State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025): Indian Federalism and Gubernatorial Discretion Limits.

ABSTRACT

The ruling of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil v Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) clarifies that governors are not permitted to postpone approving state laws indefinitely. The Court upholds legislative authority, democratic accountability, and federal balance within India’s constitutional framework by dismissing the “pocket veto” concept, which imposes deadlines under provisions such as Articles 200 and 201 of the Indian Constitution.

INTRODUCTION

India’s federal structure is a quasi-federal system, merging federal features such as division of powers between central and state governments (Union, State, and Concurrent Lists), while also incorporating unitary traits such as providing the Centre with more authority and a more powerful central government. Within this structure, Governors, within the constitutional framework act as head of a state in India, serving as a formal executive authority, and agent of the President, ensuring constitutional goverence and its adherence, along with legislative function. As a governor’s office comes into force by President’s discretion and not elected authority, they are refrained from acting as political decision makers, but rather neutral constitutional functionaries, acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers lead by the Chief Minister, except in certain circumstances where discretion is expressly granted under Article 163.

One of the most significant concerns regarding the legislative functions of the Governor is regarding Bills, which are passed by the State Legislature stated under Article 200.When a Bill is received by the Governor, they have the option to either approve it, reject it, return it for further review, or make a reservation for the President to consider under Article 201. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not provide for a situation in which a governor may put off a bill’s resolution forever. At this point, prolonged delay can undermine an elected legislature’s democratic mandate and impede government. The emphasis on State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) raises important issues regarding the constitutionality of extended gubernatorial inaction, the lack of a “pocket veto” under the Constitution, and the responsibility of constitutional office-bearers in a parliamentary democracy in light of this constitutional tension. The case centers on the controversy surrounding the Tamil Nadu Governor’s protracted inaction on several statutes that the State Legislative Assembly has enacted. The issue of whether a governor can postpone assent or reserve a law for presidential intervention after it has been re-passed by the legislature resulted in a constitutional controversy. This article examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Articles 200 and 201 in the following case, and assess how the judgement elucidates constitutional boundaries of gubernatorial discretion within India’s federal framework.

CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE GOVERNER AND ASSENT TO BILLS

Functioning within the framework of parliamentary democracy, the governor equips a constitutionally defined position as the nominal executive head of the state. Designated by the President, the governor does not act as an elected representative and is therefore not envisaged to work as a parallel legislative authority. The Constitution sets the governor’s role within the constitutional functionary as a facilitator of governance in line with democratic principles, rather than to hinder the legislative will of the State legislature.

The case sheds light on a pivotal constitutional provision, Article 200, concerning the Governor’s versatile role regarding Bills passed by the State Legislature. When a Bill passed by the State legislature is put forward for asset, Article 200 provides four constitutionally sanctioned options, which are limited in scope and carefully structured.  The governor may grant assent, hold back assent, return back the Bill to the legislator for re-evaluation, or reserve it for the careful consideration of the President. Crucially, the Governor does not have an absolute veto power under the Constitution. It is anticipated that assent will be given by the governor if the bill is sent back for review and then passed again by the Legislature, so upholding the authority of the legislative discretion.

Equivalently crucial to this framework is the principle of aid and advice under Constitutional provision Article 163. Ordinarily, the governor’s actions are purely dependent on the advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. Any decision or power exercised by the Governor is therefore constitutionally limited and cannot be treated as personal or unexamined. Notably, the constitution does not envisage indefinite inaction. Staying silent, or ignorance regarding a bill is not a recognized constitutional option. Continued delay in granting or refusing assent causes disruption of legislative functioning and creates risk regarding unsettlement of the federal balance between the Union and the States.

LEGISLATIVE DEADLOCK IN TAMIL NADU: FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) constitutional controversy emerged in the context of R.N. Ravi, Governor of Tamil Nadu’s long pending legislative and administrative cases. According to the Supreme Court’s evidence and the Supreme Court Observer’s summary, the impasse covered a number of State action categories between 2020 and 2023.

• Pending Bills before the Governor

Between the period of January 2020 and April 2023, twelve measures were accepted by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly and sent to the Governor for ratification in accordance with Article 200 of the Indian Constitution. These bills mainly dealt with administrative and governance reforms in State Universities, such as the elimination of the governor’s position as chancellor and the replacement of the vice chancellor appointment procedure. The governor delayed to either grant assent or return the laws for reconsideration, even though they had been duly passed. The Supreme Court mentioned that no formal action or communication was undertaken concerning several bills until the beginning of judicial proceedings.

