Published On: October 15, 2026
Authored By: Priscille Mabwa Mbongo
Abstract
The International Criminal Court (ICC) enters 2025–2026 under increasing pressure to reconcile judicial independence with the political realities of international criminal justice. This legal development examines the Court’s institutional resilience amid external political pressure, targeted sanctions against its officials, and persistent difficulties in securing state cooperation. It argues that the ICC’s principal vulnerability lies not in the absence of jurisdictional authority, but in its structural dependence upon states for arrests, evidence, enforcement and the execution of judicial decisions. The analysis therefore distinguishes between the Court’s capacity to preserve its legal and institutional mandate and its ability to translate judicial authority into effective accountability. Recent developments demonstrate that the ICC has shown considerable resilience, yet they also expose an enduring enforcement asymmetry: international law may impose obligations upon states, while practical enforcement remains largely dependent upon their political willingness to cooperate. The article concludes that sustained collective support from States Parties is essential to safeguarding the Court’s independence and effectiveness.
Keywords: International Criminal Court; judicial independence; state cooperation; institutional resilience; international criminal justice.
I. Introduction
International criminal law rests on the premise that individuals responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes should not be beyond accountability. The International Criminal Court (ICC), established by the Rome Statute, represents the most developed permanent institution for pursuing that objective. Yet its judicial authority is matched by a significant institutional limitation: the Court has no independent police force and therefore relies upon states to arrest suspects, obtain evidence and execute judicial requests.[1] This dependence creates a persistent tension between judicial independence and political pressure, and between legal obligation and practical cooperation. Recent developments in 2025–2026, particularly the United States’ sanctions against ICC officials and broader attempts to resist the Court’s jurisdiction, have brought this structural vulnerability into sharper focus.[2] Comparative scholarship likewise demonstrates how domestic legal measures can be used to obstruct ICC jurisdiction and how geopolitical interests continue to shape international criminal justice.[3] This article argues that the central challenge is no longer simply whether the ICC possesses jurisdiction, but whether it can meaningfully exercise that jurisdiction when states resist its authority.
II. The ICC’s Institutional Resilience in 2025–2026
A. The ICC’s Legal and Institutional Foundation
The International Criminal Court was deliberately designed as an independent judicial institution, not as an instrument subordinate to the political preferences of individual states. The Rome Statute establishes a permanent Court with jurisdiction over the gravest international crimes, while the principle of complementarity preserves the primary role of national jurisdictions and permits ICC intervention only where domestic systems are unwilling or genuinely unable to act.[4] Judicial independence is reinforced by institutional safeguards governing the election and tenure of judges and by the Prosecutor’s statutory obligation to exercise functions independently and impartially.[5] The Assembly of States Parties provides legislative and administrative oversight, while States Parties bear the principal responsibility for cooperation with investigations, arrests and other judicial requests.[6] This architecture produces an important paradox: the ICC is legally independent, but its practical operation remains embedded within a state-based system.
