CASE SUMMARY- Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath (2026)

I. CASE DETAILS

• Case Title: Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr v. P. Ayyapan & Ors.
• Court: Supreme Court of India.
• Bench: Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar.
• Date of Judgement: 19 June 2026
• Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 4665-4666 of 2025
• Citation: 2026 INSC 647
• Nature of Petition: This civil appeal arises from a motor accident claim proceedings concerning the death of a child pedestrian, in which the Supreme Court examined the broader constitution question of a Fundamental Right to Walk safely on demarcated footpaths.
• Counsel for Petitioner: Supreeta Sharanagouda, Mamidipudi Venkatarama Mukunda AC, AC
• Counsel for Respondent: Abhisth Kumar (respondent-3)

II. INTRODUCTION-

This case arises from a tragic motor accident of an innocent 5-year-old child. Who died after being hit by a truck while walking to his neighborhood school with his father on a public road which lacked safe pedestrian infrastructure. The immediate issue was about the compensation but the Supreme Court transformed this case into a landmark judgment on pedestrian rights. The supreme Court declared the RIGHT TO WALK on a safe, demarcated footpaths as a fundamental right under the Part III of the Indian Constitution.

III. FACTS OF THE CASE

1. The deceased child was walking along with his father to his neighborhood school on a road which lacked the pedestrian footpath. While walking down the road, a truck collided with him causing fatal injuries.
2. The accident occurred in circumstances where there was no proper footpath or the existing pedestrian space was encroached or unsafe, which effectively forced the child to walk on the or near the carriageway.
3. Aggrieved by the untimely death of the child, the family pursued the compensation proceeding before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACT) and high Courts, leading ultimately to civil appeal before the supreme Court.
4. In examining the record, the Supreme Court noted that the case illustrated a wider pattern: many cities in India, pedestrians are compelled to walk on the share road space with fast moving vehicles due to the lack or absent of footpaths or poorly maintained footpath. This led to a bigger cause of road accidents in India.

IV. ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT

1. Whether the Right to Walk on safe, demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right under the Article 19(1)(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India, and the Article 21 of the Constitution?
2. Whether pedestrian movement must take priority over the movement of motor vehicles in urban planning and road design?
3. Whether municipal corporations, municipalities, development authorities, and panchayats have legally enforceable duty to provide, maintain and protect footpaths and other pedestrian infrastructure.
4. Whether deficiencies in pedestrian infrastructure can affect liability and compensation in motor accident cases which arises injuries to the pedestrian or death of pedestrians.

V. JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held as follows:

On the compensation:

The High Court erred in reducing the compensatory amount by the MACT award relying on the KARNA PARMAR V. PRAKASH SINHA (2025INSC1244) case, the Court recalculated the compensation for the deceased 5-year-old minor using the minimum wage of a skilled worked under the Minimum Wages Act of 1948.

On the constitutional Declaration:

• The Supreme Court held that the primary freedom to move freely guaranteed by the Article 19(1)(d) is the core of the Right to Walk, which precedes the right to move on wheels or by the other means of transport. It is an integral article and to be read with 19(1)(a), 19(1)(b), 19(1)(c). this right encompasses the right to demarcated footpaths an shall be priority over motorized vehicles.
• The Court further linked this to article 21 observing that the right to life and personal liberty includes the right to live and move in conditions that do not unreasonably endanger bodily safety, unsafe or missing footpaths therefore implicate Article 21.
• A correlative duty exists: whenever a road exists, duty bearers such as urban authorities, municipal corporation, municipalities and panchayats are obligated to demarcate construct maintain and safeguard footpaths.
• Violation of thus right entitles the citizens to constitutional ad legal remedies (including under section 38 to 40, under the Special Relief Act, 1963) against the duty bearer. And also, shall be independent of remedies under the Motor Vehicle Act 1988.

VI. CONSEQUENTIAL DIRECTION

• Registry directed as to re number the case as Re: Fundamental right to walk and footpath under article 32.
• Copies of the judgement sent to ministers of housing & urban affairs, rural development and road transport & highways and to the law commission to examine the statutory framework.
• Government of India impleaded as a party; ASG K.M. Nataraj requested to assist.

VII. RATIO DECIDENDI

The ratio that’s is binding the legal principle of this judgement rests on three pillars.

• Pillar I- Constitutional Reinterpretation of Article 19(1) (d).

The primary ratio is that the Article 19(1)(d) that guarantees citizens the right to move freely throughout the territory of India, must be interpreted to include the right to walk on demarcated footpaths as its most foundational form. The Court reasoned that the walking precedes wheeled movement in human civilization and therefore the fundamental right to pedestrian access is the prior and superior than the vehicular movement rights. This is a significant expansive reading of the Article 19(1)(d).

• Pillar II- Right Duty Correlativity

The Court applied the Hohfeldian legal principle that every right carries a correlative duty. The existence of a road ipso facto creates an enforceable public duty on local bodies to provide the footpaths. This duty is not discretionary and it is constitutionally mandated and enforceable through writ jurisdiction and the Specific Relief Act.

