Published On: June 7th 2026
Authored By: Pramiti Kothawade
ILS Law College
Case Details:
- Case No.: 09 of 2025
- Case Title: Velusammy Karuppannan vs AVEVA Group Ltd.
- Bench: CCI CORAM (Ms. Ravneet Kaur, Mr. Anil Agrawal, Ms. Sweta Kakkad, Mr. Deepak Anurag)
Facts and Issues
The present case primarily revolves around allegations of abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive conduct in the market for industrial software solutions under the Competition Act, 2002.[1]
The information was filed by Mr. Velusamy Karuppannan (Informant) against AVEVA Group Limited (Opposite Party), a UK-based company and its associated entities, alleging that they hold a dominant position in the relevant market for industrial software solutions and had abused such dominance by imposing restrictive conditions, including bundling practices, thereby causing an Appreciable Adverse Effect on Competition (AAEC). The matter came up before the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to determine whether such conduct amounted to violations under Sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.
Accordingly, the key issues for consideration before the Commission were:
1. What is the relevant market in the present case?
2. Whether the Opposite Party holds a dominant position in the relevant market?
3. If the Opposite Party is dominant in the relevant market, whether the alleged conduct amounts to a violation of Section 4 of the Act?
Arguments by the Informant
The Informant argued that AVEVA engaged in anti-competitive practices through tying and bundling its software products. It was claimed that customers did not have the choice to purchase the products they wanted and were instead forced to purchase combined solutions rather than individual products, which restricted their freedom of choice. It was further alleged that such practices led to customer lock-in, making it difficult for users to switch to competitors in the market. Additionally, these practices were said to provide an unfair advantage to AVEVA, thereby harming competition in the market.
The Informant contended that AVEVA holds a dominant position in the relevant market and was abusing this dominance in violation of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. Accordingly, allegations of vertical restraints under Section 3(4) were also raised.
Arguments by the Opposite Party
The Opposite Party denied the allegations, submitting that they were unfounded and that AVEVA does not hold a dominant position in the market, given the presence of numerous competitors and multiple players. AVEVA contended that its product offerings, including bundled solutions, reflect standard industry practices offered based on the needs of the customer, and are not intended to restrict competition. It further submitted that customers retain the freedom of choice among different software providers and that there is no compulsion to purchase bundled products.
AVEVA concluded that the Informant had not provided sufficient evidence or market data to support claims of dominance or anti-competitive conduct in the market.
Key Merits in the Order
The CCI order demonstrates a clear structure in dealing with the case. The Commission properly defined the relevant market and noted the presence of strong competitors, indicating that the market is competitive. Importantly, it did not rely on weak factors such as the company’s popularity, its large clientele, or event sponsorship to establish dominance. Instead, the Commission focused on the lack of solid evidence and market data provided by the Informant.
The CCI acknowledged that industrial automation software operates in layered and interconnected systems, where products such as MES, SCADA, and historian software are not entirely independent but function as part of a broader ecosystem. The Commission also followed the correct legal process by first examining whether the company is dominant; since that threshold was not met, it did not proceed further into the question of abuse. Additionally, the Commission carefully examined the bundling claims and found no proof that customers were compelled to purchase bundled products.
Gaps and Lack of Information
The CCI order reflects certain gaps from a law and policy perspective. First, despite dealing with a highly technical market, the Commission did not engage in any third-party consultation. The product definitions show some overlap, particularly with respect to data-collecting functions, even though an attempt was made to differentiate between MES and Historian software. Consultation with industry stakeholders could have provided greater clarity, rather than directly closing the matter, especially given the absence of market share data.
Second, the Commission placed a heavy burden on the Informant to establish dominance under Section 4, while it did not separately address the allegations under Section 3(4) relating to vertical restraints such as tying and bundling. A more detailed examination of these interconnections would have improved the analytical framework for software and digital markets, where such practices contribute to market power even in the absence of clear dominance. Furthermore, the allegations relating to pricing practices, including predatory pricing and the imposition of flex-subscription models, were not explored in sufficient depth. These aspects required a more thorough examination of cost structures, pricing intent, and potential exclusionary effects.
Lastly, the treatment of anonymous evidence raises concerns. The Commission took certain anonymous emails on record, which suggests the exercise of suo motu powers; however, there is no clear guidance in the order on the admissibility and evaluation of such evidence.
In sum, the issue of vertical restraints under Section 3(4) was not analysed separately, even though bundling and tying were central allegations. By focusing primarily on dominance, the CCI may have overlooked the fact that such practices can harm competition even in the absence of clear dominance.
Critical Observations
On a critical note, the CCI order reflects a cautious approach that appears somewhat limited in its analysis. The mere presence of multiple competitors does not necessarily mean the market is truly competitive, particularly in digital and software sectors where companies can maintain strong control through product integration, high switching costs, and customer dependency. The allegations relating to bundling, tying, and consumer lock-in formed a central part of the Informant’s case; however, these aspects were not examined in sufficient detail. Such practices, particularly in software markets, have the potential to significantly affect consumer choice and overall market structure, and their limited assessment leaves an important dimension of the case insufficiently addressed.
Additionally, early-stage dismissal of cases, especially without extensive reasoning, may discourage future informants from approaching the Commission. While avoiding unnecessary investigations is important, it is equally necessary to properly examine conduct that may be anti-competitive.
Hypothetical Note
Some additional considerations that could strengthen the analysis are as follows:
Comparative Approach (Schott Glass India)
Drawing from the approach in Schott Glass India Pvt Ltd v. CCI,[2] the Commission could have adopted a more structured method in dealing with evidence and preliminary assessment. In that case, greater emphasis was placed on the evaluation of evidence before arriving at a conclusion. Similarly, in the present case, a more detailed consideration of the material on record could have strengthened the reasoning rather than resulting in an early closure.
Deeper Inquiry at the Prima Facie Stage
Instead of limiting the analysis to the absence of dominance, the CCI could have conducted a more thorough inquiry into the alleged practices, particularly given the technical nature of the market.
Practical Impact on Smaller Players
The Commission should also consider how such practices affect smaller or new entrants in practice. Large companies like AVEVA often offer bundled or integrated solutions, which makes it difficult for smaller players to compete, as they cannot match such wide-ranging offerings or pricing structures. As a result, even where competition exists on paper, smaller firms may struggle to enter or grow in the market, which can reduce overall competition in the long run.
Conclusion
Overall, the CCI order reflects a careful and measured approach along with a basic understanding of the relevant market. However, the analysis could have been more detailed and supported by stronger evidentiary reasoning. The case highlights the difficulties involved in adjudicating complex and fast-changing technology markets, and underscores the need for a more detailed and data-driven approach in such cases. In particular, the Commission’s failure to separately examine Section 3(4) allegations, the limited engagement with pricing conduct, and the absence of third-party consultation represent areas where a more rigorous inquiry would have enhanced the quality and persuasiveness of the order.
References
[1] Centre for Competition Law and Economics, Explainer: CCI’s Order in the AVEVA Case, ICLE, available at: https://www.icle.in/resource/explainer-ccis-order-in-the-aveva-case/, accessed 1st May, 2026.
[2] Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 5843 of 2014 (Supreme Court of India), case note available at: Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas, https://www.amsshardul.com/insight/case-note-competition-commission-of-india-v-schott-glass-india-pvt-ltd-civil-appeal-no-5843-of-2014-supreme-court-of-india/, accessed 30th April, 2026.