B. External Pressure on the Court
The events of 2025 exposed this tension with unusual force. Following the issuance of Executive Order 14203, the United States imposed sanctions targeting ICC officials, presenting the Court’s activities as a threat to US sovereignty and national interests.[7] The significance of these measures extends beyond their immediate economic consequences. Targeting judges and prosecutors because of their judicial functions risks converting political disagreement into institutional coercion, thereby challenging the principle that international judicial decisions should be determined by law rather than the political influence of powerful states. Nehaluddin and others identify this episode as a particularly clear illustration of the tension between international accountability and state sovereignty.[8] Comparative analysis further demonstrates that national legal measures can be employed to obstruct or constrain the ICC’s jurisdiction, revealing that resistance need not occur solely through overt refusal to cooperate.[9]
C. Why Institutional Resilience Matters
Institutional resilience should therefore be understood as more than the Court’s ability simply to survive political controversy. It has three interconnected dimensions. First, legal resilience concerns the Court’s capacity to continue applying the Rome Statute independently despite external pressure. Secondly, institutional resilience concerns its ability to preserve its investigative, prosecutorial and judicial functions when officials, finances and operational structures come under strain. Thirdly, normative resilience concerns whether the principle of individual accountability can retain authority when states seek to place political interests above judicial obligations. The 2025–2026 experience suggests that the ICC has demonstrated considerable resilience across these dimensions, but also exposes a deeper structural weakness: judicial independence can protect the Court’s decision-making, yet it cannot by itself secure the cooperation required to make those decisions effective.[10]
III. The Cooperation Problem: The ICC’s Structural Vulnerability
A. The ICC’s Dependence on States
The International Criminal Court’s greatest institutional vulnerability arises from a simple structural fact: its judicial authority is not matched by an equivalent coercive capacity. Under the Rome Statute, the Court may issue arrest warrants, summonses and judicial orders and may request States Parties to provide assistance, yet it possesses no independent police force capable of arresting suspects or compelling compliance.[11] The effectiveness of an ICC decision therefore depends upon a second legal actor, the state, whose cooperation is frequently indispensable to its implementation. This creates a fundamental distinction between jurisdiction and enforcement: the Court may possess lawful authority over a situation while remaining practically unable to exercise that authority without state assistance. The resulting dependency is not accidental; it is embedded within the Rome Statute’s institutional design.
B. Arrest and Surrender
This structural weakness becomes most visible when arrest warrants cannot be translated into custody. Article 86 establishes a general obligation for States Parties to cooperate fully with the Court, while Articles 89 and 92 provide mechanisms for securing the arrest and surrender of persons sought by the Court.[12] Yet a legal obligation does not automatically produce practical compliance. Suspects may remain beyond the Court’s reach where states fail to execute warrants, delay cooperation or invoke competing domestic and political considerations. The problem is particularly acute where the requested state has strategic relationships with the suspect or where cooperation could generate diplomatic costs.[13] Yadegarian and Razavi’s analysis of the ICC’s evolving arrest-warrant practice illustrates how the Court’s expanding judicial activity has not necessarily been matched by an equivalent capacity to secure execution of its warrants.[14] The central weakness, therefore, lies not simply in non-compliance, but in the absence of an independent enforcement mechanism capable of overcoming it.
C. The Politics of Cooperation
State cooperation is consequently shaped by an uneven distribution of political power. States with substantial diplomatic influence, economic leverage or strategic alliances may possess greater capacity to resist or mitigate the consequences of ICC action than weaker states. This produces what may be termed an enforcement asymmetry within international criminal justice: the legal obligations created by the Rome Statute are formally general, but the practical consequences of non-cooperation are not experienced equally. Comparative research on national measures designed to obstruct ICC jurisdiction demonstrates that resistance can operate through domestic legislation as well as overt refusal to execute judicial requests.[15] The broader challenge is therefore systemic. The ICC was established to place individuals, rather than political power, at the centre of accountability; yet its enforcement depends upon states whose interests may be directly affected by the Court’s investigations. As recent scholarship observes, geopolitical realities can consequently transform cooperation from a legal duty into a politically negotiated practice.[16] The Court’s resilience must therefore be measured not only by its willingness to issue judicial decisions, but by its capacity to secure meaningful compliance with them.
IV. 2025–2026: A Stress Test for the ICC
A. Sanctions and Judicial Independence
The events of 2025 placed the ICC’s institutional independence under exceptional pressure. In February 2025, the United States adopted Executive Order 14203, authorising sanctions against ICC officials and responding to the Court’s investigations in terms of threats to US sovereignty and national interests.[17] The significance of these measures extends beyond their immediate financial or administrative effects. Where judges and prosecutors are personally targeted because of decisions taken in the exercise of judicial functions, external pressure risks altering the conditions in which independent adjudication takes place. Nehaluddin and others consequently identify the episode as a serious challenge to the ICC’s capacity to enforce international humanitarian law amid geopolitical resistance.[18] The question is therefore not merely whether the Rome Statute formally guarantees independence, but whether that independence remains meaningful when powerful states can impose consequences upon those exercising it.
