Published On: December 24th 2025
Authored By: G. Harini
Government Law College, Theni
Introduction:
The case of Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum marks a turning point in the discourse on women’s rights, secularism, and personal laws in India. Women’s rights in India have historically been mediated through religious personal laws, often leading to unequal treatment, particularly in matters of marriage, divorce, and maintenance. The Shah Bano case highlighted the inherent conflict between secular law, represented by Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973[1], a religion-neutral provision for maintenance. and Muslim personal law, which restricted a divorced Muslim woman’s right to maintenance to the iddat period. The Supreme Court’s ruling in favour of Shah Bano not only upheld gender justice but also sparked nationwide debates on the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), envisaged under Article 44 of the Constitution. This case continues to symbolise the struggle for balancing constitutional principles with religious freedoms.
Case Details:
- Title with Citation: Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556
- Court: Supreme Court of India
- Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud (CJI), D.A. Desai, O. Chinnappa Reddy, E.S. Venkataramiah, and Ranganath Misra JJ.
- Date of Judgment: 23 April 1985
Facts of the Case:
Shah Bano Begum, a 62-year-old Muslim woman, was married to Mohd. Ahmed Khan, a well-off advocate in Indore, Madhya Pradesh, in 1932. After living together for over four decades and having five children, marital discord arose. In 1978, Khan drove Shah Bano out of the matrimonial home. Subsequently, in 1978, he pronounced an irrevocable divorce (triple talaq) and ceased providing her maintenance, claiming that under Muslim personal law his responsibility extended only to the iddat period (a waiting period of approximately three months following divorce).
Finding herself without financial support, Shah Bano filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, a secular provision that obligates a man to maintain his wife if she cannot maintain herself, regardless of religion. The Judicial Magistrate of Indore ordered Khan to pay ₹25 per month as maintenance. Dissatisfied, Shah Bano appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which enhanced the amount to ₹179.20 per month.[2]
Khan, challenging the order, approached the Supreme Court, contending that as per Muslim personal law, he was not bound to maintain his divorced wife beyond the iddat period. This set the stage for a landmark legal battle that would test the relationship between secular statutory law and religious personal law in India.⁴
Procedural History:
After Shah Bano filed a petition under Section 125 CrPC, the Trial Court at Indore ordered Mohd Ahmed Khan to pay her ₹25 per month as maintenance. Shah Bano appealed to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which enhanced the maintenance to ₹179.20 per month. Dissatisfied, Khan filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India, challenging the High Court’s decision on the grounds that under Muslim personal law, his liability ended after the iddat period. The Supreme Court, thus, was called upon to decide whether Section 125 CrPC applies to Muslim women and whether personal law could override a secular statutory provision.[3]
Legal Issues:
- Does Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 apply to Muslim women divorced under personal law?
- Is a husband’s liability to provide maintenance limited only to the iddat period under Muslim personal law?
- Can secular statutory law override personal religious practices when fundamental rights and social justice are involved?
- What is the role of the Uniform Civil Code (Article 44, Constitution of India) in resolving conflicts between personal law and secular law?
Arguments by the Parties:
Petitioner’s Arguments:
Mohd Ahmed Khan contended that his obligations to Shah Bano were governed strictly by Muslim personal law, which limits maintenance to the iddat period, approximately three months following divorce.
He argued that under Shariat law, once the iddat period expired, he had no further legal responsibility to provide maintenance. The petitioner further submitted that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 could not override religious freedoms guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, which protects the right to freely practice and propagate religion.
He asserted that compelling him to pay maintenance beyond iddat would constitute interference in religious affairs and violate the autonomy of personal law. The petitioner relied on interpretations of Muslim law by scholars to strengthen his claim that statutory law should not displace religious norms governing marital obligations.[4]
Respondent’s Arguments:
Shah Bano argued that Section 125 CrPC is a secular provision designed to prevent destitution and applies to all citizens, regardless of religion.
She contended that limiting maintenance solely to the iddat period would leave divorced women vulnerable to poverty, thereby violating the principles of social justice embedded in the Constitution. The respondent emphasized that Section 125 serves a protective function for women who are unable to maintain themselves, ensuring equality before the law.
Furthermore, she argued that fundamental rights, including the right to equality (Article 14) and protection against gender discrimination, take precedence over personal religious practices when the latter result in injustice. Shah Bano maintained that the law’s secular objective to secure maintenance for women should prevail over narrow religious interpretations, reinforcing that personal law cannot be used as a shield to deny basic rights and social security.[5]
Relevant Legal Provisions:
Several legal provisions were central to the Shah Bano case. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 obliges a man to provide maintenance to his wife, children, and parents if they are unable to maintain themselves, irrespective of religion. The provision is secular in nature and aims to prevent destitution and ensure social justice. Article 25 of the Constitution of India guarantees freedom of religion, protecting the right to practice personal laws, while Article 44 envisions the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) to promote legal uniformity across religions. The Supreme Court also considered Quranic injunctions on maintenance, noting that Islamic law mandates support for divorced women during iddat and, by extension, encourages ongoing responsibility to prevent hardship.[6]
Judgment of the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court, in a landmark ruling, held that Section 125 CrPC applies to Muslim women, and that maintenance is not limited to the iddat period if the divorced wife is unable to support herself. The Court emphasized that personal laws cannot override secular criminal law intended to provide relief from destitution. It observed that Section 125 CrPC is a remedial law designed to ensure social justice, equality, and protection of women irrespective of religion. The judgment underscored that while personal law guides family matters, it cannot be used as a shield to deny fundamental rights or statutory benefits.
