Published On: July 31, 2026
Authored By: Sabina Ajjour
Middlesex University Dubai
Case Details
Full Case Name: X v. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi & Anr.
Citation: Civil Appeal No. 5802 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12612 of 2022)[1]
Bench: D.Y. Chandrachud, Hima Kohli, and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JJ.
Date of Judgment: 29 September 2022
Facts & Issues
The petitioner, referred to as “X” to protect her anonymity, was a 25-year-old unmarried woman residing in Delhi who had become pregnant as a result of a consensual relationship. She decided to terminate the pregnancy after her partner refused to marry her, citing three grounds: first, her fear of the social stigma and harassment surrounding unmarried single parents, particularly unmarried mothers; second, her lack of financial readiness to “raise and nurture the child” properly; and third, her belief that giving birth to a child she was not prepared for would cause severe and lasting mental distress.
By the time she approached the court, her pregnancy was approximately 22 weeks advanced. She sought permission from the Delhi High Court under Section 3(2)(b) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, as amended in 2021, and Rule 3B(c) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003, as amended on 12 October 2021. On 15 July 2022, the High Court rejected her application on the ground that Rule 3B lists specific categories of women eligible for termination between 20 and 24 weeks — including survivors of rape, minors, widows, and divorced women — and that the petitioner, having become pregnant through a consensual relationship while unmarried, did not fall within any of them.
The rejection led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court, which was asked to consider:
1. Whether the exclusion of unmarried women from the benefit of safe abortion services under Rule 3B of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules violates the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
2. Whether the phrase “change of marital status” in Rule 3B(c) must be read to include unmarried women.
3. Whether unmarried women who become pregnant are entitled to terminate a pregnancy beyond the 20-to-24-week window contemplated under the Act and Rules.
4. Whether the psychological suffering resulting from an unwanted pregnancy or birth can constitute “grave injury to mental health” under the Act.
5. Whether reproductive autonomy — including reproductive choice, bodily autonomy, privacy, and dignity — forms an integral component of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.
Arguments
Arguments by the Petitioner
The petitioner argued that the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy is part of a woman’s bodily autonomy, privacy, dignity, and personal liberty under Article 21, such that forcing her to continue an unwanted pregnancy would directly violate that right. She further contended that termination was justified on the ground of “grave injury to mental health” under the Act, arguing that continuing the pregnancy would severely harm her mental health and that mental suffering should be treated as equally serious as physical harm.
She also argued that excluding unmarried women from the same abortion access available to married women or the specifically listed categories was discriminatory, arbitrary, and violative of the guarantee of equality, since marital status bears no relationship to reproductive autonomy or medical need. Restricting her access, she submitted, would expose her to societal stigma, reputational harm, emotional isolation, and economic vulnerability — outcomes the law should avoid imposing through moral judgments based on marital status. Ultimately, she argued that forcing continuation of the pregnancy against her will would violate her rights to health, dignity, and equal access to healthcare under Article 21.
Arguments by the Respondent
The respondent argued that the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 confers a limited statutory scope that must be strictly construed, and that Rule 3B of the 2003 Rules specifically enumerates the categories of women eligible for termination between 20 and 24 weeks — a list that does not expressly include unmarried women. This omission, the respondent submitted, was a deliberate legislative choice: the categories were intentionally defined, and expanding them to include unmarried women in a consensual relationship would amount to judicial overreach into legislative policy.
The respondent further argued that termination beyond 20 weeks requires medical board approval and a determination that continuing the pregnancy poses an actual risk to the woman’s life or health, and that courts should not bypass this statutory framework. It was submitted that termination of pregnancy is not an absolute right under Indian law but a conditional statutory right, meaning the petitioner could not claim entitlement to abortion purely on the basis of personal choice outside the Rules’ stated limits. Finally, the respondent maintained that courts must respect the intent of Parliament and its delegated legislation, and that any expansion of eligible categories — such as including unmarried women — was a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary.
Judgement & Ratio
On 29 September 2022, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court’s restrictive interpretation and held that the petitioner was entitled to terminate her pregnancy under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971.
The Court held that the Act and its Rules must be interpreted in light of the constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity, and personal liberty under Articles 14 and 21, and that unmarried women cannot be excluded from access to safe abortion services on that basis alone. It further held that the categories listed in Rule 3B are illustrative rather than exhaustive, and that reproductive autonomy — including consideration of mental health alongside physical harm — is a constitutionally protected right.
Critical Analysis
The decision in X v. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi marks a significant advancement in Indian reproductive rights jurisprudence. By locating reproductive choice, privacy, dignity, and personal liberty within Article 21 as components of a broader right to reproductive autonomy, the Supreme Court shifted the legal framework governing abortion access from one of statutory or medical privilege toward one grounded in fundamental rights.
The Court’s purposive interpretation — holding that Rule 3B is illustrative rather than exhaustive — reflects a move toward a constitutional approach that prioritizes lived social realities over rigid statutory categories. This interpretive choice allowed the Court to strike down the exclusion of unmarried women as an arbitrary classification under Article 14, recognizing that unmarried women may face circumstances just as compelling as those faced by the categories expressly listed in the Rules.
Equally significant is the Court’s recognition that an unwanted pregnancy can constitute “grave injury to mental health” under the Act, integrating emotional and psychological wellbeing into reproductive healthcare law and treating mental distress as comparable in seriousness to physical harm.
That said, tensions remain. Although the Court emphasized reproductive autonomy, the framework still operates within a system of substantial medical gatekeeping through statutory and medical-board-based approvals, leaving the balance between individual autonomy and state-regulated medical discretion largely unresolved. The Court’s broad move toward inclusion also raises questions about the boundary between judicial interpretation and legislative function. On balance, the judgment is best understood as transformative in principle, yet still structurally constrained by a state-regulated legal framework.
References
[1] X v. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr., (2023) 9 SCC 433 (SC).
[2] Indian Kanoon, ‘X v. The Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi & Anr.‘ (29 September 2022) <https://indiankanoon.org/doc/123985596/> accessed 27 June 2026.