B. The Court’s Institutional Response
The ICC’s response demonstrates an important degree of institutional resilience. Rather than allowing political pressure to determine its judicial agenda, the Court continued to perform its statutory functions while publicly defending judicial independence. This response was reinforced by the broader institutional support of States Parties and by efforts to strengthen the Court’s organisational capacity. Its Strategic Plan 2026–2029 is particularly significant because it treats institutional effectiveness, operational capacity and the fulfilment of the Court’s mandate as interconnected priorities.[19] Such measures suggest that resilience is not simply resistance to external criticism; it also requires the institutional capacity to continue investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating when the political environment becomes hostile. Yet financial and operational vulnerabilities remain important, particularly given the Court’s dependence upon contributions from States Parties.[20]
C. The Deeper Legal Question
These developments expose a deeper tension within international criminal justice. The ICC is legally independent precisely because its judicial functions should not be dictated by individual states; nevertheless, the Court remains practically dependent upon states for arrests, evidence, resources and enforcement. This creates a distinction between formal judicial independence and functional independence. The former concerns the Court’s legal authority to decide cases without political instruction; the latter concerns whether it possesses sufficient institutional capacity to give those decisions practical effect. Recent scholarship on geopolitical resistance and domestic measures restricting ICC jurisdiction demonstrates why this distinction matters.[21] Thus, the 2025–2026 crisis should not be understood simply as an attack on the ICC from outside. It is a test of whether an institution designed around state cooperation can preserve genuinely independent justice when some of the states upon which its effectiveness depends have political reasons to resist its authority.[22]
V. Reforming Cooperation: Strengthening the ICC without Undermining Sovereignty
The cooperation crisis requires reforms that reinforce the Rome Statute without transforming the ICC into an institution capable of overriding legitimate domestic authority.
1. Using Article 87 more systematically. First, Article 87 of the Rome Statute should be used more systematically. It permits the Court to request cooperation from States Parties and, where a state fails to comply, to make a formal finding of non-cooperation and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where appropriate, the Security Council.[23] The Assembly should develop a more predictable and coordinated response to such referrals, combining diplomatic engagement with proportionate political consequences. This would give Article 87 greater practical significance without creating coercive powers that the Statute does not confer.
2. Protecting judges, prosecutors and investigators. Secondly, States Parties should strengthen institutional protection for judges, prosecutors and investigators, particularly against politically motivated sanctions and other forms of external pressure. Collective legal, financial and diplomatic safeguards would reduce the possibility that individual officials bear the consequences of defending judicial independence.[24]
3. Cooperation as a collective responsibility. Thirdly, cooperation should become a genuinely collective responsibility. States Parties should respond collectively when the Court is threatened rather than leaving individual governments to defend it in isolation. Recent scholarship on sanctions, political resistance and the ICC’s financial vulnerabilities demonstrates why institutional resilience cannot rest solely upon the Court itself.[25] The ICC’s long-term effectiveness ultimately requires a political community willing to protect the legal framework it created. Thus, strengthening cooperation is not an assault on sovereignty; it is a means of ensuring that sovereign commitments voluntarily undertaken under the Rome Statute remain meaningful.
VI. Conclusion
The experience of 2025–2026 demonstrates that the ICC’s greatest challenge is not the absence of a sophisticated legal framework, but the political and institutional conditions in which that framework must operate. The Court has demonstrated considerable resilience by maintaining its judicial mandate despite sanctions, political pressure and attempts to constrain its jurisdiction.[26] Yet this resilience has limits. The ICC remains dependent upon states for arrests, evidence, resources and enforcement, creating a persistent gap between judicial authority and coercive capacity.[27] State cooperation therefore remains the decisive condition determining whether the Court’s legal decisions can produce practical accountability. The recent challenges also demonstrate why protecting judicial independence cannot be separated from collective political support.[28] Ultimately, the ICC can remain institutionally resilient only where States Parties collectively defend the legal commitments embodied in the Rome Statute. Its future effectiveness will therefore depend not simply upon the strength of the Court itself, but upon whether states are prepared to cooperate when cooperation becomes politically difficult.