• Prosecution sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act

The State Government submitted various documents to the Governor between April 2022 and May 2023 requesting authorization to prosecute public officials under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Due to the following files being failed to addressed, criminal proceedings against public officials accused of corruption were significantly delayed.

• Premature Release of Prisoners

Falling under a separate category, the Tamil Nadu Government further submitted 54 proposals between August 2022 and June 2023 requesting the early release of prisoners as mentioned in applicable remission policies. The personal freedom of criminals whose release depended on executive permission was directly impacted by these unresolved proportions.

• TNPSC Appointments

Delays in suggestions for nominations to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC) under Article 316 of the Indian Constitution were also emphasized by the State. The Constitutional body experienced an increase in vacancies and administrative difficulties as a result of the inaction on these appointments.

SUPREME COURT PROCEEDINGS AND ARGUMENTS

Whilst ongoing proceedings before the Supreme Court, the State of Tamil Nadu questioned the Governor’s prolonged non-intervention on Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly. An argument by the State was put forth that Article 200 does not authorize a “pocket veto”, which refers to the inaction towards a bill, causing it to die through silent disapproval. The State of Tamil Nadu argued that withholding assent necessarily triggers a constitutional commitment to return the bill to the legislature for reconsideration “as soon as possible”. The state proposed that mere silence is not a constitutionally recognized course of action, therefore disrupting the legislative process, and effectively paralyzing governance.

The Union of India and the Governor, the defendants in the case, shielded the conduct by highlighting the discretionary nature of the Governor’s powers under Article 200. Initially, it was contended that in cases involving constitutional issues, the Governor has the right to withhold assent or reserve a bill for the President’s consideration. This was further contended by the Union, who argued that such decisions involve high constitutional judgement and must be insulated from routine judicial scrutiny.

The Supreme Court conveyed serious concern regarding the prolonged delays in regards to State legislation. It stated that vague inaction is undesirable under the Constitution and unjustifiable as a use of discretion. The judgement underlines that constitutional authorities have a duty to act promptly and that failing to do so jeopardizes federal structure and democratic governance.

SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT AND REASONING (2025)

The Supreme Court explicitly outlined the constitutional boundaries of the Governor’s authority under Article 200 in the following case ruling, which was issued on April 8, 2025. On the following case judgement passed on 8^th April 2025, the Supreme Court decisively explained the constitutional limits of the Governor’s powers under Article 200. Speaking through Justice J.B. Pardiwala, for himself and Justice R. Mahadevan, the Court refuted the notion that the Governor benefits from the unfettered discretion to postpone or withhold assent to State Legislation. It maintained that the notion of “pocket veto” is not recognized in the Constitution and that gubernatorial inaction cannot be equated with a valid constitutional choice.

The most significant reasoning of the Court was the meaning of “reasonable time”. While no rigid deadlines are mentioned within Articles 200 and 201, the Court upheld timely action by constitutional authorities within a constitutionally reasonable period. Prolonged silence, the Bench noticed, conquers parliamentary democracy and undermines the supremacy of elected legislature. To put this principle to practice, the court prescribed timelines for gubernatorial and presidential action, while elucidating that these operate as judicial norms rather than constitutional amendments.

There were also certain strict restrictions placed on the power to reserve Bills for the President. Once a Bill is given back for reconsideration and re-passed by the legislature, the Governor is restricted from reserving it under Article 201. Allowing such a course would exhibit legislative reconsideration meaningless.

Significantly, the judgement broadens the scope of judicial review over constitutional inaction. The court highlighted that its involvement was aimed not at political implications, but at shielding constitutional structure. By strengthening accountability without diminishing office of the Governor, the ruling reaffirms federal balance and responsible government as central constitutional values.

IMPACT ON FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The ruling of the Supreme court in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu has profound implications for the federal and democratic framework of India. By explicitly rejecting the notion of a “pocket veto”, the Court reinforced State autonomy and made sure that elected legislatures are not subject to unelected constitutional authorities. The Court held that under Article 200, action is mandatory and that withholding assent without returning a Bill is unconstitutional, strengthening the supremacy of legislative bill.

