Published On: 17th August 2026
Authored By: Prisha Chaudhry
O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat
1. Case Details
- Full Case Name: Hindware Ltd. v. Grohe India Pvt. Ltd. and Others; Hindware Ltd. v. Omkara Infoweb Pvt. Ltd. and Others
- Citation: 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3913
- Bench: Mini Pushkarna J
- Date of Judgement: 22 May 2026 (reserved on 26 February 2026)
2. Facts of the Case
Hindware Limited has held the registered trademark HINDWARE since 1991[1], later declared well known by the Delhi High Court in a separate proceeding[2]. Around 2013 and 2014, Hindware found that competitors Cera and Grohe had purchased HINDWARE as a keyword through Google’s AdWords programme, now Google Ads so their sponsored links appeared above Hindware’s own website whenever a consumer searched for the mark[3]. Two suits followed, one against Grohe and Google, the other against Omkara Infoweb, Cera’s website developer along with Cera and Google. Cera and Grohe both settled during the proceedings, leaving Google LLC and Google India as the sole contesting defendants at trial[4] and the narrow question that survived to judgement was whether Google itself was liable through the design of its own keyword auction.
3. Legal Issues
- The Court considered the following questions, alongside preliminary issues of jurisdiction and maintainability.
- Whether use of a registered trademark as a keyword to trigger sponsored advertisements amounts to use of the mark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 even where the keyword is not visible to the consumer.
- Whether such use, if established is attributable to Google or only to the advertiser who selected the keyword.
- Whether Google’s conduct falls within Section 29, particularly Section 29(8) and whether any defence under Sections 30 or 35 applies.
- Whether Google can claim the intermediary safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
4. Arguments
Petitioner’s Arguments
Hindware argues that use of a coined, well known mark as a keyword amounts to use in advertising under Section 29(6)(d), regardless of visibility to the consumer. Google was not a passive facilitator since its Keyword Planner Tool actively suggested trademarked terms and earned revenue through a pay per click auction whenever a user was diverted to a rival’s site. This amounted to unfair advantage under Section 29(8) and could not be shielded by Section 79 of the IT Act since Google selected the recipients of the advertisement and failed to exercise due diligence.[5]
Respondent’s Arguments
Google argued that a keyword is purely a backend trigger matched by an algorithm and never seen by the consumer so Sections 2(2)(b) and (c), which speak of printed or visual representation, cannot extend to something a user never encounters. Whatever use occurs therefore belongs only to the advertiser, while Google supplies only the technical infrastructure. It relied on the European Court of Justice decision in Google France v Louis Vuitton which held that a referencing service provider does not itself use a sign merely by storing it and letting a client select it[6] and urged the same logic in India. Google also claimed to be a neutral intermediary entitled to safe harbour under Section 79 since it did not create the advertisement content and only acted on complaints. Finally, it argued no confusion arose because sponsored results are clearly labelled and distinct from organic results.[7]
5. Judgement and Court’s Reasoning
On jurisdiction, the Court held that suits were properly instituted since Google’s Adwords services were accessible in Delhi, giving rise to part of the cause of action here and rejected Google’s objections on non joinder of the settled defendants and on maintainability, holding Hindware’s cause of action against Google to be independent of any advertiser.[8]
On use, the Court held that Section 2(2)(c) defines use of a mark in wide terms, extending to any relation whatsoever and is not confined to visible use.[9] Read with Section 29(6)(d), this meant deploying HINDWARE as a keyword was use in advertising whether or not the mark appeared on screen, a conclusion drawn heavily from the Division Bench in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics, now applicable on a full trial record rather than an interim finding.[10]
The cross examination of Google’s own witnesses showed that its Keyword Planner Tool actively suggests trademarked terms, that Google runs a real time auction among competing bidders and earns revenue on a cost per click basis whenever a user is diverted to the advertiser’s website. On this evidence, the Court held Google is an active commercial participant that itself uses the trademark, declining to follow the European authorities it relied upon.[11]
Applying Section 29(8), the Court found Google took unfair advantage of the mark and acted contrary to honest practices, selling access to a reputation it had not built without sharing the revenue with the owner. The defenses under Sections 30(1), 30(2)(a) and 35 failed since they protect only use identifying the proprietor’s own goods, not a rival’s and Google was also denied safe harbour under Section 79[12] since it selected the recipients of the advertisement through its targeting tools and had not observed due diligence.[13]
Having found infringement proved but actual loss unquantified, the Court awarded nominal damages of Rs. fifteen lakhs in each suit totalling Rs. thirty lakhs with actual costs and a permanent injunction restraining Google from using HINDWARE as a keyword.[14]
6. Ratio Decidendi
Use of a registered trademark as a keyword to trigger sponsored search advertisements amounts to use of the mark in advertising under Sections 2(2)(c) and 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, even though the keyword is not visible to the consumer. Where a search engine actively suggests, auctions and monetises trademarked terms through tools of its own design that use is attributable to the search engine itself and not only to the advertiser, which takes it outside the intermediary safe harbour under Section 79 of the IT Act. Such conduct, done without the trademark owner’s consent, constitutes infringement under Section 29(8) as an unfair advantage contrary to honest commercial practice.
