardless of subsequent charge sheet filing.
5. The constitutional interpretation of Article 22(5) by Constitution Benches in Harikisan

and Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel applies equally to Article 22(1).

6.  Significance / Commentary

This judgment is a landmark reaffirmation of constitutional safeguards against arbitrary arrests under special legislation. By extending Pankaj Bansal to UAPA cases, the Court has created a uniform standard for all special statutes, preventing dilution of constitutional protections. The decision is particularly significant for press freedom, as it protects journalists from suppression through misuse of anti-terror laws. The distinction between “reasons” and “grounds” of arrest provides crucial clarity for law enforcement and ensures meaningful exercise of the right to legal representation. By holding that charge sheet filing does not cure initial constitutional violations, the Court prevents cavalier attitudes toward constitutional mandates. The judgment reinforces that procedural safeguards are substantive rights, not mere technicalities, and that no statute can override Articles 21 and 22. In an era of increasing concerns about democratic backsliding, this decision stands as a judicial bulwark protecting fundamental rights, consistent with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.