Further, the Court strongly recommended implementation of the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) to harmonize personal laws across religions, highlighting that uniformity is essential to prevent discriminatory practices against women and ensure equality before the law. The Shah Bano judgment thus established a precedent for interpreting statutory provisions in favor of social justice while respecting religious practices, reinforcing the supremacy of secular law in matters affecting the basic rights and sustenance of citizens.[7]
Ratio Decidendi:
The ratio decidendi of the Shah Bano case established a landmark legal principle regarding the application of secular law to personal law matters. The Supreme Court held that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 is religion-neutral and applies to all citizens, irrespective of their faith. Consequently, a Muslim husband is legally obligated to provide maintenance to his divorced wife if she is unable to support herself, even after the completion of the iddat period. This principle reaffirmed that statutory law designed to prevent destitution cannot be circumvented by religious personal laws. The decision underscored the judiciary’s role in balancing constitutional guarantees of religious freedom with the imperative of social justice and gender equality. By prioritizing the protection of vulnerable women, the Court effectively ensured that personal law cannot be employed as a shield to deny basic sustenance mandated by secular law.[8]
Obiter Dicta:
In addition to the binding principle, the Supreme Court made several obiter dicta that carry persuasive value. The Court emphasized the need for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) under Article 44 of the Constitution to harmonize personal laws and avoid conflicts between religious practices and fundamental rights. It observed that social reform is a constitutional responsibility and highlighted the importance of legislative action to prevent discrimination against women.[9] The Court also suggested that while personal law should guide family matters, it should not impede statutory provisions aimed at ensuring equality and social justice.
Impact on the Indian Legal System:
The Shah Bano case had a profound impact on the Indian legal landscape, particularly in the realms of women’s rights and secularism. The Supreme Court’s decision sparked nationwide debates on the tension between gender justice and religious freedom, highlighting the challenges of reconciling personal law with constitutional mandates. The ruling strengthened the movement for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) under Article 44 of the Constitution, emphasizing the need for legal uniformity to prevent discrimination against women in matters of marriage, divorce, and maintenance. However, the case also created tension between the judiciary and the legislature, as political considerations led to the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which diluted the effect of the Supreme Court’s judgment. Despite this, the case continues to serve as a reference point for debates on the supremacy of secular law over personal religious laws in ensuring social justice.[10]
Critical Analysis:
From a critical perspective, the Shah Bano judgment is widely regarded as a progressive and empowering decision for women in India. By enforcing Section 125 CrPC beyond the iddat period, the Court asserted the supremacy of secular law in matters of social justice, reinforcing that statutory protections cannot be bypassed by personal law. However, the ruling faced criticism for judicial overreach, as it ventured into sensitive religious territory and provoked political backlash. The subsequent legislative rollback through the 1986 Act reflected the limitations of implementing judicial reforms in the face of socio-political pressures. Nevertheless, the judgment remains highly relevant today, serving as a benchmark for gender justice, the ongoing discourse on UCC, and the interplay between personal law, constitutional rights, and statutory obligations. It underscores the judiciary’s role in balancing social justice with religious freedoms while highlighting the persistent need for legal and social reforms to protect women’s rights in India.[11]
Conclusion:
The Shah Bano case remains a landmark judgment in Indian legal history, exemplifying the tension between personal law and secular statutory law. By upholding the applicability of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 to Muslim women, the Supreme Court affirmed that social justice and gender equality take precedence over restrictive interpretations of personal law. The case highlighted the judiciary’s critical role in protecting vulnerable individuals, particularly divorced women, and underscored the necessity for legal mechanisms that prevent destitution. Furthermore, the Court’s observations on the Uniform Civil Code (Article 44, Constitution of India) emphasized the need for legal uniformity to reconcile religious freedoms with constitutional rights. Despite subsequent legislative dilution through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, the judgment continues to serve as a reference point in debates on women’s rights, gender justice, and the harmonization of personal laws with secular statutory provisions. Shah Bano remains a symbol of progressive legal reform and the ongoing struggle for equality in India.[12]
References:
[1] Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 125.
[2] Lawctopus, ‘Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum’ (iPleaders Blog, 2 June 2017) https://blog.ipleaders.in/shah-bano-case/
[3] Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556 (India).
[4] Lawctopus, ‘Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum’ (iPleaders Blog, 2 June 2017) https://blog.ipleaders.in/shah-bano-case/
[5] Lawctopus, ‘Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum’ (iPleaders Blog, 2 June 2017) https://blog.ipleaders.in/shah-bano-case/
[6] Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556 (India).
[7] Lawctopus, ‘Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum’ (iPleaders Blog, 2 June 2017) https://blog.ipleaders.in/shah-bano-case/
[8] Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556 (India).
[9] Ibid.
[10] Mohd Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum AIR 1985 SC 945; (1985) 2 SCC 556 (India).
[11] Lawctopus, ‘Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum’ (iPleaders Blog, 2 June 2017) https://blog.ipleaders.in/shah-bano-case/
[12] Lawctopus, ‘Case Summary: Mohd. Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum’ (iPleaders Blog, 2 June 2017) https://blog.ipleaders.in/shah-bano-case/
