Published on: 13th November 2025
Authored by: Manmohan Ji Pandey
SOA National Institute of Law
Chapter – I
Introduction.
The online platform business model is used by numerous of the most precious associations in the world to connect colourful customer groups, including suppliers and guests looking to distribute with one other. The purpose of this composition is to define these platforms’ proper legal bracket and the ramifications for competition law. In order to achieve this, it investigates two affiliated issues first, whether platforms act as agents for their suppliers; and second, whether agreements between platforms and suppliers that limit competition on the applicable request for the goods or services that the platform facilitates a sale about should be covered by the competition law’s ban on anticompetitive agreements. The first question comes up because numerous platforms claim to be agents of their suppliers, and the platform business model most nearly resembles an agency structure. Cases involving abuse of dominance under Composition 102 TFEU Given the implicit complexity performing from the two or multi-sided nature of online platforms, it’ll be necessary to reassess the request description process. In order to precisely describe the extent of these requests, it’ll be necessary to first ascertain the number of material requests that must be linked in each situation. Unfortunately, business reality is inharmonious with the being styles for this first, new step of the request defining process. In order to insure the delicacy of the request description findings, this composition offers a different system for handling this intricacy. thus, this composition suggests that the number of applicable requests in each case should be grounded on the type of relations that the online platform facilitates and the extent to which, from the standpoint of its client groups, the online platform can be substituted with other non-platform endeavours.
Chapter – II
Growth of Internet Industries and Consumer Protection.
The online platform business model is used by numerous of the most precious associations in the world to connect colourful customer groups, including suppliers and guests looking to distribute with one other. The purpose of this composition is to rightly characterize these platforms fairly and bandy the ramifications for competition law. still, the supposition that they aren’t agents has given rise to the decision- making process and commentary. The” agency rule” under the” single profitable reality doctrine,” which states that restrictive agreements between an agent and a star do within the same” undertaking” and are thus pure from the competition law’s ban on anticompetitive agreements between distinct undertakings, is the reason behind the alternate query. Key generalities and Laws Competition Law This body of law aims to promote and maintain fair competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by companies. Anti-Monopoly Measures Laws help businesses from gaining inordinate request power, which could lead to advanced prices, reduced invention, and smaller choices for consumers. illegal Trade Practices These are practices that give one company an illegal advantage over its challengers, similar as deceptive advertising, false claims, or misleading elevations. conspiracy Agreements between challengers to fix prices, divide requests, or circumscribe competition are illegal. Digital Doorkeepers Companies that control access to certain digital services, like hunt machines or social media platforms, are subject to specific regulations to help them from favouring their own services or blocking challengers unfairly. Consumer- protection law is vital for icing that request- grounded husbandry work in the profitable interest of consumers as well as businesses, and therefore to the benefit of society as a whole. This is well understood. Caveat emptor-” let the buyer guard ” may have made sense as the dereliction threat allocation between buyer and dealer in the vill commerce of history, in which deals were fairly small, and buyers and merchandisers were likely to know and anticipate unborn dealings with each other.
Chapter – III
Changing Dynamics of Algorithmic Collusion.
