Published on: April 25, 2026
Authored By: Swati Singh
Bharti Vidyapeeth Deemed University New Law College Pune
Abstract
Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India[1] is a landmark constitutional judgment in which a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India declined to recognize a fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples and refused to read the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in a gender-neutral manner. The Court was unanimous in affirming the constitutional dignity of LGBTQIA+ persons and the State’s obligation to protect them from discrimination. On the questions of civil unions and the scope of judicial power, however, the Bench divided 3:2. This case commentary examines the facts, issues, arguments, and reasoning of the judgment, and offers a critical analysis of its implications for constitutional law, separation of powers, and the future of marriage equality in India.
Keywords: Same-Sex Marriage, LGBTQIA+ Rights, Special Marriage Act, Fundamental Rights, Separation of Powers, Civil Unions, Judicial Restraint, Constitutional Morality.
I. Case Details
Case Name: Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India
Citation: (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1348
Date of Decision: 17 October 2023
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Constitution Bench (Five Judges)
Coram: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud (Chief Justice of India), Sanjay Kishan Kaul, S. Ravindra Bhat, Hima Kohli, and P.S. Narasimha
Petitioners: Supriya Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, a same-sex couple, were the lead petitioners seeking legal recognition of their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. A number of other same-sex couples and individuals filed companion petitions seeking marriage equality and related rights. The petitioners argued that the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Respondent: The Union of India, represented by the Government of India, was the principal respondent. The Union opposed the petitions, maintaining that marriage is a socio-legal institution governed by statute and that existing law recognizes only heterosexual marriages. Any redefinition of marriage, the Union contended, is a matter for the legislature.
II. Introduction
Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India is a landmark case in Indian constitutional law on the legal status of same-sex marriage. It represents the next major step in the LGBTQIA+ rights movement following the decriminalization of consensual homosexuality in Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India.[2] Where Navtej was concerned with freedom from State intervention, Supriya asked whether LGBTQIA+ persons are entitled to positive recognition through State-sanctioned institutions. The case is significant for its examination of the limits of judicial review, the doctrine of separation of powers, and whether the right to marry is an unenumerated fundamental right under the Indian Constitution.
III. Facts of the Case
The case arose from multiple writ petitions filed by same-sex couples, including the lead petitioners, Supriya Chakraborty and Abhay Dang, seeking legal recognition of their relationships as marriages under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.[3] The petitioners contended that the denial of marriage rights to same-sex couples violated their fundamental rights to equality (Article 14), non-discrimination (Article 15), freedom of expression (Article 19), and the right to life and dignity (Article 21).
The petitioners further argued that the absence of legal marital status deprived them of a range of rights and benefits available to married couples, including rights relating to adoption, surrogacy, succession, and employment and retirement benefits.
The Union of India opposed the petitions, asserting that marriage is a socially and historically grounded institution that only the legislature has the authority to redefine, and that judicial intervention on this question would constitute an impermissible breach of the separation of powers.
IV. Legal Issues
1. Whether there is a fundamental right to marry under the Constitution of India, and if so, whether it extends to same-sex couples.
2. Whether the Special Marriage Act, 1954, which employs gender-specific language, can be read in a gender-neutral manner to include same-sex unions, or whether such a reading would amount to judicial legislation.
3. Whether the denial of marriage equality to same-sex couples violates Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
4. Whether the Court has the power to direct the legislature to enact a law recognizing same-sex marriage.
5. Whether same-sex couples are entitled to recognition of civil unions and the associated legal rights in the absence of a right to marry.
6. Whether LGBTQIA+ couples may jointly adopt children under existing law.
V. Arguments
Petitioners’ Arguments
The petitioners argued that the right to marry flows naturally from the right to choose a life partner, which is an incident of the right to life and dignity under Article 21. They submitted that the Special Marriage Act, 1954 should be interpreted in a gender-neutral manner, by reading terms such as “person” in place of gendered references, so as not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. They relied on the Court’s reasoning in Navtej Singh Johar[2] and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India to argue that constitutional morality, not popular morality, must guide the interpretation of fundamental rights, and that LGBTQIA+ persons cannot be excluded from institutional recognition without a compelling constitutional justification.
Respondents’ Arguments
The Union of India contended that the right to marry is not a fundamental right but a statutory right, a creature of legislation rather than of the Constitution. The respondents further argued that the creation of a new legal regime for civil unions or same-sex marriage would require a comprehensive parallel legislative framework, extending into adoption, succession, insurance, and personal law, and that only Parliament has the institutional competence and democratic mandate to undertake such a task. Any judicial attempt to legislate in this domain, the respondents submitted, would violate the separation of powers.