7. Critical Analysis
The Court’s treatment of Section 79 is the part of the judgment most open to question. The safe harbour was meant to protect intermediaries from liability for third party content they neither author nor control, not to police every commercial arrangement built on top of that content. By locating Google’s loss of protection in its Keyword Planner Tool and cost per click model, the Court treats commercial involvement rather than editorial control as the real test, a reading defensible on these facts but pressed further than the statutory text plainly supports.
The departure from Google France v Louis Vuitton is also thinner than it could have been. The Court records the European position and rejects it without closely examining why the same AdWords architecture, treated as passive there, should be read as active under Indian statutory language. A fuller comparative discussion would have made the ratio harder to dispute.
There is also an unresolved tension between trademark protection and market competition. The judgement treats consumer choice arguments as irrelevant once impermissible means are used, without weighing whether keyword advertising can sometimes serve comparative advertising values the Act recognises elsewhere. For platforms, this means a heavier monitoring burden, since commercial facilitation alone now risks liability, pushing platforms toward screening keywords against trademark registries in advance.
Finally, the outcome leans heavily on HINDWARE being a coined word already recognised as well known. Whether Google’s use would be found equally clear for a descriptive or moderately distinctive mark remains open, a gap likely to surface in the next round of keyword litigation.
8. Conclusion
The judgement builds on the reasoning first suggested in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics but this time it rests on oral evidence and cross examination rather than the prima facie findings, giving it real weight for future disputes. Its lasting contribution lies in treating the design of a platform’s own commercial tools as capable of generating trademark liability, unsettling the easy assumption that a platform stays protected merely because it does not write the advertisement itself. What it does not settle is how far this reasoning travels once the mark is weaker or the platform’s involvement less pronounced than Google’s. Digital advertising depends so heavily on keyword targeting that the tension between trademark enforcement and workable intermediary protection is unlikely to fade after one judgement and courts will need to keep testing where that line sits.
9. References
[1]Hindware Ltd v Grohe India Pvt Ltd and Others; Hindware Ltd v Omkara Infoweb Pvt Ltd and Others 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3913, paras 4.1 to 4.5, 67 to 70 (Del HC).
[2]ibid para 6.1, referring to HSIL Ltd v Kripton Ceramics Pvt Ltd, order dated 21 April 2017 in CS(OS) 2736/2014 (Del HC).
[3]Hindware (n 1) paras 4.6 to 4.7.
[4]ibid paras 3.1 to 3.4.
[5]ibid paras 6.1 to 6.25.
[6]Hindware (n 1) paras 7.1 to 7.53.
[7]Google France SARL v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2011] Bus LR 1 (CJEU).
[8]Hindware (n 1) paras 9 to 26.
[9]Trade Marks Act 1999, s 2(2)(c).
[10]ibid s 29(6)(d); Google LLC v DRS Logistics (P) Ltd (2023) 4 HCC (Del) 515.
[11]Hindware (n 1) paras 92 to 100.
[12]Information Technology Act 2000, s 79; Hindware (n 1) paras 197 to 212.
[13]Trade Marks Act 1999, s 29(8); ss 30(1), 30(2)(a) and 35.
[14]Hindware (n 1) paras 214 to 226, 230.
