Between Security and Speech: A Critical Study of Internet Censorship in India

 

Abstract

This article examines internet censorship in India through the lens of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the permissible restrictions under Article 19(2). It analyses the conceptual basis of digital censorship, the mechanisms through which it is implemented, the statutory framework under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and its subsequent amendments, and the judicial approach of Indian courts. Through an examination of notable instances of censorship and an assessment of international press freedom and civil liberties indices, the article critically evaluates whether India is moving toward an arbitrary censorship regime. It concludes with recommendations for reform aimed at ensuring that the imperatives of security and public order do not displace the fundamental right to free expression.

I. Introduction

“Where books are burned, in the end, people will burn.”[1]

With an emphasis on internet censorship and its governing regulations in India, this article examines the concept, historical development, and operational mechanics of censorship. It aims to understand the development and consequences of censoring policies by drawing on government publications, judicial decisions, legislative materials, and secondary sources including research articles and reports. By outlining the key legal frameworks and notable instances of censorship, the article examines whether India is moving toward an arbitrary censorship regime.

In light of the constitutional guarantees under Article 19(1)(a) and the limitations under Article 19(2), this article analyses the legal framework governing internet censorship in India and assesses whether the current regulatory system represents a shift away from permissible restriction and toward administrative overreach.

II. Digital Censorship: Concept and Evolution

Internet censorship refers to the suppression, restriction, and regulation of material that is accessible on the internet. With the expansion of the internet and cyberspace, this form of censorship has become increasingly prevalent in both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, making awareness and critical understanding of it essential.

Throughout history, successive communication technologies, the printing press, radio, and television, have each been subjected to varying degrees of regulatory control. None, however, presents the same challenges as the internet. Its robustness, the speed at which information may be communicated, and its wide geographic reach make it a uniquely powerful medium, and, for censorious regimes, a uniquely difficult one to control. Certain structural characteristics of the internet compound this difficulty. National borders are more permeable in the digital space than in the physical world: citizens of one country can access content prohibited by their government by visiting websites hosted in other jurisdictions or by circumventing network restrictions through virtual private networks (VPNs).

This shift from traditional to digital forms of communication has significantly expanded both the scope and complexity of censorship practices globally.

III. Mechanisms of Internet Censorship

Governments employ a variety of technical mechanisms to restrict online content. The principal methods are as follows:

DNS Tampering: Nations that control domain name servers can deregister domain names carrying content not approved by domestic law. This prevents the domain name from being resolved into a site’s IP address, thereby blocking browser access. The effect is analogous to providing an incorrect telephone number to someone seeking to make a call.[2]

IP Blocking: Where governments exercise control over internet service providers, they can cause objectionable websites to be blocked at the network level. When a user requests access to a blocked site, surveillance systems cross-check the request against a list of blocked IP addresses and direct the internet service provider to terminate the connection.

Keyword Filtering: This mechanism involves the automated or manual blocking of specific keywords. It is commonly deployed in institutional settings and parental control systems, but is also used by governments to restrict access to content associated with particular subjects or individuals.[3]

IV. Legal Framework Governing Digital Censorship in India

The laws governing internet censorship in India derive their constitutional authority from Article 19(2), which limits the scope of the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). Article 19(2) provides:[4]

“Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”

Accordingly, the Constitution of India permits the government to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and expression in the interests of: (a) the sovereignty and integrity of India; (b) the security of the State; (c) friendly relations with foreign States; (d) public order; (e) decency or morality; (f) contempt of court; (g) defamation; and (h) incitement to an offence.

The primary statutory instrument is the Information Technology Act, 2000, which regulates e-commerce, cyber-crimes, and digital signatures. The following provisions are directly relevant to internet censorship:

Section 67A[5] punishes the publication or transmission of material containing sexually explicit acts or conduct in electronic form.

Section 67B[6] punishes the electronic publication or transmission of material depicting children in sexually explicit acts or conduct.

Section 67C[7] requires intermediaries to preserve and retain specified information for such period as the Central Government may prescribe.

Section 69A[8] empowers the Central Government to issue orders preventing public access to any information through any computer resource, on specified grounds.

The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021[9] introduced new compliance obligations, regulatory requirements, and grievance redressal procedures for social media platforms, over-the-top (OTT) content providers, digital news publishers, and messaging applications.

Subsequent amendments have progressively expanded the regulatory framework. The 2023 amendment introduced additional due diligence requirements and empowered the Central Government to establish a fact-check unit with authority to identify and require the removal of false or misleading information relating to government business.

Further amendments have introduced requirements that blocking and content-removal orders be issued only by authorised officials and comply with procedural safeguards and periodic review, with the stated aim of improving transparency and accountability in content regulation.

Recent developments have also sought to address the challenges posed by artificial intelligence and synthetically generated content, by imposing additional obligations on intermediaries to prevent the dissemination of harmful or misleading digital material.

These provisions collectively constitute the statutory basis for the regulation and control of online content in India.

V. Judicial Approach to Internet Censorship

The most significant provisions facilitating censorship under the IT Act are Sections 66A (now struck down), 69A, and 79. Section 66A was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India[10] on the ground that it constituted an unreasonable restriction on freedom of speech and expression. The discussion below therefore focuses on Sections 69A and 79.