Footnotes
[1] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 4, 86–89; International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2024) arts 86–89.
[2] Donald J Trump, ‘Executive Order 14203—Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’ (6 February 2025); Federal Register vol 90, no 28 (12 February 2025). The Order imposed sanctions in response to ICC investigations involving US personnel and nationals of close US allies.
[3] K Khwaileh, MA Obeidat and HSM Mohamed, ‘International Legal Responses to War Crimes and Genocide: A Comparative Analysis of Gaza, Ukraine, and Myanmar’ (2026) 11 Frontiers in Sociology; A Bajpai, ‘Funding Justice: Analyzing the Financial Challenges and Funding Dependencies of the International Criminal Court’ (2025) Journal of Informatics Education and Research; F Yadegarian and M Razavi, ‘The Evolution of the International Criminal Court’s Judicial Policy on Issuing Arrest Warrants: From Uganda to Palestine’ (2025) 12 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 255.
[4] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 1, 17; see also International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2024) arts 1, 17.
[5] Rome Statute (n 4) arts 36, 42; International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2024) art 42. The Statute expressly requires the Prosecutor and Deputy Prosecutors to exercise their functions independently and without activities capable of compromising that independence.
[6] Rome Statute (n 4) arts 86–89; Assembly of States Parties, Rules of Procedure and Evidence; International Criminal Court, ‘Statement by the Presidency of the Assembly of States Parties in support of the independence and impartiality of the International Criminal Court’ (17 May 2024). The Assembly of States Parties is the ICC’s management oversight and legislative body.
[7] Donald J Trump, ‘Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’, Executive Order 14203 (6 February 2025), 90 Federal Register 9577 (12 February 2025).
[8] A Nehaluddin, J Hambali, R Faizah and R Norsabreena, ‘The ICC’s Role in Enforcing International Humanitarian Law under Political Challenges: A Special Reference to President Trump’s Executive Order 14203’ (2025) 18(1) Journal of East Asia and International Law 75, 75–96. The authors identify political resistance and the ICC’s dependence on state cooperation as central constraints upon its effectiveness.
[9] V Lysyk and V Burdin, ‘Using National Law as a Means of Blocking the Jurisdiction of the ICC: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Practices in the USA and Russian Federation’ (2026) Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence.
[10] F Yadegarian and M Razavi, ‘The Evolution of the International Criminal Court’s Judicial Policy on Issuing Arrest Warrants: From Uganda to Palestine’ (2025) 12 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 255; M Ștefănoaia, ‘The Challenges of International Justice Amid Geopolitical Realities’ (2025) Proceedings of the International Conference on Future of Social Sciences and Humanities.
[11] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 54, 58, 89; see also International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2024).
[12] Rome Statute (n 11) arts 86–89.
[13] M Ștefănoaia, ‘The Challenges of International Justice Amid Geopolitical Realities’ (2025) Proceedings of the International Conference on Future of Social Sciences and Humanities; A Nehaluddin, J Hambali, R Faizah and R Norsabreena, ‘The ICC’s Role in Enforcing International Humanitarian Law under Political Challenges: A Special Reference to President Trump’s Executive Order 14203’ (2025) 18(1) Journal of East Asia and International Law.
[14] F Yadegarian and M Razavi, ‘The Evolution of the International Criminal Court’s Judicial Policy on Issuing Arrest Warrants: From Uganda to Palestine’ (2025) 12 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 255.
[15] V Lysyk and V Burdin, ‘Using National Law as a Means of Blocking the Jurisdiction of the ICC: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Practices in the USA and Russian Federation’ (2026) Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence.
