Understanding the AIJA Judgment: Reformation and Justice

Abstract

The Supreme Court of India’s 2025 judgment in All India Judges Association and Ors v. Union of India and Ors has reinstated the mandatory three-year legal practice requirement for candidates aspiring to become Civil Judges (Junior Division). This article analyses the key holdings of the judgment, traces its constitutional implications through the lens of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India, and critically evaluates the court’s reasoning. It further proposes practical suggestions for ensuring the equitable implementation of the judgment, with particular attention to its disproportionate impact on first-generation lawyers and women in the legal profession.

I. Introduction

The judicial service is an important aspiration for many law graduates, who choose to write the Judicial Service examinations after completing their legal degrees, seeking a structured and principled entry into the judiciary (until now, without a prior practice requirement). This landmark judgment, passed in 2025 by a Supreme Court bench comprising Chief Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice A.G. Masih, and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, has affirmed that a legal practice of three years is compulsory before a candidate may become a Civil Judge (Junior Division).

The court gave its judgment on several framed issues. First, the three-year practice requirement discussed above. Second, the increase of the LDCE (Limited Departmental Competitive Examination) quota from 10% to 25%, recognising merit alongside merit-cum-seniority-based promotions and direct recruits from the bar. Third, the creation of a new 10% quota in the Senior Division filled through the LDCE mechanism. Fourth, the establishment of a suitability test for candidates under the 65% promotion quota, to be evaluated on judgment quality, case disposal rate, and other relevant factors. This article focuses primarily on the practice requirement aspect of the judgment.

II. Background: The Journey of the AIJA Litigation

The case can be traced to 1989, when the All India Judges Association first approached the Supreme Court, ultimately giving rise to six distinct judgments on judicial service requirements. The Second AIJA judgment, delivered in 1993, established the three-year mandatory practice requirement before entry into the judicial service. The Third AIJA ruling, consistent with the recommendations of the First Pay Commission established under Justice Shetty, proposed at least one year and preferably two years of practice post-induction in the judicial services. Subsequently, the Fourth AIJA judgment dispensed with the minimum practice requirement, permitting even fresh graduates to write the judicial examinations without prior practice. On further appeal, the Sixth AIJA judgment reinstated the three-year practice requirement, citing Article 233[1] of the Constitution of India, which vests in the Governor the power to appoint district judges in consultation with the High Court of the relevant jurisdiction.

III. The 2025 Judgment: Key Reasoning

To appreciate the judgment, it is necessary to understand the factors that motivated the court. The court found a marked absence of courtroom etiquette and grounding in legal practice among new recruits to the judicial service. After considering the views of various High Courts across the country, the court concluded that the practice requirement should be made compulsory. Accordingly, it upheld the three-year practice requirement.

That said, it must be noted that the court has not provided sufficient judicial justification for the specific three-year period. The basis articulated in the judgment does not adequately explain why three years, as opposed to any other duration, would provide aspirants with the requisite knowledge of court functioning. The requirement appears to have been set without a sufficiently reasoned basis in the judgment text.

The court drew comparative support from practice requirements in other jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. As observed by the Chief Justice of India, B.R. Gavai: “Judicial excellence is not merely a function of academic merit but a product of sustained exposure, courtroom maturity, and ethical grounding.”[2] The court further held that a legal clerkship would count towards satisfying the three-year requirement, ensuring that meritorious candidates who have not entered formal litigation practice are not excluded from consideration.

IV. Constitutional Implications

After examining the judgment, it is important to consider its constitutional dimensions. The effect on newly enrolled lawyers is substantial: they must now build a practice for three years before becoming eligible, during which time potential clients may prefer more experienced counsel. The financial burden on new lawyers struggling to establish themselves in a competitive environment is a real and significant concern. The recognition of legal clerkship as qualifying practice does partially offset the challenges faced by such lawyers.

Article 14 (Equality): Article 14[3] of the Constitution of India mandates equality before the law and equal protection of the laws. In this context, the distinction drawn by the court may be justified as it is made for administrative purposes and for the improvement of the judiciary, without substantially curtailing any individual’s fundamental rights or their equal standing before the law.

Article 15 (Indirect Discrimination): When viewed through the lens of Article 15,[4] a different picture emerges. Lawyers without established networks within the legal community, particularly first-generation lawyers, face considerable difficulty in attracting clients and securing a livelihood during the mandatory three-year period. Additionally, women in the legal profession face disproportionate pressure, given societal expectations around family and career timelines. Commencing a legal career at 23 to 24 years of age is meaningfully different from doing so at 26 to 27. The relative underrepresentation of women in the higher judiciary, including the Supreme Court, is a testament to the systemic barriers they face. The policy, as freshly reinstated, may serve as an additional barrier to gender parity. Article 15 is therefore implicitly engaged through the operation of indirect discrimination.