VI. Reasoning of the Court
On the Right to Marry
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution does not guarantee an unqualified fundamental right to marry. The majority drew a careful distinction between the right to choose a partner, which is an aspect of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and the right to the institution of marriage, which is a statutory creation. The existence of the former does not entail the latter.
On the Special Marriage Act
By a majority of 3:2, the Bench declined to read the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in a gender-neutral manner. The majority held that the Act was enacted by Parliament with heterosexual unions in mind, and that rewriting its language to include same-sex couples would exceed the proper limits of judicial interpretation and encroach upon the legislative domain.
On Civil Unions
The Bench divided 3:2 on the question of civil unions. The minority (CJI Chandrachud and Justice Kaul) held that same-sex couples have a right to enjoy the status of civil unions and that the State bears a positive duty to give that right legal substance. The majority (Justices Bhat, Kohli, and Narasimha) held that the Court cannot through judicial decree compel the State to create an entirely new legal status or civil union regime, that too is a matter for the legislature.
On Dignity and Non-Discrimination
All five judges concurred in affirming that LGBTQIA+ persons are subject to systemic discrimination and are entitled to equal dignity and protection from violence and harassment. The Court directed the Union Government to constitute a high-level committee, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, to examine the rights and entitlements that may be extended to queer couples without requiring legislative recognition of same-sex marriage.
VII. Judgment and Ratio Decidendi
The petitions seeking legal recognition of same-sex marriage were dismissed. The Court upheld the validity of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 as it stands.
The binding ratio of the majority is twofold: first, the right to marry is not a fundamental constitutional right but a statutory right; and second, the Court cannot design or mandate a new legal framework for marriage or civil unions, that power rests exclusively with the legislature.
The Court additionally recorded the Union Government’s commitment to constitute a high-level committee to examine the specific claims and benefits that may be extended to queer couples within the existing legislative framework.
VIII. Critical Analysis
The decision is a significant exercise of judicial restraint. While the Court was widely acknowledged for its broad affirmation of the dignity and constitutional legitimacy of LGBTQIA+ persons, its refusal to grant legal redress was received by many as, in an apt phrase, dignity deferred.
Strengths
The Court’s unanimous affirmation of the right to relationship and choice is constitutionally significant. By holding that the State is obliged to protect queer couples from harassment and violence, the judgment transforms a negative liberty (freedom from State persecution, secured by Navtej) into a positive State obligation. The direction to constitute a Cabinet Secretary-led committee also provides a mechanism, however uncertain, for incremental administrative reform without requiring legislative action.
Weaknesses
The analytical distinction the Court draws between the right to choose a partner and the right to the institution of marriage has been widely criticised as paradoxical: it recognises a right to love without providing the legal infrastructure that makes love workable in civil society. Adoption, succession, insurance, medical decision-making, and employment benefits are all contingent on marital status. A right to partnership that cannot access these incidents is, in practical terms, an incomplete right. The majority’s reasoning also sits uneasily alongside the Court’s prior recognition of the right to choose a partner in interfaith and intercaste contexts, a tension the judgment does not fully resolve.
Impact
By assigning the task of reform to the political process, the Court has placed the future of marriage equality in the hands of a legislature in which LGBTQIA+ persons, as a minority, may lack the political leverage to secure change. The high-level committee mechanism offers limited assurance: committees can be constituted, delayed, or quietly set aside. Whether Parliament chooses to act, and on what terms, will determine whether the constitutional affirmations of dignity in this judgment translate into lived legal equality.
IX. Conclusion
Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India stands as a defining authority on the separation of powers in Indian constitutional law. Although it did not achieve the immediate goal of marriage equality, it marks an important moment in the constitutional recognition of queer identity and the State’s obligation to combat discrimination. The Court’s jurisprudence of dignity, rooted in Navtej Singh Johar and deepened in Supriya, has established that LGBTQIA+ persons are full constitutional citizens, entitled to protection and respect.
What the judgment has not yet answered is what that citizenship means in practice, in the absence of the legal recognition that gives it institutional content. The case has opened a door for legislative reform, placing the burden squarely on Parliament to determine the future of relationship recognition in India. Whether Parliament will walk through that door, and when, remains the central unresolved question that Supriya leaves behind.
References
[1] Supriya Chakraborty & Anr. v. Union of India, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1348 (Supreme Court of India, Oct. 17, 2023).
[2] Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
[3] Special Marriage Act, No. 43 of 1954, INDIA CODE (1954).