Section 69A was introduced in 2008 by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act as a legislative response to the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. It empowers the Central Government to issue orders preventing public access to digital content on the following grounds: the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India; the defence of India; the security of the State; friendly relations with foreign states; public order; or the prevention of incitement to a cognizable offence. An intermediary that fails to comply with a blocking order under this section is liable to imprisonment of up to seven years.

Although Section 69A survived constitutional challenge in Shreya Singhal, its validity was revisited in the 2023 case of X Corp. v. Union of India,[11] in which the technology company filed a writ petition before the Karnataka High Court challenging blocking orders issued under this section. The High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 69A, reaffirming the Shreya Singhal position while examining the scope of executive powers in blocking online content.

In practice, however, Section 69A has been applied with varying degrees of rigour. While there are undoubtedly circumstances warranting content restriction, government directives have frequently been imprecise, resulting in the blocking of entire domains rather than specific offending content, and have lacked adequate oversight and accountability mechanisms.

The Supreme Court addressed related concerns in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India,[12] where it emphasised the importance of proportionality and procedural safeguards in any restriction on internet access, holding that internet shutdowns and content restrictions must be necessary, proportionate, and subject to judicial review.

VI. Practical Trends: Notable Instances of Internet Censorship in India

An examination of the exercise of censorship powers in recent years is instructive. The following are among the most significant documented instances:

2012: Between 18 and 21 August 2012, the Indian government issued orders to block over 300 specific URLs. The blocked content allegedly included posts, accounts, groups, and videos containing fabricated material about violence in Assam and content encouraging migration from the Northeast.[13]

2015: On 1 August 2015, 857 pornographic websites were blocked pursuant to Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Department of Telecommunications lifted the prohibition on 5 August of the same year.[14]

2019: In response to a Right to Information request, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology disclosed that it had blocked 20 websites between January and October. The Ministry also directed social media companies to remove 3,433 URLs pursuant to Section 69A of the Information Technology Act.[15]

2020: In June 2020, following a military confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops in a disputed territory near their shared border, the Indian government banned approximately sixty mobile applications developed by Chinese companies. The stated justifications were the protection of India’s security, integrity, and sovereignty, and the prevention of unauthorised data collection by applications allegedly transmitting users’ data to servers outside India.[16]

2021: In early February 2021, the Indian government sought Twitter’s removal of over one thousand accounts linked to the farmers’ protests against the Indian Agricultural Acts of 2020. The government threatened staff imprisonment of up to seven years if Twitter did not comply with orders to remove accounts alleged to be spreading misleading information.[17]

2023: Internet access was repeatedly suspended in Manipur throughout 2023 in response to ethnic violence. Services were restored in December 2023.

2023-2024: The Indian government issued multiple blocking orders under Section 69A directing platforms including YouTube and X (formerly Twitter) to remove content, including documentary films and posts critical of government policy.

2024 (General Elections): During the 2024 general elections, concerns were raised about the use of algorithmic moderation and content takedown powers in relation to political speech, disinformation, and deepfake content circulating online.

These instances reflect a pattern of increasing state intervention in the regulation of online content and access in India.

VII. Critical Analysis: Is India Moving Towards an Arbitrary Censorship Regime?

Contextual indicators suggest a concerning trajectory. According to the 23rd edition of the World Press Freedom Index (WPFI 2025) published by Reporters Without Borders, India is ranked 151st out of 180 countries.[18] Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2025 report assigns India an overall score of 63 out of 100 and the status “Partly Free.”[19] This represents a notable decline from 2017, when India scored 77 out of 100 and was designated “Free.” The deterioration is reflected in both political rights and civil liberties scores, indicating a broader erosion of democratic freedoms over this period.

The instances discussed in the preceding section are enabled primarily by the Information Technology Act, 2000, operating within the constitutional permissions granted by Article 19(2). While the courts have upheld the constitutional validity of the key provisions, their practical application raises serious concerns.

Section 69A, as applied, has demonstrated a persistent tendency toward over-blocking, entire domains being restricted when only specific content was the target of a valid order, and a lack of adequate oversight and accountability mechanisms. The broad and ambiguous grounds for restriction, coupled with minimal procedural safeguards for affected users, create significant potential for administrative overreach.

Section 79 of the IT Act effectively transforms intermediaries into watchdogs of the internet. Under this provision, platforms are required to remove an extraordinarily wide range of content, including material that is “extremely harmful, harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic, libellous, invasive of privacy, hateful, racially or ethnically objectionable,” and so forth, without the requirement of a prior court order. The absence of a judicial pre-authorisation requirement, the breadth of the categories of prohibited content, and the reliance on private complaint as the trigger for enforcement collectively create a system that is vulnerable to strategic misuse as a censorship instrument.

These concerns are aggravated by structural features of internet regulation that the existing framework does not adequately address. Due to the global nature of the internet, it is virtually impossible to filter all content uploaded in other jurisdictions and accessed in India. The practical difficulties of enforcement may produce selective or politically motivated application of censorship powers. Meanwhile, questions about who has the authority to censor content, under what procedural conditions, and subject to what review mechanisms, remain inadequately resolved.