V. Counter-Arguments to the Three-Year Requirement

The reasoning of the court in the Third AIJA judgment retains considerable force. It was observed that a three-year practice period may not be necessary, given that law students already receive substantial practical exposure during their degrees. The Bar Council of India Rule 25[5] mandates a minimum of 12 weeks of internship for three-year law students and 20 weeks for five-year law students, providing meaningful exposure to legal practice. This, it may be argued, affords ample grounding in the workings of courts.

Furthermore, law students undergo rigorous training throughout their degree programmes through moot court exercises, preparation of court memorials, and other co-curricular activities that instil discipline, procedural awareness, and respect for the norms and conventions of the courtroom.

Finally, the three-year practice requirement may itself act as a deterrent, discouraging motivated aspirants from pursuing judicial service altogether.

VI. Suggestions for Equitable Implementation

The following suggestions are offered to ensure that the judgment is implemented fairly and without undue prejudice to aspiring lawyers:

Suggestion 1 – Enhanced Stipend Facilities: Lawyers should be provided with enhanced stipend support through collaborative efforts between the courts of the various states and their respective state governments, which bear primary responsibility for funding the state judiciary.

Suggestion 2 – Partial Exemption for Exceptional Candidates: Lawyers demonstrating exceptional legal acumen should be eligible for a partial exemption from the three-year requirement, enabling them to appear for the judicial examinations after completing only two years of practice. This could be facilitated through a specialised examination conducted at the state level by the judiciary, recognising outstanding candidates. Such a mechanism would also serve to retain highly motivated individuals who might otherwise abandon their judicial aspirations.

Suggestion 3 – Oversight of Practice Certificates: The requirement for a practice certificate issued either by an advocate with ten years of standing or by a presiding officer of a court should be subject to legal and institutional scrutiny. Adequate safeguards must be put in place to prevent any unlawful monetary demand in exchange for issuing such certificates.

Suggestion 4 – Extended Post-Selection Training: The training that judicial aspirants undergo following their selection could be extended in duration, providing them with thorough grounding in court procedures. This would have served as a more equitable alternative to the three-year practice mandate, offering practical knowledge without imposing a pre-eligibility practice barrier.

VII. Conclusion

The 2025 AIJA judgment stands at the crossroads of constitutionalism, the reform of the lower judiciary, and fairness to aspirants. While the court’s objective of ensuring a more experienced and ethically grounded judiciary is laudable, the absence of a reasoned basis for the specific three-year threshold, combined with its disproportionate impact on first-generation lawyers and women, raises significant constitutional concerns. The suggestions offered above aim to bridge the gap between judicial reform and equitable access, ensuring that the path to the bench remains open to the most capable and committed, regardless of background.

References

[1] Constitution of India, art. 233. Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1704953/.
[2] All India Judges Association and Ors v. Union of India and Ors, Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989, 2025 INSC 735. See also Ajay Kulkarni, ‘Case Summary: All India Judges Association & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (2025)’ (Legal Bites, 21 May 2025) https://www.legalbites.in accessed 13 January 2026.
[3] Constitution of India, art. 14. Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/367586/.
[4] Constitution of India, art. 15. Available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/609295/.
[5] Bar Council of India Rules, Part VI, r. 25 https://upload.indiacode.nic.in accessed 13 January 2026.
[6] Pavan Kasturi, ‘The SC’s Three-Year Practice Rule is a Case Study in Indirect Discrimination’ (The Leaflet, 31 May 2025) https://theleaflet.in accessed 13 January 2026.
[7] Rudra Singh Krishna and Rudraksh Chaudhary, ‘A Critique of the AIJA Judgment’ (Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, 29 August 2025) https://vidhilegalpolicy.in accessed 12 January 2026.
[8] Swasti Chaturvedi, ‘Supreme Court Restores 25% Quota Reserved for LDCE for Promotion to Higher Judicial Services’ (Verdictum, 21 May 2025) https://www.verdictum.in accessed 14 January 2026.
[9] Bhagyashree Premlal Jawarkar, ‘Recalibrating the Bench: A Case Comment on All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2025)’ (Indian Journal for Law and Legal Research, 10 July 2025) https://www.ijllr.com accessed 11 January 2026.