How conspiracy works and occurs. When two or further parties machinate in a planned, covert manner to negotiate a participated ideal, it’s appertained to as conspiracy. When agitating algorithms, conspiracy generally refers to the coordinated operation of several algorithms to impact the results of a decision- making process, constantly for immoral or illegal reasons. There are a number of ways that algorithmic conspiracy might be, depending on the particular situation in which the algorithms are being applied. Four styles live for using algorithms for conspiracy, according to Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke Algorithm Collusion in India. In India, there’s growing concern over algorithmic conspiracy, especially in relation to online requests and online advertising. Because it might affect in lower competition, advanced prices, and smaller options for consumers, algorithmic conspiracy can have a big effect on consumer weal and competitiveness in India. The Competition Commission of India( CCI) is in charge of upholding the Act in India, which attempts to guard consumers against anti-competitive gest and encourage competition. Companies that engage in anti-competitive gest, similar as algorithmic conspiracy, may be delved by the CCI and subject to warrants. Several diligence, including social media, ride- hailing, and e-commerce, are susceptible to algorithmic conspiracy. The purported price- fixing and request- controlling conspiracy between lift- hailing services like Ola and Uber is one case of algorithmic conspiracy in India. Both companies were the subject of an inquiry by the CCI in 2018. nonetheless, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal( NCLAT) affirmed the same findings after the CCI latterly rejected claims of price- fixing against both pots. Regulation under Indian Competition law. conspiracy between businesses is banned by Section 3( 3) of the Act. It declares that any agreement among businesses, opinions made by business groups, or coordinated conduct by businesses that have the impact of limiting, blocking, or distorting competition in India will be supposed anti-competitive. Section 4 of the Act forbids the abuse of a dominant position in addition to Section 3. It’s illegal for a business with a dominant request position to abuse that position by sharing in anti-competitive conditioning like algorithmic conspiracy. To stop algorithmic conspiracy and other anti-competitive gest, CCI has espoused a multifaceted strategy. request exploration in a number of diligence, including e-commerce, is one of the measures used to find anti-competitive gest, similar as algorithmic conspiracy. To stop algorithmic conspiracy and other anti-competitive gest, CCI has espoused a multifaceted strategy. Challenges ahead of CCI. Despite colourful sweats, the CCI face several challenges in dealing with algorithmic conspiracy. Some of the crucial challenges are Difficulty in discovery Algorithmic conspiracy can do in complex and connected systems, making it delicate to descry and understand the underpinning causes. This can make it challenging for competition authorities to identify cases of algorithmic conspiracy and to take applicable action. Lack of translucency numerous algorithms used in digital requests operate behind the scenes, making it delicate to understand how they’re making opinions and to identify cases of algorithmic conspiracy. Difficulty in proving anti-competitive intent The Act requires substantiation of anti-competitive intent, but algorithmic conspiracy can do without any unequivocal intention to harm competition. This can make it delicate for competition authorities to bring cases against companies for algorithmic conspiracy.
Chapter – IV
Competition Law and Artificial Intelligence – Challenges and Opportunities.
WHAT IS AI FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW?
The veritably description of AI proves quite a challenge in itself. Actually, it’s a subject of multitudinous delineations formulated on the ground of colourful fields of wisdom, yet it has not been given a single, universal and generally accepted meaning( which is else accepted at times). There’s no normative description of AI in the public and transnational legal order. Also, legal jottings devoted to AI frequently( if not as a rule) don’t define this conception at each, assuming its certain intuitive understanding or reaching for non-legal explanations of AI( generally of a specialized or sociological character). There’s no mistrustfulness that the AI conception is extremely spacious, miscellaneous and nebulous and at the same time explosively dependent on the specific environment in which it’s examined and applied. In a nutshell, AI means a collection of technologies that combine data, algorithms and calculating power or a specific combination of complex algorithms in a system able of perceiving the terrain and affecting it. Challenges For Competition Law in The Face of AI. Radical changes in the functioning of numerous requests, caused by AI development and proliferation, and especially the affiliated pitfalls pose a number of challenges for competition law. These challenges differ significantly depending on whether AI amplifies only conduct which is formerly covered under the current legal frame or whether it creates, to some extent, new pitfalls related to behaviours not covered by the current antitrust rules. In the first case, the problem doesn’t feel exceptionally complicated, because the question of using AI ought to be assessed together with the main violation that it helps apply.
Case Law
Texas Attorney General v. Google (The “Ad Tech” Antitrust Lawsuit).
Background
Filed in December 2020 by Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton and 9 other US states.
The lawsuit focuses on Google’s dominance in online advertising (“ad tech”) markets.
Central claim: Google allegedly manipulated the online ad auction ecosystem to maintain monopoly power and stifle competition.
Key Allegations.
- Manipulating Auctions:
Google operates both sides of the online ad market: the buy-side (for advertisers) and the sell-side (for publishers).