[16] MM Rahman, ‘Harmonizing Global Peace and Security: The Evolving Role of the ICC’ (2025) International Journal of Science and Research; A Bajpai, ‘The International Criminal Court and State Sovereignty: Navigating the Tensions of Global Justice’ (2025) American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation.
[17] Donald J Trump, ‘Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court’, Executive Order 14203 (6 February 2025), 90 Federal Register 9577 (12 February 2025).
[18] A Nehaluddin, J Hambali, R Faizah and R Norsabreena, ‘The ICC’s Role in Enforcing International Humanitarian Law under Political Challenges: A Special Reference to President Trump’s Executive Order 14203’ (2025) 18(1) Journal of East Asia and International Law; M Ștefănoaia, ‘The Challenges of International Justice Amid Geopolitical Realities’ (2025) Proceedings of the International Conference on Future of Social Sciences and Humanities.
[19] International Criminal Court, Strategic Plan 2026–2029 (ICC 2025); see also International Criminal Court, ‘ICC Launches First “One Court” Strategic Plan 2026–2029’ (ICC, 2025).
[20] A Bajpai, ‘Funding Justice: Analyzing the Financial Challenges and Funding Dependencies of the International Criminal Court’ (2025) Journal of Informatics Education and Research.
[21] V Lysyk and V Burdin, ‘Using National Law as a Means of Blocking the Jurisdiction of the ICC: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Practices in the USA and Russian Federation’ (2026) Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence.
[22] F Yadegarian and M Razavi, ‘The Evolution of the International Criminal Court’s Judicial Policy on Issuing Arrest Warrants: From Uganda to Palestine’ (2025) 12 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 255.
[23] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 86–87. Article 87(7) provides that where a State Party fails to comply with a cooperation request contrary to the Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.
[24] Rome Statute (n 23) arts 36, 42; Assembly of States Parties, ‘Procedures relating to the consideration of non-cooperation’ ICC-ASP/17/20, which recognises the Assembly’s role in using political and diplomatic measures to promote cooperation while preserving the Court’s judicial functions.
[25] V Lysyk and V Burdin, ‘Using National Law as a Means of Blocking the Jurisdiction of the ICC: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Practices in the USA and Russian Federation’ (2026) Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence; A Bajpai, ‘Funding Justice: Analyzing the Financial Challenges and Funding Dependencies of the International Criminal Court’ (2025) Journal of Informatics Education and Research; A Nehaluddin, J Hambali, R Faizah and R Norsabreena, ‘The ICC’s Role in Enforcing International Humanitarian Law under Political Challenges: A Special Reference to President Trump’s Executive Order 14203’ (2025) 18(1) Journal of East Asia and International Law; K Reed, ‘Sanctioned Justice: State (Non)Responses to US Sanctions against the ICC’ (2026) Journal of International Criminal Justice.
[26] A Nehaluddin, J Hambali, R Faizah and R Norsabreena, ‘The ICC’s Role in Enforcing International Humanitarian Law under Political Challenges: A Special Reference to President Trump’s Executive Order 14203’ (2025) 18(1) Journal of East Asia and International Law; M Ștefănoaia, ‘The Challenges of International Justice Amid Geopolitical Realities’ (2025) Proceedings of the International Conference on Future of Social Sciences and Humanities.
[27] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts 86–89; F Yadegarian and M Razavi, ‘The Evolution of the International Criminal Court’s Judicial Policy on Issuing Arrest Warrants: From Uganda to Palestine’ (2025) 12 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 255.
[28] V Lysyk and V Burdin, ‘Using National Law as a Means of Blocking the Jurisdiction of the ICC: A Comparative Legal Analysis of Practices in the USA and Russian Federation’ (2026) Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence; A Bajpai, ‘Funding Justice: Analyzing the Financial Challenges and Funding Dependencies of the International Criminal Court’ (2025) Journal of Informatics Education and Research.
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