Particularly concerning is the relative inattention paid to harmful content, such as aggressive, defamatory, and communally divisive material, especially that targeting women, within the existing regulatory framework. The absence of traceability, accountability, and meaningful oversight in the process of content regulation points to a pattern of drift from constitutionally permissible restriction toward potential administrative overreach.

The lack of transparency in blocking orders and the absence of effective remedies for affected users further aggravate these concerns. Taken together, these factors suggest that while India has not yet crossed the threshold into an unambiguously arbitrary censorship regime, the conditions for such a shift are increasingly present.

VIII. Recommendations and Reform

Addressing these concerns requires a multi-dimensional reform agenda. The following measures are proposed:

1. Statutory Clarity: Clear and precise criteria should be established in the legislation for what content may and may not be restricted, reducing the scope for vague or overbroad application of censorship powers.

2. Judicial Oversight: The requirement of prior judicial authorisation, or, at minimum, prompt post-facto judicial review, should be introduced for significant blocking orders. This would bring the Indian framework closer to the proportionality standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin.

3. Independent Review Body: An independent, impartial authority should be established to review censorship decisions, with the power to set aside orders that fail to meet constitutional or statutory standards.

4. Transparency Obligations: Government authorities and intermediaries should be required to publish periodic transparency reports disclosing the number, nature, and legal basis of blocking and removal orders, consistent with emerging global best practices.

5. User Notification and Remedies: Procedural safeguards including user notification of takedown orders, the provision of reasoned blocking decisions, and accessible appeal mechanisms should be institutionalised to ensure that affected individuals can seek effective redress.

6. Digital Literacy: Alongside legal reform, sustained investment in media and digital literacy programmes is essential to equip citizens to critically evaluate online content and resist manipulation.

IX. Conclusion

The regulation of internet content in India presents a genuine constitutional challenge. The Constitution permits certain forms of censorship through Article 19(2), but the global, borderless character of the internet makes comprehensive filtering virtually impossible and selective or politically motivated enforcement a persistent risk. The current statutory framework, particularly Section 69A and the intermediary liability regime under Section 79 of the IT Act, while not unconstitutional on its face, has been applied in ways that raise legitimate concerns about vagueness, lack of oversight, and administrative overreach.

It is hoped that the Supreme Court will continue to actively scrutinise the exercise of censorship powers and, where necessary, strike down provisions that fail to meet constitutional standards of reasonableness and proportionality, thereby compelling the legislative and executive branches to construct a framework that is genuinely transparent, accountable, and consistent with the spirit of Article 19(1)(a).

Ultimately, a balanced approach is essential: the legitimate imperatives of national security, public order, and the protection of citizens must be pursued through means that do not sacrifice the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Security and speech are not irreconcilably opposed, but maintaining the balance between them requires legal architecture that is precise, accountable, and subject to independent review.

References

[1] Heinrich Heine, Almansor (1820–1821) (“Dort, wo man Bücher verbrennt, verbrennt man am Ende auch Menschen”).
[2] Rochelle Terman, ‘Internet Censorship (Part 2): The Technology of Information Control’, Townsend Center for the Humanities (Apr. 1, 2024).
[3] Aliza Vigderman & Gabe Turner, ‘Internet Censorship in 2024: The Impact of Internet Restrictions’, Security.org (Jan. 22, 2024), <https://www.security.org/vpn/internet-censorship/>.
[4] Constitution of India 1950, art. 19, cl. (2).
[5] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 67A, India Code.
[6] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 67B, India Code.
[7] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 67C, India Code.
[8] Information Technology Act, No. 21 of 2000, § 69A, India Code.
[9] Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, G.S.R. 139(E).
[10] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (India).
[11] X Corp. v. Union of India, W.P. No. 13710 of 2023 (Karnataka H.C. 2023). 
[12] Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637 (India).
[13] ‘Assam Violence: Government Sets 12 Hour Deadline for Twitter to Remove Hate Pages’, The Economic Times (Aug. 23, 2012), <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/assam-violence-government-sets-12-hour-deadline-for-twitter-to-remove-hate-pages/articleshow/15610393.cms>.
[14] Sanjoy Majumdar, ‘India Porn Ban: How the Government Was Forced to Reverse Porn Ban’, BBC News (Aug. 8, 2015), <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-33810775>.
[15] ‘Websites Blocked by MeitY in 2019’, Software Freedom Law Center (Oct. 25, 2019), <https://sflc.in/websites-blocked-2019/>.
[16] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘India Bans TikTok After Himalayan Border Clash with Chinese Troops’, The Guardian (June 29, 2020), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/29/india-bans-tiktok-after-himalayan-border-clash-with-chinese-troops>.
[17] Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘Twitter Concerned for Staff in India After Row Over Account Removals’, The Guardian (Feb. 9, 2021), <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/feb/09/twitter-concerned-for-staff-in-india-after-row-over-account-removals>.
[18] Reporters Without Borders, World Press Freedom Index 2025, <https://rsf.org/en/index>. 
[19] Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: India, <https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2025>.