Allegedly rigged ad auctions to favour its own products over rivals like OpenX and AppNexus.
- “Jedi Blue” Agreement:
A secret deal between Google and Facebook (Meta).
Facebook agreed not to compete with Google in certain online ad auctions (Header Bidding).
In exchange, Google allegedly gave Facebook preferential treatment in auctions (faster data, direct access to servers, etc.).
Antitrust risk: a dominant company (Google) colluding with a major competitor (Facebook).
- Use of AI/Algorithms:
Google’s AI-driven auction technologies allegedly tilted auctions so that Google always won.
Techniques like “Dynamic Revenue Sharing” made sure that even if Google’s services were worse for publishers, they still got favoured.
Automated optimization created an appearance of fair competition, but was allegedly self-serving.
- Market Lock-in:
Google’s integration of its ad tools, search data, and publisher services made it nearly impossible for rivals to compete.
Example: forcing the use of Google Ad Manager if publishers wanted access to Google’s huge ad buyer base.
Legal Basis
Violations of:
Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 1 (illegal agreements/conspiracies)
Sherman Act, Section 2 (monopolization and abuse of dominance)
Various state-level antitrust laws.
Current Status (as of 2024–2025).
Ongoing in the US courts.
Several redacted documents have been unsealed, revealing more about Google’s internal strategies.
Google argues the lawsuit misrepresents its practices and that the ad market is highly competitive.
No final decision yet, but settlement talks and parallel investigations continue (including a federal DOJ case against Google).
Relation to Algorithmic Collusion.
Not “pure” AI collusion (i.e., independent algorithms learning to collude).
But very relevant because:
Allegations that algorithms were designed to favour Google secretly.
Secret coordination (Jedi Blue) between competitors, aided by complex AI auction systems.
Shows how opaque algorithms can facilitate anticompetitive behaviour hard to detect.
Fun Fact
The term “Jedi Blue” combines “Jedi” (Star Wars) and Facebook’s internal codename “Blue” the secrecy hints at how seriously the companies took hiding this deal from regulators.
Quick Summary.
Texas v. Google is a hybrid between classic secret agreements and new tech-based manipulation.
It shows how dominant firms can weaponize algorithms in a way that’s much harder for regulators to catch compared to traditional cartels.
The case may set new rules for antitrust law in the algorithmic age — especially concerning opacity and platform power.
Chapter – V
Digital Competition Law.
In February 2023, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs( MCA) constituted a Committee on Digital Competition Law( CDCL) to examine the need for a separate law on competition in digital requests. The CDCL meditated on the issue for a time and came to the conclusion that there was a need to condense the current ex-post frame under the Competition Act, 2002 with an ex-ante frame. It laid out this ex-ante frame in the draft Digital Competition Bill. What’s digital competition Bill? You might be wondering,” What exactly is the Digital Competition Bill?” To put it simply, it’s a proposed law intended to guarantee indifferent competition in the online request. As the online frugality grows, some big players dominate certain sectors, making it hard for new businesses to thrive. This Bill aims to level the playing field by establishing rules that promote competition and check monopolistic practices. suppose of it as a frame to keep the virtual request fair and open, where startups and lower players can contend without being crushed by the big tech titans.
Why Do We Need the Digital Competition Bill?
As businesses decreasingly operate online, traditional competition laws haven’t relatively kept up with the new dynamics.
- Bridling Market Power of Big Tech Companies like Google, Amazon, and Facebook hold significant request power, frequently acting as doorkeepers. This Bill aims to help similar dominant players from engaging in anti-competitive practices that can harm lower businesses and consumers.
- icing Fair Access The Bill seeks to give fair access to digital platforms for all businesses. suppose of it as setting rules so that lower players get a fair shot at using online commerce or advertising services without being unfairly pushed away. 3. Encouraging Innovation When lower companies are given a chance to thrive, it encourages invention. The Bill aims to produce an terrain where startups can bring new ideas to the table without facing walls set up by established players.
Annexure – I
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