The judgement also stops the misuse of the gubernatorial office by confirming that discretion under Article 200 is restrictive and reviewable. Drawing on State of Punjab v Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2023), the Court reiterated that Governors cannot “thwart the normal course of lawmaking” through delay. By ordering timelines and permitting writs of mandamus, the Court initiated enforceable accountability while preserving the Governor’s constitutional role.

Democratic governance is additionally reinforced by improving legislative efficiency. The Court recognized that extended pendency of Bills creates administrative paralysis and impairs public trust in elected governments.

Lastly, through this judgement, we observe a constitutional balance between the Union and the States. Through dependency on Constituent Assembly Debates and precedents such as Shamsher Singh v State of Punjab (1974), the Court maintained that Governors are limited by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, with the exception of narrowly defined circumstances. The Court protected constitutional framework rather than political objectives with the ruling.

LIMITATIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Even if the Supreme Court’s judgement in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu is a major milestone in the direction of strengthening constitutional accountability, there are still certain restrictions and unanswered concerns. Notably, the Constitution lacked clear deadlines for the authority of the Governor’s power under Article 200. Although the Court prescribed indicative deadlines, these are judicial standards rather than constitutionally entrenched rules, leaving room for interpretative flexibility.

The dependency on the concept of “reasonable time” —while necessary —remains intrinsically vague. What establishes reasonableness may differ across various political and administrative contexts, possibly leading to future conflicts. This ambivalence means that judicial intervention may still be needed on a case-by-case basis, mainly where delays are justified on exceptional grounds.

Moreover, the effectiveness of the judgement depends significantly on the good faith of constitutional functionaries. While judicial review serves as an important protection, it is inherently reactive and cannot fully prevent politically motivated delay before harm occurs. The likelihood of strategic or subtle misuse of procedural discretion therefore cannot be completely eliminated.

The constitutional significance of the ruling is not diminished by these constraints. Rather, they stress the necessity of continuous judicial review, institutional restraint, and persistent constitutional convention to guarantee that the Court’s stated principles are effectively implemented in reality.

WAY FORWARD: NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CLARITY

Moving forward, clear, widely recognized deadlines for gubernatorial assent would highly benefit the constitutional structure, whether through established constitutional conventions or legislative clarity. While maintaining the essential decision-making authority, such deadlines would lessen misunderstanding. To rebuild institutional confidence, cooperative federalism must be strengthened rather than confrontational Centre-State engagement. Importantly, restricting discretionary grey areas will lessen arbitrariness and guarantee that constitutional offices support, not obstruct, the democratic will be as stated by elected legislatures.

CONCLUSION

The judgement in State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) marks a decisive constitutional intervention against executive inaction that threatens democratic governance. The Supreme Court emphasized that constitutional supremacy must function in support of, not against, the elected legislature by rejecting the notion of a “pocket veto”, defining the limitations of gubernatorial discretion, and subjecting protracted delay to judicial review. Significantly, by framing accountability as a constitutional duty rather than a political dispute, the ruling preserves the institutional balance of federalism without the reduction of Governor’s office. The judgement makes it clear that procedural silence cannot be utilized as a machinery to subvert democratic will, even though there are still concerns about “reasonable time” and future adherence.

REFERENCES

• State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, Writ Petition (C) No. ___ of 2023, judgment dated Apr. 8, 2025 (Sup. Ct. India).
• Pendency of bills before Tamil Nadu governor: Judgement summary (2025) Supreme Court Observer. Available at: https://www.scobserver.in/reports/pendency-of-bills-before-tamil-nadu-governor-judgement-summary/ (Accessed: 11 January 2026).
• Scholarship repository (no date) Site. Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/ (Accessed: 11 January 2026).
• State of Punjab v. Principal Sec’y to the Governor of Punjab, (2023) ___ SCC ___ (India).
• Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 (India).
• Blog, I.-A. (2025) Balancing democracy and federalism: Judicial imposition of assent deadlines on state governors in India – IACL-IADC blog, IACL. Available at: https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2025-posts/2025/6/26/balancing-democracy-and-federalism-judicial-imposition-of-assent-deadlines-on-state-governors-in-india (Accessed: 11 January 2026).
• INDIA CONST. art. 163.
• INDIA CONST. art. 200.
• INDIA CONST. art. 201.
• INDIA CONST. art. 316.
• INDIA CONST. art. 21.
• INDIA CONST. art. 142.
• INDIA CONST. art. 143.