• Pillar III- Inadequacy of the Motor Vehicle Act Framework.

The Court categorically held that the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 was never designed to protect pedestrian rights as it is a vehicle centric legislation. Pedestrian rights under the Constitution operate on a separate and independent legal track, giving rise to restitutionary remedies beyond the mere accident compensation.

VIII. CRITICAL ANALYSIS

There are certain strengthens and limitation / point of critique with the judgement

STRENGTHS OF THE JUDGEMENT
1. Bold Constitutional Progress        
The Courts recognition of the right to walk as a fundamental right fills a critical gap in urban constitutional jurisprudence. It aligns with global trends in the cities like Paris, Amsterdam, and Singapore, who legally prioritize pedestrian infrastructure. India’s own pedestrian fatality statistics (among the highest globally) demanded such a declaration.

2.Hoslistic Reading of Part III
By reading Article 19(1)(d) conjunctively with Articles 19(1)(a), (b), (c) and linking walking with expression, assembly, and association. The Court gave the right a multi-dimensional character rooted in India’s own political and cultural history (Dandi March, Pandharpur Wari, Bhoodan Movement). This contextualization is jurisprudentially rich and culturally grounded.

3.Seprating Constitutional Remedy from Tort or Motor Vehicle Act Remedy.
This is practically significant as previously the victims could only approach MACT. Now, citizens can also sue municipal bodies directly for failure to build footpaths. this have helped in creating systemic accountability rather than individual compensation.

4. Forward Looking Institutional Design
The direction to establish a dedicated regulator for pedestrian infrastructure (modelled on regulators under the RTE Act and NFSA) is progressive and addresses the structural failure of ad hoc enforcement.

LIMITATIONS AND POINTS OF CRITIQUE.

1.Judicial Overreach Concern
Critics may argue that directing the creation of a regulatory body and re-numbering a compensation appeal as an Article 32 petition in Suo motu stretches the bounds of appellate jurisdiction. The transformation of a private compensation dispute into a PIL style constitutional matter and though well-intentioned may raises separation of powers questions.

2. Implementation Vacuum
The Court acknowledged that no legislation yet protects this right and calls for one, but the declaration of a right without an enforcement mechanism remains aspirational. Urban local bodies in India suffer from severe resource and capacity constraints; the judgment does not address how footpath construction will be funded or monitored in the interim.

3. Rural Applicability Left Vague
The duty is placed on panchayats for rural areas, but the judgment does not adequately address the distinct infrastructural realities of rural roads, where the absence of footpaths is near-universal and budgetary allocation is minimal.

4.Reasoanble Restriction Not Examined
Article 19(1)(d) is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(5). The judgment does not engage with whether any restrictions on the right to walk (e.g., highway access restrictions, expressway exclusions) survive constitutional scrutiny under the new framework and will be leaving this for future litigation.

5. Compensation Methodology
While the Court correctly enhanced compensation, applying minimum wage of a skilled worker to a five-year-old child, that is even as a legal fiction, will remain contested. The assumption of future skilled employment for a toddler is a legal construct that, though established by precedent, lacks empirical grounding.

IX. CONCLUSION

Maniyar Iliyaz v P. Ayyappan is a landmark judgement in Indian constitutional law that elevates the act of walking which is the most democratic and universal form of human movement to the status of a fundamental right. By grounding this right in Article 19(1)(d) read with Article 21, the Supreme Court has created a powerful constitutional tool for pedestrians, particularly the urban poor, daily wage workers, schoolchildren, and the elderly, who are most vulnerable to road accidents due to absent or encroached footpaths.

The judgment is simultaneously backward-looking as it is drawing from India’s civilisational, spiritual, and political walking traditions. It is also forward-looking, demanding legislative and institutional reform. It correctly identifies the Motor Vehicles Act as an inadequate vehicle (pun aside) for pedestrian rights and places accountability where it belongs: on urban local bodies and development authorities.

However, the true test of this judgment will not be in its declaration, but in its implementation. India has a history of landmark rights-based rulings either from Vishaka to NALSA , whose impact depended entirely on follow-through by Parliament and state governments. The Right to Walk now stands declared. Whether it is walked into reality remains to be seen.

XI. REFERENCES

1. Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz & Anr. v. P. Ayyappan & Ors., 2026 INSC 647, Supreme Court of India, decided on June 19, 2026.
2. Karuna Parmar v. Prakash Sinha, 2025 INSC 1244, Supreme Court of India.
3. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 295/2012, Supreme Court of India.
4. Article 19(1)(d), Constitution of India.
5. Article 21, Constitution of India.
6. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
7. The Minimum Wage Act ,1948
8. The Specific Relief Act, 1963, Sections 38–40.
9. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.
10. The Dandi March, 1930.
11. Hohfeldian Rights-Duty Correlativity.