Published On: 18th April, 2026
Authored By: Rachita Mohanty
SOA National Institute of Law
Case Name: Supriyo @ Supriya Chakraborty & Anr v Union of India
Citation: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1348 (SC)
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: D.Y. Chandrachud (CJI), S.K. Kaul, S.R. Bhat, Hima Kohli, P.S. Narasimha, JJ
Date of Judgment: October 17, 2023
Relevant Provisions/Statutes: Articles 14, 15(1), 19(1)(a), 19(1)(c), 21, 25, and 32 of the Constitution of India; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Foreign Marriage Act, 1969; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Central Adoption Resource Authority (Adoption) Regulations, 2022
Introduction
Many significant moments in recent Indian legal history have placed great pressure on the balance between judicial intervention and institutional caution, and none have done so as profoundly as Supriyo v Union of India. This case brought before a Constitution Bench the pivotal question of whether the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and autonomy could lead to the judicial recognition of same-sex marriage within the current legal framework. While the Court had previously removed the criminalisation of consensual same-sex relationships in Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India,[1] and affirmed the right to decisional autonomy in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India,[2] this case required the Bench to address a further foundational issue: whether constitutional rights could be used to reshape the institution of marriage without the need for new legislation.
Facts
The petitioners, including same-sex couples and individuals who identify as queer, challenged the constitutionality of the Special Marriage Act, 1954, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and other personal laws. They argued that prohibiting same-sex couples from marriage violated Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution.
They were not seeking the creation of a new right, but rather a gender-neutral interpretation of existing laws. Their principal argument was that marriage is a civil status that grants various legal benefits, such as inheritance rights, adoption, medical decision-making, insurance, and pension entitlements. The denial of these rights, they argued, perpetuated structural discrimination.
Issues
The legal questions that arose were as follows:
1. Does the Constitution guarantee a fundamental right to marry someone of one’s choice, regardless of sexual orientation?
2. Can the Court interpret the Special Marriage Act in a gender-neutral manner?
3. Does the denial of legal recognition to same-sex unions violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution?
Arguments
Petitioners’ Arguments
The petitioners anchored their submissions in constitutional morality. Relying heavily upon Navtej Johar, they argued that sexual orientation is a natural attribute of identity and that exclusion from marriage constitutes discrimination based on sex and sexual orientation.
They contended that Article 21 encompasses not merely survival but the right to form intimate associations recognised by law. The denial of marriage, they argued, rendered queer citizens “constitutional outsiders” in matters of civil status.
Moreover, they urged the Court to adopt an interpretive reading of the Special Marriage Act by substituting gendered terms such as “husband” and “wife” with gender-neutral expressions. According to them, such interpretive harmonisation would not amount to legislation but constitutional compliance.
Respondent’s Contentions
The Union of India opposed the petitions on institutional and sociological grounds. It argued that marriage is a socio-legal institution historically structured around heterosexual unions and that any revision thereto falls within the legislative sphere.
The State submitted that recognising same-sex marriage would necessitate a “cascade of changes” across adoption laws, inheritance statutes, personal laws, and regulatory frameworks, an exercise unsuitable for judicial intervention.
It further contended that while LGBTQIA+ persons are entitled to equality and non-discrimination, the Constitution does not mandate state recognition of marriage as a fundamental right.
Judgment
The Constitution Bench delivered a fractured verdict (3:2 majority), declining to recognise a fundamental right to marry under existing laws.
1. No Fundamental Right to Marry Under the Constitution
The majority held that although the Constitution protects the right to choose a partner, it does not obligate the State to recognise every form of union as marriage. Chief Justice Chandrachud observed that marriage is a statutory creation, not a constitutional guarantee.
The Court clarified that while decisional autonomy in matters of intimate relationships is protected under Article 21, institutional recognition of marriage is a matter of legislative policy.
2. Limits of Judicial Interpretation
The majority declined to read gender-neutral terms into the Special Marriage Act, 1954, reasoning that such interpretive reconstruction would amount to judicial legislation. The statutory scheme, it held, was premised upon heterosexual unions, and rewriting it would exceed permissible judicial limits.
Justice Bhat emphasised that courts cannot restructure an entire legislative framework under the guise of constitutional interpretation.
3. Recognition of Queer Relationships
Importantly, the Court unanimously recognised that queer couples have a right to cohabit and form unions without discrimination. The State was directed to constitute a committee to examine the entitlement of certain socio-economic benefits to queer couples.
4. Minority Opinion
Justice Kaul, in dissent, held that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the Special Marriage Act violates Article 14. He opined that constitutional morality demands equal recognition and that courts cannot remain passive when statutory language perpetuates discrimination.
Ratio Decidendi
The controlling principle emerging from the majority may be articulated thus:
While the Constitution protects individual autonomy in matters of intimate association, it does not confer a fundamental right to institutional recognition of marriage; and courts cannot, under the guise of interpretation, restructure a legislative framework whose foundational premise is heterosexual union.
Critical Analysis
The decision occupies a paradoxical position within Indian constitutional jurisprudence. It affirms equality yet withholds institutional equivalency; it recognises identity but defers status.
From a doctrinal standpoint, the majority’s reasoning is anchored in the separation of powers. The Court adopted institutional modesty, signalling that social transformation through statutory restructuring must emanate from Parliament.
Yet this restraint invites scrutiny. In Navtej Johar, the Court did not hesitate to read constitutional morality into criminal law. In Puttaswamy, it expansively interpreted privacy. Why then did interpretive energy yield to restraint in Supriyo?
The distinction appears to lie in the nature of judicial intervention. Decriminalisation involved striking down an unconstitutional provision; recognition of marriage required reconstructing a legislative framework. The former is subtractive; the latter, creative.
Still, critics argue that the Court’s refusal entrenches majoritarian indifference. Constitutional adjudication has historically intervened where legislative silence perpetuates inequality, inter-caste marriages, privacy rights, and transgender recognition in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India.[3]
Furthermore, by recognising the equality of queer unions yet denying legal status, the judgment arguably creates a hierarchy of relationships. Symbolic recognition without enforceable entitlements may risk constitutional tokenism.
At the same time, the ruling preserves institutional legitimacy. The Court resisted the temptation of populist adjudication and reaffirmed democratic dialogue as the vehicle for social reform. In doing so, it placed responsibility squarely upon Parliament.
The judgment therefore reflects a constitutional tension between transformative aspiration and structural restraint. It neither repudiates queer rights nor consummates them.
Conclusion
Supriyo v Union of India stands as a constitutional crossroads. It consolidates the jurisprudence of dignity and autonomy while simultaneously circumscribing judicial power in matters of institutional reform. The case does not close the chapter on marriage equality; rather, it transfers the narrative to the legislative arena.
Whether Parliament will respond to the constitutional call articulated by the Court remains uncertain. In the architecture of Indian constitutionalism, Supriyo will be remembered not merely for what it denied, but for the doctrinal boundaries it delineated.
It is a judgment of restraint—measured, reasoned, and institutionally conscious, yet one that leaves unresolved the deeper aspiration of substantive equality. The Constitution, through this case, continues to await its fullest realisation.
References
[1] Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 1.
[2] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd) v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
[3] National Legal Services Authority v Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
